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1. Introduction 
In a series of articles in the early 1970s, the syntactician Georgia M. Green pointed to an in-
triguing verbal complementation pattern that had been largely ignored by the linguistic com-
munity up to that point (1970, 1972, 1973). The pattern follows the formula given in (1)1 — 
where the X ranges over the variables noun (N), adjective (A), and preposition (P) — and can 
be illustrated by the sentences in (2). One interesting property of this construction is the fact 
that the second postverbal phrase XP is predicated of the first postverbal phrase NP2.2 Without 
intending to subscribe to any particular theory at the moment, I will apply the widely-used 
term 'secondary predicate' to the predicative phrase XP and will call syntactic patterns includ-
ing such a phrase 'secondary-predicate constructions'. 
(1) NP1 V NP2 XP 
(2) a.  Mary considers John a fool.  
  b.  Mary considers him silly. 
  c.  Mary considers him beneath contempt. 
What Green found even more noteworthy about (1) is the ability of this structure to code at 
least three different semantic relationships (1970: 275-7, 1973: 262-7). In (3a), John drank his 
coffee and the coffee was hot at the same time, while in (3b) the table became clean only as a 
result of the waitress's wiping it. It is more difficult to give a paraphrase for (3c) — in fact, 
Green suggested that a "Linguistic Hero Medal" should be awarded to anyone who could 
come up with a good solution (1970: 270). What is intuitively clear at least is that John is a 
fool only in Mary's subjective view of reality. 
(3) a.  John drank his coffee hot.3 
  b.  The waitress wiped the table clean. 
  c.  Mary considers John a fool. 
Green hoped that future progress in syntactic theory would find a possibility to capture the 
predicative relation between the two postverbal phrases and to explain how the same syntactic 
formula can convey such diverse meaning relationships (1970: 279).  
The research done on secondary-predicate constructions in the wake of Green's articles 
has not borne out this optimism, though. The common denominator syntacticians have been 
able to reach on these constructions in the last three decades is excruciatingly small and does 
                                                 
1 The subscripts on the NPs do not have any theoretical significance but merely serve as notational conveniences 
to tell them apart. 
2 Whenever I want to highlight the predicative relationship between NP2 and XP, I adopt the convention of itali-
cising the secondary predicate and underlining its predication subject. 
3 Since one tends to read the present-tense version of this sentence (John drinks his coffee hot) in its habitual 
sense, illustrations of dynamic sentences will, as a rule, be given in the past tense, in which the habitual/iterative 
reading is less dominant.  
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not go much beyond the few tentative suggestions already advanced by Green. It is not a mat-
ter of much dispute, for example, that the secondary predicate cannot be sensibly analysed as 
a postnominal modifier in most cases. In contrast to the AP in The waitress scrubbed some-
thing very dirty, the secondary predicate does not seem to be a constituent of the postverbal 
NP in (3b), as a few standard syntactic tests quickly reveal. It is, for instance, not possible to 
transpose the NP2 XP-string within the sentence (4a) (Green 1970: 273, 1973: 260), nor to 
paraphrase the secondary predicate with a restrictive relative clause (4b) (Green 1970: 273, 
1973: 259). Neither does the pronominalisation of the postverbal NP affect the secondary 
predicate (4c) (Rothstein 2000: 244-5). This behaviour contrasts sharply with that of post-
modified NPs, as the primed sentences illustrate. 
(4) a.  *The table clean was wiped.4 
  a'.  Something very dirty was scrubbed. 
  b.  !The waitress wiped the table that was clean. 
  b'. The waitress scrubbed something that was very dirty. 
  c.  The waitress wiped it clean. 
  c'. The waitress scrubbed it (*very dirty). 
Another potential analysis that can be safely dismissed from the start is the treatment of NP2 
XP-strings as some sort of idiomatic expressions. As Green already noted, none of the words 
in sentences such as those presented in (3) has any unusual meaning that it does not have in 
other, non-idiomatic expressions (1970: 217, 1973: 258).  
Beyond this meagre and unspectacular consensus, almost every other opinion ventured 
on secondary-predicate constructions has occasioned — to say the least — lively debate. 
There are basically four competing lines of analysis that have gained some currency in the 
syntactic literature; these analyses differ both in their hypotheses as to how many syntactic 
constituents must be assumed for the construction and in their views on which constituents 
belong closer together syntactically.  
The traditional analysis, which is provided in most descriptive grammars, suggests that 
verbs such as consider select three syntactic complements — a subject, a direct object, and 
what is here called a secondary predicate (5) (e.g. Biber et al. 1999: 130; Huddleston and Pul-
lum 2002: 53; Quirk et al. 1985: 53): 
(5)  
[Mary] considers [John] [a fool]. 
 
                                                 
4 An asterisk characterises a sentence as ungrammatical; various degrees of acceptability are indicated by one or 
two question marks. An exclamation mark implies that the sentence is grammatical but does not communicate 
the intended meaning. 
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While a ternary analysis does not cause major difficulties with verbs such as give, which are 
standardly assumed to require a subject, an indirect object and a direct object (cf. [John] gave 
[Mary] [a cake]), the situation is less straightforward with consider because the proposal 
sketched above sidesteps the issue why a fool is predicated of John and thus fails to account 
for one of the most distinctive characteristics of secondary-predicate constructions. 
Due to this serious analytical deficiency of the traditional account, a radically different 
analysis has quickly gained ground in the syntactic literature from the early 1980s onward. 
Since the relationship between the two postverbal elements is one of predication, and predica-
tion is first of all a property of clauses, John and a fool could be assumed to constitute the 
subject and predicate of a verbless (or 'small') clause (e.g. Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 108-
9; Stowell 1983: 297-9). In this view, consider is a binary verb, taking Mary and the proposi-
tion John a fool as its complements: 
(6)  
[Mary] considers [John a fool]. 
 
While the analysis given in (6) solves the problem of the additional subject/predicate relation-
ship quite neatly, it works on the assumption that the postverbal NP2 XP-string forms a syntac-
tic unit — an assumption that seems to be counter-intuitive because this string does not con-
tain any of the formal characteristics standardly associated with a subordinate clause, such as 
a complementiser before or a verb between the two postverbal phrases. Proponents of a 
clausal analysis must therefore employ considerable syntactic ingenuity to prove that the NP2 
XP-string does in fact act as a clausal constituent. 
In view of these difficulties, another binary analysis has been put forward in the literature 
devoted to secondary-predicate constructions. According to this proposal, the proper parsing 
of the sentence is that given in (7), where there is a discontinuous predicate considers...a fool, 
of which John is the direct object (e.g. Hoeksema 1991: 666; Larson 1988: 349): 
(7)   
[Mary] considers-a fool [John]. 
 
Since a fool is specified as part of a complex predicate selecting NP2 as its direct object, the 
predicative relation between the two postverbal phrases does not pose the same problems here 
as in other analyses. What must be entered on the debit side of this hypothesis, however, is the 
fact that it cannot easily account for the surface position of the direct object between the two 
parts of the complex predicate. 
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The various shortcomings of the clausal and complex-predicate analyses have led some 
syntacticians to argue for a more sophisticated ternary analysis instead. These proposals form 
a rather heterogeneous set and can be subsumed under the label of 'Predication theory', a term 
used by Williams for his pioneering work in this direction (1980, 1983). Some predication 
theorists maintain that the secondary predicate is not a complement of the main verb, but is 
licensed by the syntactic complex consisting of the verb and its two arguments through a spe-
cial grammatical mechanism. 
(8)  
[[Mary] considers [John]]  [a fool]. 
 
  
All of the approaches outlined above are primarily concerned with the correct parsing of the 
syntactic formula given in (1). No matter which analysis one prefers, therefore, Green's cen-
tral question as to how the same syntactic pattern can code three distinct semantic relation-
ships has not even been touched on. While some syntacticians have remained remarkably si-
lent about this issue, others have made various kinds of suggestions. The most popular proce-
dure is to assign different syntactic structures to the sentences given in (3) along the lines of 
some complement/adjunct distinction. Such an approach is, however, subject to as wildly di-
vergent opinions as is the proper analysis of the syntactic blueprint in (1) itself. The research 
done on the relationship between the syntax and the semantics of secondary-predicate con-
structions has thus not been able to substantially flesh out Green's early speculative sugges-
tions:  
[S]ome interplay between target-structure conspiracies, syntactic properties of lexical items, 
real-world possibilities and nonobvious aspects of the meaning of lexical items serves to adjust 
the number of readings possible for any given sentence of this form. (1973: 268) 
The present dissertation makes the rather strong claim that none of the analyses sketched in 
(5-8) can be sustained, and that the different semantics of secondary-predicate constructions 
cannot be explained by a complement/adjunct analysis or, for that matter, any other purely 
syntactic analysis. Following the spirit of some promising recent publications on syntactic 
theory (particularly Croft 2001 and Goldberg 1995), I aim to show that the quandary syntacti-
cians find themselves in when tackling NP2 XP-constructions results from a number of errone-
ous assumptions that lie at the core of contemporary syntactic theories working within what I 
call the 'discreteness' paradigm. Chapter 3 intends to reveal the largely implicit presupposi-
tions discrete syntactic theories rely on, and to pit them against the fresh perspective offered 
by 'non-discrete' grammar, which suggests itself as a viable alternative. 
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The rest of part I is given over to a detailed criticism of the four discrete analyses of sec-
ondary-predicate constructions outlined above. Chapters 4 and 5 contain a thorough critique 
of the traditional ternary analysis and the small-clause account, respectively, while chapters 6 
and 7 are devoted to relatively brief discussions of the more marginal complex-predicate and 
predication theories. After the 'challenge'-part of this book has illustrated that each of these 
analyses runs into major conceptual difficulties that are largely unresolvable with the machin-
ery provided by mainstream syntactic theories, part II approaches the syntactic and semantic 
problems posed by secondary-predicate constructions from the theoretical angle of non-
discrete grammar and shows that this framework opens promising new avenues of inquiry. 
Before we delve into the details of secondary-predicate constructions, a few remarks on 
the empirical basis of my data are in order. 
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2. Data and methods 
2.1 Data based on linguistic intuition 
Studies which purport to explain syntactic phenomena must ultimately stand up to the evi-
dence of actual language data. Such data can be obtained in various ways; the most conven-
ient, direct, and unlimited source of information is certainly introspection, i.e. the construction 
and evaluation of examples on the basis of one's own linguistic intuition (Schneider 1988a: 
156). The utility of this method is, of course, severely limited because it is based on subjec-
tive judgements5, but introspection nevertheless remains an indispensable methodological tool 
because it also allows the inclusion of negative data (Kilby 1984: 5). If possible, one's own 
linguistic intuition should always be supplemented by and checked against the intuitions of 
other speakers. For the present study, I conducted interviews with several native speakers of 
English, in which they were asked to read individual sentences and to give their judgements 
on the grammaticality or acceptability of these sentences. The interviews did not only provide 
me with an opportunity to compare several individual intuitions, but also to discuss possible 
reasons for certain acceptability judgements (cf. Feagin 2002: 31; Schneider 1988a: 157-8).  
For a broader and more representative empirical basis, I also conducted standardised tests 
with a relatively large number of native speakers of English in order to elicit judgements on a 
number of syntactic constructions. The results obtained allowed me to verify or falsify certain 
syntactic or semantic hypotheses that were hidden behind the sentences included in the tests 
(cf. Schneider 1988a: 158).6 In contrast to the interviews, participants were not asked to con-
sciously reflect on the linguistic material or to verbalise their intuitions, but to spontaneously 
select one of the given alternatives or to evaluate a sentence on the basis of their linguistic 
                                                 
5 Since I am not a native speaker of English, I have double-checked all of my intuitions with those of native 
speakers. 
6 When participants had to evaluate sentences, they could choose between '+' (perfectly natural), '?' (doubtful) 
and '-' (totally unacceptable) (cf. Schneider 1988a: 172). To calibrate the relative degree of objection to a certain 
sentence, I used Schneider's 'Relative Objection Score' (ROS) (1988a: 172-3). Whenever an informant marked a 
sentence as totally unacceptable, this was counted as 1, and when he or she specified the sentence as doubtful, 
this was put down as 0.5. To get an illustrative numerical value, these numbers were added together and multi-
plied by 100; the result was then divided by the total number of informants (each ROS-value is based on the 
judgements of at least 30 informants). To interpret the resulting ROS-values, I use the following rule of thumb: a 
sentence with an ROS between 0 and 30 is interpreted as acceptable; an ROS between 31 and 50 is rated as 
doubtful (?), and a value between 51 and 70 as very doubtful (??). An ROS-value greater than 70 is taken as an 
indication that the sentence is ungrammatical (*). The decision to treat an ROS of up to 30 as still acceptable 
seems to be fairly tolerant, but had to be taken because informants tend to question even well-formed sentences 
when they are presented out of context. Many sentences that look slightly doubtful in isolation become fully 
acceptable when the right context is supplied, though. Not all evaluations given for sentences have been submit-
ted to a larger number of informants; evaluations that are not followed by an ROS-value are based on interviews 
with at least two educated native speakers of English. 
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intuition. Such tests are a means of observing unconscious, performance-like linguistic behav-
iour; again, however, neither the sentences constructed by me or other syntacticians, nor the 
participants' reaction to such sentences in a test situation is particularly natural and authentic 
linguistic behaviour (Schneider 1988a: 158). To enhance the adequacy of syntactic models, 
the introspective methods outlined so far must consequently be complemented with data pro-
vided by computerised language corpora. 
2.2 Data based on electronic corpora 
The number of electronic corpora available to researchers and particularly their size have con-
siderably increased in the last two decades. While the first computerised corpora of written 
present-day English, the Brown University Standard Corpus of Present-Day American Eng-
lish (published in 1964) and its somewhat later British counterpart, the Lancaster-
Oslo/Bergen Corpus (published in 1978), were one-million-word collections of texts, the 
most advanced corpus to date, the British National Corpus (first published in 1995), com-
prises over 100 million words of contemporary British English. The BNC has been designed 
to be representative of modern British English and therefore includes texts from a large vari-
ety of genres and registers (Aston and Burnard 1998: 28). Several criteria were applied for the 
selection of texts, such as date of publication, medium of publication, and, particularly, the 
domain of a text (for details see Aston and Burnard 1998: 29-30). According to the domain-
criterion, 75 per cent of the texts are informative, with roughly equal quantities coming from 
the fields of natural and pure science, applied science, social science, commerce and finance, 
world affairs, belief and thought, arts, and leisure. The remaining 25 per cent are composed of 
imaginative texts (Aston and Burnard 1998: 29). An outstanding characteristic of the BNC is 
that it also contains a very substantial spoken part, which makes up about 10 per cent (i.e., 10 
million words) of the whole corpus. The spoken corpus has two components, unscripted in-
formal conversation recorded by volunteers, and context-governed spoken texts such as re-
cordings of political speeches or sports commentaries. The unscripted conversations include 
recordings of speakers of different ages, regions, and social classes (Aston and Burnard 1998: 
31). 
The BNC forms the main empirical basis of this dissertation and is used both for exem-
plification7 and, more importantly, for quantifiable results. The use of a corpus for a study of 
syntactic phenomena is not a matter of course because corpus linguistics, at least outside the 
                                                 
7 Quotations from the British National Corpus are indicated by a source code. The three positions before the 
space specify the extract that the example is part of, and the number following the space identifies the line of the 
example within the extract. 
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domain of variationist studies, has tended to focus on questions of morphology and lexis 
rather than syntax (Kennedy 1998: 8). While descriptive grammars have only recently begun 
to integrate corpus results into their accounts (notably Biber et al. 1999), generative grammar 
has, on the whole, remained unimpressed by progress in corpus and variation linguistics: 
"work on variation and on syntax has essentially gone on in parallel, undertaken by different 
practitioners, with different outlets for disseminating their results" (Henry 2002: 270; see also 
Cook and Newson 1996: 22). Contemporary generative linguistics concentrates on abstract 
linguistic universals and has often been dismissive of actually observed language data as 
documented in corpora. If syntacticians do not want to lose touch with linguistic reality, how-
ever, they have no alternative but to work out their syntactic hypotheses empirically. For a 
study of syntactic constructions like the ones under investigation here, it is thus vital to view 
theoretical considerations against the background of an objective database provided by a cor-
pus. This is not the place to review all the advantages offered by modern language corpora, so 
I only want to point out briefly why a study of syntactic constructions can benefit from a cor-
pus like the BNC.  
It is a truism that language corpora provide a database of naturally occurring, authentic 
texts, but this authenticity is actually an invaluable tool when attempting to uncover the prin-
ciples underlying the variation between functionally related syntactic constructions such as I 
believe him to be a liar and I consider him a liar. Both traditional grammars and contempo-
rary generative studies base their observations almost exclusively on a small number of sen-
tences gained through introspection. In contrast to such self-invented examples, corpus texts 
"were written without the possibility in mind of their being linguistically analysed" (Schnei-
der 1988d: 301) and can thus furnish a more objective, empirical basis for verifying whatever 
factors are claimed to lie behind variation patterns. This inductive method of analysis makes it 
possible to "use well-established scientific procedures involving observation, analysis, theory 
building and subsequent verification" (Kennedy 1998: 271). As a result, observations based 
on a large body of natural texts can help to elaborate and articulate empirically reliable syn-
tactic models, while invented examples may be misused to tailor linguistic reality according 
to some pre-shaped theoretical opinions. 
Modern corpora afford the opportunity of making precise statements not only about 
which alternative structures a given verb is found in but also about their relative frequencies, 
and of correlating the use of individual structures with several variables. Such information is 
important for a full description of the constructions studied in this monograph, but it is rarely 
found in dictionaries and grammars, which tend to concentrate on the structural alternatives 
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which are theoretically available, neglecting the relative importance and exact conditions of 
these options. Corpus studies do not only allow the examination of the syntactic system, i.e. 
of what constructions are possible in a language, but also of the ways this system is actually 
put to use in parole (Kennedy 1998: 270-1; Schneider 1997: 43), which may facilitate our 
understanding of why one construction is chosen over a functionally related one in a certain 
context.8  
Finally, electronic corpora have made it feasible to study syntactic constructions in ex-
tremely data-intensive ways (Kennedy 1998: 5). For an analysis of the factors underlying pat-
terns of syntactic variation, quantification is crucial because there is "strength in numbers" 
(Kilby 1984: 7) — to obtain a truthful and reliable picture of syntactic and semantic tenden-
cies in the use of specific constructions, the empirical basis should be as large and firm as 
possible.9  
Absolute numbers are frequently not very telling in themselves, however, and are cer-
tainly not the best way to exploit the potential of quantitative data. To give a better sense of 
relative numbers, I use percentages and illustrate frequencies in diagrams.10 Moreover, in or-
der to get a truthful picture of the significance of certain factors I also apply the statistical 
method of the chi-square-test, which helps to decide if numerical differences are due to 
chance or indicative of systematic variation. 
2.3 A short outline of the statistical methods used 
To use the chi-square test, every independent observation that is made must be classified ac-
cording to two groups of qualitative attributes and then arranged in a contingency table, which 
provides a crosstabulation of the two factor groups so that each possible combination of the 
qualitative criteria is represented by one cell in the table (Tesch 1988: 54-5). The numbers in 
each cell represent the observed frequencies O as found experimentally in the corpus, which 
                                                 
8 Regional, social, or gender differences in the use of the constructions studied here are excluded from the pre-
sent investigation for two principled reasons. First of all, I am interested in comparing the treatment of a group of 
syntactic structures within the discrete and non-discrete paradigms of syntax; the inclusion of heterogeneous 
regional or social data would make it more difficult to appreciate the overall conceptual picture I intend to draw. 
Secondly, my overarching concern is to reveal the cognitive foundation of secondary-predicate constructions, 
which, I suspect, is largely independent of regional or social differences. While such differences are thus imma-
terial for the present purpose, they may certainly prove relevant for more sociolinguistically oriented studies of 
secondary-predicate constructions. When I use the language name 'English', this is therefore meant as "a harm-
less reification of the commonality of the linguistic ... knowledge of a perceived community of speakers" 
(Jackendoff 2002: 35).  
9 Due to the enormous size of the BNC, the behaviour of high-frequency words such as believe and think could 
not be studied in the entire corpus. In such cases, reasonably large random samples were taken to be representa-
tive of the whole population. 
10 Percentages are usually rounded because I am more interested in appreciable relative frequencies than in spu-
rious accuracy. Due to rounding, the sum of individual percentages does sometimes not exactly add up to 100. 
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can then be compared with the frequencies as expected under the null hypothesis of independ-
ence between the two classes of attributes examined (Tesch 1988: 55). The statistically ex-
pected frequency E in a cellij is defined as the product of the row total times the column total 
of the observed frequencies, divided by the grand total of items n (Tesch 1988: 55; Zöfel 
1985: 193). To assess the difference between the observed and expected frequencies in a cellij, 
the index χ2 is used, which is calculated with the following formula (Tesch 1988: 56; Zöfel 
1985: 193): 
χ2ij = 
ij
 2
ijij  ) - (
E
EO
 
The empirical χ2-value of the whole table is the sum of the χ2-values of all cells (Tesch 1988: 
56). The calculated χ2-value can now be used to decide whether the two characteristics exam-
ined are independent or whether they are somehow associated with each other. For this pur-
pose, the empirical χ2-value is compared with a critical value as found in statistical tables 
(such as Oakes 1998: 226).11 If the empirical χ2-value is greater than or equal to the critical 
one, the null hypothesis that the two attributes studied are independent of each other can be 
rejected at a stated significance level: if the χ2-value for the table is higher at p < 0.05 (i.e. the 
probability that the null hypothesis can be rejected is greater than 95%), the differences are 
said to be 'significant', if it is higher at p < 0.01, the differences are 'very significant', and if it 
is higher at p < 0.001, the differences are 'highly significant'.  
Since the chi-square test detects virtually any departure from independence between two 
characteristics, a significant result only tells us that two characteristics are not independent of 
each other, but it does not indicate the strength of association between them. In order to assess 
the strength of relationship between two attributes, we can use the phi-coefficient12, which is 
defined as follows (L being the smaller of the two columns/rows): 
ϕ = 
1)-(L  
χ 2
n
 
A score close to 0 shows that there is little or no relationship between the two attributes stud-
ied, while a score close to 1 reflects almost complete dependence.13 The value obtained in this 
                                                 
11 The value of the critical χ2-index is dependent on the size of the contingency table, which is indicated by the 
number of degrees of freedom df a table has. The degrees of freedom are calculated with the following formula: 
df = (k –1 * m –1), with k being the number of rows and m the number of columns in a table (Tesch 1988: 57). 
12 The ϕ-coefficient is more convenient than the frequently used coefficient of contingency, which cannot reach 
an upper limit of 1 (Zöfel 1985: 191). 
13 χ2-values only indicate that there is some significant association, and ϕ-values measure the strength of this 
association. None of these values can, however, be used to make cause and effect claims (Oakes 1998: 24). 
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way may not only be used to illustrate the strength of relationship between the two character-
istics examined in one table, but can also be used to compare strengths of relationships across 
several tables. 
It is not enough to know that two attributes are significantly related and what the strength 
of this association is; we also need to factor out the cells which are responsible for significant 
results. The following rule of thumb can be applied for that purpose: if the χ2-value of a cell is 
> 10.8, differences between the observed and expected frequencies in that cell can be said to 
be highly significant (Zöfel 1985: 187). 
2.4 Limits of corpus studies 
Electronic corpora and statistical procedures hold out the promise of absolute objectivity and 
reliability, but empirical methods also have their limitations. Every corpus is restricted in 
scope and its design is subject to editorial decisions, so that comprehensiveness and represen-
tativeness remain ideals that can never be fully attained. Moreover, corpus data are never in-
dependent of theoretical considerations. Although the BNC is a fully tagged corpus, I had to 
code every instance of a relevant construction by hand, assigning to it several semantic and 
syntactic values specific to my purpose of study, before I could submit the data to frequency 
counts.14 Since each observation must be placed in a distinct cell of a contingency table, lin-
guistic classifications intended for frequency counts are necessarily based on absolute distinc-
tions. Yet many linguistic phenomena are not amenable to such either-or treatment because 
the criteria used do not always constitute disjoint sets; this difficulty can be observed with 
particular perspicuity when semantic differences are at stake. The arrangement of individual 
observations in contingency tables is therefore sometimes dependent on subjective, if princi-
pled, criteria. Furthermore, corpus results only present a picture of the surface-structure side 
of language (Schneider 1988d: 301). To explain the reasons for particular frequencies and 
distributions, it will be necessary to interpret the syntactic and semantic mechanisms underly-
ing statistical significances. The analysis of these factors again requires conceptual rather than 
purely empirical work (Kilby 1984: 5; Schneider 1988d: 311).  
Another major drawback of corpus studies is of a much more basic and practical nature: 
"corpus analysis is time-consuming and involves tedious search procedures which are not 
particularly productive or creative labour. However, even with the aid of a computer every 
researcher has only a limited amount of time and working capacity at his disposal" (Schneider 
                                                 
14 Given the comparatively large number of tokens examined, the possibility of counting or classification errors 
cannot be ruled out. I hope that this does not impair the overall picture that emerges, though. 
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1988d: 301-2). Researchers must thus put restrictions on the amount of corpus data they can 
integrate into their studies. While it would certainly have been desirable to underpin all of my 
results with corpus evidence, practical considerations have forced me to envisage a more lim-
ited scope for the use of corpus data. Whenever possible, I have used the following question 
as a yardstick: where is corpus evidence absolutely necessary as a basis for reliable syntactic 
claims, and where does it primarily provide interesting exemplification without considerably 
enhancing the understanding of a syntactic problem? On the basis of these common-sense 
considerations, I have decided to concentrate corpus investigations on only one of the secon-
dary-predicate construction, the so-called QUALIFYING Construction illustrated by (3c) above 
(see chapter 11), which poses the most vexing and long-standing problems, and in which the 
principles underlying the functional variation between related structures can only be revealed 
on the basis of huge amounts of data. The other two secondary-predicate constructions exam-
ined in this monograph, the RESULTATIVE and DEPICTIVE Constructions illustrated by (3a) and 
(3b), respectively (see chapters 9 and 10), present problems of a more conceptual nature, 
which do not necessarily require the help of a corpus. This does not mean, of course, that fol-
low-up studies will not be able to put this conceptual work on a more solid empirical founda-
tion or that some of my assumptions will have to be modified on the basis of additional data. 
Corpus data are but one of the many resources that can be brought to bear in finding a so-
lution to the problems posed by secondary-predicate constructions. It is not the case that only 
corpus results are empirical while other methods are subjective; rather, the "boundaries ... 
between corpus-based descriptions and argumentation and other approaches to language de-
scription are not rigid" (Kennedy 1998: 8). Since we should be sure we get everything we can 
in the way of evidence, I have opted for an eclectic methodological approach in this disserta-
tion and will use corpus evidence alongside syntactic tests, semantic analyses, introspection, 
interviews, and evaluation tests conducted with native speakers of English.  
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3. A critique of syntactic discreteness 
Syntactic studies aim to uncover general principles underlying the seemingly unsystematic 
mass of sentence data a modern language like English confronts us with. It consequently goes 
without saying that no inquiry into syntactic structures can be written in a theory-neutral vac-
uum, and even grammars with a mainly descriptive and empirical orientation (such as, for 
example, Biber et al. 1999) are grounded in largely implicit but nevertheless far-reaching 
theoretical assumptions. In itself, the fact that syntax is the theoretically most complex branch 
of modern linguistics is thus neither surprising nor alarming. What is alarming, however, is 
the impression that some of the most advanced contemporary syntactic theories appear to 
have lost touch with the sentence data they were originally designed to explain, and that many 
current syntactic discussions tend to be caught up in complexities created by the theoretical 
framework itself rather than by the linguistic situation. Adding to that impression is the fact 
that we are experiencing an unprecedented proliferation of syntactic theories that are drifting 
apart into largely incompatible grammatical models.  
There are a few voices in the field that oppose this current trend and demand that the bal-
ance between theory and data should be redressed to a great extent (e.g. Croft 2001: viii). In 
accordance with this view, the present chapter seeks to provide a critical re-examination of 
some deeply-rooted theoretical axioms that permeate most contemporary syntactic ap-
proaches, and to challenge them with methods that are theoretically less encumbered and em-
pirically sounder. My criticism will centre around the notion of 'linguistic discreteness' (Linz 
2002: 14-5) endorsed by most formal grammars, a notion which can roughly be subdivided 
into the categories of syntactic, intersystemic and epistemological discreteness. The last two 
aspects will be taken up in part II; what concerns us here is the paradigm of syntactic dis-
creteness, which will be confronted with the alternative view of 'linguistic non-discreteness' as 
developed in recent publications of a more functional bent, particularly Langacker's work on 
cognitive grammar (1987, 1999a), Golberg's book on Construction grammar (1995) and 
Croft's monographs on functional and Construction grammar (1991, 2001). 
3.1 Distributional mismatches as the stumbling block of discrete syntax 
In large measure, syntactic theories are predicated on the assumption that complex linguistic 
units such as sentences are built up from smaller, discrete parts. Such approaches, which de-
fine syntactic constructions in terms of combinations of atomic, primitive elements, will here 
be referred to as 'syntactically discrete'. A syntactically discrete model works bottom-up be-
cause it assumes that discrete syntactic elements taken from some independently existing lin-
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guistic inventory are combined to form larger constructions according to certain rules of com-
bination (Croft 2001: 47; Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988: 502). In other words, it is 
thought that the form and meaning of a complex syntactic entity can be computed from the 
knowledge of its constituents and of a limited number of syntactic and semantic rules (Fill-
more, Kay and O'Connor 1988: 502). A famous proponent of discrete syntax is Jackendoff, 
who believes that knowledge of a language essentially comprises two components: "One is a 
finite list of structural elements that are available to be combined ... The other component is a 
finite set of combinatorial principles, or a grammar" (2002: 39). 
These basic tenets are shared by descriptive grammars such as Biber et al. (1999) or 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002), as well as formalist theories like modern generative grammar 
(e.g. Chomsky 1981, 1995) or Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG; e.g. Bresnan 2001), and 
the difference between them in this respect is a matter of degree only, not of kind. The distinc-
tive property of formalist grammars is that they embrace what Chomsky has dubbed the 
"Galilean style" of linguistic description (1980: 218), i.e. they aim to capture the nature of the 
linguistic system in mathematically precise, closed models (Bresnan 2001: 3). A logical con-
sequence of positing complex formal structures behind the human language faculty is the hy-
pothesis that linguistic knowledge must, to a large extent, be determined genetically (Chom-
sky 2000: 4; Grewendorf 2002: 11; Jackendoff 2002: 334). Descriptive grammars are on the 
whole less fastidious about the formal rigidity of their syntactic representations and do not 
theorise much about the cognitive basis of their models, yet their general approach is likewise 
based on the premise that syntax must be described in a discrete, bottom-up way. Since the 
sophisticated and sometimes involved concepts of generative theories will be more closely 
examined in chapter 5, I shall confine my discussion here to the more familiar notions used in 
descriptive grammars. 
As a rule, descriptive grammars take the verb to act as the core of the sentence in the 
sense that it determines the basic architecture of a syntactic construction. The verb is consid-
ered to be a relational entity containing variables that are satisfied by arguments in the 
clause.15 When verbs are held to govern the rest of the sentence, they need to be classified 
according to the specific syntactic frames they occur in. This sort of subcategorisation fre-
quently goes by the name of 'valency', which indicates the capacity a certain verb has for 
combining with other sentence elements (Allerton 1982: 2). There are two facets to the 
valency of a verb: the 'quantitative' valency specifies the number of arguments or participants 
                                                 
15 The idea that the verb is a function that maps arguments into some sort of eventuality has been introduced into 
modern linguistics by Tesnière (1965). 
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that are minimally involved in the activity, process or state expressed by the verbal predicate. 
On this basis it is possible to distinguish between one-place (monovalent, intransitive), two-
place (bivalent, transitive), and three-place (trivalent, ditransitive) verbs (Allerton 1982: 94; 
Emons 1978: 4; Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 218-9). In traditional terminology, a construc-
tion containing a monovalent verb is called an 'intransitive' clause and sentences with bivalent 
and trivalent verbs are labelled 'transitive' and 'ditransitive', respectively (Huddleston and Pul-
lum 2002: 216-7).16 The 'qualitative' valency defines the semantic relationships in which the 
arguments stand with the verb because verbs are considered to assign thematic roles such as 
AGENT17 or PATIENT to their arguments (Fillmore 1968; Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 
228). Although there is no general consensus on this, most syntacticians would agree that the 
qualitative valency of a verb also determines the morphosyntactic realisation of the thematic 
roles (Emons 1978: 5-6). By way of illustration, a simple sentence such as Mary killed John is 
composed of a bivalent verb (killed) taking two complements, the NP subject Mary carrying 
the thematic role AGENT and the NP direct object John with the thematic role PATIENT. The 
rationale behind the valency approach is that the whole — some syntactic construction such 
as a sentence — is hierarchically composed of its parts, with the verb acting as a kind of 'con-
trol centre'. Both the structure and the meaning of a sentence are considered to be composi-
tional because they can be derived from the form/meaning of its constituents and the syntac-
tic/semantic relations obtaining between them (Saeed 1997: 11). 
Familiar and pervasive though this building-block view of syntax and semantics may be, 
it is vulnerable and, in the final analysis, untenable. It crucially depends on the recognition of 
a limited and clearly definable number of syntactic primitives such as distinct subclasses of 
verbs, semantic relations such as AGENT or PATIENT, and syntactic relations such as sub-
ject and direct object. The fundamental empirical procedure to justify these distinctions is the 
distributional method, which systematically examines the grammatical (and semantic) behav-
iour of a particular linguistic element across various syntactic constructions (Croft 1991: 6; 
2001: 11). Elements showing the same distribution in the sense that they can fill the same role 
in different syntactic environments may then be classified as belonging to the same category. 
A particular verb is identified as bivalent, for example, if it fulfils the set of criteria estab-
lished for bivalent verbs in English, i.e. if it shows some characteristically bivalent behaviour 
in the constructions used as syntactic tests. 
                                                 
16 In addition to complements, a sentence may also contain adjuncts, i.e. optional elements governed by the verb 
but not required by its argument structure; adjuncts provide additional information with respect to, for example, 
time or place (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 219). 
17 In this book, capitals are used to label thematic roles. 
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The distributional method is a crucial and indispensable empirical tool; however, its 
practical application in contemporary syntactic theories reveals problems that seriously un-
dermine the discrete conception of syntax. Since the close evaluation of the syntactic tests put 
forward for the elements of secondary-predicate constructions will be a focal concern of the 
following chapters, I will restrict my criticism to a few sketchy remarks, using the category 
'direct object' as illustration. At first blush, this grammatical function seems to be clearly de-
fined in English by a number of intuitively plausible distributional criteria. To mention just 
five familiar diagnostic tests: direct objects are right-adjacent to the verb that selects them 
(9a), are realised by an NP (9b), show accusative case marking (9c), have the potential to be 
converted into the subject of a corresponding passive construction (9d), and are realised by a 
reflexive pronoun if they are co-referential with the subject, but by a non-reflexive element if 
they are referentially distinct (9e) (e.g. Allerton 1982: 42-4; Biber et al. 1999: 126; Huddle-
ston and Pullum 2002: 245-7, 1487). 
(9) a.  John saw Mary in the pub. 
  b.  John saw his old love in the pub. 
  c.  John saw her in the pub. 
  d.  Mary was seen in the pub by John. 
  e.  Johni loves himselfi./ Johni loves Maryj.18 
Yet the idea of clear-cut syntactic distinctions that the discrete model of syntax relies on 
stands in sharp contrast to the variability we actually observe in language. For each of the 
tests described above, there are counter-examples which show that the direct object criteria 
are variable in their consistency: what seems to be a direct object does not immediately follow 
the verb in (10a); the position after the verb is occupied by a clause instead of an NP in (10b); 
unless the direct object is realised by a pronoun, it does not show distinctive case marking 
(10c); the transposition to the subject of a related passive clause is not possible in (10d); fi-
nally, the direct object must be co-referential with the subject and cannot be referentially dis-
tinct in (10e). 
(10) a.  John saw in the pub his old love Mary, who he hadn't spoken to for years. 
  b.  John saw that his old love Mary was in the pub. 
  c.  John saw Mary in the pub. 
  d.  *180 pounds were weighed by Mary now. 
  e.  Johni prided himselfi on his attractiveness./ *Johni prided Maryj on her  
        attractiveness. 
To call the expressions printed in boldface 'direct objects' would prejudge the case and mean, 
as Kilby puts it, "to fit a number of incompatible phenomena into a pigeonhole which happens 
to be there" (1984: 41), in this case the category 'direct object'. Yet the examples above amply 
                                                 
18 Co-referential NPs are typically marked by identical coindexes. 
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demonstrate that there are mismatches in distributional patterns which make it difficult to 
identify a clearly circumscribed notion 'direct object'. If we want to retain such a linguistic 
entity, we are forced to use only a specified subset or just a single one of the diagnostic tests 
and disregard the conflicting evidence. This is common practice in grammars of English, but 
it represents what Croft calls "methodological opportunism" (2001: 84) because it chooses to 
overlook data that does not fit neatly into the preestablished boxes: "Methodological oppor-
tunism selects distributional tests at the whim of the analyst, and ignores the evidence from 
other distributional tests that do not match the analyst's expectations, or else treats them as 
superficial or peripheral" (Croft 2001: 45). 
Croft's criticism of opportunistic methods in syntax is wholly justified. The consequence 
of this analytical policy is not only that a considerable number of exceptional and equivocal 
cases is simply ignored, but also that each syntactic theory takes different tests to be relevant 
and consequently draws different distinctions between syntactic categories, to the extent that 
"the wide-ranging nature of the determinative criteria ... allows for no common point of refer-
ence and comparison" any more (Morley 1991: 296). The definition of syntactic building-
blocks and grammatical relations such as 'transitive verb', 'subject' or 'direct object' is thus 
largely conditioned by the theory to which we subscribe, a fact that should cast severe doubt 
on the tenability of this syntactic procedure: "[M]ethodological opportunism ... is unprincipled 
and ad hoc and hence is not a rigorous scientific method for discovering the properties of the 
grammar of a language" (Croft 2001: 41). 
The upshot of our discussion is that it is not possible to define a cross-constructional 
category of 'direct object' in English, nor, for that matter, of any other of the syntactic build-
ing-blocks whose existence is commonly taken for granted:  
Every linguist relies on these concepts, but few if any are prepared to define them in an ade-
quate, explicit, and revealing way ... The linguistic community has not yet achieved generable, 
workable, deeply revelatory characterizations of these constructs in terms of more fundamental 
notions in the context of a coherent overall conceptual framework. (Langacker 1987: 2)  
Several instances of a presumed linguistic category across different constructions exhibit 
similar, but not identical behaviour because every construction (such as the passive or reflex-
ive constructions illustrated in (10d) and (10e)) is characterised by its own peculiarities. As 
Kilby rightly observes, it is therefore preferable to discard such sketchily defined concepts as 
'direct object' because "it is not at all clear that the same notion of 'direct object' needs to be 
specified independently of the particular construction that we are investigating" (Kilby 1984: 
41). 
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3.2 Constraints and representational levels — a way out for discrete syntax? 
While descriptive grammars are usually satisfied to list diagnostic tests for a particular lin-
guistic entity without being bothered too much by conflicting evidence, formal theories such 
as the generative school of linguistics must find ways to cope with distributional mismatches 
in order to maintain the coherence and mathematical consistency of their syntactic analyses. 
Both the extent to which exceptional cases are tolerated and the ways in which they are han-
dled have changed considerably in the history of generative grammar. 
Early generative theories such as the Standard Theory and the Extended Standard Theory 
(Chomsky 1957, 1965, 1975) sought to construct descriptively adequate syntactic derivations. 
As a result, the empirical complexity of a language such as English was fully accepted and 
even unusual constructions were captured by specific, narrowly defined derivational rules 
(Grewendorf 2002: 98; Henry 2002: 8). In the course of this early phase, the goal of descrip-
tive adequacy necessarily led to a steady increase in the number of syntactic rules. The ever 
greater complexity and variety of rule systems, however, soon came into conflict with the 
second basic principle of generative grammar, that of explanatory adequacy. Chomsky and his 
followers have always aspired to uncover general linguistic universals restricting the number 
of possible grammars so that the cognitive basis of the human language faculty could be ac-
counted for (Linz 2002: 52). 
The tensions between the conflicting demands of descriptive and explanatory adequacy 
have been alleviated from the so-called Government-and-Binding (GB) version of generative 
grammar onwards (Chomsky 1981) — much to the detriment of descriptive adequacy. The 
properties of language are now held to be invariant at some deeper level: "The natural way is 
to challenge the traditional assumption ... that a language is a complex system of rules, each 
specific to particular languages and particular grammatical constructions" (Chomsky 2000: 7). 
Since the early 1980s, we can discern a general trend in generative scholarship to focus on 
abstract, universal principles of grammar that interact with a finite number of options or pa-
rameters to yield specific syntactic constructions (Chomsky 1995: 6; Grewendorf 2002: 98; 
Henry 2002: 275). The overriding concern of GB-theory is the formulation of those underly-
ing principles, which are assumed to be organised in the form of separate modules or subtheo-
ries that exert a constraining effect on one another (Grewendorf 2002: 13). The following dia-
gram sketches the GB-model of generative grammar and indicates the place the subtheories 
occupy within the overall framework: 
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Figure 1: The Government-and-Binding model of generative grammar 
Phonological Form  S-Structure  Logical Form 
     D-Structure 
Lexicon             Categorial component  
 
       (adapted from Aarts 1992: 14 and Grewendorf 2002: 107) 
The base comprises the lexical component, which contains entries specifying the form and 
meaning of words, and the categorial component, which determines the structural properties 
of the sentence according to the rules of X'-theory (for details see chapter 5.3). The insertion 
of lexical items into the structures generated by the categorial component results in an under-
lying, abstract representation called D-structure, which conveys all the information pertaining 
to the thematic relations in the sentence (Grewendorf 2002: 106). This is the place where most 
of the subtheories come into play: according to the constraints imposed by these theories, the 
base structure is transformed into a corresponding surface representation (S-structure), which 
serves as input for the phonological component (Aarts 1992: 13-4). If interpretative demands 
of the subtheories make it necessary, the S-structure of the sentence is turned into a distinctive 
Logical Form (LF) representation that does not have phonological reflexes (Haegeman and 
Guéron 1999: 538-9).  
This multi-stratal, modular architecture has fundamental implications for the treatment of 
specific syntactic constructions. The representational levels that are orthogonal to the theories 
(D-Structure, S-Structure, LF) represent the structure of the sentence in different forms, de-
pending on the specific constraints imposed by subtheories at the respective point in the deri-
vation. When the subtheories are held to be the regular, coherent substrate of the human lan-
guage faculty, empirically observed constructions and distributional mismatches can be con-
veniently explained away as superficial phenomena resulting from the interaction of conflict-
ing syntactic modules (Croft 1991: 29). The exact workings of this theoretical device with 
respect to secondary-predicate constructions will be laid out in chapter 5.3; at this point, a 
brief and rather straightforward illustration must suffice. To take up one of the distributional 
mismatches concerning the category 'direct object' encountered above: the putative direct ob-
ject does not occupy the immediately postverbal position in the S-structure of the sentence 
John saw in the pub his old love Mary. Within the GB-model, this can be claimed to consti-
tute only a superficial feature; at D-structure, the phrase his old love Mary is taken to be right-
adjacent to the verb saw and thus to occupy the canonical direct object position (Haegeman 
and Guéron 1999: 222). In the transition from D-structure to S-structure, however, some con-
subtheories/constraints
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straint having to do with phonological 'weight' or information structure forces the direct object 
to the right of the adverbial phrase in the pub (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 222). Since a 
movement is thought to leave behind a co-indexed trace in the base position (Haegeman and 
Guéron 1999: 222), the 'landing-site' of the direct object remains related to its original posi-
tion (John saw ti in the pub his old love Maryi). If diagnostic tests for discrete syntactic units 
such as 'direct object' are assumed to be met if they apply at some representational level or 
other, this sentence must no longer be considered a counter-example to the positional crite-
rion. 
This line of reasoning can accommodate the atomistic and discrete paradigm of grammar, 
but it runs into serious conceptual difficulties. The complexities of empirically observed con-
structions can only be accounted for if a large number of constraints and levels of representa-
tion are added to the system, "until one reaches the situation of having a component for every 
rule or construction in the grammar" (Croft 1991: 28). Such a proliferation of theoretical 
components ultimately threatens the aim of explanatory adequacy which the GB-theory of 
grammar was originally intended to provide (Linz 2002: 214).  
For this reason, Chomsky has tried hard to work against the isolating aspects of the GB-
model, which the increasing tendency towards modularisation has created, by strengthening 
the integrative properties of the system (Sternefeld 1991: 3). These efforts finally resulted in 
the Minimalist Program (MP), which substituted some of the modular structure of grammar 
endorsed by GB-theory with an integrated derivational system (Chomsky 1995: 170). An in-
depth exposition of the computational machinery of the MP is beyond the scope of this pa-
per19, so I will only concentrate on the conceptual basis of this theory insofar as it is relevant 
to the present discussion. Chomsky demanded that the "'excess baggage' [of the GB-theories; 
H.S.] is shed" (2000: 11) in order to pave the way for a much leaner version of universal 
grammar. As Jackendoff puts it, "[t]he goal is to posit the smallest toolkit that can still ac-
count for the data" (2002: 76). Derivations are now measured against general scientific crite-
ria such as economy, simplicity, or elegance; syntactic analyses that do not conform to these 
yardsticks are barred from the system (Chomsky 1995: 8-9; Grewendorf 2002: 100-1). Chom-
sky argues that the "substantial idealisation" (1995: 7) imposed by such abstract criteria is not 
forced upon language, but exactly mirrors the nature of this human faculty:  
                                                 
19 Most publications of generative grammarians on secondary-predicate constructions are couched in the termi-
nology of GB-theory and not in that of the MP, so I will predominantly refer to the former framework in later 
chapters. Since "the Minimalist Programme is a progression rather than a complete U-turn" (Cook and Newson 
1996: 312), many of the arguments and analyses presented in a GB-framework still hold essentially true in the 
MP. More central deviations from GB-theoy will be indicated in the following discussions whenever necessary. 
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[W]e can ask how good the design is. How close does language come to what some super-
engineer would construct ... there are even indications that the language faculty may be close to 
"perfect" in this sense; if true, this is a surprising conclusion. (2000: 9) 
My sense is that this conclusion is too surprising to be true, and it definitely runs counter to 
the distributional mismatches manifested by almost every linguistic phenomenon. Since 
Chomsky has chosen to reject the inelegant complexities of the GB-model, the only way to 
uphold the notion of language as "something like a 'perfect' system" (1995: 1) is to focus on 
very general, abstract rules and constraints and to ignore the empirical variability of language. 
This seems to be the direction that Chomsky's grammar has headed into when we consider his 
claim that, in contrast to abstract principles, "constructions are ... taxonomic artifacts, useful 
for informal description perhaps but with no theoretical standing" (2000: 8). A telling sign of 
Chomsky's policy of idealisation is the terminological distinction between 'I(nternalized)-
language', the static system of universal grammar, and 'E(xternalized)-language', i.e. actually 
observed language data (Chomsky 1995: 15, 2000: 123; Cook and Newson 1996: 21). Chom-
sky has always characterised the latter as "epiphenomenal" (1980: 83) and not worth the lin-
guist's attention. Generative grammar may have managed to defend its discrete, atomistic 
paradigm, but only at the cost of narrowing the scope of syntax to just a few core linguistic 
phenomena. Anything that cannot be captured by abstract, construction-independent princi-
ples is relegated to some grammatical periphery that is usually identified with the lexicon, 
which Chomsky characterises as "a list of 'exceptions', whatever does not follow from general 
principles" (1995: 235). The lexicon has thus become "the last receptacle of all idiosyncratic 
information" (Goldberg 1995: 22) within an artificially perfect grammatical system.  
In my view, the conceptual foundations of the MP are gratuitous and rather dubious; it is 
therefore high time to accept the empirical fact that "[m]aximally general categories and rules 
are highly likely not to be psychologically real; hence the search for maximally general analy-
ses is probably a search for an empirically nonexistent — that is, a fictional — entity" (Croft 
2001: 5). How far removed contemporary generative grammar is from the linguistic reality 
becomes clear in the grand programmatic words of the German generative grammarian 
Sternefeld: 
Wie in der Physik bemißt sich das Ziel der Universalgrammatik nämlich an ihrem Erfolg, sich 
sozusagen einer "Weltformel" anzunähern, welche die vielfältigen Existenzformen des Kosmos 
(und der Sprache) wie aus dem Urknall heraus abzuleiten vermag. (1991: 2) 
For anyone interested in explanations of actual linguistic phenomena, such a quest for meta-
principles is certainly not the right way to go. The following chapter will therefore look at an 
alternative, non-discrete view of syntax. 
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3.3 The non-discreteness paradigm of Construction grammar 
When we are not prepared to downplay the significance of conflicting distributional data or to 
relegate their explanation to some more abstract representational level, we are compelled to 
reject discrete linguistic notions such as 'bivalent verb' or 'direct object' — the same verb or 
NP just never behaves alike in two different syntactic environments (Croft 1991: 16). The fact 
that "distributional analysis reveals a myriad of classes" (Croft 2001: 83) and not simply a few 
sharply delineated grammatical primitives may be a source of irritation to discrete syntactic 
conceptions, but it is an undeniable characteristic of linguistic reality. The properties of a par-
ticular NP are not defined by its belonging to a uniform linguistic class of 'subjects' or 'ob-
jects', but only by the specific construction it occurs in (Croft 2001: 48). 
We can make a virtue of necessity if we change our familiar outlook and accept construc-
tions, rather than the constituents they contain, as the proper units of syntactic representation 
(cf. Croft 2001: 47; Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988: 501; Goldberg 1995: 1-2). In such a 
grammatical framework, constructions must be assigned not a derivative, but a primitive 
status. Construction grammar thus "begins with the largest units and defines the smaller ones 
in terms of their relation to the larger units" (Croft 2001: 47) — in clear contradiction to the 
building-block model of mainstream discrete grammars. A top-down approach is not surpris-
ing when we consider our linguistic and cognitive reality:  
What occurs in natural discourse are constructions, that is, complex syntactic units; we do not 
hear individual words with category labels attached to them ... In other words, from the points 
of view of the language analyst, language user, and language learner, the larger units come first. 
(Croft 2001: 52) 
Although this view may sound unfamiliar in syntax, it has a notable scientific predecessor in 
the paradigm of 'Gestalt psychology'. The following quotation from one of the most outspo-
ken proponents of this school of thought could serve as a motto for modern Construction 
grammar:  
The whole is more than the sum of its parts. It is more correct to say that the whole is something 
else than the sum of its parts, because summing is a meaningless procedure, whereas the whole-
part relationship is meaningful. (Koffka 1935: 176) 
Such a change of perspective from smaller to larger units does not suggest, of course, that 
syntactic constructions must be seen as unanalysable wholes; without a doubt, they consist of 
smaller parts such as words and phrases. Yet Construction grammar assumes a difference be-
tween what Langacker calls "compositionality" and "analysability" (1987: 448): composition-
ality expresses the standard view that "the value of the whole is predictable from the values of 
its parts" (Langacker 1987: 448); analysability only pertains to the possibility of describing 
the contribution of individual constituents to the form and meaning of the whole structure, but 
A CRITIQUE OF SYNTACTIC DISCRETENESS  
 
24
rejects the idea of full constructional compositionality: "A composite structure derives sys-
temic motivation from its components, but is not assembled out of them" (Langacker 1987: 
463).  
Discarding the bottom-up approach for semantic analyses implies that the meaning of a 
larger construction cannot be calculated from the associated meanings of its constituents. 
Complex constructions have a gestalt structure because they are customarily invested with 
components of meaning that cannot be inferred from its parts or general rules of semantic 
combination (Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988: 501; Lee 2001: 84). The only items larger 
than words that componential grammars usually accept are idioms such as let the cat out of 
the bag or spill the beans about someone because they cannot be interpreted by general se-
mantic rules (Jackendoff 2002: 168). Although there are probably as many idioms in the Eng-
lish language as there are adjectives (Jackendoff 2002: 167), idioms have largely been ignored 
by componential grammars because they threaten the neat division of work between the lexi-
con and the syntactic component (Jackendoff 2002: 178). While mainstream grammars treat 
idioms as exceptional phenomena, Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988) have been able to 
show that the large bulk of idioms is much more similar to 'ordinary' syntactic constructions 
than is usually realised. The only difference between the sentences John let the cat out of the 
bag (in its idiomatic sense) and John chased the cat is that the former is, with the exception of 
the subject John, fully lexically specified, while the latter allows a greater degree of lexical 
variation (cf. Mary chased the cat; John chased the dog; John ran after the cat). Idioms differ 
from regular constructions only in their lesser degree of syntactic and semantic variability. 
Construction grammars assume that the components of any syntactic structure, whether it is a 
conventional idiom or not, motivate only aspects of the constructional meaning but fail to 
exhaust its full content. The following five sentences, which are arranged in the order of the 
variability of their lexical make-up (variable elements are bracketed and printed in boldface) 
can serve as illustrations:  
(11) a.  That's the way the cookie crumbles. 
  b.  [John] let the cat out of the bag. 
  c.  [John] pulled [Mary]'s leg. 
  d.  [John] [drank] [the whole afternoon] away. 
  e.  [John] [chased] [the cat]. 
Our approach necessitates one final iconoclastic move. If constructions are generally associ-
ated with their own idiosyncratic meanings, it no longer makes sense to draw a sharp line be-
tween lexical items and constructions. Instead, we must assume a continuum between the 
lexicon and syntax because both words and larger constructions are pairings of form with 
meaning (Croft 2001: 16-7; Goldberg 1995: 7; Goldberg, Casenhiser and Sethuraman, to ap-
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pear; Langacker 1987: 58; Wierzbicka 1988: 8). The only difference between words and syn-
tactic structures is that the former are "substantive and atomic", while the latter "can be at 
least partially schematic and complex" (Croft 2001: 16). Even componential grammarians 
such as Jackendoff accept that, in light of current research, the distinction between lexical 
items and syntactic rules has begun to blur and that there is probably "no epistemological di-
vide between the form of stored items and the form of rules" (2002: 189), but rather "a cline 
of stored linguistic forms, from ordinary words, through idioms ..., through constructions ..., 
all the way to phrase structure rules" (2002: 218; see also Goldberg and Jackendoff, to ap-
pear). Constructions exhibit behaviour that is typical of all linguistic signs, irrespective of 
their size and internal complexity; like words, for example, constructions do not have a single, 
fixed meaning, but are characteristically polysemous (Goldberg 1995: 31-2).  
The relation between words and constructions is bi-directional: a word can appear in a 
whole range of different constructions, while the roles in a construction can be filled by a 
large number of different words (Croft 2001: 46). This is the place where generalisations and 
even language universals come into play in Construction grammar: there are strong intra-
linguistic and sometimes even cross-linguistic associations between a construction having a 
particular function and a semantically related group of words filling a specific role in that 
construction (Goldberg 1995: 49, 60; Goldberg, Casenhiser and Sethuraman, to appear). We 
are, however, not dealing with absolute correlations as are assumed by discrete grammars to 
exist, for instance, between the directly postverbal position and the direct object, but with ten-
dencies and prototypes (Croft 1991: 17). Corpus investigations therefore fit squarely into the 
approach of non-discrete syntax: the results obtained from a large variety of authentic texts 
are usually not as clear-cut as invented examples and thus do not always support the basic 
distinctions postulated by discrete grammars. For a construction grammarian working with 
gradience and prototypicality, though, heterogeneous data do not preclude the possibility of 
arriving at valuable linguistic generalisations. The models based on such empirical results 
may be "less elegant", but they are "certainly more realistic" (Schneider 1988d: 301) and con-
sequently more conducive to gaining insights into a cognitive system that is founded on asso-
ciative networks and not on clearly defined mathematical algorithms. 
It is incumbent on the grammarian to categorise the constructions that serve as meaning-
ful units for the user of an individual language such as English and to describe the lexical 
items that prototypically occupy the constructional slots (Croft 2001: 53-4). This dissertation 
regards the three formally similar, but semantically different sentences mentioned in the in-
troduction as three separate constructions because they represent distinct pairings of form and 
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meaning. Since constructions are assigned the status of syntactic primitives (instead of such 
elements as 'small clause' or 'complex predicate'), they are identified by constructional 
(proper) names: RESULTATIVE Construction (cf. Halliday 1967: 63) for sentences of type 
(12a), DEPICTIVE Construction (cf. Halliday 1967: 63) for (12b) and QUALIFYING Construc-
tion (cf. Schneider 1997: 39) for (12c): 
(12) a.  The farmer shot the dog dead. 
  b.  John ate the soup hot. 
  c.  Mary considers John handsome.  
A detailed account of these constructions can only be given in part II of this book, when the 
other two basic tenets of discrete grammars, intersystemic and epistemological discreteness, 
have been challenged. At this point, we are interested in additional arguments supporting the 
basic principles of Construction grammar. 
3.4 The non-discrete perspective of the neurosciences 
Almost 40 years ago, Chomsky's claim that syntacticians need not bother about the mental 
reality of their theories (1965: 193, footnote 1) was not in dispute. As Jackendoff rightly re-
marks, however, "with our greater understanding of brain function at the neural level, depend-
ency has to be regarded as going both ways" (2002: 27), i.e. the validity of syntactic theories 
should also be measured against what we know about the neural instantiation of knowledge 
structures such as language (an attitude that Lakoff characterises as "Cognitive Commitment" 
(1989: 124-5); cf. also Langacker 1999b: 15). Since the neurosciences are only beginning to 
develop cognitive models of their own, linguists could help to refine these models on the basis 
of linguistic data. At present, though, many cognitive phenomena are still only dimly compre-
hended: "The paradox that we know more about faraway galaxies than we do about the core 
of our own planet has a cognitive analogue: We seem to know a good deal more about the 
world around us than we do about our minds and brains" (Fauconnier 1997: 2). The following 
remarks should therefore be taken as suggestive only, but I think they can provide first, if 
rather coarse, guidelines for understanding brain processes with respect to language. 
The neurosciences are centrally concerned with what has come to be known as the 'bind-
ing problem', i.e. the perplexing question of how our brains can synthesise the flood of frag-
mentary sensory and intellectual data they are constantly confronted with into coherent, mean-
ingful units of experience (Linz 2002: 158). The classic view assumed a hierarchically organ-
ised system of information-processing in which isolated bits of information gradually con-
verge into more complex representations. According to that step-by-step, bottom-up approach, 
discrete assemblies of neurons that are located towards the bottom end of this processing se-
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quence code quite specific, uni-modal fragments of information, while those neurons located 
towards the top end contain integrated, multi-modal representations of reality (Linz 2002: 
159-60). This way of thought, which was inspired by the computational analogy (Jackendoff 
2002: 21-2), exactly parallels the linguistic hypothesis that complex syntactic units are se-
quentially constructed from discrete elements according to some rules of combination.  
The neurosciences have, however, undergone a paradigm change that has left these tradi-
tional notions of information processing and information storage far behind. An alternative 
theory that has gained considerable popularity is that formulated by the cognitive scientist 
Antonio Damasio. Damasio and others have found out that there are no discrete neuro-
anatomical sites onto which sensory and intellectual data could be projected in order to be 
integrated into coherent wholes (Damasio 1989: 35-6). Instead of a unidirectional processing 
cascade leading to some higher-order system of integration, the perception of external reality 
results in the firing of neurons in multiple, disintegrated anatomical sites, a form of mental 
organisation that must be described as "divergent, one-to-many, parallel, and sequential" 
(Damasio 1989: 36). The key to the binding problem seems to be what Damasio calls a "trick 
of timing" (1989: 38). Neural activity in multiple brain areas is synchronised by the simulta-
neous firing of neurons (Damasio 1989: 39):  
If activity occurs within anatomically separate brain regions, but if it does so within approxi-
mately the same window of time, it is still possible to link the parts behind the scenes, as it 
were, and create the impression that it all happens in the same place. (Damasio 1994: 95) 
Neurons encoding properties of one object fire in synchrony but out of phase with neurons 
representing properties of another object. It seems to be this mechanism of temporal correla-
tion on a fast time scale that allows our brains to construct the impression of coherent, mean-
ingful slices of reality. In a similar vein, Damasio speculates that what is stored in so-called 
'convergence zones' is not a representation of some experience, but simply a record of the 
combinatorial arrangements of the neurons that were active during the original experience 
(1989: 26). This view demands a re-evaluation of the concept of information storage prevalent 
in the information-processing approach: "A display of the meaning of an entity does not exist 
in permanent fashion. It is recreated for each new instantiation" (Damasio 1989: 28). The in-
formation stored in convergence zones is thus dispositional, potential knowledge, some sort of 
"dormant firing potentiality" (Damasio 1994: 103) that can only be accessed if the neurons 
active during the original experience are re-activated in order to reconstruct a copy of that 
experience. The more often a certain disintegrated group of neurons is led to fire in synchro-
nicity in reaction to some experience, the more stable the convergence zones recording this 
experience get and the more faithfully this experience can be reinstantiated (Linz 2002: 180). 
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The fundamental insight of Damasio's theory is that it is not individual, discrete neurons 
arranged along some hierarchical processing dimension, but coherently active cell groups that 
must be seen as the basic units of our information-processing system. As a consequence, the 
function of a single neuron can only be interpreted within a current context of neural activity. 
Neurons do thus not occupy a fixed place in some static processing line, but can participate in 
different cell assemblies at different points of time by synchronising their firing activity with 
some currently activated correlation pattern (Linz 2002: 161-2).  
This theory has significant implications for linguistics because Damasio claims that the 
"representations related to language ... are perceived, acquired, and co-activated according to 
the principles articulated for non-verbal entities" (1989: 55). Words and sentences are per-
ceived by our brains as acoustic or visual images and processed in a similar way to more con-
crete external entities (Damasio 1989: 44, 1994: 97; see also Langacker 1987: 78-9). Applied 
to syntax, Damasio's model casts doubt on discrete approaches and favours constructional 
theories. The latter do not suppose a unidirectional sequence from words and phrases to sen-
tences; rather, they are in accordance with a disintegrated model of knowledge because they 
only posit associations between words referring, for example, to particular extralinguistic ob-
jects and constructions expressing some extralinguistic event.20 These associations could be 
created by a mechanism of temporal synchronisation if the same group of objects regularly 
appears within the same kind of event. The more frequently these associations are made, the 
stronger the synaptic links between particular objects coded by certain words and particular 
events coded by certain syntactic constructions can get, which explains why certain lexical 
items are more prototypically found in some constructions than in others. Language is thus 
"ecological", meaning that it is "a system with an overall structure, where effects cannot be 
localised — that is, where something in one part of the system affects things elsewhere in the 
system" (Lakoff 1987: 113). If syntax works in as non-discrete or ecological a fashion as 
other mental processes, the principles of the discreteness paradigm cannot be upheld. At the 
present stage of research, however, we do not know enough about how syntactic processes are 
embodied in neurons to decide the discrete/non-discrete debate from a neurological perspec-
tive alone. 
The question of which syntactic paradigm produces more fruitful results (cf. Croft 1991: 
6) is frequently posed from the vantage point of lofty theoretical discourses and therefore does 
not contribute much to advancing the cause of one paradigm over that of another. Linguistic 
                                                 
20 Both objects and events are recorded in convergence zones, but of different hierarchical ranks and complexi-
ties (Damasio 1989: 48). 
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frameworks can only prove their utility when they are put to the test of having to explain the 
gritty details of language; in our case, these are the difficulties created by secondary-predicate 
constructions. 
The following chapters provide an extensive critique of the various ways in which dis-
crete grammars have tried to come to terms with this linguistic pattern in the course of the last 
thirty years. The discussion will show that none of the various discrete approaches has come 
up with a solution that is even close to satisfactory; on the contrary, it will become evident 
that, in its attempts to wrestle with the tricky aspects of linguistic phenomena such as secon-
dary-predicate constructions, a complex syntactic theory like contemporary generative gram-
mar "has also begun to generate anomalies that suggest that the methodology is creating seri-
ous conceptual problems" (Croft 1991: 18). This criticism will be followed by an analysis of 
secondary-predicate constructions from the perspective of non-discrete syntax in part II. 
At the same time, we cannot simply skip to part II and reject the results of discrete 
grammars out of hand. As Bierwisch rightly remarks in a reply to Jäger's (1993) criticism of 
generative grammar, the summary dismissal of formal theories could lead "zur Ignorierung 
und Abwertung formaler Instrumentarien, und damit zur Inkompetenz im Umgang mit ihnen" 
(1993: 110). Formal grammars have their strengths, and I certainly do not want to diminish or 
undervalue the host of illuminating insights offered by them; I therefore concur with Jackend-
off that, at the present stage of syntactic research, "[w]e need all the help we can get from 
every possible quarter" (2002: 429). 
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4. Challenging complex-transitive analyses of secondary- 
predicate constructions  
Descriptive grammars undertake to draw a comprehensive picture of the syntactic system of a 
language like English, and thus have no choice but to integrate tricky structures such as the 
[NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern into their overall framework as well. Not surprisingly, the treatment of 
this complementation pattern has been "the subject of some unease among descriptive ana-
lysts of present-day English" (Burton-Roberts 1991: 160). Descriptive grammars have gener-
ally adopted the strategy of describing and explaining this pattern against the background of 
other sentence structures that are more familiar and seem to be better understood. In 4.1, I will 
present and criticise the abortive attempts of contemporary grammars to come to terms with 
the thorny issues raised by secondary-predicate constructions on the matrix of more familiar 
structures. Since the NP2 XP-pattern is closely related, both syntactically and semantically, to 
the structures underlying sentences such as I consider him to be a fool and I regard him as a 
genius, the subsequent chapters, 4.2 and 4.3, will also outline the approach of descriptive 
grammars to the NP2 to be XP and NP2 as XP-patterns, respectively. The structural analysis of 
this group of related patterns is the major contribution of descriptive grammars to the research 
on secondary-predicate constructions, as opposed to a semantic study of the diverse meaning 
relationships they can convey. In point of fact, there is not much that descriptive grammars 
have to say on that score, as we will see. 
4.1 Treatment of the [NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern in descriptive grammars 
4.1.1 The models: transitive and copula clauses 
The major clause types assumed by descriptive grammars fall into a relatively small number 
of categories. In the most common terminology, these are: NP V or 'intransitive' clause (13a), 
NP1 V NP2 or 'transitive' clause (13b), NP2 V NP2 NP3 or 'ditransitive' clause (13c), and NP V XP or 
'copula' clause (13d) (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985: 53-4): 
(13) a.  [John] is running. 
  b.  [John] built [a house]. 
  c.  [John] gave [Mary] [a cake]. 
  d.  [John] is [a teacher]. 
(13b) and (13d) contain bivalent verbs, while (13a) includes a monovalent and (13c) a triva-
lent predicate. For the purpose of this chapter, we can disregard intransitive clauses because 
only transitive, copula and ditransitive patterns have served as analytical models for secon-
dary-predicate constructions. The ditransitive construction is only relevant quantitatively be-
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cause verbs such as consider are thought to require two postverbal complements like, for in-
stance, the prototypical ditransitive verb give. In qualitative respects, however, it is the transi-
tive and copula patterns that have provided a template for secondary-predicate constructions 
in descriptive grammars. 
Both transitive and copula verbs are analysed as bivalent predicates selecting a subject NP 
and a postverbal phrase as obligatory complements. The two patterns (13b) and (13d) are as-
sumed to differ primarily in the nature of this postverbal constituent. Both kinds of phrases 
follow immediately after the verb, but while the postverbal phrase in a transitive clause is 
invariably realised by an NP, that of a copula pattern can be an AP or PP besides an NP (14a, a') 
(e.g. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 53). In addition, only the NP2 of a transitive clause, and not 
the XP of a copula structure, can be made the subject of a passive sentence (14b, b') (e.g. 
Downing and Locke 2002: 50), and there is typically number agreement between the subject 
and the postverbal phrase in a copula structure, but not in a transitive clause (14c, c') (e.g. 
Downing and Locke 2002: 50-1): 
(14) a.  John built a house.  
  a'. John is a teacher/ friendly/ in good spirits. 
  b.  A house was built by John. 
  b'. *A teacher is been by John.  
  c.  John and Mary built a house/ houses. 
  c'. John and Mary are *a teacher/ teachers. 
Semantically, the XP in a copula pattern does not refer to an additional participant like the NP2 
in a transitive sentence, but rather denotes some kind of property of the subject (Burton-
Roberts 1986: 79; Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 217-8; Seppänen and Herriman 1997: 136). 
This semantic characteristic has led some grammarians to dissent from the majority view that 
the copula verb selects two complements, and to argue instead that the XP must be seen as the 
main, if non-verbal, predicate, with the copula verb only having auxiliary status (e.g. 
Hengeveld 1992: 26). While this is not, unlike in generative grammars, the standard analysis 
of copula structures, descriptive grammarians frequently toy with this view as well (e.g. Hud-
dleston and Pullum 2002: 52; Koziol and Hüttenbrenner 1956: 26), so we must briefly look at 
the pros and cons of this alternative account. 
One major argument that is advanced for the auxiliary hypothesis is typological: since 
there are languages such as Turkish or Russian that can express the semantics of English cop-
ula sentences without using an overt verb, it is argued that the copula cannot be the syntactic 
core of the sentence (Hengeveld 1992: 27-8). (15) is an example from Russian21 with an inter-
linear translation: 
                                                 
21 I am grateful to Ekaterina Nikolaevna Batiouk for the Russian examples. 
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(15) Devushka krasivaja. 
  'the girl beautiful' 
The second plank of this analysis concerns semantics: the copula is claimed not to contribute 
anything to the meaning of the sentence, but to be a mere "supportive device, functioning as a 
carrier for tense, mood, aspect, and possibly other distinctions" (Hengeveld 1992: 33), a claim 
that can be traced back to Frege, who calls the copula a "bloßes Formwort der Aussage" (in 
Angelelli 1990: 168).  
Both arguments must be subjected to critical scrutiny, though. The cross-linguistic evi-
dence is more complex and less straightforward than (15) seems to suggest. Languages such 
as Turkish and Russian do not employ a copula in the present tense, but in the past tense a 
copula is optional in Turkish and required in Russian (16): 
(16) Devushka byla krasivaja. 
  'the girl was beautiful' 
The only difference between English and Russian with respect to copula structures is that 
English requires an overt copula in all sentences, while Russian does not use a phonologically 
independent morpheme in copula sentences that are unmarked for tense and mood. If we as-
sume the existence of a 'zero copula' in the present tense, nothing prevents us from taking this 
copula to select NP and XP as its complements. Whatever merits an analysis with zero mor-
phemes may have, we do not really need it in order to dismiss the typological argument. Con-
structions are language-specific entities, so the structure of a pattern in one language cannot 
be used to explain the structure of a related pattern in another language: "We are in danger 
here of making one language fit the mould of others and/or of ignoring the surface syntactic 
patterns in our zeal to appreciate (cross-language) semantic patterns" (Allerton 1982: 38). 
This leaves us with the semantic argument that the copula does not have any lexical con-
tent and therefore must be treated as an auxiliary. No one would claim that the semantics of 
the copula are particularly rich, but it can be argued that the relationship between the subject 
and the postverbal phrase is effected by the copula, which "expresses the sense of the mathe-
matical equal sign" (Verspoor and Sauter 2000: 25). It is not the case that the presumed non-
verbal predicate simply selects the subject argument itself, but the copula is needed to act as a 
link attaching the property expressed by the postverbal phrase to the subject NP. That the verb 
in copula sentences is more than just a dummy carrier of tense and mood can be demonstrated 
by taking a closer look at the paradigmatic options of the copula. Apart from the default cop-
ula be, we also find verbs such as become, remain, seem, and look in copula constructions. 
While become and remain may be treated as quasi-auxiliaries because they mainly contribute 
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aspectual, not lexical meaning to the sentence (Hengefeld 1992: 36)22, seem expresses the 
epistemic stance of the speaker, who can use this verb to mark a particular degree of certainty 
(Biber et al. 1999: 439-40; Schopf 1976: 37). On the basis of structures like He seems to be 
angry and It seems that he is angry, Hengeveld claims that in He seems angry, the non-verbal 
predicate angry and its subject argument He constitute a reduced clause, with the 'pseudo-
copula' seem acting as a predicate taking the reduced clause as its propositional argument 
(1992: 39-40). Seem is consequently argued not to be an auxiliary, but a monovalent predicate 
selecting the verbless clause He angry (Hengeveld 1992: 40). 
Yet Hengeveld's solution fares rather poorly once we attempt to apply the same reason-
ing to sentences with sensory copula verbs such as look, feel, or taste, which indicate the per-
ceptual basis of the speaker's judgement (Biber et al. 1999: 442). A sentence like The milk 
tastes sour cannot be regarded as containing a reduced clause (cf. *The milk tastes to be sour; 
*It tastes that the milk is sour), and Hengeveld must admit that sensory copula verbs are 
"clearly lexical in nature" and bivalent, selecting a subject argument and a postverbal argu-
ment (1992: 42). It is not consistent, however, to analyse seem as a lexical verb selecting a 
verbless proposition and taste as a lexical verb taking two phrasal arguments, because they are 
semantically similar in that the former expresses an evaluation on a mental basis and the latter 
on a sensory basis. Moreover, Hengeveld's solution forces us to treat the syntax of verbs like 
be/remain, seem, and taste entirely differently (as auxiliary, monovalent, and bivalent, respec-
tively), which misses our intuition that all of these verbs relate some property to the subject 
(The milk was/seemed/tasted bad). 
One final argument against Hengeveld's analysis concerns identifying or equative sen-
tences such as His girlfriend is the woman sitting on the sofa and locative sentences such as 
John is in the garden. In these examples, the postverbal phrase does not denote a characteris-
tic of the subject, but helps to identify or localise it. Be clearly has a semantic effect in such 
cases (Allerton 1982: 87-8; Cann 1993: 34; Halliday 1967: 66-7; Huddleston and Pullum 
2002: 252), selecting two referring participants as its complements.23 I hypothesise that 
equative and locative sentences can be regarded as the limiting cases of a predication-
reference continuum in copula clauses. At the predicative end of this continuum, we find the 
                                                 
22 The distinction between 'aspectual' and 'lexical' meaning demands a sceptical attitude, though. Apart from the 
common aspectual component, there must be other shades of meaning that distinguish the continuative copulas 
remain (motionless), keep (fit), stay (healthy) etc. and the ingressive ones become (clear), get (angry), come 
(true), fall (ill), go (mad) etc. (for details, see Biber et al. 1999: 441, 443-6). 
23 Strictly speaking, the subject NP is not specifically referring in an equative predication but serves as a variable 
that is identified by the value provided by the postverbal NP (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 402). Nevertheless, it 
is possible to argue that both NPs are referential, the variable NP referring indefinitely and the value NP referring 
definitely. Rothstein, for instance, also regards both NPs as referential (1995: 42). 
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prototypical copula sentences in which the postverbal phrase attributes a property to the sub-
ject (17a). As opposed to this purely characterising construction, the subject is subsumed un-
der a type in (17b); although the postverbal phrase does not introduce a new participant, it 
does refer to some conventionally established class and does not merely indicate some prop-
erty of the subject. (17c), on the other hand, expresses a relation of token-token identity, in 
which the XP introduces a new referent that is identified with the subject; to put the matter 
another way, the subject is the only member of the class denoted by the postverbal phrase 
(Halliday 1994: 122). Halliday argues convincingly that such sentences should be analysed as 
transitive and not as copulative, particularly because the subject and postverbal phrase are 
reversible in a way that is similar to the passive transformation of transitive sentences (17c') 
(1994: 127). 
(17) a.  John is intelligent. 
  b.  John is a teacher. 
  c.  The man who was killed by his wife is John. 
  c'. John is the man who was killed by his wife. 
To recapitulate, there do not seem to be any prevailing reasons for preferring an analysis of 
the postverbal phrase as a non-verbal predicate and of the copula as an auxiliary with no lexi-
cal content over the traditional bivalent account of copula sentences. I suggest that there is a 
gradient from copula to transitive clauses, with prototypical transitive sentences expressing a 
relation between two participants and prototypical copula sentences denoting a relation be-
tween a participant and a quality. To put this continuum on a firmer semantic basis, we can 
use Edward Marty's distinction between 'categorical' and 'thetic' judgements, which is cur-
rently being re-discovered in the linguistic literature (cf. Jackendoff 2002: 412-3). In a cate-
gorical judgement such as Mary is intelligent, the subject argument Mary is singled out as the 
topic of the clause, while the predicate intelligent ascribes a property to it. In a thetic judge-
ment such as Mary kissed one of her students, the subject is not singled out, but is introduced 
as the first participant of an event, which is put in relation to the second participant expressed 
by the postverbal phrase. In other words, both participants in a thetic predication are intro-
duced as new, while the topic of a categorical predication is treated as a presupposition that is 
commented on by the postverbal phrase. Marty calls categorical predications 'Doppelurteile' 
(in Eisenmeier, Kastil and Kraus 1918: 228) because they first assert the existence of the topic 
and then predicate new information of it: "Wir bilden ein Doppelurteil, so oft wir an einem, 
gewissen Bestimmungen nach bereits bekannten, Gegenstand eine weitere Bestimmung oder 
Beziehung, ein bisher nicht beachtetes Moment, kurz einen neuen Teil  irgendwelcher 
Art entdecken" (in Eisenmeier, Kastil and Kraus 1918: 239). To Marty, the expression of 
such a Doppelurteil is the main function of the copula be, which he therefore says may be 
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"inhaltlos", but not "bedeutungslos" (in Eisenmeier, Kastil and Kraus 1918: 224; see also 
Langacker 1987: 323). 
I have belaboured the syntax and semantics of copula clauses because they, along with 
the transitive pattern, serve as the template for the analysis of secondary-predicate patterns in 
descriptive grammars. A clear understanding of this template helps to make the defects of 
descriptive analyses with respect to the derivative construction more readily apparent. 
4.1.2 The derivative structure: complex-transitive clauses 
Most descriptive grammars analyse the [NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern as a trivalent structure that 
combines the postverbal argument types of transitive and copula clauses (table 1): 
Table 1: Complex-transitive complementation as a combination of transitive and copula patterns 
 transitive copula 
bivalent ('simple') NP1 V NP2 NP V XP 
trivalent ('complex') NP1 V  NP2  XP 
Since the [NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern is transitive by virtue of having a direct object (NP2), and tri-
valent or complex by virtue of having an additional postverbal argument, it is commonly 
called a 'complex transitive complementation pattern' in descriptive grammars (e.g. Biber et 
al. 1999: 381; Downing and Locke 2002: 94; Ek and Robat 1984: 319; Quirk et al. 1985: 
1195). To support this discrete analysis, NP2 and XP must be shown to exhibit the same behav-
iour in the complex structure as they do in simple transitive and copula clauses. The claim is 
indeed made that NP2 in the complex-transitive pattern conforms to the whole catalogue of 
direct object characteristics illustrated in 3.1: it occupies the immediately postverbal position, 
is realised by an NP, shows accusative case if it is pronominal (18a), and moves to the subject 
position in the passive equivalent of the sentence (18b) (e.g. Downing and Locke 2002: 95; 
Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 245-7). Moreover, it must be turned into a reflexive pronoun if 
it is co-referential with the subject (18c). 
(18) a. Mary considers John/him a fool. 
  b. Access in contravention of these rules will be considered a serious offence (BNC 
   B3A: 531). 
  c. His wife, Belinda, ... has been brought up to consider herself a deprived aristocrat 
       (BNC B0Y: 1233). 
Givòn tentatively suggests that the XP in the complex pattern is a "second direct object", 
which is removed from "the transitive direct object prototype" (1993: 125), but most gram-
marians identify this phrase with the postverbal complement of a copula clause instead. 
Again, a number of syntactic tests are particularised in order to prove this syntactic identity: 
the XP can be realised categorially by an AP (and PP) as well as an NP (19a) (e.g. Aarts and 
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Aarts 1988: 141-2; Emons 1974: 138-9; Huddleston 1984: 194); it cannot be preposed in the 
passive (19b) (e.g. Emons 1974: 138; Huddleston 1984: 194-5); and it agrees in number with 
the direct object NP (19c, c') (e.g. Downing and Locke 2002: 53; Emons 1974: 137-9; Huddle-
ston 1984: 195): 
(19) a.  To choose to study 'arts' rather than 'science' is to make a statement about the 
        values one considers important (BNC FA6: 432).  
  b.  *A fool is considered John by Mary. 
  c.  He considers himself an expert on the subject now (BNC EVC: 2362). 
  c'. Most people consider themselves experts on marriage on the basis of their own 
       experience (BNC BNF: 15). 
From a semantic point of view, the relation between the XP and the direct object appears to be 
the same as that between the XP and the subject in a copula clause (20a, b) (Biber et al. 1999: 
130; Burton-Roberts 1986: 81; Matthews 1981: 184). Even more strikingly, the passive ver-
sion of a complex-transitive clause (20c) is arguably a copula-like structure (Aarts and Aarts 
1988: 142; Scheurweghs 1959: 28; Smith 1977: 329). 
(20) a. Mary considers  John     a fool. 
  b.           John   is  a fool. 
  c.                 John   is considered   a fool. 
The semantic similarities between the XP in copula and complex-transitive constructions are 
captured by the term 'intensive': while direct objects are "extensive to/ discrete from the sub-
ject" (Morley 1991: 299), XPs "relate back to and are thus intensive to the subject or object" 
(Morley 1991: 301; see also Downing and Locke 2002: 53; Ek and Robat 1984: 320-1; Quirk 
et al. 1972: 38). The intensive/extensive dimension, coupled with the transitivity dimension, 
allows a systematic cross-tabulation of the discrete complementation patterns that are regu-
larly postulated in descriptive grammars (e.g. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 218; Young 
1980: 117): 
Table 2: The system of canonical clause types in descriptive grammars 
 extensive intensive 
intransitive NP V 
(John died.) 
NP V XP 
(John is dead.) 
monotransitive NP1 V NP2 
(Mary killed John.) 
NP1 V NP2 XP 
(Mary considers John a fool.) 
ditransitive NP1 V NP2 NP3 
(Bob offered John no help.) 
 
— 
In this system, patterns without a direct object (NP2) are called 'intransitive'; this includes the 
canonical intransitive structure ('intransitive extensive') as well as the copula pattern ('intransi-
tive intensive'). Structures with one object are monotransitive; the canonical transitive con-
struction is 'transitive extensive' (or 'transitive non-intensive'), while the complex-transitive 
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structure is 'transitive intensive' (Young 1980: 117). In the ditransitive pattern, both postver-
bal complements are extensive, i.e. objects. 
While NP2 in monotransitive patterns is invariably called a 'direct object', there is no gen-
erally accepted syntactic term for the function of the XP in intensive constructions. The most 
familiar functional label is 'subject/object complement' (e.g. Brown and Miller 1991: 333; 
Francis, Hunston and Manning 1996: 277; Quirk et al. 1985: 54-5; Sinclair 1990: 180), which 
is used to convey the sense that the XP somehow completes the meaning of the subject in an 
intransitive structure or the object in a monotransitive pattern by characterising it more closely 
(Downing and Locke 2002: 53). Yet this term is, despite its wide use, misguided. In a sen-
tence such as Mary considers John a fool, a fool is not syntactically a complement of the ob-
ject John, nor does it, strictly speaking, complement its meaning (Aarts 1992: 36). Moreover, 
the term 'complement' is now standardly used in opposition to 'adjunct' and thus applies to 
every syntactic argument of a verb, so that subjects and objects are complements as well in 
this broader sense. More recent descriptive grammars have therefore given up the term 'sub-
ject/object complement' despite their general tendency to be "terminologically conservative" 
(Biber et al. 1999: 7). 
A related term that avoids the ambiguous label 'complement' is 'subject/object attribute', 
which likewise draws attention to the fact that the XP describes some kind of attribute of the 
subject or object (e.g. Aarts and Aarts 1988: 140-1; Verspoor and Sauter 2000: 21). The term 
'attribute', however, creates new confusion: while it is used semantically in 'subject/object 
attribute', it is also widely used syntactically to designate additional, optional elements in a 
phrase (e.g. in 'attributive adjective'). 
The label that seems to have won the field is 'predicative complement' (e.g. Huddleston 
and Pullum 2002: 217; Levin 1993: 180). 'Complement' is used here in its wider syntactic 
sense, so that a predicative complement contrasts with a direct object complement, for in-
stance. 'Predicative' is a semantic characteristic that emphasises the intensive, predicative rela-
tion between the XP and the subject or object (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 252).24 While 
'predicative complement' is less ambiguous than 'subject/object complement' and 'sub-
ject/object attribute', it is a rather clumsy term when used to differentiate XPs in intransitive 
and complex-transitive constructions; Huddleston and Pullum, for example, speak of "subject-
oriented" vs. "object-oriented" predicative complements (2002: 217). This terminological in-
convenience seems to be one of the main reasons for the shorter names 'subject predicative' 
                                                 
24 The similar term 'predicate complement' (XComp) is also used in LFG, and is explicitly employed there in 
opposition to 'predicative adjuncts' as in Mary looked down, ashamed of herself (Bresnan 2001: 267). 
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and 'object predicative' (e.g. Allerton 1982: 81; Biber et al. 1999: 126, 130; Burton-Roberts 
1986: 81). The problem with these latter terms, on the other hand, is their purely semantic 
content because 'predicative' refers to the intensive relationship between the XP and the subject 
or object, and there is no additional syntactic component such as 'complement' in these names. 
While all of the terminological proposals discussed so far at least share more or less the 
same analysis of XPs, we also find labels that reflect somewhat different assumptions. The 
term 'predicative adjunct to the subject/object' (e.g. Scheurweghs 1959: 27; Zandvoort 1966: 
203), for instance, emphasises the common feature of XPs and attributive adjectives or adver-
bials to provide additional information on some element of the sentence (Zandvoort 1966: 
203). Similarly, the term 'adverbial complement' (e.g. Wekker and Haegeman 1985: 79) con-
veys the sense that an XP, like an adverbial, "narrows down the activity" of the verb (Wekker 
and Haegeman 1985: 79). 
Descriptive grammars have, incidentally, not really made much progress in their termino-
logical conventions with regard to complex-transitive constructions. Onions, for instance, 
called XP a "Predicate Adjective or Noun referring to the Object" as early as 1904 (41), and 
Curme already used the term "predicate complement" in 1931 (26). The lack of agreement on 
terminology is actually symptomatic of a deeper uncertainty behind the analysis of the [NP1 V 
NP2 XP]-pattern itself.  
4.1.3 Analytical problems of the complex-transitive complementation analysis 
As with all discrete analyses, it would be obtuse to place unquestioning faith in the empirical 
validity of such building-blocks as 'direct object' or 'predicative complement to the object' on 
the strength of a few defining syntactic tests. Some common distributional mismatches with 
regard to direct objects have already been illustrated in chapter 3.1; the following sentences 
provide conflicting evidence for predicative complements to the object: the XP in (21a) can 
only be realised by an AP, and that in (21a') only by an NP, so that we do not find the typical 
categorial commutation possibilities of predicative complements here; in (21b), there is no 
number agreement between the direct object and the predicative complement. 
(21) a.  The waitress wiped the table clean. 
  a'. They elected John Smith president. 
  b.  Bob considers John and Mary a nuisance. 
In itself, such mismatches are not enough to disconfirm the notion 'predicative complement to 
the object' because they could be explained away as exceptions or special cases. What must 
primarily be targeted is the claim that NP2 and XP in a complex-transitive pattern are the same 
building-blocks as the direct object in a transitive and the predicative complement in a copula 
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structure. That this hypothesis does not hold up will be demonstrated by a comparison of the 
XPs in copula and complex-transitive patterns. 
To begin with, it seems to be obvious that the positional criterion must be dismissed if 
XPs in simple and complex structures are to be considered under the umbrella term 'predica-
tive complement' because only the XP in a copula pattern occupies the immediately postverbal 
position, while that in a complex-transitive construction is usually placed after the direct ob-
ject. More importantly, the XP in the complex pattern does not admit of the same range of 
semantic fillers as the XP in copula clauses. While characterising attributes are possible in 
both structures (22a), classifying and identity phrases are doubtful in the complex pattern 
(22b, c), and locative phrases are clearly out in this structure (22d): 
(22) a. John is intelligent./ I consider John intelligent. 
  b. John is a teacher./ ?I consider John a teacher. (ROS: 45) 
  c. John is the director of this bank./ ?I consider John the director of this bank.  
       (ROS: 45) 
  d. John is in the garden./ *I consider John in the garden. (ROS: 91) 
The reason behind these distributional differences seems to be that copula and complex-
transitive patterns constitute completely different constructions semantically. The copula sen-
tences can all be said to denote categorical judgements, in which the already known entity 
'John' is more closely characterised with respect to his attributes, his profession, his identity, 
and his location, yet sentences with complex-transitive complementation do not appear to be 
best described as Doppelurteile. While it may at least be arguable that the direct object after 
verbs like consider serves as some sort of presupposition for the predicative complement, in 
other complex-transitive clauses both the NP2 and the XP can introduce new information (cf. 
The waitress wiped a dirty table clean; John ate his soup hot).  
That brings us to the main objection which must be raised against grafting the notion 
'predicative complement' in copula clauses onto that in complex-transitive sentences. Since 
descriptive grammars analyse NP2 and XP as two postverbal arguments in the complex pattern, 
they must explain where the predicative link between these two phrases stems from. The 
predicative relation between the subject and the XP in a copula clause does not pose the same 
problems if it is assumed that a categorical predication is established by the copula. Quirk et 
al. merely provide a description of the predicative link between NP and XP: they analyse the 
NP 'sandwiched' between the verb and the XP as being simultaneously a direct object of the 
verb and a subject of the predicative complement, and attribute these bilateral associations of 
the NP to "a fusion of the monotransitive and intensive types of complementation" (1972: 
850): 
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(23)   We considered Bill a friend 


850)  :1972  (Quirk                                                                                    friend a  wasBill
Bill  considered We
et al.
 
This fusion analysis seems to offer a transparent description of the linguistic situation and has 
therefore been readily seized on by many descriptive grammarians (Burton-Roberts 1986: 81; 
Downing and Locke 2002: 94; Matthews 1981: 185; Young: 1980: 130). It has, however, no 
explanatory power: Quirk et al. evade the question why the complex pattern can establish a 
predicative relationship without a copula verb, something that is not possible in the simple 
pattern (*Bill a friend). Quirk et al.'s analysis is also unconvincing semantically because it 
must be doubted that the meaning of consider in We considered Bill a friend is the same as 
that in We considered Bill — whatever the latter sentence may mean anyway.25 
Other descriptive grammarians have tried to provide an explanation for the additional 
predicative relationship, but the solutions that have been put forward so far are all opportunis-
tic. The most extreme position possible is championed in some older publications, where 
complex-transitive verbs like consider are tentatively lumped together with copulas (e.g. 
Koziol and Hüttenbrenner 1956: 26; Smith 1977: 327-8). This approach has already been 
criticised as impermissible by Poutsma because verbs such as consider, let alone wipe or eat, 
exhibit full lexical meanings (1928: 341) and do not establish the categorical predication typi-
cal of copulas. A less bold position is taken by a number of contemporary grammarians, who 
maintain that a copula is understood in complex-transitive sentences and can be brought out 
by a paraphrase (Aarts and Aarts 1988: 141; Downing and Locke 2002: 94; Long and Long 
1971: 8; Radden 1989: 426). Yet this solution cannot avoid two pitfalls: firstly, it is highly 
doubtful that in the sentence "We found the new secretary very helpful" it is implied that "the 
new secretary was very helpful" (Downing and Locke 2002: 53), or that "They elect someone 
chairman" and "I call that nothing" can be paraphrased by the copula sentences "Someone 
becomes chairman" and "That is nothing" (Long and Long 1971: 8) — it is a specious kind of 
semantic simplicity to assume that these categorical judgements are really entailed by the re-
spective complex-transitive sentences. Secondly, if descriptive grammarians argue that the 
NP2 XP-string is synonymous with a copula clause, they come dangerously close to discount-
ing their non-clausal, ternary analysis without being aware of it. Some syntacticians even go 
so far as to speculate that a copula is not only understood between the two postverbal phrases, 
                                                 
25 A similarly stipulative explanation is provided in LFG. Here, a predicate complement (XComp) is claimed to 
be an unsaturated predicative phrase that needs a subject. Since an XComp cannot take a subject itself, it is de-
pendent on another argument in the sentence that can serve as its subject. An additional functional control rela-
tion then identifies the direct object argument of the main predicate as the subject of the XComp, so that this 
argument is shared by the main verb and by the XComp (Bresnan 2001: 270-2). There is, however, no explana-
tion given for the hypothesised control relation. 
~ 
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but that it could be considered present underlyingly (e.g. Brown and Miller 1991: 333; Givòn 
1993: 125-6). Since descriptive grammarians do not normally work with different representa-
tional levels, such proposals are usually hedged with 'ifs' and 'maybes'; in any case, the idea of 
an underlying copula does not constitute an improvement over that of an understood copula. 
Attempts to provide a solution to this analytical dilemma without recourse to a hidden 
copula have on the whole been unsatisfactory as well. One procedure that is sometimes 
adopted is to mark the main verb with some sort of "intensive sub-categorisation feature" that 
is claimed to be responsible for the additional predicative relation between its two postverbal 
arguments (e.g. Burton-Roberts 1986: 81-2): 
(24)                          S 
 
NP       VP 
 V [intensive]  NP  AP 
  The waitress   considers              John              foolish 
This subcategorisation feature is purely stipulative, though, and does not derive support from 
any independent principle. Another possible approach lies in postulating some characteristic 
semantic role, which is frequently called 'ESSIVE' (from Latin esse 'to be') (e.g. Radden 1989: 
451-9), but also goes under various other names such as, for instance, 'ATTRIBUTE' (Biber et 
al. 1999: 130). ESSIVE is a semantic role which designates a characterising relation with an-
other phrase in the sentence, the referent of which must necessarily be co-referential with it. 
This can be illustrated with the sentence Mary considers John a fool:  
(25)      considers 
AGENT   PATIENT  ESSIVE 
 
                 Mary        John    a fool 
Again, however, the additional semantic relation between the direct object and the predicative 
complement is not explained but only attributed to some special semantic role. The intensive 
relationship between the direct object and the predicative complement in a complex- transitive 
pattern remains a primitive, unexplained notion, whether we attribute it to an underlying cop-
ula, to an intensive subcategorisation feature of the verb or to some intensive property of a 
semantic role. 
Even setting aside the mercurial conceptual basis of the complex-transitive pattern, the 
analysis behind it creates a number of serious difficulties that threaten to dismantle crucial 
tenets of the discreteness paradigm descriptive grammars work in. In the first place, the post-
verbal NP has an indeterminate status in the complex pattern as syntactic object of the main 
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verb and semantic subject of the predicative complement. Zandvoort therefore represents sen-
tences with complex-transitive complementation as "S + P (o/s + p), in which S stands for the 
subject of the sentence, P for the (verbal) predicate, o/s for the object, which at the same time 
functions as the subject of the p (the predicative complement; H.S.)" (1966: 203).  
A similar non-isomorphism between syntax and semantics pertains to the main verb be-
cause there are "two semantic predications encoded within a single syntactic subject-predicate 
construction" (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 252; cf. also Emons 1974: 137 and Huddleston 
1984: 195). There is a predication between the main verb and its three arguments — the sub-
ject, direct object, and predicative complement —, as well as between the predicative com-
plement and its single argument, the NP2. Syntactically, however, there is only one clause be-
cause the predicative link between NP2 and XP is not established by a verb and the two post-
verbal elements can also be separated from each other, for example in the passive (He was 
considered a fool). While most formal grammarians would recoil from such a lack of syntax-
semantics homomorphism, Quirk et al. try to see its positive side by stating that "[t]his divisi-
bility into two elements of a semantically clausal construction following the verb is the defin-
ing property of complex-transitive complementation" (1985: 1195). Yet such a solution does 
not fit neatly into a discrete syntactic framework. The main verb sits uncomfortably between a 
bivalent and a trivalent predicate: if the two postverbal phrases are considered to be separate 
arguments of the verb, we would have to posit a trivalent predicate, but if NP2 is the subject of 
XP in a copula-like subordinate clause, the main predicate would only be bivalent. Allerton 
comes close to realising that such discrete notions as 'subject' and 'direct object' or 'bivalent 
verb' and 'trivalent verb' break down in a complex-transitive analysis when he says that "verb, 
object and predicative [are] each linked to the others and the subject [is] also involved" (1982: 
109), but he does fall back on the paradigm of discrete grammar again when he concludes that 
"it is best to regard such verbs as trivalent" (1982: 109). 
The most central discrete notion that is undermined by the complex-transitive analysis is 
the distinction between 'predicate' and 'argument'. In the standard trivalent analysis, the predi-
cative complement to the object is an argument of the main predicate, but it is at the same 
time a monovalent predicate that selects NP2 as its 'subject' argument. Huddleston and Pullum 
admit that "[t]he relation between semantic and syntactic structure is less straightforward" 
than in a monotransitive clause because "[s]yntactically predicatives are complements, but 
semantically they are comparable to verbs in predicator function" (2002: 252). The predica-
tive complement must be regarded as an argument of the matrix verb mainly for reasons of 
valency: a verb such as consider cannot be construed with a subject and direct object only (*I 
CHALLENGING COMPLEX-TRANSITIVE ANALYSES  
 
43
consider John), but seems to require an additional argument (I consider John a fool). At the 
same time, predicative complements behave like predicates and not like complements, as even 
a cursory look at some syntactic tests reveals: unlike a direct object, a predicative complement 
cannot serve as the antecedent for a personal pronoun (26a vs. a') and cannot be relativised or 
questioned by who26 (26b, c vs. b', c') (Contreras 1987: 237; Emonds 1985: 269-72). 
(26) a.  *The teacher considers him a rock, because it never stands up.  
                     (from Emonds 1985: 271) 
  a'. He didn't carry the rock because it was too heavy. 
  b.  *I consider John the expert who I would have liked to be. 
  b'. He met the expert who I had spoken to yesterday. 
  c.  *Who do you consider him? — An expert.  
  c'. Who did you meet? — An expert. 
What these tests indicate is that the predicative complement does not denote a participant in 
the event that could be pronominalised, relativised or asked for. In this light, the diagnostic 
tests that are standardly used to distinguish predicative complements from direct objects turn 
out to be not so much tests differentiating two kinds of complements, but rather tests that re-
veal the predicative status of the XP: since both object and subject are complements in the 
sense that they refer to participants in the clause, they can be aligned differently by the voice 
system, whereas XP, which is of the different conceptual type 'predicate', remains unaffected 
by such transformations (cf. 19b) (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 253-4). The fact that the 
direct object refers to a participant in the clause also explains why it can select its number 
independently of other complements (Seppänen and Herriman 1997: 136-7); the XP, on the 
other hand, is like a verbal predicate in that it shows number agreement with its 'subject' ar-
gument NP2 (cf. 19c, c').27 
Furthermore, since the XP denotes properties and not participants, it can also be realised 
by an AP, while a direct object must be an NP in order to pick out a participant from the uni-
verse of discourse (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 253; Seppänen and Herriman 1997: 136). 
When the XP is realised by an NP, this NP behaves similarly to adjectives in some interesting 
respects, while a direct object NP shows more centrally nominal behaviour. Unlike direct ob-
                                                 
26 The relativisers that and which and the interrogative pronoun what are possible here (I consider John the ex-
pert that/which I would have liked to be; What do you consider John?). While who refers to an animate antece-
dent, these pronouns refer to inanimate antecedents, including non-referring predicative concepts. 
27 Similarly, the direct object also has a case form that distinguishes it from other complements, while the XP 
agrees in case with the object. The high degree of case syncretism in modern English masks this relation, but it 
can be shown to have existed in the morphologically richer case system of Old English (cf. a) and to still hold in 
modern German (cf. b): 
 a.  Buton ic openlice gecyþe æt ic God sylfa sy, ne onmun u me [acc.] nanre are 
  wyrþne [acc.].           (Blickl. Hom. 181, 36; quoted from Visser 1963: 560; my emphasis) 
    'Unless I should say openly that I am God myself, do not consider me worthy of 
     any honour.' (my translation) 
b.  Ich finde ihn einen attraktiven Mann. 
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jects, an NP and an AP can be coordinated as predicative complements to the object (27a vs. 
a'); like predicative adjectives but unlike direct objects, NPs in the XP-position can be referred 
to by so (27b vs. b') (Contreras 1987: 237), and can take adverbs of degree (27c vs. c') 
(Contreras 1987: 237; Goodall 1987: 45-6). 
(27) a.  It would put them in an impossible position if a legally-binding Living Will demanded 
        what they considered unethical or bad medical practice (BNC C8G: 106). 
  a'. *He rejects bad medical practice and unethical. 
  b.  I consider John an expert, more so than I do Mary. (ROS: 15) 
  b'. ??I met experts, more so than I did nonspecialists. (ROS: 55)  
  c.  I consider John an expert enough to understand this phenomenon. (ROS: 30)/ I consider John 
        very much an expert. (ROS: 15)/ I consider him an expert through and through. (ROS: 15)/ I 
        consider him more a liar than an expert. (ROS: 15) 
  c'. *I met an expert enough to explain this phenomenon to me. (ROS: 90)/ *I met very much an 
        expert. (ROS: 80)/ *I met an expert through and through. (ROS: 75)/ *I met more a liar than 
       an expert. (ROS: 75) 
Similar tests can be replicated for PPs as predicative complements as opposed to PPs as prepo-
sitional objects. A predicative PP cannot be referred to by a pronoun (28a vs. a') and it also 
exhibits the gradability that is typical of predicative adjectives (28b vs. b'). 
(28) a.  *I consider him off his rocker because his father has also been there. 
  a'.  John put the vase on the table. There he noticed a letter from Mary.  
  b.  I consider him very much off his rocker. (ROS: 30)/ I consider him off his rocker, 
        more so than I do Mary. (ROS: 25) 
  c'. *He put the vase very much on the table. (ROS: 90)/ *He put the vase on the table, 
        more so than did Mary. (ROS: 85) 
All these tests suggest that XPs are predicative in nature, whether they are realised by a predi-
cative AP or by NPs/PPs, which are not normally thought to be predicative categories (for a 
functional account of syntactic categories, see 11.4.6.2). When predicative complements are 
identified as predicates, however, the complex-transitive pattern is singular in containing a 
complement that is at the same time a predicate. Matthews gives a diagrammatic representa-
tion of the "network in which the complements which follow the matrix verb are themselves 
in a predicative relationship" (1981: 185): 
(29)  
   they painted  it black 
 
A weakening of the distinction between argument and predicate would have conceptual con-
sequences for discrete grammars far beyond the treatment of complex-transitive complemen-
tation patterns. Aarts, working from the perspective of generative grammar, rejects the com-
plex-transitive analysis by saying that the predicative complement "is a predicate and cannot 
therefore syntactically be a complement" (1992: 36). Similarly, linguistic philosophers such 
as Chierchia and Turner maintain that arguments (which they call 'individuals') and predicates 
(which they call 'properties') must be sharply differentiated: properties "are intrinsically 'in-
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complete' or 'unsaturated' structures. An act of predication is the 'completion' or 'saturation' of 
these structures ... Qua unsaturated structures, properties are not individuals and cannot satu-
rate other properties" (1988: 264). More simply put, a predicate cannot at the same time be a 
complement, so that 'predicative complement' is actually a contradiction in terms. The com-
plex-transitive pattern is an erratic syntactic entity because it requires non-discrete notions 
(NP2 is a subject and a direct object at the same time; the main verb is bivalent and trivalent at 
the same time; the complex-transitive pattern is monoclausal and biclausal at the same time; 
XP is a complement and a predicate at the same time) within a syntactic framework that cru-
cially relies on discrete linguistic building-blocks. 
4.1.4  Problems of classifying complex-transitive complementation patterns 
Thus far, we have pointed out the analytical quandaries created by the treatment of the [NP1 V 
NP2 XP]-structure as complex-transitive. The focus in this chapter is on the attempts of descrip-
tive grammars to account for the various semantic relationships underlying this pattern. In 
most grammars, classifications of complex-transitive structures are not primarily based on 
semantic, but on formal terms, with the alternative categorial realisation possibilities of XP 
serving as the basis of subclassification. Quirk et al., for instance, make a distinction between 
complex-transitive verbs that can take an AP complement and those that take an NP comple-
ment (1985: 1196-9). Since many complex-transitive verbs allow both categorial realisations, 
these verbs must be listed twice, however. 
In preference to this rather redundant subclassification, in other grammars complex-
transitive verbs are categorised according to their semantics first, and only additionally ac-
cording to the categories the XP can be realised by. Such semantic classifications usually dis-
tinguish between mental verbs (e.g. consider (a success), find (attractive)), verbs of making 
(e.g. make (happy), wipe (clean)), verbs of appointing (appoint (director), elect (president)), 
verbs of naming (name (Mary), dub ('the Boss')), verbs such as eat (hot) and bury (alive), as 
well as other, more marginal semantic groups, e.g. verbs of wanting (want (dead or alive), 
like (hot)) or verbs of declaring (declare (the winner), report (dead)) (e.g. Downing and 
Locke 2002: 94; Francis, Hunston and Manning 1996: 277, 281-5; Jespersen 1940: 9-24; 
Levin 1993: 181-3; Visser 1963: 553-86).  
Such semantic classifications tend to result in a comparatively large number of classes 
and subclasses (e.g. 16 main classes in Jespersen's classification (1940: 9-24), and 10 in Vis-
ser's classification (1963: 553-86)), there being no basis for establishing the right degree of 
semantic granularity. To counter this particularising tendency, two semantic macro-groups are 
frequently set up that generalise over a great number of semantic distinctions. The two seman-
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tic groups are mostly referred to as 'current' and 'resulting' (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985: 1196), or 
'depictive' and 'resultative' (e.g. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 251). This is a time-honoured 
aspectual distinction that was already made by Onions (1904: 42), Jespersen (1940: 9, 18), 
and Hornby (1954: 32-3). Again, we do not have to search far for a model of these two se-
mantic groups: current/depictive complex-transitive verbs, e.g. consider, are compared to sta-
tive or continuative copulas such as be and remain, while resulting/resultative complex-
transitive verbs, e.g. render, are regarded as parallel to ingressive copulas such as become and 
get (Allerton 1982: 122-3; Biber et al. 1999: 151). These similarities seem to reinforce de-
scriptive grammarians' assumption that predicative complements in transitive and intransitive 
complementation patterns are, at bottom, the same syntactic building-blocks (Huddleston and 
Pullum 2002: 251): 
Table 3: Semantic groups of intransitive and transitive intensive patterns 
 intransitive transitive 
depictive John seemed nervous. Mary considered John foolish. 
resultative Mary became angry. The waitress wiped the table clean. 
Yet this is a spurious systematisation that cannot be upheld in this form. While it might be 
argued that a verb such as consider selects the XP (30a), it is doubtful that a verb like wipe 
(30b), and extremely improbable that a verb such as eat (30c) requires the XP as its comple-
ment: 
(30)  
a. [Mary] considers [John] [a fool]. 
 
 
b. [The waitress] wiped [the table] [clean]. 
 
 
c. [John] ate [the soup] [hot]. 
It seems to be more reasonable to entertain an analysis in which wipe and particularly eat are 
bivalent verbs that only select their subjects and direct objects, but not the predicative XPs, 
which are non-obligatory elements that could be deleted without making the sentences un-
grammatical or radically changing their meaning. These XPs should therefore not be called 
'predicative complements', but rather 'predicative adjuncts'. This is indeed the direction taken 
by a variety of grammars, which regard the XP in (30b) as a resultative adjunct and that in 
(30c) as a depictive adjunct. 
There are, however, two drawbacks to the adjunct analysis: firstly, the parallelism with 
the copula sentences breaks down if predicative adjuncts are posited alongside predicative 
?
?? 
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complements because the XPs in intransitive-intensive sentences can never be omitted (cf. The 
table becomes *(clean); The soup is *(hot)).28 Secondly, the predicative link between the di-
rect object and the predicative phrase demands a new solution. As has been outlined above, 
this link is explained either by an intensive subcategorisation feature of the main verb or by 
the ESSIVE role of the predicative complement; to account for the semantic differences illus-
trated in table 3, we would have to presuppose a depictive and a resultative ESSIVE role. But 
if the predicative phrases in (30b-c) are adjuncts, as the omissibility criterion seems to sug-
gest, they cannot be assigned thematic roles by the main verbs, and the intensive relationship 
between the postverbal phrases remains a mystery. 
The discrete machinery of descriptive grammars is ill-equipped to handle this problem. It 
will not do to call the XPs in (30b, c) 'optional adverbials' (Brown and Miller 1991: 334; Quirk 
et al. 1985: 1197-8) because there is no subject/predicate relationship between the comple-
ment of a verb and an adverbial. Moreover, there seem to be at least some selectional restric-
tions between the verb and the XP (31a, b), which could not be explained by an adverbial 
analysis. 
(31) a.  The waitress wiped the table clean/ *stained. (ROS: 93) 
  b.  Mary shot the tiger dead/ *wounded. (ROS: 100) 
Such semantic restrictions are used by other grammarians to toy with an analysis of resulta-
tive XPs as complements (e.g. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 262; Wechsler 1997: 315). This 
strategy requires an opportunistic selection of complement/adjunct criteria, though (cf. Dowty 
2000: 53-4; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 28-9; Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 219-228; 
Tenny 1994: 174-5). Resultative XPs fulfil certain complement criteria in that they are seman-
tically restricted (cf. 31), cannot be recursively combined within a sentence (cf. *John painted 
the door blue, sticky and beautiful), and are usually restricted to one position (cf. (*Clean) she 
wiped the tables (clean)). On the other hand, the facts that the XPs in (31) are omissible and 
that they are typically realised by an AP that designates a property of the direct object point to 
an adjunct analysis. To treat resultative phrases as complements therefore requires an oppor-
tunistic selection of complement/adjunct criteria (table 4): 
                                                 
28 The notation 'AB*(C)' means that ABC is acceptable, but AB is ungrammatical, i.e. the material in the paren-
theses cannot be removed. 
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Table 4: Complement/adjunct characteristics of resultative XP 
 semantic  
restrictions 
only one of a 
kind possible 
positionally 
restricted 
optionality realised by a 
modifying AP 
complement 
criteria 
√ √ √   
adjunct criteria    √ √ 
 
Moreover, while selectional restrictions might conceivably be posited for resultatives, they are 
rarer and more difficult to describe for depictives. To treat hot in John ate the soup hot or 
young in He died young as a predicative complement (to the object or to the subject) requires 
not only an opportunistic, but arbitrary argumentation, such as the one given by Downing and 
Locke: "We shall consider such constituents as Complements on the strength of the possible 
paraphrase containing be" (2002: 50); in other words, XPs must be complements despite all 
indications to the contrary because otherwise we could not explain the additional predicative 
link with NP1or NP2. To make matters worse, there are also cases in which both the XP and the 
NP2 are optional, such as in John talked himself hoarse. As we will see in the following chap-
ters, such special cases are not amenable to a discrete treatment at all. 
For this reason, it is not surprising that many, if not most, descriptive grammarians sim-
ply remain silent about semantic distinctions in their discussions of the complex-transitive 
pattern. To give just two examples, Francis, Hunston and Manning (1996: 281) treat consider 
(implacable) and scrub (clean) together; similarly, Young (1980: 130-1) does not make an 
analytical distinction between found (difficult) and received (damaged). The careful circum-
navigation of the different semantic relationships underlying secondary-predicate construc-
tions is, however, no less opportunistic than the decision to base the difference on some sort 
of weakened complement/adjunct-distinction. 
4.1.5 Discarding the distinction between objects and predicative complements — 
a way out? 
Despite the many difficulties besetting the syntactic function 'predicative complement to the 
object', it has struck very firm roots in descriptive grammars. Seppänen and Herriman are 
rather the exception when they try to offer a corrective to the traditional understanding within 
a descriptive framework; in their article they claim that the function 'predicative complement' 
could be done away with and simply be subsumed under that of 'direct object' (1997: 144-5). 
As a point of departure, they discuss the unusual structure behind the sentence She made him 
a good wife. In this sentence, there is an intensive relationship between the XP a good wife and 
the subject as in a copula clause, but there is an additional NP between these two phrases 
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(Quirk et al. 1972: 851). Seppänen and Herriman argue that a good wife is not a predicative 
complement to the subject but a direct object, with him being an ordinary indirect object 
(1997: 144). They then go on to tentatively suggest that the structural description they postu-
late for this sentence, 'subject – verb - indirect object - direct object', can also be applied to 
some of the sentences which are standardly analysed as complex-transitive (1997: 145). 
Their first argument concerns the fact that while there are copulas that only admit APs as 
predicative complements (e.g. grow, get) and copulas that admit both APs and NPs (e.g. be, 
become, remain), make would be unique in requiring its XP to be realised by an NP. This 
would necessitate "introducing a third subclass of copulas, with members admitting only NPs 
as predicatives" (Seppänen and Herriman 1997: 142). If make is analysed as a (di)transitive 
verb, though, the restriction to NPs would be expected (1997: 143). Secondly, a copula analy-
sis means that make would be the only copula verb that could occur with an indirect object, 
which again "must thus be recognised as an anomaly in the grammar" (1997: 135). Yet if 
make is considered a transitive verb instead, the occurrence of an indirect object would not be 
unusual. As the last link in their chain of reasoning, they adduce examples where copulas are 
followed by referential phrases such as "The man standing in front of me is Peter Whitelaw" 
(1997: 138), and other cases where the presumed predicative complement does not fulfil typi-
cal predicative criteria; the phrase a good wife, for instance, can be moved to the subject in a 
passive construction that is "easily interpretable though in practice avoided as strained": ??A 
good wife was made by her (Seppänen and Herriman 1997: 143).  
While I am truly sympathetic towards attempts to dismantle discrete syntactic notions, I 
do not think that Seppänen and Herriman's arguments are substantial enough to discard the 
function 'predicative complement' from the analysis of copula and complex-transitive clauses 
in one sweep. The 'good wife'-structure cannot, I believe, serve as the motor for deconstruct-
ing the notion 'predicative complement' because it is an exceptional construction whose un-
usual syntactic properties should be accounted for instead. The fact that only NPs are allowed 
as predicative complements results from the specialised semantics of this construction, which 
conveys the meaning that the participants coded as the subject fulfil the functions that are 
typically attributed to them in an exemplary way. Since a function can only be coded by an NP 
and not an AP, the latter category is barred from this structure. Moreover, I submit that the 
immediately postverbal phrase can indeed be identified with an indirect object, but only if we 
see 'indirect object' as a radial, semantically diverse syntactic function. Indirect objects are not 
only found in the prototypical transfer sense, where they may be analysed as arguments of a 
trivalent predicate (e.g. John gave Mary a book), but can also optionally code the beneficiar-
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ies of an event, as in John baked (Mary) a cake. The 'good wife'-construction, which commu-
nicates the sense that the subject performs a function very well, allows the inclusion of a 
beneficiary of that function in one of the ways made available by English syntax (She made 
him a good wife; She made a good wife for him), while the ascription of properties communi-
cated by more central copula sentences makes the conceptualisation of a beneficiary more 
difficult (??John is attractive for his wife). Finally, I fully agree with the claim that it is not 
possible to draw a firm line between referential and predicative phrases, but I consider it op-
portunistic to say that we should therefore treat all NPs as objects. As has been suggested with 
regard to copula sentences above (4.1.1), it is more realistic to work with a reference-
predication continuum. 
The [NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern has been a hard nut to crack for descriptive grammars, and I 
hope to have shown that it is not legitimate to simply graft the analysis of copula sentences 
with the semantics of categorical judgements on this syntactically and semantically divergent 
construction. The next two chapters will take up the issue of how the formally and function-
ally related [NP1 V to be NP2 XP]-structure and the [NP1 V NP2 as XP]-pattern are treated in de-
scriptive grammars. 
4.2 Treatment of the [NP1 V NP2 to be XP]-pattern in descriptive grammars 
The structural closeness of the [NP1 V NP2 to be XP]-pattern to complex-transitive complemen-
tation (cf. 32) was already noticed by Onions (1904: 42) and is standardly mentioned in con-
temporary grammars (e.g. Biber et al. 1999: 199; Levin 1993: 180; Quirk et al. 1972: 850). 
(32) a.  Mary considered John  a fool. 
  b.  Mary considered John to be a fool. 
(32b) is a construction on which descriptive grammars are hard pressed to say anything of 
substance; very often, they only list it as one of the alternatives of complex-transitive com-
plementation without subjecting it to a detailed syntactic and semantic analysis. In structural 
terms, it is usually simply subsumed under one of the two more familiar infinitival patterns, 
the monotransitive and the object-control structures. 
Infinitival complements that conform to the general structural description 'NP2 + infini-
tive' are commonly thought to fall into two distinct groups according to the syntactic and se-
mantic status of the postverbal noun phrase (e.g. Quirk et al. 1972: 837-8; Traugott 1992: 
245). In some patterns, NP2 can be interpreted as the direct object argument of the matrix verb 
and at the same time as the subject of the infinitive. Verbs requiring such a construction are 
known as 'object-control verbs' (33a). The idea behind this term is that the notional subject of 
the infinitive is controlled by, i.e. referentially identical to, the object of the main verb (Aarts 
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1992: 110-1). Conversely, NP2 may only be regarded as the subject of the lower infinitival 
clause and not as an argument of the main verb; the matrix verb would be monotransitive in 
this case (33b). Visser provides a convenient cover term for both constructions, viz. "VOSI (= 
verb + object/ subject + infinitive" (1973: 2234). Intuitively, then, object-control verbs are 
trivalent, assigning thematic roles to the subject, the object, and the infinitival complement, 
while monotransitive verbs are bivalent, selecting the subject and the infinitival complement, 
but not the postverbal noun phrase. 
(33) a.  [Mary] forced [John] [to leave]. 
  b.  [Mary] expected [John to leave]. 
The typical monotransitive verbs selecting an infinitival complement are expect-type verbs 
such as expect, want, desire etc., while the canonical object-control verbs are persuade-type 
verbs like persuade, force, urge etc. (Rudanko 1997: 259-60). There are a number of diagnos-
tic tests that help to classify a verb as bivalent/monotransitive or as trivalent/object-control; 
these tests can be applied to consider-type verbs found in pattern (32b) in order to decide if 
they should be specified as 'expect-type' or 'persuade-type'. 
Since an NP2 to be XP-string is a single constituent in sentences with expect-type verbs, it 
can commute with a single NP (34a). In sentences with persuade-type verbs, where it consists 
of two constituents, it must commute with two phrases (34b) (cf. Denison 1993: 167; Quirk et 
al. 1972: 837). The results are not so clear-cut for consider, though. If we take the corre-
sponding complex-transitive pattern to be a trivalent construction, consider behaves like an 
object-control verb (34c). A bivalent pattern is also possible (34c'), but this seems to represent 
a different, dynamic sememe of the verb. 
(34) a.  I expected [the news]./ [What] did you expect? 
  b.  I persuaded [John] [of my opinion]./ [What] did you persuade [John] of? 
 c.  I consider [John] [a fool]./ [What] do you consider [John]? 
 c'. !I'm considering [the plan]./ ![What] are you considering? 
A related test substitutes finite clauses for the 'NP2 + infinitive'-string. The bivalent expect-
type verbs allow commutation with just a finite clause (35a), while persuade-type verbs re-
quire commutation with an NP plus a finite clause (35b) (cf. Denison 1993: 167; Huddleston 
and Pullum 2002: 1201; Quirk et al. 1972: 837). Consider cannot pattern with persuade-type 
verbs (35c)29; on the other hand, when it behaves like expect (35c'), the construction seems 
again to include a different sememe. The results of this test are consequently rather indetermi-
nate. 
(35) a.  Mary expected [that John would leave]. 
  b.  Mary persuaded [John] [that he should leave]. 
                                                 
29 A finite clause with whatever is marginally acceptable: ??I'll consider John whatever I like. 
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 c.  *I consider [John] [that he is a fool]. 
 c'. !If you consider [that John has been in jail before], I'm not surprised. 
The reflexivisation evidence is more straightforward. If the subject of the infinitive is co-
referential with the subject of the main verb, the sandwiched NP does not need to appear in 
sentences with expect-type verbs (36a) (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1202; Traugott 
1992: 245). Yet it must appear as a reflexive pronoun before the infinitive in sentences with 
persuade-type verbs because it functions as a direct object at the same time (36b). Consider-
type verbs also require the postverbal NP to be reflexivised if it is co-referential with the sub-
ject of the finite verb (36c). 
(36) a. Mary expects ∅ to pass the test. 
  b. Mary persuaded herself to study harder. 
 c.  Mary considers herself a genius. 
The passivisation test works on the assumption that when NP2 can be separated from the in-
finitive in the passive, it may be identified as a separate direct-object constituent (Downing 
and Locke 2002: 96-7). This test yields rather inconclusive results because it does not neatly 
distinguish between expect-type verbs and persuade-type verbs in the first place. While the 
latter group can always passivise (37b), only some expect-type verbs can be used in the pas-
sive (37a), while others are only possible in the active (37a'). The postverbal noun phrase of 
consider-type verbs can also be moved to the subject position in the passive (37c), but since 
this is also possible with some expect-type verbs, the facts derived from this test must be re-
garded as ambiguous. 
(37) a.  Mary was expected to pass the test. 
  a'. *Mary was wanted to pass the test. 
  b.  Mary was persuaded to study harder. 
  c.  Mary was considered to be a genius. 
Another means of testing whether the main verb selects the NP2 is to examine if there is a se-
mantic relation between them. There are two ways that can help shed light on this question: 
firstly, presumably non-referential elements such as it or there can be inserted into the post-
verbal position in order to see if the result is an acceptable sentence. Non-referential elements 
seem to be possible with expect-type verbs (38a), but they invariably render the sentence ill-
formed with persuade-type verbs (38b), indicating that the latter impose selectional restric-
tions on their direct objects (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1202; Kilby 1984: 149). However, 
the evidence is somewhat unsatisfactory for consider (38c) because we get sentences whose 
acceptability ranges somewhere between (38a) and (38b): 
(38) a.  John expected it to rain. 
  b. *John persuaded it to rain. 
  c. ??I considered it rainy. 
Secondly, when the infinitival clause is passivised, yielding a so-called 'second passive', the 
resulting sentence is claimed to be synonymous or at least "truth-conditionally equivalent" 
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(Aarts 1992: 110) with its active version only with expect-type verbs (39a), but not with per-
suade-type verbs (39b), which semantically select their objects (cf. Denison 1993: 167; Hud-
dleston and Pullum 2002: 1202; Traugott 1992: 245). This test is difficult to apply to con-
sider-type verbs, which are largely restricted to infinitives with to be (39c). In the rare cases 
where we find other infinitives, the corresponding second passive could be argued to be truth-
conditionally equivalent to the active (39c'). 
(39) a.  I expected John to kiss Mary. ≅ I expected Mary to be kissed by John. 
  b.  I persuaded John to kiss Mary. ≠ I persuaded Mary to be kissed by  
        John. 
  c.  I consider the president to be a criminal. (no passive possible) 
  c'.  ??I consider the president to undermine our democratic system. (ROS: 55) ≅ I 
        consider our democratic system to be undermined by the president. (ROS: 25) 
If we pause at this point to summarise the results of the various tests, we obtain a rather che-
quered picture:  
Table 5: Summary of the object-control and monotransitive tests 
 monotransitive  
(expect-type) 
object-control  
(persuade-type) 
 
consider-type 
commutation with two 
phrases (cf. 34) 
— √ √ 
commutation with NP and 
finite clause (cf. 35) 
— √ — 
obligatory reflexivisation 
of NP2 (cf. 36) 
— √ √ 
passivisation of main 
verb possible (cf. 37) 
—/√ √ √ 
nonreferential elements 
as NP2 possible (cf. 38) 
√ — (√) 
second passive semanti-
cally equivalent to active 
(cf. 39) 
√ — (√) 
 
A clear either/or-verdict cannot be derived from these findings. The only test that provides 
unambiguous results is the reflexivisation evidence; all the other tests remain inconclusive 
because they either do not clearly distinguish between expect-type and persuade-type verbs 
(passivisation of the main verb), or the results we get for constructions with consider are se-
mantically tricky or syntactically doubtful (cf. checks in parentheses). The commutation tests 
yields contradictory results because consider can have two postverbal phrases like persuade, 
but patterns with expect in that it does not allow a postverbal NP plus a that-clause. If we still 
want to model the infinitival construction after consider-type verbs on either a monotransitive 
or an object-control pattern, we need to proceed opportunistically. This is exactly what is 
done in most descriptive grammars. 
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Older grammars usually interpret consider-type verbs followed by an infinitival construc-
tion as monotransitive. Scheurweghs, for example, analyses "the whole group noun + infini-
tive" as "the real object of the main verb" (1959: 224). The same view is held by Ek and Ro-
bat (1984: 321) and by Quirk et al. in the 1972 edition of their grammar (834, 838). This 
analysis is primarily based on the intuitive semantic argument that consider-type verbs do not 
impose selectional restrictions on the postverbal NP2. Evidence for this claim is sparse and 
should be viewed with caution, though, because non-referential phrases in the NP2-position are 
somewhat doubtful and the passivisation of the infinitive is rarely possible with consider. 
Moreover, a monotransitive analysis has all the other tests against itself and is therefore 
rightly criticised by many grammarians (e.g. Emons 1978: 89; Mair 1990: 175).  
Even so, the monotransitive analysis has shown considerable persistence because it pre-
sumably has a prominent model in Latin, namely the 'accusative and infinitive construction' 
(AcI) (Dirven and Radden 1977: 278; Onions 1904: 127-8; Staudinger 1996: 68). Modern 
grammars of Latin do not apply the term 'AcI' indiscriminately to all VOSI-structures but 
make a distinction similar to that found in English grammars: an AcI in the narrow sense is 
only assumed to exist in sentences where it is semantically impossible to regard the postverbal 
noun phrase as the object of the main verb and where this phrase can only be conceived of as 
the subject of the infinitival clause (Menge 2000: 677; Pinkster 1988: 188-9; Rubenbauer, 
Hofmann and Heine 1977: 192). This definition seems to apply to English expect-type verbs 
and possibly consider-type verbs as well; however, such an analogy would be subject to inter-
linguistic methodological opportunism because the criteria for Latin AcI-constructions are 
much stricter than those for the equivalent English patterns.30 The differences between Latin 
and English become rather conspicuous when we take a look at the verba dicendi, for in-
stance, where it is possible to insert an additional addressee in front of the AcI (40a) (Pinkster 
1988: 188), which shows that the subject of the infinitive need not be identical with the object 
of the main verb as in English (40a'). Furthermore, Latin AcI-constructions after verbs mean-
ing 'believe, consider' such as credere, opinari and putare can have future reference (cf. 40b) 
(Ard 1977: 44-5; Menge 2000: 681-2), indicating that the postverbal noun phrase is not a se-
mantic argument of the main verb. Future reference is not possible after the English transla-
tion equivalents believe or consider (40b'), where the postverbal noun phrase must be constru-
able as an entity that the referent of the subject has had experience with and consequently has 
                                                 
30 The most obvious reason for this opportunism is the fact that the range of applicability of the AcI (as opposed 
to the much more restricted finite ut-clauses) is very wide in classical Latin, while the use of infinitival clauses 
as opposed to finite that-clauses is more constrained in modern English. 
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a permanently stored opinion about (more on the significance of the tense restrictions after 
these verbs in 11.4.3).31 
(40) a.  dico ei te venire.                  (from Pinkster 1988: 188) 
  a'  *I tell him you to come. 
  b.  opinatus sum me in provinciam exiturum.        (Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 7,17,2) 
  b'. *I believe myself to go into the provinces. 
It would be difficult to account convincingly for these differences if there were really no se-
mantic relationship between a main verb such as consider and the postverbal noun phrase in 
English, so that the Latin AcI cannot serve as a model for the English construction. Even Dir-
ven and Radden, who analyse consider as a monotransitive verb, concede that "psychologisch 
das Subjekt des Komplementsatzes mehr als Komplement des Matrixsatzes empfunden wird" 
(1977: 278). 
It is not surprising therefore that the alternative analysis of consider-type verbs as object-
control has gained the upper hand in contemporary grammars. Interestingly, even Quirk et al. 
changed their analysis in the 1985 edition of their grammar, where the pattern in (32b) is clas-
sified as a variant of complex-transitive complementation (1195, 1202). Consider is taken to 
be a trivalent verb, whether its predicative complement is realised by a plain XP or by an in-
finitival clause. As with persuade-type verbs, the notional subject of the infinitive is thought 
to be controlled by the postverbal phrase NP2 (Quirk et al. 1985: 1202). Yet this solution is no 
less opportunistic than the monotransitive analysis because the tests summarised in table 5 do 
not constitute conclusive proof that consider, like persuade, is a trivalent verb, with NP2 form-
ing an independent semantic and syntactic argument. Moreover, pattern (32b) with consider-
type verbs is semantically quite remote from more central object-control constructions. Sen-
tences including persuade-type verbs all conform to a semantic description in which "a cer-
tain participant (the referent of the object) is influenced by another participant (the referent of 
the subject) to perform an action (... denoted by the VP complement)" (Sag and Pollard 1991: 
66). While typical object-control verbs such as persuade, order, encourage, allow, force etc. 
are dynamic verbs denoting a type of social interaction, verbs such as consider or believe ex-
press static, mental relationships that cannot be captured by Sag and Pollard's paraphrase. It 
would be difficult to construct a clear, cogent argument for treating constructions with per-
suade-type verbs and those with consider-type verbs together semantically. 
                                                 
31 Latin grammars speculate that the AcI-construction started with verbs where the postverbal noun phrase can 
be regarded as an argument of the main verb, but, in contrast to Germanic languages, was generalised to an 'all-
purpose' subordinating construction where NP2 is semantically the subject of the subordinated infinitive construc-
tion only (Hofmann 1972: 353-4). 
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Some grammarians have tried to find a diplomatic compromise between monotransitive 
and object-control analyses by teasing apart the syntactic and the semantic evidence of the 
tests described above. They attach considerable importance to the fact that the semantic tests 
(inclusion of non-referential elements and second passive) point to a monotransitive analysis, 
while the syntactic tests (commutation with two phrases, reflexivisation of NP2 and passivisa-
tion of the main verb) rather suggest an object-control analysis by conjecturing that structure 
(32b) is semantically bivalent, but syntactically trivalent. The model behind this proposal is 
the 'raising' analysis originally advanced in generative grammar (see 5.1): believe in (41a) is 
analysed as a bivalent verb semantically, which takes a subject argument and a direct object 
argument realised by an infinitival clause. Syntactically, however, the presumed semantic 
subject of the infinitival argument, NP2, functions as the ('raised') direct object of the matrix 
verb (41b) (e.g. Biber et al. 1999: 696; Dik 1981: 34-5; Downing and Locke 2002: 96; 
Noonan 1985: 69).32  
(41) a.  semantic frame: [I] believe [Mary to be the best student]. 
  b.  syntactic frame: [I] believe [Mary] [to be the best student]. 
Typical persuade-type verbs require a direct object both semantically and syntactically; the 
NP2 in constructions with expect-type verbs, on the other hand, seems to be neither semanti-
cally nor syntactically a direct object of the main verb, but only a subject of the infinitival 
argument. While syntax and semantics are thus homomorphic in monotransitive and object-
control-structures, they are separate in the 'raising' analysis of (41). Apart from the fact that 
such an analysis requires the use of separate representational levels, neither the semantic nor 
the syntactic evidence of the tests summarised in table 5 supports the unambiguous semantic 
parsing of (41a) and the clear-cut syntactic analysis of (41b).  
Verbs with infinitival complements have, in my opinion, been reduced to an excessively 
simple dialectic as bivalent/monotransitive or trivalent/object-control. Along the lines of the 
gradient distinction between transitive and copula constructions suggested in 4.1.1, it seems to 
be more realistic to arrange infinitival constructions on a continuum. At one end of the scale 
we find constructions in which the NP2 is clearly a participant in the event denoted by the 
main verb (e.g. as the addressee in a speech-act event or as the influenced entity of a social 
interaction event), while towards the other end of the scale, the relationship between the event 
                                                 
32 A similar analysis is submitted by Bresnan in the LFG framework. The postverbal NP is regarded as the subject 
of the infinitive in logical terms and as the object of the matrix verb in syntactic terms. To capture these bilateral 
associations, LFG uses the notation '(SUBJ, VCOMP); OBJ = VCOMP SUBJ' for verbs such as believe. The 
subject and infinitival complement roles are included in brackets to show that they are semantic arguments of the 
main verb, while the direct object, which is identified in the control equation with the subject of the infinitival 
complement, is placed outside of the brackets because it is not part of the thematic, but only of the syntactic (or 
functional) structure of believe (Bresnan 1982: 66, 2001: 272). 
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denoted by the verb and the postverbal noun phrase becomes more subtle and must be de-
scribed in mental rather than physical terms. (42) contains an extract of such a continuum: 
(42) a. I told John to come. 
  b. I persuaded John to come. 
  c. I expect John to come. 
  d.  I want John to come. 
We will postpone the question of where consider-type verbs fit into such a continuum and 
how the relationship between consider and NP2 can be described semantically until a later 
point (see chapter 11). 
For all grammarians who see the infinitival pattern (32b) as a variant of complex-
transitive complementation (32a), the question remains of how these two formal alternatives 
can be modelled in the grammar. There are basically three approaches to this problem. One 
possibility is to argue that some verbs such as consider or believe allow to be to be inserted 
between the direct object and the predicative complement (e.g. Allerton 1982: 109; Curme 
1931: 120-1; Radden 1989: 426; Smith 1977: 329). This insertion hypothesis might be sub-
stantiated from a historical point of view by arguing that an analytical language like English 
prefers to formally mark the predicative relationship between the two postverbal arguments: 
"Die Einfügung von to be ist in dem Charakteristikum begründet, daß die englische Sprache 
... bestrebt ist, einem dem Sinn nach bestehenden prädikativen Verhältnis in der Form Aus-
druck zu geben" (Behrens 1937: 100). The insertion argument loses some of its substance, 
though, when we consider that the infinitival variant is rather formal and has remained re-
stricted to a few mental verbs. It would be impossible, for instance, to stress the predicative 
relationship between NP2 and XP by inserting to be (or, for that matter, to become) in most 
other complex-transitive sentences: *She wiped the table to be/become clean; *He drank the 
coffee to be hot; *The parents named the child to be/become Peter. 
Alternatively, the claim is made that to be is optionally or obligatorily deleted with some 
matrix verbs (Dirven and Radden 1977: 278; Hornby 1954: 23; Ross 1981: 465). In genera-
tive parlance, Stockwell, Schachter and Partee submit that "[t]he predicates which allow or 
require this deletion must be marked with the exception feature [+TO-BE-DEL]" (1973: 578). 
Interestingly, a historical explanation is also given for this deletion mechanism: Einenkel as-
sumes that predicative NP2 XP-strings have been derived from infinitive clauses by deletion of 
the copula (1916: 25). The deletion analysis is not only implausible historically (cf. Ard 1977: 
32-4; Visser 1963: 552-3), but also problematic as a description of the present-day state of 
play. (32b) is not simply "a truncated version of the parallel sentence containing to be" 
(Newman 1982: 154) because this does not explain the semantic differences between these 
two structures, which will be elucidated in chapter 11 (cf. Borkin 1973: 44; Newman 1982: 
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154). Furthermore, a deletion feature is purely stipulative and cannot account for the fact that 
to be-deletion should be optional with some verbs, and obligatory with most other complex-
transitive verbs. 
Finally, it is always possible to circumvent derivational accounts by claiming that the re-
alisation possibilities of the complex-transitive complementation pattern are specified in the 
lexicon for each verb (e.g. Emons 1978: 111-2). This suggestion does not have any explana-
tory power, however, and only shifts the problem away from syntax and into the lexicon. If 
we really want to get to the heart of the problem, there is no other way but to focus on the 
semantic differences between constructions with and those without to be, as will be done in 
part II. 
4.3 Treatment of the [NP1 V NP2 as XP]-pattern in descriptive grammars 
The second pattern besides [NP1 V NP2 to be XP] that is found as a structural alternative to com-
plex-transitive complementation is [NP1 V NP2 as XP]: 
(43) a. John considers Mary a genius. 
  b. John considers Mary as  a genius. 
The predicative relationship between Mary and as a genius in (43b) is similar to that obtain-
ing in (43a). Generally speaking, "the second phrase expresses a classifying or qualifying 
property attributed to the first ... NP" (Schneider 1997: 33; cf. also Emonds 1985: 264; Swan 
1980: 72). As XPs share most of the predicative characteristics of plain XPs: they can be real-
ised by as APs and as PPs beside as NPs (44a), cannot be preposed in the passive (44b) 
(Emonds 1985: 267), show number agreement with the NP2 (44c), cannot serve as antecedents 
for personal pronouns or the interrogative pronoun who (44d and d')33, may be referred to by 
so/thus (44e), and permit adverbs of degree (44f and f'). 
(44) a.  [T]he resulting estimate of six million disabled people includes many who would not 
        regard themselves as disabled or in need of special help from services or cash 
       benefits (BNC B01: 1036). 
  b.  *As a genius was considered Mary by John. 
  c.  John considers Mary and David as experts. 
  d.  *The teacher regards him as a rock, because it never stands up.  
                     (from Emonds 1985: 271) 
  d'. *Who does John regard Mary as? 
  e.  Thus, indeed, would many 'Christians' regard it today (BNC EDY: 1756). 
  f.  "I regard you as a bit of a weathervane," he said (BNC G0B: 237). 
  f'. Like Ann, Maureen had often felt uneasy about Sarah's relationship with Terry and 
                                                 
33 The antecedent criterion is, however, weaker with most as NPs than with plain predicative NPs because as NPs 
are semantically less adjective-like (for an explanation see 11.4.6.2). In the following example, as NP is referred 
to by the relative pronoun who: 
A remarkable proportion regard the technical investigator as an unwelcome intruder who pre-
sumes to usurp the coroner's function (BNC CN2: 583). 
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       thought that she seemed to regard him more as a brother than a lover (BNC G16: 
       2268). 
[NP2 as XP] occupies an intermediate position between the ordinary complex-transitive pattern 
and the infinitival structure: like the former, it does not include a verb, but like the latter, it 
contains an element that mediates between the two postverbal phrases. This characteristic has 
aptly been described by Curme: "as ... points as with an index finger to the following noun 
which expresses the idea in mind" (1931: 34).  
There are basically two related questions raised by the [NP1 V NP2 as XP]-structure: the 
first concerns the word class of as, and the second the analysis of this structure in relation to 
the complex-transitive complementation pattern. Unfortunately, "qualifying as" (Schneider 
1997: 33) has figured only at the periphery of the representation of complex-transitive com-
plementation in grammars of English (Schneider 1997: 33-4). Answers to the two related 
questions asked above must therefore be gleaned from the casual remarks scattered in descrip-
tive grammars. 
We take up the issue of word class first. The two main functions of the word as besides 
its qualifying use — introducing comparative constructions (45a) and subordinate clauses 
(45b) — are usually classed as 'conjunctions' (Emonds 1985: 264-5; Swan 1980: 72).  
(45) a. Now behind the little man stood a great grey dog, as tall as he was, with red eyes 
       and hot breath (BNC APR: 1404). 
  b. As he neared the garage, one of the dogs grabbed his foot and dragged his leg under 
       the door (BNC AJD: 235) 
The word class of qualifying as, which makes up about a third of all occurrences of the form 
as in English texts (Schneider 1997: 42), has proved to be much more difficult to pin down. 
Several linguists, particularly in older grammars, avoid committing themselves to a clear posi-
tion on this question, describing as in purely functional terms instead: House and Harman 
(1950: 254), Scheurweghs (1959: 30), and Zandvoort (1966: 203) simply state that the predi-
cative complement may also be introduced by as. Kruisinga calls this introductory element 
"connecting as" (1932: 195), and Smith "Anknüpfungsglied" (1977: 328), while Pence and 
Emery treat it as an "expletive", i.e. as a sort of dummy element that is "grammatically ... su-
perfluous" (1963: 149). Jespersen calls it a "particle", a decision which, as he explicitly re-
marks, allows him to avoid "having to discuss whether it is a conjunction or not" (1932: 374-
5). Such vague descriptions may be tolerated since the notion of word class is certainly not 
central to an analytical language like English (Schneider 1997: 48), but if descriptive gram-
marians want to integrate [NP1 V NP2 as XP]-structures into their overall framework, some sort 
of informative label is required. 
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The word class most frequently assigned to qualifying as in contemporary grammars is 
'preposition' (e.g. Francis, Hunston and Manning 1996: 158; Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 
217; Quirk et al. 1985: 1200; Sinclair 1990: 183). The label 'conjunction', on the other hand, 
is found in only a few grammars (e.g. Poutsma 1928: 347), but is quite common in monolin-
gual dictionaries (Schneider 1997: 34). Tagged electronic corpora such as the BNC do not 
treat the word class of as systematically either.34 Most frequently, qualifying as is assigned 
the tag PRP (preposition), particularly when it is followed by an NP (46a); if as is followed by 
an adjective (46b) or a verbal –ing-form (46b'), on the other hand, the most likely tag is CJS 
(subordinating conjunction). In quite a number of comparable cases, however, as is simply 
assigned the label CJS-PRP, a 'portmanteau code' that turns up in cases "where the CLAWS 
system has indicated an uncertainty between two possible analyses" (Aston and Burnard 
1998: 233) (46c). In addition, one sometimes comes across other, more unusual labels such as 
AV0 (adverb) (46d). 
(46) a.  He decided not to appeal in order to highlight what he regards [w PRP]as the  
        absurdity of the law (BNC A28: 159). 
  b.  The plaintiff will be at risk as to costs, if the court regards the actuarial evidence  
        [w CJS]as unnecessary (BNC J6V: 209). 
  b'. It is not suggested however that directors' duties ... are shaped by a theory that 
        regards the purpose of the company and company law [w CJS]as being to further 
        the public interest (BNC FP2: 802). 
  c.  Miss Araminta regards me [w CJS-PRP]as a servant (BNC HGV: 1676). 
  d.  Teachers make use of a discourse which regards male aggression [w AV0]as 
        normal: 'Boys will be boys' (BNC FA6: 306). 
These seemingly random categorisations can be accounted for by the way the automatic part-
of-speech-tagger CLAWS works. This probabilistic device assigns tags to words on the basis 
of the context they appear in (for details see Oakes 1998: 80-4). Since qualifying as (as op-
posed to comparative and subordinating as) can be followed by all kinds of word classes, it 
cannot be unambiguously tagged by CLAWS.  
A well-substantiated decision either in favour of preposition or conjunction requires the 
careful examination of more finely-grained data, something that is neither done by CLAWS 
nor by most descriptive grammars. We can begin by looking at the kinds of phrases that as NP 
can be coordinated with. Emonds argues that since as-phrases can be coordinated with PPs, 
they must be treated as PPs as well (47a) (1985: 274-5). Unfortunately, though, the coordina-
tion data does not allow for such a straightforward conclusion. As-phrases can also be coordi-
nated with adverbs (47b), and we certainly do not want to conclude from this that they consti-
tute adverbs themselves. Rather, as-phrases after mental verbs such as regard can commute 
                                                 
34 The same indeterminacy can be observed in the tagged versions of the LOB and Brown corpora (cf. Schneider 
1997: 42). 
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with or be coordinated with adverbials, however they may be realised formally. The coordina-
tion data does not reveal anything about the category of as-phrases, but only shows that they 
are semantically compatible with adverbials, a fact that will be accounted for in section 
11.2.4. 
(47) a.  This highly illuminating way of regarding beliefs and concepts not in terms of 
        their ultimate truth or falsity, but as the product of specific social conditions, is 
        best illustrated in Durkheim's book (BNC CS0: 472). 
  b.  [A] consequence of being officially labelled 'deviant' is that other people come to 
        regard the labelled person differently, as a different kind of person (BNC CRX: 
   713). 
Qualifying as-phrases can even commute with a comparative clause introduced by the con-
junction as (48a), which again does not allow us to conclude that as is a conjunction in all 
cases, but only that there must be some functional similarity between these two uses of the 
word. (48b) contains an example of the peculiar, but not too infrequent case in which a quali-
fying as-phrase and a comparative as-phrase are coordinated, with the two functions of as 
being merged into a single form, probably to avoid the clumsy juxtaposition of two as's. 
(48) a.  I gather that there is a very strong bond among these people between brothers-in- 
        law and that they regard them as we do blood brothers (BNC H9G: 124).  
  b.  [S]he had to translate fifty pages a week, a drudgery she tried to regard as 
        ineluctable as brushing her teeth or washing the kitchen floor (BNC CMJ: 119). 
Another argument Emonds adduces for the prepositional status of as is his claim that the word 
can be followed by a gerund, which, as a nominal category, can follow a preposition, but not a 
conjunction (1984: 138-9, 1985: 274). Yet the identification of the –ing-form as a gerund is a 
point of contention. Hantson claims that this non-finite verb is not a gerund, but a present par-
ticiple, which is preceded by the conjunction as (1989: 216; for a similar view, see Scheur-
weghs 1959: 170-1). It is very difficult to test these conflicting hypotheses. Hantson argues 
his case by showing that gerunds can have an overt subject (49a), whereas present participles 
cannot (49b), and that the non-finite form following as behaves like a present participle in that 
it does not allow an overt subject (49c) (1989: 216-7). Emonds, in his turn, constructs a 
(rather doubtful) sentence in which the –ing-form after as does have its own subject (49d), 
and I also found a single such case in the corpus (49d'). The nature of the –ing form after 
qualifying as is thus still in litigation. 
(49) a.  On John coming in she stopped reading. 
  b.  *When John coming in she stopped reading. 
  c.  *He rejects communism as its usual realisation leading to totalitarianism. 
                             (from Hantson 1989: 217; my emphasis) 
  d.  ??I would describe what happened as you(r) not being considerate of me. (ROS: 58) 
                        (from Emonds 1985: 274; my emphasis) 
  d'. ?The later, more sophisticated theories tended to view the question of salvation not 
        so much as God winning back the world from the Evil One ... but in terms of a 
        legal arrangement entered into by God and man (BNC CCE: 321). (ROS: 45) 
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The data in (50), on the other hand, seem to accord well with Emond's prepositional analysis. 
While it would fit into the picture of a conjunction that as does not pied-pipe (50a, a'), it is 
highly unusual for a conjunction to allow stranding, which Emonds (1984: 141; 1985: 278) 
claims is possible with as (cf. 50b, b', b''). It is not clear how much of substance we can de-
duce from these sentences, though. Naturally occurring cases where as is stranded in ques-
tions are extremely rare. I did not find examples including verbs such as regard, but only a 
few instances in which as is stranded in copula-like constructions (e.g. 50c). Similarly, cases 
such as (50c'), where as is stranded in a relative clause, are few and far between. In the major-
ity of instances, how is used in (indirect) questions (50d), and some piped preposition other 
than as in relative clauses (50d'). The last two sentences are not directly relevant to our dis-
cussion because they cannot be related to qualifying as-constructions but rather to the func-
tionally equivalent adverbial structures described above. 
(50) a.  *As what does John regard Mr. Smith? 
  a'. *Mr. Smith is not the good teacher as whom John regards him. 
  b.  ??What does John regard Mr. Smith as? (ROS: 60) 
  b'. ?Mr. Smith is not the good teacher John regards him as. (ROS: 42) 
  b''. ?What we view the world as is dependent on our society. (ROS: 31) 
  c.  What were Brownies first known as? (BNC G23: 938) 
  c'. Chris believes in teaching children about snakes, showing them that they aren't the 
        horrible slimy things they're sometimes portrayed as (BNC K1E: 3554).   
  d.  How you view public transport depends very much on where you live (BNC AB6:  
        1084). 
  d'. This exercise shows that the way in which we view the world is completely a 
        question of how we see things and where we're coming from (BNC CEF: 384). 
The following piece of evidence seems to tip the scales away from a prepositional analysis 
again. Qualifying as is not only followed by NPs, but very frequently by APs as well (51a). Yet 
a preposition cannot govern an AP (Hantson 1989: 217; Ogawa 1994: 443-4; Schneider 1997: 
34) — not even in an "exceptional" (Long and Long 1971: 34; Quirk et al. 1985: 1201) or 
"highly uncharacteristic" (Ek and Robat 1984: 320) construction. What is even more, as is 
also occasionally followed by a PP (51b), and it is beyond doubt that a preposition does not 
take a PP as complement (Schneider 1997: 34).35 
(51) a.  The figure of profit Mr Damant regards as most useful is that of maintainable 
        earnings (BNC CBX: 757). 
  b.  To exercise his right to treat the contract as repudiated ..., the buyer must inform 
        the seller that he regards the contract as at an end (BNC H7U: 1041). 
Two ways out of this predicament are suggested by grammarians trying to defend their prepo-
sitional analyses. Inoue (1984) points to the fact that qualifying as clearly prefers NPs over APs 
and particularly over PPs quantitatively. Table 6 presents my BNC corpus results for the three 
                                                 
35 There are some exceptions such as Bill came from near Boston (Rauh 1995: 19), but I feel that they require a 
different analysis. 
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verbs view, think of and regard: as is followed by NPs in more than two thirds of all sentences 
with these verbs in the [NP1 V NP2 as XP]-construction; APs make up only about a fourth of all 
instances, and the quantity of PPs is clearly negligible. 
Table 6: Proportion of NPs, APs, and PPs after qualifying as 
 NP AP PP n 
view 917 
79.2% 
223 
19.3% 
18 
1.6% 
1,158 
think of  62 
68.9% 
25 
27.8% 
3 
3.3% 
90 
regard 2,617 
70.3% 
1,031 
27.7% 
74 
2% 
3,722 
These results are striking, and we will have to concern ourselves seriously with them later 
(see chapter 11.4.6.2). However, they do not lend themselves very easily to an argument for 
as as a preposition because other prepositions such as in and with govern NPs exclusively and 
do not show such a preferential hierarchy. In a discrete grammatical framework, the results of 
table 6 are puzzling and difficult to account for. 
Other grammarians try to come to terms with the variety of phrases followed by the puta-
tive preposition as by analysing the complement of as as a non-finite clause underlyingly: as 
being silly/in high spirits (Ek and Robat 1984: 320; Quirk et al. 1985: 1201). The respective 
cases without a copula would then probably be derived by deleting being. This "quasi-
solution" (Schneider 1997: 34) strikes one as counter-intuitive, though, and was already criti-
cised by Jespersen (1932: 375). As is followed by the non-finite copula in only a minority of 
sentences (according to a BNC-search, in 164 out of 3,661 sentences with regard in the rele-
vant construction, which makes up just 4.5%). It therefore seems more reasonable to argue 
that being is inserted as a stylistic device between as and XP under certain conditions. One 
factor conditioning the occurrence of being is the categorial realisation of XP: being is found 
disproportionately more often before APs (52a) and particularly before PPs (52b) than before 
NPs (52c), as Table 736 illustrates. A reason behind this distributional pattern seems to be that 
NPs are clearly preferred after as, so being is primarily inserted if the XP-slot is realised by the 
less frequent and probably less natural adjectival and prepositional phrases. 
                                                 
36 In this and the contingency tables to follow, the first line of each cell contains the observed frequency, which 
is followed in brackets by the expected frequency. The third line gives the empirical χ2-value for the individual 
cell. Cells that show a significant difference between observed and expected frequencies are brought out by 
shading; if the observed frequency is significantly lower than expected, the cell is lightly shaded, and if it is 
significantly higher than expected, it is darkly shaded. The χ2-value and the ϕ-value for the whole table are given 
below the table. 
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(52) a.  Maybe they do think of themselves as being professional in the same, or similar, 
        sense to that which is commonly understood (BNC FPJ: 1622). 
  b.  The Soviet forces regard this as being of the highest importance and will 
        probably regard the save delivery of the offrs [sic!] as a test of British good faith 
        (BNC FE5: 926). 
  c.  They regard the problems as being a result of the structure of the common 
        agricultural policy (BNC HHV: 10627).37 
Table 7: Comparison of as XP and as being XP across categories 
 NP AP PP n 
as XP 3,681  
(3,577.6) 
χ2=3 
1,185  
(1,254.5) 
χ2=3.9 
58  
(91.9) 
χ2=12.5 
4,924 
as being XP 55  
(158.4) 
χ2=67.5 
125  
(55.5) 
χ2=87 
38  
(4.1) 
χ2=280.3 
218 
n 3,736 1,310 96 5,142 
             χ2=454.2; df=2; highly significant at p<0.001; ϕ=0.3 
The existence of the as being XP-pattern can thus not be used to mount a case for as as a 
preposition because the presumably more basic pattern is much rarer than the typical structure 
without being. As table 7 has shown, the occurrence of being seems to be just a device to 
naturalise APs and particularly PPs in the XP-position. 
An additional argument against the prepositional status of as is the fact that as does not 
govern the case of a following NP. Examples from English are extremely rare (cf. 53a; here, 
us could easily be substituted for we), but equivalent structures in German demonstrate that 
the case of the NP is not determined by the word als, but is dependent on the case of the direct 
object (53b, b' and b''). 
(53) a.    I stammered something about not understanding cricket, totally incredulous that 
          anyone should suppose I did understand it, or that I should regard the English side 
          as 'we' (BNC ADM: 15). 
  b.    John betrachtet seinen Englischlehrer (acc.) als einen guten Pädagogen (acc.). 
  b'.   John glaubt seinem Englischlehrer (dat.) als einem guten Pädagogen (dat.). 
  b''.  John gedenkt seines Englischlehrers (gen.) als eines guten Pädagogen (gen.). 
Table 8 gives a synopsis of the tests used for classifying as as a preposition or a conjunction. 
The coordination data are inconclusive because qualifying as-phrases can be followed by 
functionally equivalent adverbial phrases of any category; similarly, the status of the –ing-
                                                 
37 While the proportion of being before APs is 6.6% and before PPs even 39.6%, it is a mere 1.5% before NPs. A 
considerable number of these exceptional cases seems to be due to additional factors; in two-thirds of the sen-
tences with being before NPs, there is an adverbial or adjectival premodifier before the noun, which seems to 
favour the use of being. This preference could also be brought out in an evaluation test: of 45 informants, 34 
chose (a) with being in front of the premodified NP, and only 11 opted for (b) without being. 
(a)  The US regard Britain as being in general a trustworthy ally (34). 
(b)  The US regard Britain as in general a trustworthy ally (11). 
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form after as remains indeterminate between a gerund and a present participle. The fact that 
stranding is possible with as points in the direction of preposition, yet pertinent examples are 
rare and sometimes doubtful. On the other hand, the fact that as can be followed by APs and 
PPs appears to favour an analysis as conjunction, but then we do not have an explanation for 
the preferential hierarchy of table 6 yet. Finally, as behaves like a conjunction because it is 
transparent for case marking, but this can hardly be tested in English, and evidence from other 
languages must be used with caution. 
Table 8: Summary of preposition/conjunction tests for qualifying as 
 preposition conjunction 
coordination data ?? 
-ing form after as ?? 
preposition stranding (√)  
category of XPs  (√) 
case of XP after as  (√) 
The squish-like syntactic nature of qualifying as does not allow us to unequivocally assign the 
label 'preposition' or 'conjunction' to it. Discrete word classes are not able to capture the many 
peculiar characteristics of as, which straddles the distinction between preposition and con-
junction.38 Most descriptive grammars do not carefully weigh the pros and cons of a preposi-
tional analysis of qualifying as, but opportunistically treat it as a preposition. This allows 
them to integrate the [NP1 V NP2 as XP]-structure more conveniently into their overall frame-
work. If qualifying as is regarded as a preposition, as XP can then be analysed as a preposi-
tional predicative complement as compared to a plain XP complement, in the same way that a 
prepositional object is distinguished from a plain NP object (Downing and Locke 2002: 54; 
Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 54, 216-7; Quirk et al. 1985: 1200). The alleged systematicity 
is reinforced by the claim that the preposition as has "copulative force" (Long 1961: 279; cf. 
also Long and Long 1971: 34; Quirk et al. 1985: 1200) and thus constitutes a "copular prepo-
                                                 
38 There are, however, predicative complements in English which are introduced by more central prepositions 
such as for and into.  
(a)  Mary takes John for a fool. 
(b)  Mary changed the frog into a handsome prince. 
Unlike as, they do not allow APs and PPs as complements, govern case in German and freely allow stranding. 
While for is quite exceptional in this function in English, German für is found much more often and can even be 
followed by an AP and a PP: Ich halte John für dumm/unter meiner Würde — an indication that it is developing 
into a less canonical preposition in German. 
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sition", whereas most other prepositions are "transitive prepositions" (Emonds 1984: 144; 
1985: 264): 
(54) a.  The police accused Bob of [transitive preposition] the murder [prepositional object]. 
  b.  The police regard Bob as [copular preposition] the murderer [prepositional 
        predicative complement]. 
This proposal does not carry great conviction because it opportunistically squeezes the [NP1 V 
NP2 as XP]-structure into a discrete grammatical framework. Apart from the numerous distribu-
tional mismatches that have to be ignored, the analysis in (54b) has nothing to say about the 
semantic differences between plain and 'prepositional' predicative complements, nor does it 
explain why some verbs must have a 'prepositional' predicative complement obligatorily (e.g. 
regard), while others select it only optionally (e.g. consider), and still others do not tolerate it 
at all (e.g. believe). Downing and Locke state that "[s]ome verbs require this; with others it is 
optional" — this is all they and other descriptive grammarians have to say on that score (cf. 
also Allerton 1982: 110).  
 
If we take a step back at this point and review the treatment of secondary-predicate construc-
tions in descriptive grammars, we realise that the complex-transitive analysis is accorded a 
theoretical status quite unjustified by the linguistic facts. Even setting aside semantics, which 
is all but ignored in descriptive grammars, the syntactic analyses are based on spurious analo-
gies and face numerous unresolvable decisions between discrete syntactic functions. (55) 
gives an overview of the problems inherent in the descriptive analyses of the [NP1 V NP2 (to 
be/as) XP]-pattern. 
(55)  
 
 
 
[The  waitress   [considers]   [John] (to be/as)   [a fool]]. 
 
 
 
In view of these difficulties, it is not surprising that generative grammarians such as Aarts 
suggest that "we do away with the superfluous functions of subject predicative and object 
predicative, and admit small clauses into our grammatical terminology" (1997: 339). The 
Pandora's box of small clauses will be opened in the next chapter. 
bivalent or  
trivalent? 
subject or  
direct object? 
argument or  
predicate? 
one clause or  
two clauses? 
conjunction or 
preposition? 
complement 
or adjunct? 
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5. Challenging small-clause analyses of secondary-predicate  
constructions  
5.1 From Subject-to-Object Raising to Small-Clause Theory 
Generative syntax by and large neglected the [NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern up to the 1980s (Aarts 
1992: 9). The focus of the (Extended) Standard Theory was rather on the question of how the 
infinitival complement in Mary believes John to be foolish is related to the finite variant in 
Mary believes that John is foolish (Postal 1974: 4). Picking up an analysis originally sug-
gested by Rosenbaum (1967), Postal and his followers advanced the proposition that such 
finite and infinitival clauses are identical underlyingly, but that, in the non-finite pattern, the 
deep-structure subject has been raised to the matrix object position at surface structure, with a 
concomitant change of the verb form from finite to infinitival (56) (Perlmutter and Soames 
1979: 79, 81-3; Postal 1974: 40-1).  
(56)     S 
 
NP1    VP 
 
                V       S 
 
      NP2  VP 
 
              Mary           believes                John is foolish → to be foolish 
 
This 'Subject-to-Object Raising' analysis tries to capture the characteristic facts also noticed in 
descriptive grammars (cf. 4.2) that the NP2 seems to function as the semantic subject of the 
infinitive but has the grammatical qualities of a direct object. The derivation sketched in (56), 
which was assumed to be triggered by verbs such as believe and consider (Postal 1974: 297-
8), was regularly contrasted with the so-called 'Equi-NP-Deletion'-analysis suggested for verbs 
such as persuade and urge, which were taken to bear both a syntactic and a logical relation to 
their objects. In a sentence such as Mary forced John to leave, a second occurrence of the NP 
John was posited in the subject position of the infinitival clause, which was thought to have 
been deleted at surface structure because it is identical with the object of the main verb forced 
(Borkin 1984: 4).  
The Raising-analysis of (56) was extended from infinitival clauses to [NP2 as XP]-
complements as well: [NP2 as XP] was argued to form a clause at deep structure but to have 
been broken up at surface structure, where NP2 functions as the derived object of the matrix 
verb in the same way as in the infinitival pattern (Postal 1974: 240-1). Like some descriptive 
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grammarians (cf. 4.3),  Postal analysed as in She regards him as a fool as governing a verbal 
–ing-complement (as being a fool) underlyingly, with the copula having been deleted in the 
derived structure (1974: 240; cf. also Borkin 1984: 5-6; Hantson 1989: 212-3). The sugges-
tion that a clause underlies the NP2 XP-pattern as well (cf. Menzel 1973: 16-7; Stockwell, 
Schachter and Partee 1973: 578) did not figure prominently in the Raising debate, though.  
It was not before the framework of GB-theory was established (Chomsky 1981) that the 
[NP1 V NP2 XP]-structure captured the attention of generative linguists (Aarts 1992: 12) within 
the new concept of 'Small-Clause theory'. This concept posed a challenge to the Raising 
analysis because it tried to accommodate the phenomenon in a different way. NP2 (to be/ as) 
XP-strings were now analysed as clauses at all levels of derivation, including surface structure. 
The deconstruction of the traditional Raising analysis had already begun ten years earlier, 
however, when Chomsky claimed that finite and infinitival structures form clausal constitu-
ents both underlyingly and in the derived structure, i.e. that NP2 in the infinitival variant has 
not been moved to the object position of the superordinate clause (1972: 6-7). Chomsky's 
original criticisms of Subject-to-Object Raising were not always well-grounded and are 
largely obsolete today, but the spirit of his suggestion has nevertheless caught on. Small-
Clause-theoreticians have pressed the matter even further, arguing that not only finite that-
clauses and infinitival clauses, but verbless NP2 XP-strings as well should be treated as clauses 
at all levels of derivation, and that the three complement structures differ only in their internal 
form (finite verb, non-finite verb, no verb). The verbless 'NP2 XP'-string, or 'small clause' (SC), 
has assumed a determining role in GB-theory because the subject/predicate relationship in-
stantiated by the NP2 XP-string is thought to be a reflection of its clausal status even in the ab-
sence of an ordinary verb phrase (Aarts 1992: 21; Basilico 2003: 1; Stowell 1995: 272).39 The 
square brackets around Mary intelligent in (57a) indicate that an SC is analysed as one clausal 
constituent occupying the direct-object position in the matrix sentence on a par with finite and 
non-finite clauses (57b, c). 
(57) a.  John considers [SC Mary intelligent]. 
  b.  John believes [that Mary is intelligent]. 
  c.  John believes [Mary to be intelligent]. 
What appears to be a completely unprecedented and unorthodox proposal had one notable 
predecessor in the first half of the 20th century: the Dane Otto Jespersen. Jespersen draws a 
                                                 
39 The term 'SC' is also frequently applied to structures where XP is an uninflected verb such as a bare infinitive, 
an –ing-form or a past participle (e.g. Mary made John leave the house; The waitress saw him drinking his 
coffee; Mary got Fred invited to her party) (e.g. Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 111-2). Since these verbal SCs 
differ crucially from non-verbal SCs both syntactically and semantically (Aarts 1992: 189; Basilico 2003: 2-3), 
they do not fall within the purview of this dissertation. 
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distinction between what he calls a 'junction' and a 'nexus'; the former structure expresses a 
single idea through the combination of a core semantic element and an adjunct enriching its 
description (e.g. a beautiful rose), while the latter construction contains two ideas that stand 
in a subject/predicate relationship with each other (e.g. the rose is beautiful): "A junction is 
like a picture, a nexus like a process or a drama" (Jespersen 1924: 116). Jespersen then goes 
on to distinguish between nexus structures which occur independently — essentially simple 
sentences — and those which cannot occur on their own (1940: 6). Such 'dependent nexus 
structures' include finite subordinate clauses (e.g. I think that the rose is beautiful), non-finite 
structures (e.g. I like roses to be beautiful), and, Jespersen claims, predicative NP2 XP-strings 
(e.g. John considers the rose beautiful) (1924: 117-23, 1940: 7-8). Jespersen provides the 
following abstract functional representations of nexus-objects, where 'S2' stands for the second 
subject in the sentence and 'P' for the predicate of the dependent nexus structure. Like modern 
descriptive grammars, Jespersen differentiates between current objects (58a) and resultant 
objects, which he represents as 'Or' (58b) (1924: 122, 1940: 8). (58c) and (58d) are the de-
scriptions of the functionally equivalent infinitival and finite clauses, respectively, and (58e) 
the corresponding structure with the 'particle' (p) as before the secondary predicate (1932: 
375, 1940: 12). The four structures (S2 P), (S2 I P), (S2 V2 P) and (S2 p P) are consequently 
treated by Jespersen as functionally equivalent expressions that only differ in the formal reali-
sation of the dependent subject/predicate relationship (1924: 117-23). 
(58) a.  They considered Tom a happy man: S V O(S2 P) 
  b.  They elected Tom President: S V Or(S2 P) 
  c.  I considered Tom to be a happy man: S V O(S2 I P) 
  d.  I believed that Tom was a happy man: S V O(S2 V2 P) 
  e.  He regarded Tom as a happy man: S V O(S2 p P) 
The idea that the direct objects in (58a, b) and (58e) are realised by subordinate verbless 
clauses, which establish a predicative link of their own, was and still is anything but conven-
tional. Yet Jespersen went one step further still in bucking traditional analyses: he argues that 
if in a sentence such as They made him President the postverbal elements form a nexus-
object, then the corresponding passive sentence He was made President must contain a dis-
continuous nexus-subject, namely "He...President" (1924: 123, 1933: 312).40 SC-theory has 
adopted Jespersen's verbless dependent nexus structures in essence if not detail. While the 
                                                 
40 Not everyone of Jespersen's followers was prepared to go all the way with him. The German linguist Ham-
merich, who on the whole espoused Jespersen's account of dependent nexus structures, was a bit more cautious 
about the analysis of passive sentences. While he admits that in a sentence like "der Sohn wurde Johannes ge-
tauft" the logical subject should be the nexus "der Sohn Johannes", he feels urged to concede: "Aber das 
Sprachbewusstsein fasst den Zusammenhang sicher anders auf, nämlich als der Sohn (S) wurde Johannes getauft 
(P)" (1930: 307). 
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treatment of active sentences is almost identical, the modern distinction between deep and 
surface structure made it possible to replace Jespersen's clumsy notion of discontinuous nexus 
subjects in passive sentences with the more elegant analysis of (59). The NP He has been 
raised from the subject position in the SC to be the subject of the main clause, leaving behind 
a trace t. The moved constituent He and the trace are co-indexed (cf. Aarts 1992: 21). 
(59) Hei was made [SC ti president]. 
Jespersen's suggestion to analyse NP2 XP-strings as clauses both semantically and syntactically 
had lain dormant for almost 50 years, when SC-theory arrived at similar conclusions within a 
completely different syntactic framework. Stowell (1981, 1983) was the first to revisit the 
possibility that NP2 XP-strings constitute verbless clauses at all syntactic levels, and has 
thereby touched off one of the liveliest discussions in generative grammar to date. The GB-
framework offered a fresh conceptual basis for this proposal because many of its principles 
barred the descriptive complex-transitive analysis or a hybrid analysis such as the Raising 
proposal, where a clausal constituent is assumed to be present at D-structure and two separate 
constituents are postulated for S-structure. To keep our discussion within bounds, I will out-
line the basic ideas behind these GB-principles only. 
The lexical entry of a verb is generally thought to spell out the number and nature of the 
arguments selected by that verb (Grewendorf 2002: 18-9; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 25). 
According to the Theta-Criterion, one of the central principles of GB-theory, each thematic or 
theta role (θ-role) associated with a verb must be realised by one and only one argument in 
the syntax, and each argument may be assigned one and only one θ-role (Aarts 1992: 19; 
Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 28). This "biunique relation between arguments and θ-roles" 
(Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 30) prohibits the complex-transitive analysis, in which NP2 is 
both the direct object of the main verb and the subject of the predicative complement because 
it would be assigned two θ-roles. The Raising analysis would not violate this principle be-
cause NP2 is thought by Postal and his followers to be assigned a thematic role only by the 
subordinate predicate (XP) and not to bear a thematic relation with the matrix verb. 
As a result of the Theta-Criterion, it must be argued by proponents of GB-theory that a 
matrix verb such as consider does not select a direct-object NP, but assigns a propositional θ-
role to the whole string [John foolish] (Chomsky 1986a: 90-1; Kaplan 1988: 78). This seman-
tic claim follows mainly from the uniqueness requirement of the Theta-Criterion, whereas the 
following independent semantic arguments given in the literature are rather feeble:  
(i) Rafel surmises that the postverbal string must form a semantic clause because the sub-
ject/predicate relationship between NP2 and XP "can be independently established within a 
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copular sentence" (2002: 475). As has already been noted in 4.1.3, the copula sentence John is 
a fool is not necessarily entailed by Mary considers John a fool, so there is no sound semantic 
basis for arguing that it must be assumed to underlie the latter structure.  
(ii) Proponents of SC-theory frequently mention the semantic affinity between the NP2 
XP-string and infinitival or finite subordinate clauses and claim that these are alternative for-
mal realisations of the same semantic unit (e.g. Aarts 1992: 70; Rothstein 1995: 32; Staud-
inger 1996: 28). Since consider selects a subordinate clause in Mary considers that John is a 
fool and in Mary considers John to be a fool, the "truth-conditionally equivalent" (Rothstein 
1995: 32) or "interpretive similar[.]" (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 110) structure Mary con-
siders John a fool is argued to contain a (verbless) subordinate clause as well (Chomsky 
1981: 106; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 109; Rothstein 1995: 29). Hoekstra goes on to claim 
that "[t]he minimal hypothesis would be that the same thematic roles are assigned ..., the sin-
gle difference being that the internal role is now borne by a small clause instead of a full 
clause" in the NP2 XP-pattern (1992: 147; similarly, Staudinger 1996: 123).41 Two objections 
must be raised against this 'minimal hypothesis', though. First of all, the three structures 
claimed to be paraphrases of one another are not synonymous, and one cannot felicitously be 
exchanged for the other in most cases. If I consider John a fool and I find John a fool are sim-
ply paraphrased by I consider that John is a fool and I find that John is a fool, important 
meaning distinctions have to a considerable degree fallen by the wayside (see chapter 11). 
Moreover, infinitival or finite variants are not available for resultative and depictive (and even 
some qualifying) structures at all (cf. She shot John dead; She served the coffee hot; They re-
gard him as a genius). My second objection is related to the first one and concerns the argu-
ment that NP2 and XP must form a clause because there is a clause in the similar finite and in-
finitival structures as well. This sort of reasoning is dubious and has already been criticised by 
Marty as "Fehler der Substitution eines verwandten Satzes an Stelle der unbefangenen Inter-
pretation des gegebenen" (in Eisenmeier, Kastil and Kraus 1918: 290). From a Construction-
grammar perspective, syntactically distinct constructions cannot simply be claimed to be se-
                                                 
41 Chomsky (1981: 38) and other generative grammarians argue that the material contained in lexical entries can 
be restricted to semantic information, so that the categorial realisation of an argument ideally follows from its 
semantics alone. Verbs that take a propositional argument will have this argument realised as a clause, i.e. as a 
structurally defined subject/predicate relationship (Rothstein 1992: 119-21). When different formal realisations 
of an argument are possible, as is the case with the finite, infinitival and small-clause variants of the proposi-
tional argument, only the so-called 'Canonical Structural Realisation' (CSR) automatically follows from the 
meaning of the argument, while alternative syntactic realisations must be specified in the lexical entry of a verb 
as marked options (Chomsky 1986a: 87-90; Kaplan 1988: 86; Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1992: 249-50). Since 
the CSR of the 'propositional argument' is usually taken to be a full clause, infinitival clauses and particularly 
SCs must be explicitly stated in the lexical entries of the respective verbs as marked encodings of the proposi-
tional θ-role (Aarts 1992: 70; Kaplan 1988: 79, 85-6). 
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mantically identical; to speak with Marty: "Derselbe Tatbestand kann Anlaß zu einer Mehr-
heit inhaltlich verwandter Urteile ... geben, und auch wenn mit dem Gegebensein des einen 
ein anderes ... nahe liegt, so ist damit gar nicht gesagt, daß sie identisch seien" (in Eisenmeier, 
Kastil and Kraus 1918: 292).  
(iii) If consider selects a propositional argument, it cannot assign a θ-role to the NP2, so 
this noun phrase must be shown to be not a semantic argument of the main verb. To prove this 
contention, it is claimed that in a sentence such as Mary considers John a fool, Mary does not 
consider 'John' but the proposition 'that John is a fool' (cf. Aarts 1992: 22; Chomsky 1986a: 
91). Likewise, since a sentence such as I consider the problem difficult does not entail I con-
sider the problem, the noun phrase the problem is thought to be an argument of the main verb 
in the latter, but not the former structure (Rafel 2001: 476; Rothstein 1995: 31, 2000: 243). 
Yet the entailment relation between the two sentences with consider is only permissible if we 
suppose that we are dealing with the same meaning of the verb. However, it seems more rea-
sonable to argue that consider in He's considering the problem is a dynamic verb denoting a 
thinking process, while in He considers the problem difficult it has a static meaning, express-
ing a subjectively stored opinion (Schneider 1988b: 59-70, 346-50). As a corollary of this, it 
can be argued that the dynamic sememe is bivalent, whereas the static one is trivalent, so that 
an entailment relation cannot be felicitously construed. In a Construction-grammar frame-
work, consider would be argued to fill the roles in two semantically different syntactic con-
structions, and it is not legitimate to explain its behaviour in one construction with that in the 
other. 
Although the claim that verbs such as consider select a propositional argument is no-
where meticulously argued for and is not based on reliable semantic tests, the bivalent nature 
of such verbs is generally thought to be sufficiently established by the provisions of the 
Theta-Criterion.  
Once the lexical requirements of a verb are determined, it must be examined how they 
are projected into syntax. The D-structure format of representation constitutes an interface 
between the lexicon and syntax because the syntactic configurations at that level directly mir-
ror the thematic relations between a verb and its arguments (Grewendorf 2002: 15). The D-
structure representation would parse our example sentence as [Mary] considers [John a fool]. 
In earlier versions of generative grammar, the derivational component could raise the NP John 
to the direct-object position of the main verb, so that consider would have two postverbal 
complements at surface structure: [Mary] considers [Johni] [ti a fool]. Yet the introduction of 
the Projection Principle in Chomsky 1981 (32-3) required a tight correspondence between the 
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argument structure as determined by the Theta-Criterion and syntactic representation: infor-
mation given in the argument structure of a verb must be represented categorically at each 
syntactic level, i.e. not only at D-structure, but at S-structure (and LF) as well (Grewendorf 
2002: 20; Kaplan 1988: 78). This means that if a verb selects a propositional argument, the 
verb must have a propositional argument at all levels of grammar; similarly, if the verb does 
not subcategorise for a direct-object argument, it cannot have a direct-object argument at any 
level, contra the Raising account (Aarts 1992: 23; Cook and Newson 1996: 166; Hoekstra 
1988: 106). The SC-analysis is in keeping with the strict requirements of the Projection Prin-
ciple because a verb such as consider assigns a θ-role to a proposition and this proposition 
remains intact as a syntactic constituent at S-structure. NP2 is not moved to a direct-object po-
sition, which is not subcategorised for by the verb and cannot be created at S-structure only. 
[Mary] considers [John a fool] is thus both the D-structure and the S-structure representation 
of the sentence (Chomsky 1981: 32-3, 1986a: 90-1). 
One final reason for favouring SC-analyses in GB-theory lies in the requirements of the 
categorial component of grammar (for more details see 5.3). Both the complex-transitive 
analysis and the Raising analysis (at surface structure) assume that a verb such as consider has 
two phrases as sisters: 
(60)       V' 
 
   V NP XP/VP 
 
  consider    John    a fool/ to be a fool 
Such ternary branching is prohibited by more recent developments in the theory of the cate-
gorial component, however. The new postulate that branching must be binary is, like the 
Theta-Criterion, based on theoretical rather than empirical arguments and is explained slightly 
differently from author to author. Kayne, an early proponent of binary branching, argues that 
there is an 'unambiguous-path' requirement on government, which is violated by the configu-
ration in (60). NP and XP/VP must both be governed by the verb in this structure; yet, Kayne 
claims, there is no unambiguous path from either NP or XP/VP to the governor V because if one 
traced the path from, say, NP, one would have to make a choice between the branch leading to 
V and the branch leading to XP/VP. Since government is subject to the unambiguous-path re-
quirement, the branch leading to XP/VP would be in violation of this injunction (Kayne 1984: 
130-2). Kayne consequently argues for the alternative configuration (61), where V unambigu-
ously governs the subordinate clause and XP/VP unambiguously governs its subject NP (1984: 
133-5). 
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(61)    V' 
 
   V   S 
 
    NP  XP 
 
 consider     John       a fool/ to be a fool 
Whatever the particular theoretical reasons offered for the binary-branching requirement in 
GB-theory or the MP, it has become the consensus opinion in generative syntax (e.g. Wilder 
1994: 220) and has conspired with the Theta-Criterion and the Projection Principle to disal-
low the Raising analysis, or, for that matter, the complex-transitive complementation analysis, 
and to favour the SC-analysis.42 
The treatment of NP2 XP-strings as SCs has become the standard view in generative text-
books43 (e.g. Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 109), and some syntacticians have taken up the 
notion so enthusiastically that they apply SC-analyses "to almost every other construction in 
one form or another" (Stowell 1995: 271; cf. also Moro 1995: 109). Yet despite the volumi-
nous literature on SCs published in the last two decades, most of the details of the SC-analysis 
still command no consensus (Aarts 1992: 21; Basilico 2003: 1; Ogawa 1994: 447; Suzuki 
1991: 27), and the Raising analysis surfaces in the literature from time to time despite its hav-
ing being banished from mainstream generative grammar as a "heresy" (Koster 1984: 445) — 
a fact that is frequently lamented by Raising proponents (cf. Hantson 1989: 207; Koster 1984: 
445; Postal and Pullum 1988: 665). There are basically two issues that still provoke animated 
discussions with regard to the SC-analysis: the first concerns the fundamental question if SCs 
really form clausal constituents, with NP2 representing the subject of a verbless clause (Naka-
jima 1991a: 3-4; Williams 1983: 287). In other words, is there really a clause boundary be-
tween the matrix verb and NP2, i.e. are NP2 and XP exhaustively dominated by some SC-node? 
In purely semantic terms, dependent nexus objects a.k.a. SCs make sense because they offer a 
disarmingly easy solution to the predicative relationship between NP2 and XP — the sub-
ject/predicate relation is simply a direct reflection of the fact that the two phrases form a 
clause (Stowell 1995: 272). Yet the concept of SCs is not so easy to swallow in syntactic 
terms because NP2 has a number of typical direct-object characteristics and the NP2 XP-string 
                                                 
42 The Projection Principle is no longer valid in the MP, which has done away with the distinction between D-
structure and S-structure; Theta Theory and particularly the binary-branching requirement still force the SC-
analysis in this framework, though (Kleanthes K. Grohmann, p.c.).  
43 The SC-analysis has not, however, influenced the description of the phenomenon in reference grammars to 
any considerable degree. The notion 'SC' is, for example, merely mentioned cursorily in a footnote in Huddleston 
and Pullum (2002: 218, footnote 5). Biber et al. only speak of verbless clauses in cases such as "Although not a 
classic, this ... video is worth watching", where the subject of the adverbial clause is controlled by the subject of 
the main clause (1999: 201). Even though descriptive and generative grammars often tackle the same linguistic 
problems, the theory-laden analyses of generative grammar do not readily translate into a descriptive framework. 
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does not exhibit any overt clausal features. It thus has to be proved that a matrix verb like 
consider "subcategorises semantically and syntactically for a proposition rather than for two 
separate arguments" (Aarts 1992: 37). The semantic fact that there is a subject/predicate rela-
tion is only a necessary condition for an SC-analysis, which must be combined with the syn-
tactic fact that we are dealing with an NP2 XP-constituent. To qualify as a clause, the NP2 XP-
construct must be satisfactory on both counts. Since this discussion is concerned with the very 
existence of SCs as syntactic entities, Stowell has aptly characterised SCs as "the black holes 
of syntactic theory" because "most of the discussion about them has been devoted to the ques-
tion of whether they exist" (1995: 271).  
The second issue builds on the first one: if one accepts that the NP XP-string constitutes a 
clausal constituent, the categorial status of the SC-node dominating this string must be de-
scribed within the narrow confines imposed by the categorial component of grammar. The 
first issue can and will be couched in largely theory-neutral terms (5.2); the question of the 
categorial status of the SC-node is inextricably linked to the framework of generative gram-
mar, though. Since formal structural descriptions are the generativists' weapons of choice, we 
have no alternative but to pick up these weapons as well (5.3). 
5.2 Attempts to prove the existence of a black hole: are small clauses  
syntactic entities? 
Before going on to more special and frequently theory-internal problems, most publications 
on SCs begin by furnishing several pieces of evidence in favour of the SC-analysis. A consid-
erable part of this evidence has become received wisdom in SC-theory and is simply handed 
down from author to author without being critically re-examined. It is my intention to sift 
through the putative evidence for SCs and to subject it to a more extensive and focused analy-
sis than is usually done. Since the arguments for SCs as syntactic entities fall into the two 
broad categories of constituency tests and tests trying to demonstrate the subject status of NP2, 
I will arrange my discussion accordingly. 
5.2.1 A critical look at constituency tests 
In order to demonstrate the constituency of the NP2 XP-string, a number of structural environ-
ments have been identified that are assumed to be sensitive to the constituency of syntactic 
phrases.44 Five such structural conditions recur in the literature time and again: (a) constituent 
                                                 
44 An interesting exception is Wallace, who tries to come at the problem from another angle. He asks the psycho-
linguistic question if "native speakers really treat SCs as units or not" (1998: 129) and looks for answers by hav-
ing paraphrases of sentences containing NP2 XP-strings evaluated by volunteers; some of those paraphrases con-
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coordination, (b) independent NP XP-strings, (c) NP XP-strings in subject position, (d) adver-
bials between NP2 and XP, and (e) the syntactic behaviour of nominals derived from matrix 
verbs such as believe or consider. I will take them up in the order stated. 
 
(a) Constituent coordination 
In a coordination structure, two or more syntactic elements of the same kind are conjoined by 
a conjunction, typically and (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 27; Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 
66). Since it is commonly assumed that only constituents allow coordination, the elements 
that can be related in a coordination structure are usually identified as constituents (Aarts 
1992: 37; Sportiche 1995: 289). The following sentences demonstrate that NP2 (as) XP-strings 
can be coordinated, which would imply that they form constituents as well (cf. Aarts 1992: 
37, 113): 
(62) a.  I consider [this man an idiot] and [that man a genius].      (from Aarts 1992: 37)  
  b.  I had few friends, ..., but on the infrequent occasions when we met I could see  
        from their faces that they pitied me, finding me foolish and Syl a bore (BNC G06: 
        104). 
  c.  I couldn't stop myself thinking that Estella would consider Joe's boots too thick 
        and his hands too coarse, and our whole family common (BNC EPU: 502). 
  d.  Though born in Britain, he regards himself as a citizen of Europe and Italy as 
        his adopted home (BNC K9C: 482).  
If the hypothesis that only constituents can be coordinated were airtight, then the highlighted 
strings above would demarcate SC-constituents. The following data are inconsistent with this 
hypothesis, however. The highlighted sequences in (63) cannot be coordinated arguments of 
their respective verbs because they consist of two constituents each — at least in the standard 
analyses of these structures: 
(63) a.  I gave this man five pounds and that man ten pounds. 
  b.  I convinced Mary of my opinion and John of my wife's opinion. 
  c.  I sent John to New York and Mary to Washington. 
Two different conclusions can be drawn from these data. It can either be argued that the 
strings [this man five pounds], [Mary of my opinion], and [John to New York] do form clause-
like constituents in a way that would have to be specified further, or that the coordination test 
                                                                                                                                                        
tain two constituents, and some only one. Although his testing procedures are laudable (1998: 129-31), the lin-
guistic foundations of his study are doubtful. A sentence such as Sue doesn't need Chris on the team is para-
phrased by the presumed one-constituent sentences Sue doesn't need Chris to be on the team and ??For Chris to 
be on the team, Sue doesn't need and the putative two-constituent sentences It is Chris that Sue doesn't need on 
the team and ??To be on the team is what Sue doesn't need of Chris; a group of native speakers then has to 
evaluate the relative (un)acceptability of these paraphrases (Wallace 1998: 130). While it is generally problem-
atic to make inferences about the structure or semantics of one construction from a structurally or semantically 
related construction, the inclusion of marginally acceptable sentences casts even more doubt on such an under-
taking. Moreover, the results Wallace obtains do not permit a clear decision in favour of either the constituent or 
the non-constituent hypothesis (1998: 133-4). 
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is able to conjoin non-constituents as well in some cases. Sportiche opts for the first alterna-
tive because she claims that coordination is "[o]ne of the most robust tests of constituency" 
(1995: 289); by contrast, Aarts concedes that "coordination evidence is not wholly reliable, 
and we should perhaps regard it as suggestive at best" (1992: 113). I tend towards the latter 
opinion and think that it is intuitively more plausible to accommodate the data above as 
marked cases of non-constituent coordination rather than as cases of coordinated (small) 
clauses.  
Thus, a more viable approach would be to claim that it is not the strings [this man five 
pounds] and [that man ten pounds] that are coordinated in (63a), but that we are dealing with 
two conjoined VPs (or even sentences), the verb (and maybe even the subject) being elliptical 
in the second conjunct because it is recoverable from the first: I [gave this man five pounds] 
and [(gave) that man ten pounds] or [I gave this man five pounds] and [(I) (gave) that man ten 
pounds]. A similar structural representation can then be used as a means to disconfirm the 
claim of SC-theoreticians that the highlighted sequences in (62) must be constituents: [I con-
sider this man an idiot] and [(I) (consider) that man a genius]. If both constituents and non-
constituents can be coordinated, the question arises how non-constituent coordination based 
on ellipsis can be distinguished from true constituent coordination as in John and Mary went 
to New York or I admire Bach and love Beethoven. One indication is stress: elliptical con-
structions are usually accompanied by contrastive stress on the non-constituent conjuncts, 
while there is no comparable focus on coordinated constituents (Hayashi 1991: 15; Hoeksema 
1991: 683-5; Sag et al. 1985: 161): I consider thi s man an idiot and that man a genius. This 
quality of contrast can be regarded as the hallmark of elliptical coordination structures; all the 
elements that are not part of the contrast are left out in the second conjunct so that the con-
trasting elements can be more effectively put into relief. 
From a Construction-grammar perspective, I prefer the following insertion analysis to the 
ellipsis account: 
(64)  
 
   I      consider     this man      an idiot          and                           that man     a genius. 
 
The same construction type is coordinated, with only the third and fourth elements of the con-
juncts being different. It is therefore enough if the second conjunct simply provides the differ-
ing and contrasting constructional fillers because they can easily be associated with the rele-
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vant roles of the immediately preceding construction.45 Among other things, this representa-
tion does not force us to decide if only the verb or the verb plus the subject are elliptical in the 
second conjunct. No matter if we prefer the ellipsis or the insertion analysis, though, it is clear 
that the bracketed strings in (62) need not be regarded as true constituents. 
 
(b) Independent NP XP-strings 
Predicative NP XP-strings that occur independently of a main verb are another commonly in-
voked criterion for SC-constituency. Aarts presents the short conversation in (65), where the 
bracketed string should, in his view, be analysed as a clause because it establishes a sub-
ject/predicate relation on its own (Aarts 1992: 38): 
(65) A. Do you consider that man an idiot? 
  B. [That man an idiot?] You must be joking!        (from Aarts 1992: 38) 
However, the string [That man an idiot] again lends itself more easily to an ellipsis or inser-
tion account. The verb consider is not repeated in B's reply, but it can easily be computed 
from the preceding question. A similar example with give impedes drawing the conclusion 
that the two elements form an independent clause because the relation holding between My 
car and to that woman is clearly dependent on the predicate give in the sentence before: 
(66) A. Did you give your car to that woman? 
  B. My car to that woman? You must be joking! 
Again, contrastive stress on the elements My  car and to that woman as well as on That man 
and an i diot indicates that the highlighted strings in (65) and (66) do not consist of one, but of 
two constituents each. Ellipsis or constructional insertion thus seems to be possible across 
speakers in discourse as well: "In the give-and-take of conversation, the speaker and the ad-
dressee leave out what is easily recoverable from the linguistic or situational context ... In 
conversation, a minimum amount of form is put to maximum use" (Biber et al. 1999: 157; cf. 
also Jackendoff 2002: 394). Significantly, such independently occurring elliptical structures, 
which Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor aptly call "Incredulity Response Construction[s]" (1988: 
511), are restricted to "echo-contexts" and cannot be used at the beginning of a conversation 
(Radford 1988: 330): A. *Your car to that woman? A related, but somewhat special case are 
signs such as [Doors open] or newspaper headlines such as [The president dead!] (cf. Aarts 
1992: 39), where the predicate (usually a form of be) is left out for reasons of space, but can 
                                                 
45 Interestingly, a contrast between two elements seems to be the maximum; if the second conjunct differs from 
the first in three elements, the coordination structure becomes difficult to process: ??John considers this man a 
fool and Mary that man an idiot (cf. Culicover and Wilkins 1986: 141; Postal 1974: 129-30).  
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again easily be supplied — this time not from the linguistic context, but from the knowledge 
speakers of English have of related unshortened copula constructions.  
 
(c) NP XP-strings as subjects 
If predicative NP XP-strings are clauses, some explanation must be provided for the fact that 
their occurrence is virtually restricted to postverbal position, while infinitival and finite 
clauses can also form the (extraposed) subject of sentences: 
(67) a. That John loses in tennis is very unusual./ It is very unusual that John loses in 
       tennis. 
  b. For John to lose in tennis is very unusual./ It is very unusual for John to lose in 
       tennis. 
  c. *John a loser in tennis is very unusual./ *It is very unusual for John a loser in tennis. 
Safir confronts this problem head-on by pointing to the fact that copula sentences exception-
ally allow 'honorary NPs' as subjects, i.e. phrases that are barred from NP-positions in other 
sentences, such as the PP in "Under the bed is a cozy spot" (vs. "*Under the bed pleased the 
cat") or the past participle in "Unwanted is a terrible way to feel" (vs. "*Unwanted would 
please the cat") (1983: 731). He goes on to claim that SCs can also act as 'honorary NPs' in 
copula constructions: 
(68) a. Workers angry about the pay is just the sort of situation that the ad campaign was  
       designed to avoid.             (from Safir 1983: 732; my emphasis) 
  b. Men nude on the street appears to be the puritan's worst nightmare.  
                   (from Starke 1995: 263, footnote 7) 
  c. John and Bob as chairmen is a good idea.     (adapted from Aarts 1992: 113) 
Safir maintains that workers angry about the pay in (68a) is not a normal postmodified NP 
because it does not trigger plural agreement on the copula, but is an SC that, like other 
clauses, induces singular agreement (1983: 732-3; similarly, Aarts 1992: 44; Haegeman and 
Guéron 1999: 120). If it is further accepted that the subject position can only be occupied by 
true constituents, the data in (68) seem to indicate that SCs are constituents (Contreras 1987: 
226; Stowell 1983: 299). From this piece of evidence Safir concludes that all NP XP-strings, 
including those that occur postverbally, must be SCs: "since one is forced to accept some 
CISCs [clausally interpreted SCs; H.S.] as constituents, it is reasonable to assume that the 
world is as simple as possible", so "any clausally interpreted construction ... is a constituent in 
syntax" (1983: 733-4). 
The world is more complicated, though. For one thing, Safir's account does not offer an 
explanation for the fact that SCs can only function as 'honorary NP'-subjects in copula clauses, 
while finite and non-finite clauses are under no such constraint (cf. 67). Moreover, if the high-
lighted strings in (68) are really clauses, it is not clear why a bare XP cannot be realised by an 
NP as well: *John and Bob chairmen is a good idea. Pace Safir, I agree with Baltin that it is in 
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fact possible to analyse workers in (68a) as an ordinary NP subject that is postmodified by an 
adjectival phrase (Baltin 1998: 514). The disparity between plural subject and singular copula 
can be explained by notional agreement between the subject and the verb if workers angry 
about the pay is interpreted as a situation (cf. The situation that workers are angry about the 
pay is something the ad campaign was designed to avoid). Baltin offers examples of notional 
agreement where the highlighted strings are clearly not clauses but ordinary NPs (69a, a') 
(1998: 514); along the same lines, (69b) and (69c) are paraphrases of (68b) and (68c), respec-
tively: 
(69) a.  Several angry workers is just the sort of situation ... 
  a'. Workers who are angry about the pay is just the sort of situation ...  
               (from Baltin 1998: 514; my emphasis) 
  b.  Nude men on the streets is the puritans' worst nightmare. 
  c.  John applying for the post of first chairman and Bob applying for the 
        post of vice-chairman is a good idea. 
In view of these sentences, Safir's argument that the subject position can be used to demon-
strate the constituency of predicative NP XP-strings collapses in itself. 
 
(d) Adverbial modification of NP2 XP-strings 
Since adverbials with sentential scope modify the whole clausal constituent in which they 
occur, they are regularly adduced by adherents of SC-theory to demonstrate that NP2 XP-
strings form clausal constituents. Adverbials of time and frequency are, as a rule, not possible 
between NP2 and (as) XP (*John considers Mary today/frequently ill-tempered), for reasons 
that are explained independently in SC-theory (see 5.3.3), so we have to restrict our discus-
sion to modal adverbials. SC-theoreticians would argue that the scope of probably in (70a, a') 
extends over the whole bracketed string but not the rest of the sentence, which means that this 
string must be a clause (Aarts 1992: 45; Stowell 1991a: 189-90). To substantiate this conclu-
sion, Aarts shows that (70a) can be paraphrased by a true subordinate clause (70b), but, he 
continues, it cannot be rephrased as (70c), where the sentence adverbial is in the main clause 
and modifies the matrix proposition (1992: 45-6). 
(70) a.  I must admit that I have found [these summer international schools probably the 
        most rewarding part of my work].             (from Aarts 1992: 45; my emphasis) 
  a'.  Robertson regards [France as probably the most sinister and duplicitous force in 
        the EC] (BNC ECU: 1239). 
  b.  I must admit that I have found that [these summer international schools are 
        probably the most rewarding part of my work].    (from Aarts 1992: 46; my emphasis) 
  c.  I must admit that I have probably found [these summer international schools the 
        most rewarding part of my work].             (from Aarts 1992: 46; my emphasis) 
I can think of two lines of attack against this argumentation. Firstly, if NP2 (as) XP-strings 
really formed clausal constituents, then they should not tolerate adverbials that modify the 
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main proposition. Yet such main-clause adverbials are possible between NP2 and (as) XP, con-
trary to the predictions of SC-theory (71a, a'), while they are not found in true subordinate 
clauses (71b). What is more, sentence (71c) with an NP2 as XP-string and (71c') with a subor-
dinate that-clause differ in meaning, with the adverb modifying the main clause in the former 
(meaning: 'it is easy to assume that Bob is the elder brother') and the subordinate clause in the 
latter example (meaning: 'you could think that Bob is a lot older than his brother') (cf. Borkin 
1984: 36; Postal 1974: 146-7). 
(71) a.  We considered Bush among ourselves as the probable winner.  
                     (from Hoeksema 1991: 703; my emphasis) 
  a'.  Mary considers her dog — correctly I'm afraid — her best friend.  
        (from Hoeksema 1991: 703; my emphasis) 
  b.  *Jane believes that Bob, if I am not mistaken, is Hungarian.  
               (from Postal 1974: 146; my emphasis) 
  c.  ?You could regard Bob easily as the elder brother.46 
  c'. You could think that Bob is easily the elder brother. 
If adverbials between NP2 and (as) XP modify the main clause and not a subordinate proposi-
tion as they do in that-clauses, NP2 (as) XP-strings are apparently not clausal at all. To account 
for a sentence such as (70a), where probably does not have main-clause scope, I must come to 
my second objection against the adverbial test as used by SC-proponents. (70a) and (70b) are 
similar in meaning, but they can be argued to differ in structure. In (70b), probably undoubt-
edly has sentential scope and modifies the validity of the proposition expressed in the subor-
dinate clause. Yet it is not so clear that it has sentential scope in (70a), too. Probably could as 
well be part of the NP the most rewarding part of my work and merely restrict the validity of 
this NP, rather than that of the whole bracketed string. Several pieces of evidence actually fa-
vour the latter analysis. In (72a), the placement of the quotation marks implies that probably 
the most exciting thing is treated as a constituent by the writer of this sentence, and not some 
clause that would also include the alleged subject this. More convincingly perhaps, it is again 
possible to construe comparable examples with give. In (72b) the adverbial has sentential 
scope, whereas in (72b') the scope only extends over the following NP. There is therefore no 
reason why one should not extend this analysis to sentences with find or consider as well. The 
sentences (72c, c') have been constructed to corroborate this thesis: a possible afterthought to 
(72c), where probably only restricts the NP, may change the modifications of this NP; an after-
thought to (72c'), where probably restricts the matrix proposition, would more felicitously 
comment on the validity of this main-clause modification. 
                                                 
46 The placement of easily between Bob and the elder brother is more natural with comma intonation: You could 
regard Bob, easily I think, as the elder brother. In any case, easily modifies the main proposition in this sentence 
like in the more idiomatic You could easily regard Bob as the elder brother. 
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(72) a.  She considers this 'probably the most exciting thing I've been involved with' 
        (BNC A7D: 515). 
  b.  I should probably give her 100 pounds, but I don't want to. 
  b'. I should give her probably 100 pounds, maybe even 200. 
  c.  I consider summer camps probably a rewarding experience, maybe even a 
        life-changing experience. 
  c'. I think that summer camps are probably a rewarding experience — of course, 
        they are a rewarding experience, there cannot be any doubt. 
The data in (71), where adverbials between NP2 and (as) XP modify the main clause, coupled 
with the alternative analysis of narrow-scope adverbs as NP-modifiers illustrated in (72), count 
strongly against the claim that the postverbal string of consider-type verbs forms a clausal 
constituent. 
 
(e) Derived nominals 
One final argument that is repeatedly put forward for SC-constituency is a bit more exotic and 
a good deal more theoretical than the preceding four and therefore justifies a more cursory 
treatment. Kayne argues that ordinary transitive clauses have derived nominal counterparts 
(73a), while sentences with consider-type verbs do not (73b) (1984: 151-2).  
(73) a. The enemy destroyed the city. ⇒ The enemy's destruction of the city 
  b. John considers Mary a genius. ⇒ *John's consideration of Mary a genius 
Kayne explains the impossibility of the transformation in (73b) within the framework of Case 
theory (for details see 5.3)47: while the noun destruction in (73a) can govern and assign Case 
to the NP the city with the help of the preposition of, the noun consideration cannot govern 
and assign Case to Mary because a putative SC-boundary intervenes (1984: 152, 155).48 If the 
ungrammaticality of the derived nominal in (73b) is due to a clause boundary between the 
head noun consideration and the string Mary a genius, this string can be argued to "form an 
embedded constituent" (Kayne 1984: 155).  
I am not very happy with such theoretical explanations because they tend to be rather 
stipulative in nature and require us to buy a whole syntactic framework in order to interpret a 
specific syntactic problem. Fortunately, it seems to be possible to come at the problem from a 
different angle. Derived nominalisations are ungrammatical when the base verb has two non-
prepositional postverbal arguments, whether they could be claimed to form a (small) clause as 
                                                 
47 Case is an abstract notion in generative grammar and is not identical with empirically observed case forms. All 
NPs are assumed to be specified for Case, whether this case has a morphological reflex or not (Cook and Newson 
1996: 223) — for this reason, the term 'Case' as used by generative grammarians is usually spelled with a capital 
'C'. 
48 Generative grammarians attribute this to a principled difference in the Case-assigning properties of nouns and 
verbs. While the verb consider can assign Case to the subject of the SC, nouns such as consideration cannot: 
"Somehow, the impact of a verb on its complement is stronger than that of an N" (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 
441; cf. Kayne 1984: 143). 
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in (73b) or not as in (74a). Such nominalisations become possible, however, if the second 
postverbal argument of the verb is introduced by a preposition that the derived nominal can 
inherit (74b, b'). 
(74) a.  John offered Bob the money. ⇒ *John's offer of Bob the money 
  b.  John offered the money to Bob. ⇒ John's offer of the money to Bob 
  b'. John converted Mary to Catholicism. ⇒ John's conversion of Mary to Catholicism 
We could consequently assume that (74a) is ungrammatical because the NP the money is not 
properly tied to its head noun offer, unlike the NP Bob, which is linked to the head noun by the 
'all-purpose' preposition of, while (74b, b') are grammatical because the base verbs provide the 
nominal constructions with an extra preposition that can be used to link the arguments Bob 
and Catholicism to their respective head nouns. The only way to tie the second postverbal 
argument of secondary-predicate constructions to a derived nominal is to use the preposi-
tion/conjunction as (or into with some resultative constructions) insofar as it is licensed by the 
corresponding base verb. Such derived nominals are clearly possible as opposed to the one 
provided in (73b): 
(75) a.  The plant transforms solar energy into electricity. ⇒ I support the 
        transformation of solar energy into electricity. (ROS: 0) 
  b.  I can't understand why the members elected John as chairman. ⇒ I can't understand 
       the members' election of John as chairman. (ROS: 5) 
  c.  The president views the situation as a danger to our nation. ⇒ I can't understand 
        the president's view of the situation as a danger to our nation. (ROS: 5) 
The way arguments of verbs are syntactically inherited by derived nominals is still poorly 
understood and requires more extensive research. What is relevant for the matter at hand is 
that the sentences above vitiate Kayne's claim that verbs presumably selecting SCs cannot be 
converted into nominals (1985: 102) — they can, provided that the respective base verbs li-
cense a 'connecting word' such as into or as. 
 
All five of the tests discussed constitute prima facie evidence for the constituency of predica-
tive NP XP-strings, but none of them stands up to closer examination. Even if we granted the 
argumentation of SC-proponents with respect to these tests, every SC-analysis must confront 
distributional mismatches from structural environments where NP and XP can occur separately 
within the main clause. In what follows, I will summarily review some typical non-
constituency evidence.49 
                                                 
49 In isolation, none of these pieces of evidence is potent enough to disprove the clausehood of the NP XP-string 
because generative grammar assumes that elements can cross clause boundaries (cf. the house whichi he said [he 
wanted to buy ti]) (Thomas Hoffmann, p.c.). Nevertheless, the relative ease with which NP and XP can be sepa-
rated from one another, coupled with the fact that they can almost never be transposed in combination, bode ill 
for the constituency analysis. 
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(i) Elements that can be moved around in the sentence as a unit are commonly identified 
as constituents (Biber et al. 1999: 94; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 46). Direct or indirect 
questions form a good syntactic environment for such movement operations because strings 
that can be placed at the beginning of a question may be considered constituents. It is possible 
to front NP2 (76a) in a question, and — even if to a considerably lesser degree — (as) XP as 
well50 (76b, b'): 
(76) a.  Who do you consider a fool? 
  b.  I'm sure you know how vital The Office considers this whole business. (BNC H86:  
        1860) 
  b'. What does the book, The Joy of Sex, describe an orgasm as? (BNC KCU: 9022) 
(ii) A special case of movement is topicalisation, where a constituent is fronted in a declara-
tive sentence for reasons of information structure. While that-clauses can be topicalised under 
suitable pragmatic circumstances (77a), NP2 (as) XP-strings can never be moved to the begin-
ning of a sentence (77b) (Kluender 1985: 285; Raposo and Uriagereka 1995: 180-1). How-
ever, given the right pragmatic conditions (see Biber et al. 1999: 900-5 for a description of 
topicalisation conditions), the NP2 (77c, d) and — less typically — the XP (77e, f) can undergo 
topicalisation (out of context, (77e, f) do not sound very natural, though). 
(77) a.  That Mary is the murderer I simply can't believe. 
  b.  *Mary the murderer I simply don't consider. 
  c.  ?The others, Mary considers ugly. (ROS: 35) 
  d.  This I still consider the most brilliant course of lectures I have ever heard 
        anywhere (BNC H9X: 319). 
  e.  ?An ugly yellow they have painted their house. (ROS: 50) 
  f.  Beautiful I have never considered Mary ??(to be).51 
(iii) In cleft-constructions, information that could be included in one clause is broken up into 
two clauses in order to put a particular sentence element into relief (Huddleston and Pullum 
2002: 67; Jackendoff 2002: 410-1). The focal element of an it-cleft appears in the first half of 
the construction, while the foregrounded element is inserted into the second half of a wh-cleft 
                                                 
50 The fronting of XP in questions and other structural environments is much more frequent in the corpus when to 
be is also present in the construction: 
a.  "[W]hat do you consider yourself to be?" (APC: 473) 
b.  But Cureton then groups clitic phrases into what he considers the intonational structure to 
      be. (BNC J7S: 64) 
c.  'Successful' though it is deemed to be, the new Cavalier took seven years from  
     conception to launch. (BNC EDT: 2084) 
Ross has aptly characterised the phenomenon that XPs can hardly be fronted unless the infinitival copula is pre-
sent in the sentence as "be-less frost" (1981: 469) and has also shown that this effect is strengthened in passive 
sentences: my informants were not bothered too much by an example such as ?How smart do they consider 
John? (ROS: 32), but the passive version ??How smart is John considered? was frequently rejected (ROS: 67), 
as opposed to How smart is John considered to be? (ROS: 22). The exact reasons why fronting is better in 
QUALIFYING Constructions with to be than in those without to be still elude me. 
51 Fronting is again more natural with to be present; ??Beautiful I have never considered Mary received an ROS 
of 65, while ?Beautiful I have never considered Mary to be was only rated with an ROS of 40 (see the discussion 
in the preceding footnote). 
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(also commonly known as 'pseudo-cleft') (Biber et al. 1999: 959). Since it is only constituents 
that can be focused in cleft-constructions, these patterns provide another suitable environment 
for constituency tests (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 49). While a that-clause can appear in the 
focus position of a wh-cleft, an NP2 (as) XP-string cannot be cleft felicitously (78a, a').52 On 
the other hand, NP2 can be the specially focused element of both an it-cleft and a wh-cleft 
(78b, b'); as a predicative phrase, (as) XP is only very marginally acceptable in it-clefts (78c) 
(Emonds 1984: 133-4), but is possible in wh-clefts (78c'). 
(78) a.  What John thinks is that Mary is extremely beautiful. 
  a'.  *What John considers is Mary extremely beautiful. 
  b.  It is Mary that John considers extremely beautiful. 
  b'. Who John considers extremely beautiful is Mary.  
  c.  ??It's as a complete disaster that John regards the party. (ROS: 65) 
  c'.  ?What they elected John as is chairman. (ROS: 35) 
(iv) A final syntactic environment that can be used to counter the claim that NP2 XP-strings are 
constituents is the 'Right Node Raising' (RNR) construction. When two coordinated sentences 
contain an identical constituent, this constituent can, in generative parlance, be "lifted, or 
'raised', out of the two parallel ... positions and function[.] as an argument for both of them" 
(Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 52). This pragmatically marked construction is typically used 
when the meaning of the verbs in the two conjuncts is to be contrasted with respect to their 
common argument. RNR is not a sufficient test for syntactic constituency because non-
constituents can sometimes undergo this process as well, but if a string cannot be 'raised' to 
the right end of the sentence, it is very probably not a constituent (Kluender 1985: 280-1). 
What is interesting in our context is that putative SCs, unlike that-clauses, cannot undergo 
RNR (79a, a'). (as) XP, however, can easily be factored out from two conjoined sentences by 
itself (79b). 
(79) a.  I find it easy to believe — but Mary finds it hard to believe — that John is dead. 
  a'.  *I consider, and even John considers, Mary intelligent. 
  b.  I regard you, and in fact you regard yourself, as more beautiful than Mary. 
Each of these four tests jars with the assumption of SC-theory that predicative NP XP-strings 
form clausal constituents. If SC-proponents want to stick to the constituency hypothesis in the 
face of all this evidence to the contrary — as they typically do —, they need to work opportu-
nistically on a massive scale: they must both take their own constituency tests at face value 
and ignore or explain away the non-constituency evidence. There are two common strategies 
to rationalise the impossibility of putative SCs to undergo the constituent movements de-
scribed above: one is to argue that "these tests — unlike, say, constituent coordination, are not 
                                                 
52 Since it-clefts can only be used to foreground nominal elements, they principally disallow clausal structures in 
the focal position. 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for constituency" (Sportiche 1995: 290) — a doubtful ob-
jection when we consider the precarious basis of such tests as constituent coordination. Alter-
natively, the unacceptability of these movement operations could be attributed to independent 
theory-internal reasons such as the fact that NP2 cannot be assigned Case in the moved posi-
tion (Stowell 1983: 301). 
As we will see in the following chapter, the claim that NP2 is the subject of an SC does 
not fare much better on closer examination. 
5.2.2 A critical look at subject tests 
Besides the evidence coming from constituency tests, NP2 XP-strings might also be identified 
as clauses if it could be demonstrated that NP2 behaves like the subject of its own clause and 
not like the direct object of the matrix verb. Five more pieces of evidence are commonly mar-
shalled in the SC-literature to argue for the subjecthood of this phrase; these include (a) non-
referential elements in the NP2-position, (b) alone-final and not-initial noun phrases as NP2, (c) 
evidence from binding, (d) the behaviour of floating emphatic reflexives, and (e) extraction 
data. These tests will be closely examined and evaluated in the following sections. 
 
(a) Non-referential elements in the NP2-position 
Generative grammar presupposes the existence of a class of dummy or expletive pronouns 
such as it and there, which do not refer to an entity in the discourse but are devoid of any se-
mantic content (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 42-4; Postal and Pullum 1988: 635-6; Rizzi 
1986: 526). Expletives are maintained to be restricted to subject position and to be impossible 
as, for instance, the direct object of a clause: as a consequence of the Projection Principle, a 
direct-object position can only be created in the syntax if it is subcategorised for and θ-
marked by the verb (Hoekstra 1988: 108; Rizzi 1986: 527); according to the Extended Projec-
tion Principle, however, sentences are required to have a subject position, irrespective of 
whether the verb assigns a subject θ-role or not (Grewendorf 2001: 20-1; Haegeman and 
Guéron 1999: 392). As a result, direct-object positions are always theta-positions, while the 
subject slot can be filled by a non-referential element when there is no thematic argument 
available for that position (Cook and Newson 1996: 179-80; Hoekstra 1988: 108).  
If the postverbal NP of consider-type verbs is the subject of an SC, it should be tolerant of 
expletive pronouns. This prediction is to a certain degree borne out by the following sen-
tences: in (80a), the so-called 'anticipatory' or 'extrapositive' it can be claimed to be in con-
struction with the extraposed notional subject that she has resigned (cf. Chomsky 1986a: 91; 
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Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 120); in (80b), the NP2-position is presumably filled by the non-
referential 'weather/time-it' (cf. Aarts 1992: 38; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 43-4; Kitagawa 
1985: 213). Existential there, on the other hand, cannot occupy the NP2 slot (80c) (cf. Aarts 
1992: 38; Law 1996: 508).53 
(80) a. I consider [iti a pity [that she has resigned]i].  
           (from Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 121) 
  b.  I find [it rather hot].54          (from Aarts 1992: 38) 
  c.  *I consider [there a problem].             (from Aarts 1992: 38; my emphasis) 
None of these cases is trivial, and each of them deserves a separate and more focused treat-
ment.  
The theory of GB requires one to interpret it in (80a) as an extrapositive subject and the 
sentential constituent [that she has resigned] as the extraposed notional subject. Descriptive 
grammars, however, which do not have such postulates as the Projection Principle and the 
Extended Projection Principle in their framework, do not bother to call the expletive in this 
sentence an extrapositive object and the sentential constituent it is in construction with an 
extraposed notional object (e.g. Huddleston and Pullum 2000: 247, 252-3). Postal and Pullum 
have been able to show that it is, in fact, mandatory to accept extrapositive it in the direct-
object position as well. In examples (81a, a'), it is followed by main-clause adverbials and 
objects and therefore cannot be the subject of a subordinate clause (cf. Postal and Pullum 
1988: 642-4). But even if there is no additional main-clause material, it cannot be analysed as 
a subject because the subordinate (small) clause would contain nothing but this expletive ele-
ment and its extraposed sentential subject (81b, b') (Postal and Pullum 1988: 645). 
                                                 
53 Besides expletive pronouns, SC-theoreticians also sometimes adduce other non-thematic fillers of the NP2-
position. Hoekstra, for example, claims that this site can be occupied by derived subjects, which, like expletives, 
do not receive a subject theta-role from the verb (1992: 148). His example sentence We found [this conclusioni 
arrived at ti too easily], where the NP this conclusion has presumably been moved from the thematic object posi-
tion of arrived to the subject position in the corresponding passive, was unanimously rejected by my informants, 
however. In addition, idiom chunks are maintained to be possible in the NP2-slot as well: Consider your leg 
pulled (Bresnan 1982: 79), I consider headway unlikely to be made on this bog (Ross 1981: 465), I consider real 
advantage unlikely to be taken of that offer (Postal 1974: 196, footnote 7). Since idiom chunks can only be inter-
preted with respect to the rest of the idiom, they are asserted to be athematic arguments that occupy the subject 
position of an SC such as [real advantage unlikely to be taken of that offer]. Apart from the fact that such sen-
tences are again far from perfectly acceptable (the ROS of Bresnan's sentence is 20, of Ross's sentence 35, and of 
Postal's sentence 72), they do not pose a problem in Construction grammar: if it is assumed that all syntactic 
constructs are idiomatic to a certain degree and depend on the rest of the construction for their interpretation, no 
firm line can be drawn between these idiomatic expressions and other constructions. Most idioms are thus not 
unanalysable, but only less schematic than other syntactic structures (Langacker 1987: 94; cf. 3.3). As a conse-
quence, headway or real advantage are not athematic idiom chunks, but meaningful elements that can occupy 
the thematic object position. 
54 Since verbs such as find or consider express subjective opinions, the weather-expression in the XP-slot must 
allow some latitude for personal interpretation. My informants rejected a sentence such as ??I consider it rainy 
because rain is a fact that can be observed and is thus not really open to subjective interpretation; the sentence 
becomes fine, however, when the speaker can interpret degrees of 'raininess' with respect to some specific pur-
pose, as in I consider it too rainy to go hiking. 
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(81) a.  I regret it very much that you could not come to the party. 
  a'.  I mentioned it to Sally that Mary was jealous of her. 
  b.  I take it that Mary will come to the party. 
  b'. I would prefer it if John didn't come. 
The claim that extrapositive it is possible as a direct object as well has obvious ramifications 
for GB-theory because the direct-object position, like the subject position, must be assumed to 
be possible as a non-theta position as well in some cases (cf. Postal and Pullum 1988: 663-7, 
who also discuss the consequences this could have for a rehabilitation of Subject-to-Object 
Raising). What is important for our purpose is that there is no principled reason to argue that 
the it in (80a) must be a subject instead of a direct object. 
SC-theoreticians interpret the 'weather/time-it' in (80b) as an expletive, arguing that what 
the subject finds is clearly not 'it', but rather the proposition 'it rather hot' (Aarts 1992: 38). 
Building on this interpretation, they maintain that it as a non-referential element cannot be 
assigned a θ-role and thus cannot function as a direct-object argument of the verb find. As a 
corollary of this, the pronoun must be the subject-slot filler of the clause it rather hot (Aarts 
1992: 38; Staudinger 1996: 116-7). Find is consequently a bivalent verb, selecting a subject 
argument and a propositional object argument, but not a direct-object NP; (rather) hot, on the 
other hand, would be a zero-valent predicate, with 'weather-it' acting as the default dummy 
filler of the SC subject-slot. Although this reasoning has remained largely unrebutted in SC-
theory, it is anything but clear that it in (80b) is really non-referential. While it is admittedly 
hard to replace 'weather-it' in a sentence with a meteorological verb (82a)55, it is conceivable 
to rephrase (80b) as (82b). In this view, the pronoun it "can ... be understood as a normal ref-
erential it, though admittedly the reference is a bit vague" (Allerton 1982: 44-5). If we accept 
this analysis, it in (80b) could be analysed as a direct-object argument which vaguely refers 
to, for example, the weather, and rather hot as a secondary predicate which specifies the 
property of the weather. 
(82) a.  It has been raining for days. 
  b.  I find [the weather/the sun/this room/the day etc.] [rather hot]. 
It would be preferable if we had some principled grounds on which we could decide between 
the analysis of 'weather/time-it' as a non-referential subject-slot filler and its analysis as a 
vaguely referring pronoun. There is, in fact, both a syntactic and a semantic argument that 
might tip the scales towards the latter analysis. The syntactic argument exploits an observa-
tion made by Chomsky (1981: 324). In sentences such as The park rangers consider it hot 
enough to cause even more forest fires (ROS: 10) or I consider it windy enough to help the 
                                                 
55 In poetic language it may be possible to say something like The clouds/the sky have/has been raining for days, 
but this is clearly a stylistically and syntactically marked use of the structure. 
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kids fly their kites (ROS: 20), the consecutive clauses are controlled by 'weather/time-it'. Since 
controlled subjects assume the referential properties of their antecedents, it cannot be seman-
tically vacuous in these sentences. 'Weather-it' and  'time-it' would have to be admitted as 
"quasi-arguments" (Chomsky 1981: 325), which bear "atmospheric or temporal θ-roles" 
(Rizzi 1986: 529). My semantic argument is of a more general nature: properties such as 
rather hot are inherently relational and cannot be construed in isolation, but must invariably 
be attributed to some entity (see the functional theory of syntactic categories given in 
11.4.6.2). Whenever such an entity is rather abstract and difficult to denote, the vaguely refer-
ring pronoun it can be used; however, it is always possible to replace it with a more concrete 
denotation (cf. 82b). 
Generative and descriptive grammars treat existential there as an expletive subject that is 
in construction with a notional NP, commonly called its 'associate'. The main function of exis-
tential clauses is to foreground new information, typically coded in an indefinite NP plus some 
place adverbial (83a) (Biber et al. 1999: 943-4; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 121; Stowell 
1978: 460). The standard structural analysis of existential clauses in generative grammar takes 
the string after the copula to form an SC (83b) (Grewendorf 2002: 104; Stowell 1978: 465; 
Law 1996: 493). 
(83) a.  There is a man in the room. 
  b.  Therei be [SC NP XP]i. 
Since existential there is one of the most typical expletive fillers of the subject slot, the un-
grammaticality of (80c) has created some unease among SC-theoreticians. There have been 
various attempts to come to terms with this situation, none of which carries much weight, 
though. Lasnik, for instance, suggests that the obligatoriness of the copula in We consider 
there *(to be) a man in the room56 is due to the fact that the associate NP a man needs to be 
assigned Case independently of the expletive there, which is Case-marked by the matrix verb 
consider. Since the copula is not normally thought to be a Case assigner, Lasnik proposes that 
it could exceptionally attribute 'partitive Case' to the NP in the existential construction (1992: 
384, 391-5). Lasnik's account is rather stipulative and also contradicts the standard analysis of 
existential constructions in generative grammar, which assumes that the expletive there is 
assigned Case by the main verb, and that it can transmit its Case to the co-indexed associate 
NP (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 507). Since a Case-related account for (80c) is not likely to 
gain wide acceptance, Law has urged a different procedure (1996: 506-7). He argues that *We 
                                                 
56 Even the sentences with to be are not very natural, though. Aarts' ?I considered there to be a problem (1992: 
38) was evaluated with an ROS of 37, and Lasnik's ??We consider there to be a man in the room (1992: 384) 
received an ROS of 59. 
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consider there a man in the room is ungrammatical because it contains two SCs: in the room 
is predicated of the subject a man and the SC a man in the room is then predicated of the sub-
ject there. Not only is this double-SC account ludicrous in itself 57, though, but existential 
constructions without a place adverbial (e.g. 80c) would remain intractable to such an ac-
count. Law must have realised the untenability of his proposal himself because he makes an 
alternative suggestion as well. He claims that the subject of an SC needs to be a thematic posi-
tion because it must be able to receive a θ-role from the SC-predicate; existential there can 
consequently not be tolerated as an SC-subject (Law 1996: 507-8). I do not know, however, 
how this explanation is to be reconciled with the Extended Projection Principle and the stan-
dard generative analyses of extrapositive it (80a) and 'weather/time-it' (80b). It might there-
fore be more rewarding to analyse (80c) from another stance: its ungrammaticality may not be 
due to the violation of some isolated syntactic or semantic principle, but could be the result of 
the functional incompatibility of the QUALIFYING Construction and the EXISTENTIAL Con-
struction. While the former construction expresses some permanently stored opinion with 
respect to a familiar entity (see chapter 11), the latter construction is used to prepare the 
ground for the presentation of a new entity: there profiles "abstract settings, perhaps to be 
thought of as abstract presentational frames within which something is going to be intro-
duced" (Langacker 1999b: 47; see also Biber et al. 1999: 951; Langacker 1991: 352-4). The 
same NP may, however, not be specified as simultaneously familiar and new within the same 
sentence. 
To recapitulate, non-referential pronouns in the NP2-slot cannot be used to demonstrate 
the subjecthood of this position: extrapositive it is possible both as subject and direct object, 
and 'weather/time-it' is more amenable to a treatment as a vaguely referring 'quasi-argument' 
than as a semantically vacuous subject-slot filler. Furthermore, it is not feasible to construct 
an argument around existential there, which is not found in the NP2-position for functional 
reasons. 
 
                                                 
57 As has already been shown, locative phrases are not possible in the XP-position even if there were only one SC 
(*We consider [SC a man in the room]) because such phrases are not truly predicative (cf. 4.1.3). Moreover, if 
there is an expletive pronoun without any semantic content, how could it be assigned a θ-role, let alone a pro-
positional θ-role, by the putative SC [a man in the room] anyway? 
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(b) Alone-final and not-initial noun phrases as NP2 
A second kind of evidence that has been marshalled in support of the subjecthood of NP2 is 
alone-final and not-initial NPs, which allegedly can only be related to the subject, but not the 
direct object of a verb (Hayashi 1991: 21-2; Postal 1974: 95, 100; Radford 1988: 326).  
NPs can be postmodified by the adverb alone, essentially meaning 'only' in this construc-
tion (Postal 1974: 99). Alone-final NPs are claimed to occur only in subject and not in direct-
object position (84a vs. b); since they are found in the postverbal slot of verbs such as con-
sider, it is concluded that this must be a subject position as well (84c) (Aarts 1992: 47). 
(84) a.  Jones alone knows the secret formula.           (from Postal 1974: 99; my emphasis) 
  b.  *Melvin hires those plumbers alone.           (from Postal 1974: 99; my emphasis) 
  c.  The head of department considers MA students alone good PhD students. 
                   (from Aarts 1992: 47) 
Yet Aarts casts doubt on the validity of the alone-final test himself by providing the sentence 
in (85a), where the alone-final NP stands in the object position. To this we can add cases 
where alone-final NPs are not very felicitous in the postverbal position of consider or regard 
(85b, b'), while there is no such restriction on the subject position of a that-clause (85c): 
(85) a.  I gave that girl alone $60.             (from Aarts 1992: 47; my emphasis) 
  b.  ??I consider Mary alone beautiful. (ROS: 64) 
  b'. ? I regard John alone as intelligent. (ROS: 40) 
  c. I think that Mary alone is beautiful. 
If we probe more deeply into the distribution of alone-final NPs, we see that their behaviour is 
more complicated than a neat division between subject and object might suggest. In subject 
position, the adverb alone has narrow scope over its NP, i.e. it throws special stress on the 
entity in this position, but does not extend its scope to any other entity in the clause. If alone 
is related to a direct object, however, it must have wide scope: it singles out the direct-object 
entity and contrasts it with some other entity in the linguistic or extralinguistic context. Stress 
usually serves as a disambiguating device: in the subject position, the stress is on alone (86a), 
while it is on the noun or its determiner in the object position (with maybe secondary stress on 
alone) because the referent of this noun is compared to other exemplars of its class (86b, b'). 
Alone-final NPs are not possible in direct-object position when a wide-scope interpretation 
would be implausible (e.g. 84b and 85b, b'), but are felicitous when a contrast can be con-
strued (e.g. 85a: I gave that girl alone $60, not the other one). 
(86) a.  This story alone is true. 
  b.  I believe this story alo ne, not that one. 
  b'. I believe John alo ne, not Mary. 
In this more sophisticated version of the test, alone can identify a subject if it has narrow 
scope, and a direct object if it has wide scope. If applied in this way, the alone-final test dis-
mantles the argumentation of SC-proponents. My informants agreed that alone in (87a) has 
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wide scope, i.e. that it (implicitly or explicitly) contrasts German students with other students, 
while it has narrow scope in (87b), simply foregrounding German students without comparing 
them to anyone else. 
(87) a.  The head of the department considers German students alone good PhD students 
        (not French students). 
  b.  The head of our department thinks that German students alone are good PhD 
        students. 
SC-proponents attempt to make a similar point with the not-initial test as with the alone-final 
test. The negator not in front of an NP (usually one quantified by many/much) is claimed to 
occur only in subject (88a), but not in direct-object position (88b) (Aarts 1992: 47; Postal 
1974: 95). Since not-initial NPs pass muster after consider, it is argued that this must be the 
subject position of an SC (88c) (Aarts 1992: 47; Radford 1988: 326). 
(88) a.  Not many houses were built here.         (from Aarts 1992: 47) 
  b.  *I like not many houses.          (from Aarts 1992: 47) 
  c.  The head of department considers not many students good PhD students.  
                            (from Aarts 1992: 47) 
The not-initial test suffers of exactly the same problems as the alone-final test and can also be 
turned around against the SC-analysis. Not has narrow scope in the subject position, but must 
have wide scope in the direct-object position. Not-initial NPs as direct objects require contras-
tive stress (89a); if such a contrast is difficult to construe, the sentence becomes ungrammati-
cal (cf. 88b) — unless constituent negation is replaced by sentential negation, of course (I 
don't like many houses). The position after consider-type verbs has wide scope (89b, b'): 
(89) a.  I kissed not John, but Mike. 
  b.  I consider not all of them liars, but certainly a lot of them. 
  b'. The head of department considers not ma ny students good PhD students, but only 
        a handful. 
If anything, then, the results of both the alone-final and the not-initial test are overwhelmingly 
in favour of the objecthood of NP2 and thus cannot be used as arguments for SCs. 
 
(c) Binding evidence 
Another piece of evidence that has been called into play in an effort to prove the subjecthood 
of NP2 is data from binding. Since the Binding Theory is one of the most complex subtheories 
of generative grammar, we will have to trim away many details so that we can focus on the 
main lines of argumentation.  
NPs such as John or my neighbour can establish their referent independently; they are 
consequently called 'referential' or 'R'-expressions (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 376). Re-
flexives (e.g. himself) and reciprocals (e.g. each other), on the other hand, are referentially 
dependent on an antecedent NP; elements that must be bound by a co-referent antecedent are 
CHALLENGING SMALL-CLAUSE ANALYSES 
 
93
commonly called 'anaphors' in generative grammar (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 370). The 
main function of the Binding Theory is to establish the exact conditions for the binding rela-
tions between anaphors and their antecedents; the dominant mode of research attempts to cap-
ture binding relations in structural terms. The structural relation thought to underlie all bind-
ing configurations is asymmetrical c(onstituent)-command: an antecedent c-commands an 
anaphor if the first branching node that dominates it also dominates its anaphor (Haegeman 
and Guéron 1999: 364); in an asymmetrical c-command relation, the antecedent must be 
structurally higher in the clause than the anaphor it binds. This c-command relation must then 
be restricted to the right local domain (Grewendorf 2002: 26; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 
365): an anaphor can only be bound by its antecedent if it is asymmetrically c-commanded by 
it and if they are both in the same local domain. The definition of this binding domain consti-
tutes one of the greatest research efforts in generative grammar, and the identification of the 
NP2-position as subject or direct object crucially depends on this definition. 
On its face, the local domain for binding relations seems to be the minimal clause that 
contains both the anaphor and its antecedent, with the antecedent functioning as the subject of 
the clause (Grewendorf 2002: 26; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 365; Staudinger 1996: 119). 
SC-proponents argue that since a reflexive or reciprocal in the XP-position can be bound by an 
antecedent in the NP2-slot, this must be the subject position of an SC (90a, a'); furthermore, the 
reflexive or reciprocal cannot be bound by the subject of the main clause because the embed-
ded SC presumably intervenes (90b, b') (Chomsky 1981: 290-1; Contreras 1987: 228; Hae-
geman and Guéron 1999: 366; Safir 1983: 730; Stowell 1991a: 190). 
(90) a.  John considers [SC Maryi too proud of herselfi].   
           (from Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 366) 
  a'.  John considered [SC the meni angry at each otheri].                    (from Safir 1983: 730) 
  b.  *Johni considers [SC Mary too proud of himselfi].  
           (from Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 366) 
  b'. *The meni considered [SC John angry at each otheri].                (from Safir 1983: 730) 
The definition of binding domain as minimal clause and of the antecedent as the subject of 
this clause is intuitively appealing, but empirically untenable. There are numerous cases 
where an anaphor is not bound by the subject, but by an object (91a-c): 
(91) a.  I talked to Johni about himselfi. (ROS: 22)                                 (from Croft 2001: 153) 
  b.  Ralph described mei to myselfi perfectly. (ROS: 18) 
              (from Napoli 1989: 306; my emphasis) 
  c.  Wanda warned the meni about each otheri. (ROS: 14) 
              (from Napoli 1989: 303; my emphasis) 
In view of these data, it is not clear that the antecedents in (90) could not also be direct ob-
jects. Moreover, the notion 'minimal clause' is problematic because if NP2 is an anaphor itself, 
it can be bound by the main-clause subject (92a-b): 
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(92) a.  Johni considers himselfi the winner. 
  b. Theyi consider each otheri stupid. 
In order to avoid the conclusion that himself in (92a) is a direct object bound by the subject 
John (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1487), generative grammarians have modified the 
definition of binding domain. Since the matrix verb consider governs and Case-marks the SC-
subject (see 5.3), the local domain for the SC-subject is thought to be the minimal clause that 
also contains its governor; in other words, the binding domain is extended to include the main 
clause as well in such cases, so himself can be bound by the matrix subject (Cook and Newson 
1996: 251; Grewendorf 2002: 26-7; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 368). The definition of lo-
cal domain as 'governing category' has been acquired for a theoretical price, though: there is 
now an asymmetry between small and ordinary clauses because the subject of a finite that-
clause, which is not governed by the matrix verb, cannot be bound by the main-clause subject 
(*Johni thinks that himselfi is the winner). If we interpret himself in (92a) not as a subject but 
as a direct object, this asymmetry is expected. 
But the definition of binding domain as governing category is not only problematic theo-
retically, but empirically as well. Reflexives can also be bound within an NP (93a) (Grewen-
dorf 2002: 27). If such an NP does not include a potential binder for the anaphor, the reflexive 
can be bound by the main-clause subject irrespective of whether it is found in the subject of a 
small or ordinary clause (93b vs. b') (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 369). 
(93) a.  John likes Mary'si stories about herselfi.  
  b. Johni considers the stories about himselfi foolish.  
  b'. Johni thinks that the stories about himselfi are foolish. 
According to the definition of binding domain as governing category, we would expect an 
asymmetry between (93b) and (93b') because the NP the stories about himself is governed by 
the matrix verb only in (93b), and so the binding domain should be extended to the main 
clause only in this sentence — contrary to fact. Generative grammar has tackled this new 
problem by a further elaboration of the notion 'binding domain': an anaphor must be bound 
within a so-called 'complete functional complex' (CFC), which contains the anaphor, its gov-
ernor and an accessible SUBJECT58, i.e. a potential binder for the anaphor (Graffi 1988: 403-
5; Grewendorf 2002: 27; Johnson 1987: 354-5; Martin 2002: 142). In informal terms, the re-
flexive in (93b') can be bound by the subject of the main clause because there is no accessible 
SUBJECT for it within the subordinate that-clause. Not even this sophisticated definition of 
binding domain as a CFC will do, however. In (94a), the reflexive is part of an NP within a 
                                                 
58 Since the notion of 'accessible SUBJECT' includes both clausal subjects and arguments realised by an 's-
genitive within an NP (e.g. John's pictures of himself), the term is capitalised in this special use. 
CHALLENGING SMALL-CLAUSE ANALYSES 
 
95
that-clause, and it is bound by the main-clause subject although there is an accessible SUB-
JECT within the subordinate clause. Similarly, in (94b-b''), the reflexive is bound by the 
main-clause subject although the NP2-position contains a potential binder. 
(94) a.  Mikei will not believe that this*i is a photograph of himselfi. (ROS: 30)      
             (from Postal 1974: 64) 
  b. Johni considered Catherine*i an equal to himselfi. (ROS: 20) 
                                                   (from Napoli 1989: 308) 
  b'. Ii regard them*i as more liberal than myselfi. (ROS: 10)     (from Postal 1974: 66) 
  b''. The mystici surrenders his will to some being or idea which*i he considers superior 
    to himselfi (BNC CEE: 1048). 
The model of structural binding relations has proved very robust in the generative literature, 
but it is ill-equipped to handle such sentences.59 From a semantic perspective, the binding 
facts in (94b-b'') are not really surprising: although the putative SCs all contain potential 
binders, these phrases would be semantically odd as antecedents for the respective anaphors; 
as a consequence, the reflexives can be bound by the semantically compatible main-clause 
subjects.  
Another case in point is an example I found in the corpus which is amenable to neither a 
structural nor a semantic solution, but requires a pragmatic explanation. The reflexive myself 
in (95a) cannot be bound by the NP2 the stranger; nor does it relate to the main-clause subject 
he, however. Instead, it must be referred to the speaker of the sentence that can be inferred 
pragmatically. Similarly, in (95b) the reflexive does not refer to the real George W. Bush in 
the subject position, but to a character that impersonates the president in a comic strip. 
(95)   a.  In fact, he*i would probably come to regard the stranger*i as myselfi (BNC FTV: 
   888). 
  b. George W. Bush*i did not find himselfi funny in the comic strip. 
The issue about the correct definition of binding domains is far from settled, but it has be-
come clear from the preceding discussion that purely structural accounts will not do. Until 
                                                 
59 There are other cases as well that pose problems to structural binding conditions. The question Which pictures 
of himselfi does Johni consider foolish? violates the c-command relation because here the reflexive c-commands 
its antecedent instead of the other way round. In order to obtain an orthodox c-command relationship, the process 
of 'reconstruction' is sometimes invoked, which can restore the moved constituent which pictures of himself to its 
D-structure position after consider. Reconstruction operates at LF and does not have any overt reflexes, yet it 
guarantees that John c-commands the anaphor at least at the level of LF (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 553). 
Although Haegeman and Guéron affirm that reconstruction is "not simply a technical trick" (1999: 533), I cannot 
see it as anything else because its main motivation is to save the structural c-command condition. Since the MP 
has done away with separate levels of representation, the Binding Theory in this framework only requires that 
the relevant binding configurations are fulfilled at any point during the derivation (Grewendorf 2002: 114); this 
means, however, that binding relations become much more difficult to test empirically. Be that as it may, there 
are cases that cannot be handled by either mechanism: in As for himself, John considers Rome the most beautiful 
city (Napoli 1989: 299), the phrase as for himself cannot reasonably be claimed to have been moved from a posi-
tion structurally lower than John at any point in the derivation. The c-command requirement on binding therefore 
does not seem to be empirically correct (Napoli 1989: 299). 
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recently, semantic and pragmatic factors have received relatively little attention in binding 
accounts, but their important role is currently under investigation (Jackendoff 2002: 388-9; 
Langacker 1999b: 51; Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996: 6). This is not the place to provide an 
alternative account of binding relations; the important upshot of our discussion is that binding 
facts cannot be used to identify the NP2 position as a structural subject. 
 
(d) Floating emphatic reflexives 
In his monograph on SCs, Aarts (1992: 47) takes up a test used by Napoli (1989: 319-20) to 
prove that the postverbal NP is syntactically a subject. The test works with so-called 'floating 
emphatic reflexives', which can allegedly only be related to a subject (96a), but cannot be 
bound by an antecedent in object position (96b) (Aarts 1992: 46). 
(96) a.  The presidenti is coming himselfi!        (from Napoli 1989: 319; my emphasis) 
  b. *We put the presidenti in our car himselfi.       (from Napoli 1989: 319; my emphasis) 
Aarts then constructs a sentence in order to show that the reflexive can be related to the post-
verbal NP of consider-type verbs, which will consequently have to be interpreted as the sub-
ject of a clause: 
(97) I thought [the prime-ministeri herselfi a controversial person].       (from Aarts 1992: 47) 
Yet (97) is not pertinent to the point Aarts wants to make. The sentence contains an emphatic 
reflexive, but this reflexive is not in a floating position. Non-floating emphatic reflexives im-
mediately follow the nominal they are bound by, whatever grammatical function this NP has 
(cf. Biber et al. 1999: 344). As a result, it is not very difficult to find a counter-example in 
which the emphatic reflexive does not relate to the subject, but to the direct object: 
(98) It was Brian Friel's aim to reproduce Irish lifei itselfi in his plays. 
Napoli, on the other hand, provides a true illustration of a floating emphatic reflexive which 
refers to the postverbal NP of consider: 
(99) I consider [the presidenti entirely responsible himselfi].  
                           (from Napoli 1989: 319; my emphasis) 
As with the binding evidence in the preceding section, it is doubtful that the emphatic reflex-
ive is sensitive to the subjecthood of its antecedent rather than to the semantic compatibility of 
the phrase in NP2-position. As the following sentence illustrates, the floating emphatic reflex-
ive can also refer to the subject of the matrix verb if the NP2-position is not available for se-
mantic reasons: 
(100) Ii consider the prime minster*i responsible myselfi. 
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It could objected at this juncture that the string the prime minister responsible does form an 
SC and that the reflexive myself is outside the SC (101a). In fact, the sentence becomes un-
grammatical when the emphatic reflexive intervenes between NP2 and XP (101b). 
(101) a.  I consider [SC the prime minister responsible] myself. 
   b.  *I consider [SC the prime minister myself responsible]. (ROS: 94) 
I do not think, however, that the ungrammaticality of (101b) is due to the fact that the accessi-
ble subject the prime minister intervenes between the floating emphatic reflexive and the 
main-clause subject I. Rather, floating emphatic reflexives are, by definition, stressed pro-
nouns and constitute the information focus within the sentence. In English, the information-
ally salient part of a sentence occupies the clause-final position, so the placement of the less 
salient XP responsible after the emphatic reflexive is in violation of this information principle. 
The following pair of sentences, where no other potential binder intervenes between the re-
flexive and its antecedent, is supportive of this conclusion: most of my informants have pre-
ferred (102b) to (102a) in evaluation tests.  
(102) a.  ?The prime minister is responsible himself for the slump. 
  b.  The prime minister is responsible for the slump himself. 
I do not have an explanation, however, why a floating emphatic reflexive cannot refer to the 
postverbal NP in a sentence such as (96b), but I doubt that a purely structural account can pro-
vide a satisfying answer. 
 
(e) Extraction evidence 
The different extraction possibilities of complex subject and object NPs have intrigued Chom-
sky from a very early point on (1972: 19-21), and have been brought back into play by SC-
proponents in an attempt to substantiate the subjecthood of the NP2-position. Chomsky and his 
followers claim that an NP included in a complex noun phrase cannot be extracted from such a 
noun phrase if it occupies the subject position (103a), but that extraction is possible from the 
object position (103b) (Basilico 2003: 5; Chomsky 1972: 20-1). 
(103) a.  *Whoi did [a picture of ti] anger you?         (from Basilico 2003: 5; my emphasis) 
    b.  Whoi did you see [a picture of ti]?         (from Basilico 2003: 5; my emphasis) 
The reasons given for this asymmetry are rather theoretical and need not detain us here (see 
Basilico 2003: 6; Kayne 1984: 167-9, 1985: 102-3). It is argued by SC-theoreticians that since 
the extraction of a subpart of the postverbal NP of consider yields a violation, this must be a 
subject position (Aarts 1992: 47; Basilico 2003: 5; Hoekstra 1988: 107; 1992: 147; Kayne 
1984: 169; Stowell 1991a: 191): 
(104) *Whoi do you consider the sister of ti very smart? (ROS: 86) 
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(104) is clearly ungrammatical and has almost unanimously been rejected in native speaker 
tests. The problem is, however, that the degree of acceptability is not much higher for most 
extractions out of object positions either. While (105a) has been evaluated as doubtful but still 
acceptable, (105b) has been discarded even more clearly than (104).  
(105) a.  ?Whoi did you meet the sister of ti? (ROS: 50) 
    b.  *Whoi did you tell the sister of ti stories? (ROS: 99) 
Extraction possibilities are not only subject to widespread idiolectal variation, but seem to 
depend on more complex factors than a simple dichotomy between subject and object posi-
tion. The following two sentences (106a, b), which have been slightly adapted from Hoekstra 
(1988: 107), have received very similar ROS values; Hoekstra, however, avers that the first 
one is "ungrammatical" because there has been extraction from a putative SC-subject position, 
while the second one "does not give any problems" because it shows extraction from an object 
position (1988: 107). Theoretical expectations seem to have overridden sound empirical 
judgements here. 
(106) a.  ?The moviei, which I found the complaints about ti ridiculous, was very 
           interesting. (ROS: 38) 
    b.  ?The moviei, which I found the announcement about ti in yesterday's paper, is 
           very successful. (ROS: 31) 
Speaker judgements aside, there is even some uncertainty about the value of extraction evi-
dence as a subject diagnostic within generative grammar (see Stowell 1991a: 192-3). For in-
dependent theoretical reasons, Stowell claims that the extraction data may turn out to be "the-
ory neutral for the SC controversy" (1991a: 194). The facts of (105) and (106), in any case, 
demand a healthy scepticism towards the extraction test. 
 
Like the constituency tests provided by SC-proponents, the subject tests are not substantial 
enough to advance the cause of the SC-hypothesis. As our discussion has shown, it is a rather 
rash policy to accommodate syntactic data to one's own purposes unless that data has been 
thoroughly investigated. What Postal observed 30 years ago still obtains today; Postal empha-
sised the importance of realising  
the great difficulty involved in validating empirical arguments for grammatical proposals, the 
great care that must be taken in reaching conclusions, and the always existing possibility that 
independent, unconsidered factors can always render an apparently clear argument untenable. 
(Postal 1974: 118) 
But even if the subject tests discussed above could have been corroborated, SC-proponents 
are again faced with distributional mismatches because NP2 also has some typical direct-object 
properties. The main direct-object characteristics of this phrase have already been mentioned 
in conjunction with the complex-transitive complementation analysis (4.1.2): NP2 must be 
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adjacent to the matrix verb and must not be separated from the verb by an adverbial (107a), it 
is assigned accusative Case by the main verb (107b), it corresponds to the main-clause subject 
in a passive paraphrase (107c), and it must be turned into a reflexive pronoun if it is co-
referential with the main-clause subject (107d). All of these characteristics are absent from the 
subject of a that-clause, as the primed sentences illustrate: 
(107) a.   *I consider very strongly the waitress innocent. 
    a'.  I believe very strongly that the waitress is innocent. 
    b.   I consider her innocent. 
    b'.  I believe that she is innocent. 
    c.   The waitress is considered innocent. 
    c'.  *The waitress is believed (that) is innocent. 
    d.   The waitress considers herself innocent. 
    d'.  *The waitress thinks that herself is innocent. 
As with the non-constituency evidence, there is no way out of this impasse for SC-
theoreticians than to either dismiss such conflicting data as insignificant or to explain them 
away by driving the machinery of formal grammar (see 5.3), both of which are opportunistic 
escape hatches. 
As a construction grammarian, I do not want to weigh the pros and cons of a subject vs. 
direct-object analysis because I think that the overall procedure to explain the syntactic nature 
of elements in one construction on the template of their behaviour in related constructions is 
exceedingly slippery — the behaviour of NP2 and XP in COORDINATION Constructions, CLEFT 
Constructions or PASSIVE Constructions, for instance, is determined by the special properties 
of these constructions and cannot be used to explain the nature of these phrases in the secon-
dary-predicate constructions illustrated under (3) in the introduction. Moreover, I think that 
many grammatical constructs, including the ones under investigation here, lie at the border-
line of divisions such as 'subject' vs. 'direct object' and consequently do not lend themselves 
very well to a discrete treatment. With respect to the question whether SCs form constituents, 
I would clearly argue that they do not because the tests provided by SC-theoreticians have not 
been able to reveal any additional structure between NP2 and XP, so the null-hypothesis would 
be that they do not form a construction of their own. 
Most SC-proponents do not see such distributional mismatches as an insuperable obsta-
cle to their theory, though, and have an undeterred go at the syntactic description of SCs. The 
discussion about the SC-node is included in the following chapter not only because it illus-
trates how distributional mismatches can opportunistically be resolved on different represen-
tational levels, but also because it shows that it has not been possible to reasonably integrate 
SCs into the framework of generative grammar in the last two decades without considerably 
changing this framework itself.  
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5.3 Attempts to identify a black hole: what is the categorial status of small  
clauses?  
5.3.1 Some preliminaries: the categorial component of generative grammar 
Although SC-theoreticians have lamentably failed to provide empirical evidence for the con-
stituency of the NP2 XP-string and the subjecthood of NP2, they have nevertheless attempted to 
naturalise the SC-analysis within the theoretical framework of generative grammar. Since SCs 
tie in perfectly with other generative principles such as the Theta-Criterion, the Projection 
Principle and the binary-branching requirement (cf. 5.1), SC-proponents have redoubled their 
efforts to prove the existence of SCs from a theoretical stance at least. As has been pointed 
out in 3.2, the postulation of different representational levels and various subtheories gives 
grammarians a rather useful loophole in order to come to terms with distributional mis-
matches. In a multi-stratal framework, the constituency of SCs could also be established if it 
were possible to identify a node that exhaustively dominates NP2 and XP at D-structure and if 
the non-constituency behaviour of this string could be claimed to be an S-structure reflex oc-
casioned by independent principles of grammar; similarly, the subjecthood of NP2 may be 
demonstrated if this phrase clearly occupied the subject position of a clausal entity at D-
structure and if its direct-object properties could be coherently attributed to other premises of 
the grammatical system. As the various proposals that have been advanced along these lines 
in the past two decades draw extensively on theoretical notions of GB-theory (and, more re-
cently, the MP), some common principles of the categorial component of generative grammar 
and Case theory must be laid out at this point. 
The categorial component integrates the lexicon with the syntax via certain structural 
rules and principles. In the versions of generative grammar preceding GB-theory, the cate-
gorial component was essentially made up of a rich set of category-specific rewrite rules de-
fining the constituent structure of each phrasal category, e.g. S → NP VP, or PP → P NP (Hoek-
stra 1988: 102-3; Stowell 1983: 288). While the device of rewrite rules may have been well 
suited to the task of constructing descriptively adequate phrase-structure configurations for a 
specific language such as English, it lacked explanatory adequacy because the rules had idio-
syncratic properties and could not be deduced from more general principles of grammar (cf. 
3.2) (Cook and Newson 1996: 135; Grewendorf 2002: 12). The 1970s and 1980s therefore 
saw systematic attempts to reduce the redundancy of individual phrase-structure rules and to 
accommodate them to some more abstract principles within the new framework of X'-theory. 
Category labels such as 'NP' or 'VP' used to be essentially unanalysed symbols, with no sys-
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tematic relations holding between V and VP or N and NP. X'-theory, on the other hand, hy-
pothesises that the label of each phrase consists of a "categorial value" such as N and V, which 
identifies the lexical nature of the phrase, and a "hierarchical value" represented by the re-
spective bar-level (or, today, number of primes), e.g. V' or V'' (Stowell 1991b: 40). The impor-
tant generalisation of this system is that each complex syntactic entity has the same categorial 
value as its lexical head, irrespective of its hierarchical level, i.e. "Xn → ... Xn-1 ..." (Grewen-
dorf 2002: 33). Heads are zero-level categories belonging to a particular lexical class (e.g. V0 
or N0); the categories of the first bar-level are so-called intermediate projections of their heads 
(e.g. V' or N'), and the categories of the second and highest bar-level are maximal projections 
or phrases (e.g. V''/VP or N''/NP) (Cook and Newson 1996: 139). The principle of endocentric-
ity thus guarantees that the features of the head progressively project up onto the maximal 
projection. 
While the maxim of endocentricity makes the relations between a lexical head such as N 
and its projections N' and NP explicit, it does not, as such, capture the structural parallels be-
tween phrases of different categories. X'-theory remedied this situation as well because it pro-
vided a uniform rule schema into which all phrasal categories could be collapsed (Starke 
1995: 237-8; Stowell 1983: 288-9). The structural skeleton of (108) is a category-neutral tem-
plate, where the value of X can range over the lexical categories N, V, A and P. This template 
allows for no X-particular variation and thus guarantees that the syntactic levels X' and XP are 
projected from their heads in a uniform way, irrespective of what lexical categories these 
heads are instantiated by.60 
(108) a.  X'    → X0 + YP 
  b.  XP   → SPEC + X' 
  c.  XP*  → XP + ZP 
All projections are reduced to binary branching: the intermediate projection X' dominates the 
lexical head and at most one complement YP (108a), while the maximal projection XP consists 
of a so-called 'specifier' (SPEC) and the X'-projection (108b) (Cook and Newson 1996: 141-4; 
Stowell 1991b: 40). A specifier is defined in terms of its particular syntactic position; its exact 
categorial values, however, are notoriously vague and subject to continuing debate (Sternefeld 
1991: 17-8; Stowell 1991b: 42).61 Maximal projections can be recursively combined with ad-
                                                 
60 In the MP, this strict algorithm has been replaced by the simple recursive operation 'merge', which combines 
two elements in a piecemeal fashion (Cook and Newson 1996: 323). The advantage of 'merge' is that certain 
(complement or specifier) positions which the X'-format would have required but which are not lexically filled in 
the sentence need not be projected (Chomsky 1995: 249). The principle of endocentricity remains unaffected, 
though: one of the two elements merged provides the label for the whole structure (Cook and Newson 1996: 
339-40). 
61 A notational device for expressing the notion 'specifier of XP' is [SPEC,XP]. 
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junct ZPs — without increasing the hierarchical value of XP, though (108c)62 (Haegeman and 
Guéron 1999: 80); alternatively, adjuncts are also sometimes analysed as sisters to X', recur-
sively creating other X'-levels (Cook and Newson 1996: 145-6). 
The blueprint of (108) has been extended from lexical to functional categories such as 
determiners, temporal inflections, and complementisers as well (Bresnan 2001: 99-100; Hae-
geman and Guéron 1999: 103). While a sentence was originally analysed as an exocentric 
structure (S → NP VP), it is now thought to be a hierarchically structured projection of the ver-
bal inflection, abbreviated as 'I' (Cook and Newson 1996: 148). The head I determines whether 
a clause is finite ([+tense]) or non-finite ([-tense]), and what its person/number agreement-
features ([AGR]) are.63 I takes a VP as its complement to form an I' projection, which in turn 
combines with a specifier — in this case the subject of the sentence (but see 5.3.5) — to form 
the maximal projection IP (109a, a') (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 95; Stowell 1991b: 41). 
Similarly, a clause introduced by a complementiser (C) such as that, for or if is no longer con-
ceived of as an exocentric construct (S' → C + S), but as a projection of this complementiser. 
The head C selects a clause, IP, as its complement and forms a C'-projection; C' then combines 
with a specifier to result in the maximal projection CP (109b, b') (Cook and Newson 1996: 
150-1; Stowell 1991b: 41).64 
(109) a.   I' → I + VP 
  a'.  IP → SPEC + I 
  b.   C' → C + IP  
  b'.  CP → SPEC + C' 
The extension of the X'-template to functional categories is first and foremost based on theo-
retical reasons; the postulate that I selects VP or that C selects IP, for example, does not follow 
from empirical considerations, but is primarily "a matter of analytical convenience" (Stowell 
1991b: 42). The developments of the categorial component thus clearly illustrate the continu-
ing drive in generative grammar from descriptively adequate analyses to abstract, explanato-
rily adequate accounts. 
                                                 
62 A maximal projection without adjuncts is called the 'minimal maximal projection'; this projection can then be 
recursively extended by adjuncts, creating various 'segments' of a phrase (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 80).  
63 The tense and agreement features of I can be represented by a free morpheme such as is or by a bound mor-
pheme such as –s. In the course of the derivation, a bound morpheme must be combined with its lexical stem by 
some mechanism that raises the verb to the bound morpheme (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 90-2). In the more 
recent 'checking account', verbs are base-generated under the head V complete with their inflectional endings. 
The functional head I does not contain tense or agreement morphemes, but only abstract tense/agreement fea-
tures. These abstract features must be checked by a verb with matching inflections; for this checking procedure, 
the verb must (overtly or covertly) move to the functional head I (Grewendorf 2002: 39-40). 
64 The position of C can also be empty and serve, for example, as the landing site of auxiliaries in root interroga-
tives (Will [C] he come tomorrow?). Likewise, [SPEC,CP] is frequently unfilled, but may function as the structural 
position for interrogative pronouns in wh-questions (e.g. When [SPEC,CP] will [C] he come tomorrow?) (Haege-
man and Guéron 1999: 170-2). 
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GB-theory defines SCs as clausal complements of verbs like consider; since complement 
positions are occupied by maximal projections such as NPs (I believe the story) or CPs (I be-
lieve that the story is true) (Cook and Newson 1996: 141; Moro 1995: 113), the propositional 
θ-role of SCs must be syntactically realised by a maximal projection as well. According to the 
principle of endocentricity underlying X'-theory, SCs must thus be projected by some head.65 
The problem now is to specify what head projects an SC as in Mary considers [SC John fool-
ish] (cf. 110) — is it some sort of lexical projection (e.g. an AP), or a functional projection 
(e.g. an IP or a CP)? 
(110)                ?P 
 
 NP    AP 
 
John              foolish 
Any proposal concerning the categorial status of the SC-node must also account for the fact 
that the SC-subject does not show characteristic subject properties; in particular, it must ex-
plain why this phrase can act as a separate constituent at S-structure and has the accusative 
Case typical of direct objects (cf. 5.2). Case-relations are explicated within the GB-module of 
'Case theory', the cornerstone of which is the requirement that all overt NPs must be assigned 
Case (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 133; Stowell 1983: 286).66 In the standard account, nomi-
native and accusative Case are assigned by governors such as P or V under specific S-
structural configurations (Grewendorf 2002: 23). A head can assign structural Case to an NP if 
it bears one of two possible local relations to it: a head governs its complement and can Case-
mark it under this relation of government; furthermore, a head is in an agreement relation with 
the specifier of its maximal projection and can assign Case to the NP in the specifier position 
under this relation of SPEC-head agreement (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 79). More explic-
itly, a verb assigns accusative Case to its direct-object complement and I assigns nominative 
Case to the subject in the [SPEC,IP] position (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 129-30). It is, 
however, assumed that only finite I (marked [+AGR]) has the ability to assign nominative 
Case on the strength of the agreement relation holding between it and the subject NP (Haege-
                                                 
65 Despite the wide-spread acceptance of the endocentricity principle, there have been occasional attempts to 
treat SCs as exocentric structures (e.g. Chung and McCloskey 1987; Hayashi 1991: 23; Kluender 1985). Chung 
and McCloskey, for instance, argue that an SC is of the category 'S' because "it shows all the characteristic traits 
of maximal categories but is not a projection of any category" (1987: 234-5); Kluender likewise identifies SCs as 
Ss and wants to exempt S from the principle of endocentricity (1985: 287-8). Exocentric analyses of SCs have 
come in for heavy criticism because they violate the generalizations of X'-theory (Aarts 1992: 178-9) and treat 
'SC' as a primitive, unexplained notion (Radford 1988: 516). 
66 The Case requirement for overt NPs is often explained by the fact that Case renders an NP visible for the as-
signment of a θ-role (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 502). As a consequence, a direct relation between Theta-
theory and Case-theory can be established if it is assumed that "Cases are to syntax what theta-roles are to the 
lexicon" (Brody and Manzini 1988: 117-8).  
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man and Guéron 1999: 95; Stowell 1983: 286). Non-finite I (marked [-AGR]), on the other 
hand, cannot establish an agreement relation with [SPEC,IP] and thus cannot Case-mark the 
subject at all (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 132; Stowell 1983: 290-1). In more recent devel-
opments of Case theory, where the concept of government has been abolished (Cook and 
Newson 1996: 316), it is assumed that both nominative and accusative Case are assigned un-
der SPEC-head agreement relations; a direct object must thus be moved to the specifier posi-
tion of some functional head to receive accusative Case (Grewendorf 2002: 39).67  
The accusative Case of the putative SC-subject can thus be explained in two ways: if ac-
cusative Case is assumed to be assigned under government, as the traditional theory has it, the 
SC-subject must be exceptionally governed and Case-marked by the matrix verb (Rothstein 
1992: 136; Stowell 1991a: 187-8). SC-theories working on this assumption must explain why 
such Exceptional Case Marking (ECM) is possible, i.e. why and how a matrix verb can gov-
ern an NP it has not semantically selected across a clause boundary. Alternatively, if it is hy-
pothesised along the lines of more recent assumptions that the SC-subject moves to the speci-
fier position of some functional head to receive accusative Case (Cook and Newson 1996: 
334), it must be pointed out where exactly the landing site of this NP is and how it can move 
there.68 In addition to these questions, both Case accounts must explain why the SC-subject 
can separately move into the matrix clause, e.g. in the passive transformation (Hei is consid-
ered [SC ti a fool]), although it is only a subconstituent of a clause. 
In the following sections, we will look at various attempts to identify the SC-node and to 
explain the accusative Case of the putative SC-subject in the chronological order of their ap-
pearance in the SC-literature. 
                                                 
67 In the current 'checking account', a head is not regarded as assigning Case to some NP, but to check an NP that 
has been inserted into the structure along with its Case feature (Grewendorf 2002: 159-60; Haegeman and 
Guéron 1999: 129). The checking account works with the notion of 'uninterpretable' features: Case is seen as an 
uninterpretable feature that does not have any meaning in the semantic interpretation of the sentence; a Case-
bearing NP must therefore move to the specifier position of some functional head to have its Case feature 
checked and subsequently deleted; this movement is overt for the subject (which checks for nominative Case), 
but covert for the object (which checks for accusative Case) in English (Cook and Newson 1996: 333-5; Gre-
wendorf 2002: 162-3, 189-90). As I am not interested in clearly differentiating between alternative theories of 
Case in GB or the MP, I will use the terminology of the Case assignment account and the checking account in-
discriminately in the following discussions. 
68 If an NP moves from its theta-position at D-structure to some Case position at S-structure, it leaves behind a 
co-indexed trace; the moved NP and its trace are said to form a chain (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 396). The 
notion 'chain' ensures that both the Theta-Criterion and the Case requirement are satisfied because the NP is in a 
Case position in this chain and the co-indexed trace occupies a theta-position (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 
506). NP-movement is 'A(rgument)-movement' (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 217-8): an NP moves from its base-
structure argument position to another argument position (Cook and Newson 1996: 178; Grewendorf 2002: 19). 
The idea of A-positions is important to guarantee that such an NP does not move to a position that cannot be 
assigned a thematic role (so-called A'-positions), such as the [SPEC,CP] position, which serves as the landing site 
for wh-phrases in questions (Cook and Newson 1996: 314; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 218). 
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5.3.2 Small clauses as quasi-clauses: is an SC a pure lexical projection? 
Stowell, who has laid the groundwork for modern SC-theory, did not analyse NP2 XP-strings 
on a par with non-finite and finite clauses; specifically, he assumed that SCs do not contain 
any functional projections such as I or C. Instead, he proposed that an SC is simply a maximal 
projection of the lexical category of its predicate (1983: 301); the inner architecture of an SC 
would then look something like (111a). When an SCs is a bare lexical projection (LP), it can 
be, among other things, an NP (111b) or AP (111c): 
(111) a.  [LP = SC SC-subj [L' [L0 SC-pred]]]. 
  b.  Mary considers  [NP = SC       John  [N' [N0 a fool]]].  
  c.  Mary considers  [AP = SC       John  [A' [A0 foolish]]].69 
Stowell and the scholars drawing on his LP-analysis (which include Chomsky (1981), 
Contreras (1987), Kayne (1985), and Manzini (1989)) furnish several pieces of evidence to 
substantiate the configuration of (111a). In the first place, Stowell asserts that the matrix verb 
can select for the categorial status of the SC-predicate (1983: 301). To corroborate this hy-
pothesis, he makes up the following ungrammatical sentences: 
(112) a.  *I consider [John off my ship].  
  b.  *I expect [that man very stupid].                             (from Stowell 1983: 301) 
Stowell attributes the ungrammaticality of these sentences to the categorial constraints that 
consider cannot subcategorise for a PP and expect not for an AP. As these verbs are able to 
specify the categorial status of XP, Stowell concludes that SCs must be projections of the lexi-
cal head X. If they were sentences, the matrix verb would categorially select a subconstituent 
of its sentential argument, something which is strictly disallowed by the rules of subcategori-
sation (Stowell 1981: 259, 1983: 301). These selection data therefore seem to underpin Stow-
ell's claim that a matrix verb such as consider subcategorises for one postverbal argument, 
which may be an NP or AP; an SC is therefore nothing more than a maximal projection of a 
lexical category which is preceded by a subject NP within the same phrase. 
One more assumption is necessary to make the analysis of (111) sustainable, though. 
Stowell needs to postulate that not just IPs, but all maximal projections may contain a struc-
tural subject (1983: 295-6) — a generalisation not usually included in the X'-framework of the 
time. As the only structural position made available by X'-theory for this sort of subject is the 
specifier of the respective maximal projection, the notion 'subject' would generalise across 
categories and be synonymous with the template '[SPEC,XP]'. N' or A' would thus combine with 
                                                 
69 The intermediate projections N' or A' are identical to their heads N0 and A0 in these sentences, but some nouns 
and adjectives can also take complements in the SC-predicate position: I consider John an obstacle to our plans; 
I consider John too proud of his achievements. 
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their specifiers a.k.a. subjects to form the maximal projections NP (111b) and AP (111c), re-
spectively.70 
As a result, the propositional θ-role assigned by matrix verbs such as consider can be 
structurally realised not only by ordinary clauses, but also by quasi-clauses such as the LPs 
postulated by Stowell (1981: 259-61). The subject/predicate relation between NP2 and XP is 
not structurally reflected by a canonical clause, which would also contain a functional projec-
tion for tense or a complementiser, but by the subject/predicate configuration holding between 
the specifier and the lexical head within a single maximal projection (Nakajima 1991a: 5; 
Staudinger 1996: 29; Stowell 1983: 298-9). In this view, SCs constitute structural and seman-
tic predication domains like full clauses (Ionescu 1997: 168; Stowell 1991a: 183, 1995: 274). 
While the latter are the CSRs (cf. footnote 41) of the propositional θ-role, SCs would be 
marked structural realisations because they contain a subject and a predicate position but not 
any other typical clausal characteristics (Chomsky 1981: 112; Kaplan 1988: 81).  
The subject in the specifier position of an SC is θ-marked by the lexical head of the SC, 
but is thought not to be governed or assigned Case by it (Stowell 1983: 297). The NP2 there-
fore needs Case from the matrix verb outside the SC (Ionescu 1997: 169; Stowell 1991a: 
182). The SC-boundary must consequently be taken to be transparent to government so that 
the SC-subject can be exceptionally Case-marked by the matrix verb.71 The movement of the 
NP2 in passive sentences (Johni is considered [ti foolish]) is also attributed to Case theory be-
cause passive verbs are assumed not to assign accusative Case, so the SC-subject must move 
to the matrix subject position where it can receive nominative Case from finite I (Stowell 
1991a: 182). The mechanism of ECM thus explains both the S-structure direct-object proper-
ties of NP2 and the non-constituent behaviour of the NP2 XP-string in passive constructions, for 
instance. 
                                                 
70 Stowell's argumentation for the category-neutral definition of the subject position relies heavily on Case the-
ory. While the subject position of finite IPs, i.e. ordinary clauses, must be obligatorily filled by an NP, the subject 
of lexical projections such as NP and AP is optional (1983: 289-90). Stowell theorises that this "defective cross-
categorial distribution of lexical subjects" (1983: 290) can be attributed to Case: finite I can assign nominative 
Case to the clausal subject, but lexical categories such as N and A are unable to assign Case and therefore usually 
do not have their subject positions filled by an NP (1983: 292).  
71 The theory of Case then prevalent demanded that a matrix verb can only govern into a non-maximal projec-
tion, so it had to be argued that SCs are non-maximal projections of their predicates (Chomsky 1981: 107, 169). 
The usual approach to the related problem of how the subjects of infinitival clauses like I believe [him to be a 
liar] can be assigned accusative Case was to suggest "a marked rule of S'-deletion" (1981: 66), which deletes S' 
(today: the CP-projection) so that the remaining configuration was no longer a maximal projection (S or IP was 
assumed to be non-maximal at that time) (Stowell 1983: 296-7; Watts 1983: 47). In a similar way, the LP-
projection of SCs could be exceptionally deleted so that the matrix verb can govern the subject of the non-
maximal projection L' (Staudinger 1996: 148). For several reasons, however, the rule of S'-deletion or LP-deletion 
has always been "a fudge which sems a little uncomfortable" (May 1987: 27). The post-Barriers framework 
(Chomsky 1986b) offered a new solution to the problem (see 5.2.4). 
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Stowell's analysis of SCs as maximal projections of their lexical heads has come under 
heavy attack from generative grammarians since the late 1980s; as Hornstein and Lightfoot 
put it, "Stowell commits himself to some complications which range from unnecessary to un-
acceptable" (1987: 32). To begin with, Stowell's assumption that the matrix verb is sensitive 
to the categorial status of the predicate is highly problematic. Kitagawa shows that the reason 
for the ungrammaticality of (112a) and (112b) does not lie in some categorial restrictions that 
consider and expect impose on their complements. Rather, the unacceptability of these sen-
tences is induced by the semantics of the matrix verbs: consider needs a complement express-
ing "state of affairs" and expect a complement expressing "change of state" (Kitagawa 1985: 
211-2). If these restrictions are met, consider can occur with a PP (113a) and expect with an AP 
(113b): 
(113) a.  Unfortunately, our pilot considers [that island off the route].  
  b.  I expect [that man dead by tomorrow].             (from Kitagawa 1985: 212) 
I agree with Kitagawa that the grammaticality of the sentences is determined by semantic 
considerations, and not by the categorial realisation of the XP-position. It is at this point that 
we part company, though: Kitagawa argues that the matrix verb subcategorises for the SC as a 
whole and not merely for the category of its predicate (1985: 212; see also Hornstein and 
Lightfoot 1987: 32-3). From the perspective of Construction grammar, I submit that the static 
interpretation of the XP-role in (113a) is part of the meaning of the QUALIFYING Construction 
instantiated by this sentence as a whole, while the dynamic interpretation of (113b) is due to 
the meaning of prospective constructions (see 9.2.3 and 11.4.3.2).72 Whatever position one 
takes, it is clear that Stowell's assumptions are untenable.  
The structural analysis of SCs as maximal projections of lexical categories, with the SC-
subject occupying the [SPEC,LP]-position, does not fare much better than the selection argu-
ment. What militates against the configuration of (111) is the fact that the putative L'-predicate 
behaves like a maximal projection because it can undergo movement operations without its 
specifier (114a) (Kitagawa 1985: 213; Williams 1983: 297-8); non-maximal projections, i.e. 
subparts of syntactic phrases, cannot normally be moved on their own, however (114a'). The 
problems of the specifier-analysis are also aggravated by the fact that the SC-predicate can 
have two subjects and consequently two specifier positions (114b) (Radford 1988: 517; Wil-
                                                 
72 Contreras defends Stowell's categorial selection account against Kitagawa's criticism by constructing the sen-
tence *I expect you an attorney by the end of the year, which is ungrammatical even though it has a dynamic 
meaning (1987: 230; see also Endo 1991: 62-3). The ungrammaticality of this sentence seems, however, to be 
due to the fact that attorney is not a noun that can be used predicatively (cf. *I consider you an attorney) (see 
11.4.6.2). 
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liams 1983: 297-8), something that is prohibited for other maximal projections (114b') (for 
additional non-constituency evidence, cf. 5.2.1). 
(114) a.  How foolishi does Mary consider [AP John [A' ti]]? 
  a'. *Whoi do you love [NP John's [N' ti]]? (e.g., t=brother) 
  b.  Mary considers [NP John [NP Mary's [N' lover]]]. 
  b'. *Mary loves [NP John's [NP Bob's [N' brother]]]. 
In the face of such serious objections, proponents of the lexical theory of SCs have suggested 
a cop-out: if both the SC-subject and the SC-predicate are maximal projections, i.e. independ-
ent constituents, NP2 could be argued to occupy a base-generated position as an adjunct to XP 
(Chomsky 1986b: 16; Manzini 1989: 158), a solution that has more recently been revisited by 
Sternefeld (1991: 28) and Haegeman and Guéron (1999: 110). In this configuration, the SC-
subject is not in the specifier position of the maximal projection, but the two maximal projec-
tions NP2 and XP are simply juxtaposed, with the categorial features of the minimal maximal 
projection XP1 (cf. footnote 62) projecting up to the full maximal projection XP2 (Manzini 
1989: 159): 
(115)  
   AP2 
 
  NP    AP1 
 
              John              foolish 
I cannot comprehend the relative popularity of this adjunction analysis, whose faulty logic can 
easily be attacked. We would have to assume, in the first place, that the SC-subject is an 
obligatory adjunct because the sentence *Mary considers foolish is ungrammatical; for most 
syntacticians, 'obligatory adjunct' is a contradiction in terms, though. Moreover, adjunction 
operations are typically recursive, but can only apply once in (115) (cf. *Mary considers John 
Bob foolish) (Radford 1988: 519). Structure (115), like (111a), is also problematic because no 
matter if NP2 is in the specifier position of the SC-predicate or adjoined to it, there is no repre-
sentational space for the conjunction/preposition as in constructions like John regards Mary 
as a genius (Starke 1995: 240-1). The adjunction analysis is a theoretical contrivance that 
attempts to salvage the LP-analysis of SCs without having any factual basis to speak of. 
The most serious objection to Stowell's proposal concerns the analysis of phrasal sub-
ject/predicate configurations as quasi-clauses. If every phrasal subject/predicate relation con-
stituted some sort of clause, NPs such as "Al's gift to the hospital of $3000" or "Bill's pictures 
of himself" would have to be analysed as clauses as well, which would stretch the notion 
'clause' to an unacceptable degree, however (Kaplan 1988: 81). Furthermore, the analysis of 
(111) forces grammarians to treat not only adjectives, but NPs as predicates as well, which 
calls for a re-evaluation of the notion 'predicate'. Stowell and his followers have tried to cope 
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with the definition of 'predicate' within the framework of generative grammar. Noun phrases 
were originally analysed as NPs, with N being the referential lexical head of the maximal pro-
jection and a determiner (which could also be non-overt) occupying the specifier position 
(Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 65-7; Stowell 1991b: 37-8). The development of X'-theory 
changed this analysis because NP was, on analogy with IP, recast as 'DP': a determiner D takes 
an NP as its complement to form a D', which in turn combines with a specifier position (which 
can be occupied by prenominal genitives) to yield a DP projection (Stowell 1991b: 41-2). 
Stowell proposes that the referential properties of noun phrases are created by the determiner 
position; while DPs are referring expressions (116a) and cannot occupy the SC-predicate posi-
tion (116a'), bare NPs can serve as predicates (116b) but are barred from referential positions 
in the sentence (116b') (1989: 248-9, 1991b: 44-5).  
(116) a.   The president came to see me today.  
  a'.  *They elected John the president. 
  b.   They elected John president. 
  b'.  *President came to see me today. 
This proposal opens a nasty can of worms, though. Stowell realises himself that the dichot-
omy between predicative NPs and referential DPs is anything but firm. It is true that DPs pro-
jected from definite articles, demonstratives, or numerals cannot normally be used predica-
tively (*I consider John the/this/one friend) (Stowell 1991b: 47), but DPs projected by a pos-
sessive and especially an indefinite article are regularly found in the predicative position of 
SCs (I consider John my/a good friend) (Stowell 1989: 251, 1991b: 47). As a matter of fact, 
only the narrow class of NPs denoting titles such as president or chairman can be used predi-
catively without a determiner, while a determiner is required in the SC-predicate position in 
practically all other cases (Stowell 1991b: 49). These mismatches prompt Stowell to concede 
that "the apparent occurrence of DPs, rather than NPs, as predicates ... is a complete mystery, 
as is the ungrammaticality of bare NPs as predicates" (1991b: 47).73 Discrete grammars are 
unable to explain why noun phrases, which are typically referential expressions, may be used 
in the predicative XP-position, because the distinction between referential and predicative 
noun phrases does not correlate with discrete structural properties such as the presence or ab-
                                                 
73 There have been several quasi-solutions to the problem: Contreras posits that "different members of D are 
marked in the lexicon as either + or – referential" (1995: 147). This is a desperate and purely stipulative expedi-
ent; moreover, it does not really work because even if definite articles were marked as [+referential] in the lexi-
con, there is still conflicting evidence where nouns with definite articles can be used predicatively (e.g. I con-
sider John the best man for this job) (cf. Rapoport 1995: 154). Alternatively, Sag et al. suggest an 'archicate-
gory' for predicative phrases that possess a feature such as [+Pred] but are underspecified for lexical category 
(1985: 119, 141; similarly, Goodall 1987: 45). Yet this solution only shifts the problem to some more abstract 
level because it is not clear which NPs could be assigned a [+Pred] feature; why is John is an attorney grammati-
cal but ??I consider John an attorney not? The predicative nature of an NP cannot be established in isolation but 
depends on the specific construction it is used in. 
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sence of a determiner (for a non-discrete and functional treatment of predicative noun phrases, 
see 11.4.6.2). 
An observation made by Moro can be used as the last nail in the lexical SC-coffin. Stow-
ell argues that NP2 is assigned a θ-role by the SC-predicate. This seems indeed to be the case 
in (117a): the noun cause is a two-place predicate, assigning the semantic roles AGENT to 
Mary and PATIENT to the riot (Moro 1995: 116). In (117b), the two-place predicate picture 
assigns the semantic roles AGENT to the pronoun his and PATIENT to Mary. The putative 
SC-subject these, however, is not assigned a θ-role by the predicate (Moro 1995: 116) and 
thus cannot be its subject argument. 
(117) a.  John considers [SC [DP Mary]+agent ←[DP the cause of → [DP the riot]+patient ]]. 
  b.  John considers [SC [DP these] [DP [DP his]+agent best pictures of [DP Mary]+patient ]].
                             (from Moro 1995: 116) 
Stowell's LP-proposal has proved so resilient in the generative literature despite its many em-
pirical and theoretical drawbacks because it allegedly derives support from observations made 
in the area of language acquisition. Radford analyses children's sentences such as [John hun-
gry] or [Mommy in kitchen] as bare projections of lexical categories. Since children under two 
generally do not use inflections in verbal sentences (e.g. John eating chocolate) and do not 
introduce clauses with complementisers, Radford infers that their grammar does not include 
functional categories (1990: 112). While children can use SCs in a largely unconstrained fash-
ion, adult SCs are essentially restricted to governed contexts after matrix verbs such as con-
sider because the SC-subject needs Case (Radford 1990: 184-5). Yet Radford's motto that 
"Small children speak Small Clauses", while adults use SCs only in a few restricted contexts 
(1990: 112), is highly doubtful for several reasons. Adult constructions such as I consider 
Mary intelligent are not only distributionally but also semantically and pragmatically distinct 
from utterances in early child language; they are rather formal structures and unlikely to be 
remnants of a more primitive SC-stage in language acquisition. Moreover, most language-
acquisition researchers today believe that children's sentences do contain functional projec-
tions from a very early stage on (for references see Cardinaletti and Guasti 1995: 11). The 
main reason why children prefer infinitives to finite verbs (What Mommy do?) and frequently 
do not use a copula (John angry) seems to be that they cannot fully master the concept of 
time/tense (Cardinaletti and Guasti 1995: 17-8). Children obviously live in the hic et nunc of 
their world and therefore do not feel the need to anchor their utterances to time (or place). In 
any case, adult NP2 XP-constructions cannot reasonably be related to utterances of early child 
language. 
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Stowell's analysis of NP2 XP-strings as quasi-clauses has increasingly fallen into disfavour 
after the late 1980s and has been replaced by the rather bold move to assimilate SCs more 
closely to the structure of canonical clauses. 
5.3.3 Small clauses as reduced clauses: do SCs contain functional projections? 
In the early 1990s, the dominant mode of thinking on SCs came to be the idea that predicative 
NP2 XP-strings might be more similar to infinitives and finite sentences in that they contain 
functional categories as well. SCs were taken to differ from other clauses in the number and 
identity of these functional projections in much the same way that non-finite and finite clauses 
differ from each other in their functional make-up.  
An early proposal along these lines was put forward by Hornstein and Lightfoot, who 
suggested analysing SCs as IPs projected from a zero I-node (118). While finite clauses are 
[+tense, +AGR] and non-finite clauses are [-tense, -AGR], SCs do not contain a tense or 
agreement operator at all (1987: 27-8). Hornstein and Lightfoot further speculate that an I 
marked [± tense] selects a VP as complement, while empty I selects AP, NP, or PP (1987: 28). 
(118) [SC = IP NP I0 XP]74 
Although this structure has pointed the way for further analyses, it is clumsy and not very 
convincing. The notion of 'zero I' does not only complicate the grammar, but is also difficult 
to substantiate in syntactic terms. It is not clear what it means for a clause to be neither finite 
nor non-finite; as Aarts puts it, "[t]hat would be rather like having human beings who are nei-
ther male nor female" (1992: 182). 
The functional analysis of SCs gained fresh impetus when syntacticians started to intro-
duce a more articulated functional structure for canonical clauses. According to the 'Split-I-
hypothesis', I was decomposed into separate functional heads, each with its own maximal pro-
jection. The number and arrangement of these more atomic inflectional projections has been 
an arena for ongoing debates, so I will only outline one common version of the theory here 
(cf. Cardinaletti and Guasti 1993: 41; Cook and Newson 1996: 181-5; Grewendorf 2002: 39; 
Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 509). The highest functional phrase in a clause is AGRSP, whose 
head AGRS regulates person and number agreement between the subject in the [SPEC,AGRSP]-
position and the verb; if the clause is finite, it is this node that also checks the nominative 
Case of the subject NP (119a, a'). Embedded under AGRSP is the maximal category NEGP pro-
jected by the node NEG, which is responsible for sentential negation (119b, b'). NEG takes a TP 
                                                 
74 Hornstein and Lightfoot's notational conventions, like those of some of the proposals that follow, have been 
slightly adapted to contemporary standards (for example, INFL has been replaced by 'I' and 'S' by 'IP').  
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as complement, which is projected by the tense operator T (119c, c'). The lowest functional 
projection is AGROP, whose head AGRO establishes an agreement relation with the direct ob-
ject in the [SPEC,AGROP]-position. In English, number agreement between the verb and the 
direct object does not have any overt reflex, but AGRO is also thought to check the accusative 
Case of the direct-object NP in more recent accounts that no longer work with the structural 
relation 'government' (cf. 5.1). AGRO finally takes the VP as its complement (119d, d').75 
(119) a.  AGRsP → SPEC + AGRs' 
a'.  AGRs'  → AGRs0 + NEGP 
 
b.  NEGP   → SPEC + NEG' 
b'. NEG'    → NEG0 + TP 
 
c.  TP        → SPEC + T' 
c'.  T'          → T0 + AGRoP 
    
d.  AGRoP  → SPEC + AGRo' 
d'. AGRo'   → AGRo0 + VP 
The rich internal structure attributed to ordinary clauses has exerted considerable influence on 
SC-theory because it could now be argued that SCs need not either contain all functional pro-
jections of full clauses or no functional projections at all, but could be identified as function-
ally reduced clauses: "The term 'small clauses' is generally used in opposition to the term 'full 
clauses' to convey the idea that the former are morphologically poorer/less complex than the 
latter" (Cardinaletti and Guasti 1995: xi; cf. also Nakajima 1991b: 41). While the lowest func-
tional head of a full clause selects a VP (cf. 119d'), the lowest functional head of an SC selects 
an AP, NP, or PP. The postulation of functional projections in SCs now permitted the generali-
sation that the predication relation between a subject and a predicate is always mediated by 
some functional projection within a clausal domain (Moro 1995: 110). The search for the 
functional projections present in SCs has been the main concern of SC-theoreticians since the 
early 1990s. 
Obviously, SCs do not contain an AGRS-node because there is no person agreement be-
tween NP2 and XP such as exists between the subject and verb of a finite clause (Cardinaletti 
and Guasti 1993: 56). Moreover, SCs do not function as domains for sentential negation, so 
they do not seem to include a NEGP-projection, either. In English, the head of the negation 
projection is realised by the affix –n't, which can attach to an auxiliary or be supported by do 
(Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 529); both mechanisms are impossible for SCs, though (120a, 
                                                 
75 While some syntacticians have fissioned IP into still more functional subprojections, the trend has recently 
been to reduce the number of functional projections again; AGRSP has, for example, been conflated with TP. In 
addition, AGROP has generally been replaced by the maximal category νP, whose head ν is assumed to be some 
transitivity operator or empty causative verb (Grewendorf 2002: 147-52).  
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a'). The negator not is assumed to occupy the [SPEC,NEGP]-position in full clauses (Haegeman 
and Guéron 1999: 529-30). While the element not is marginally acceptable between NP2 and 
XP, it does not have scope over the whole SC but only negates the XP-constituent; as is typical 
of narrow-scope constructs, not usually carries emphatic stress (120b) (Bayer 1986: 13-4).76 
These findings indicate that the negator does not occupy the [SPEC,NEGP]-position as in ordi-
nary clauses, but is an adverbial adjoined to the SC-predicate (Cardinaletti and Guasti 1993: 
40, 55; Endo 1991: 59-60; Radford 1990: 153; Suzuki 1991: 33).77 What is more, NPs in the 
SC-predicate position cannot be negated at all (120b'). 
(120) a.  *I consider her can't attractive. 
  a'.  *I consider her don't attractive. 
  b.  ??I consider Mary no t attractive (why don't you believe me?). 
  b'. *I consider Mary not a genius. 
In addition, most researchers also agree that SCs do not contain a functional projection for 
tense. Neither do SCs exhibit any typical tense morphology, nor do they tolerate temporal 
adverbials (Cardinaletti and Guasti 1995: 14). The adverb yesterday can take scope over the 
that-clause in (121a) and contrast with the main-clause adverb today, but SCs do not allow 
any independent temporal modification (121b).78 
(121) a.  Today I believe that he was sick yesterday. 
  b.  *Today I consider him sick yesterday. 
If SCs lack the maximal projections AGRSP, NEGP and TP, then the only functional projection 
that they can be invested with is an SC-equivalent of AGROP. That SCs are projected by some 
agreement category has become the standard opinion among researchers subscribing to the 
reduced-clause hypothesis (e.g. Nakajima 1991b: 41; Suzuki 1991: 28). When the SC-
predicate is realised by an NP in English, it shows number agreement with its subject NP 
(122a, a'); in languages such as French, adjectives agree in number (and gender) with the sub-
ject NP as well (122b, b') (Cardinaletti and Guasti 1995: 12; Kikuchi and Takahashi 1991: 87-
8). 
(122) a.  I consider Mary an attractive woman. 
  a'.  I consider Mary and Sue attractive women. 
  b.  Je considère Marie intelligente. 
  c.  Je considère Marie et Jean intelligents. 
                                                 
76 The contrast is with the positive value of the property that is presupposed by the interlocutor; the speaker of 
(120b) confirms that in his opinion, Mary cannot be assigned the property attractive. 
77 Compare my analysis of modal adverbs such as probably as taking narrow scope over the XP-constituent only 
(5.2.1). 
78 There have been several attempts to explain how SCs can inherit the tense specifications of the main clause. 
Guéron and Hoekstra, for instance, have constructed an elaborate account of how the event described by the SC 
can be connected to the tense domain of the main clause, making use of the notion 'T(ense)-chain' (1995: 79-82). 
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According to the AGR-hypothesis of SCs, the subject NP is located in the specifier of an 
agreement phrase at some point in the derivation and enters into a SPEC-head relation with an 
agreement node, which takes XP as its complement (123).79 The SC-subject is again thought to 
be exceptionally assigned accusative Case by the main verb (Endo 1991: 61). 
(123) [AGRP = SC NP [AGR' AGR0 XP]] 
The predicative relation between NP2 and XP can consequently be assumed to be mediated by 
an agreement phrase in both full and small clauses; AGR would thus be a structural correlate 
of predication (Staudinger 1996: 126). The chief difference between predication domains 
would then simply lie in the number of functional projections included in the clause in addi-
tion to AGRP (Guéron and Hoekstra 1995: 78-9; Suzuki 1991: 31). 
Since the SC sketched in (123) contains two maximal projections, a lexical projection 
plus an agreement projection, the movement operations which have been intractable for the 
bare LP-approach do not pose any problems here. The analysis of SCs as AGRPs has the addi-
tional advantage that it offers a representational space for as, namely as the spell-out of the 
agreement node. 
The AGR-analysis of SCs may have been compelling for generative grammarians at some 
point, but it has lost its appeal since it has been realised that the agreement node cannot be 
responsible for the predication relation holding between NP2 and XP. Moro quotes a number of 
Italian examples where there is no agreement between the NP2 and XP of an SC (1995: 114) 
and concludes that "if the predicative relation involves a form of agreement, this cannot be a 
necessary condition for this relation to be established" (1995: 115).80 In most English sen-
tences there is agreement between NP2 and XP, but there are also counter-examples that show 
that "[w]hat is required is semantic compatibility, not syntactic agreement" (Huddleston and 
Pullum 2002: 255). 
(124) a.  I consider these people (pl.) a nuisance (sg.). 
  b.  Tolstikov is a wealthy professional athlete, yet he considers bananas (pl.) a luxury 
       (sg.) (BNC AJR: 538). 
  d.  I consider John (sg.) three sheets to the wind (pl.). 
  e.  I consider the distance (sg.) at least 200 metres (pl.). 
Moro admits that "[w]e still do not know whether the predicative relation derives from inde-
pendent modules of grammar" (1995: 118). Since the predicative character of SCs cannot be 
attributed to an agreement node, Moro resorts to a minimal solution. He speculates that an SC 
                                                 
79 The head X0 of the SC-predicate must move to AGR0, where it can 'pick up' the relevant agreement features 
(Staudinger 1996: 37). 
80 If we look beyond English, we see that the predicative relation is frequently independent of structural agree-
ment. This is the case in Japanese, which does not have any agreement features at all (Kikuchi and Takahashi 
1991: 88), and, closer to home, in German, where the putative SC-predicate is required to appear in the unin-
flected form of the adjective: Ich finde die Mädchen sehr *attraktive/ attraktiv. 
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has the status of a predicative phrase which is projected by an empty "predicative head" 
(1995: 118). Similarly, Bowers contends that an SC is a "predicate phrase" headed by the 
empty functional node PR, which mediates the predication relation between NP2 and XP. While 
Bowers also posits this node for full clauses in addition to all other functional categories, he 
thinks that SCs are instantiations of bare PRPs (1993: 595). 
(125) They consider [PRP John [PR' [PR e] [AP crazy]]].               (from Bowers 1993: 595) 
If as cannot regarded as the formal realisation of an agreement head, it may be recast as the 
spell-out of the predication node (Bowers 1993: 596-7; Moro 1995: 119). 
But the assumption that the predication between NP2 and XP is established by an abstract 
functional head is not a permissible way out of the dilemma because it is based on stipulative 
fiats. There is a predicative relationship between NP2 and XP, which according to SC-theory 
must have some functional correlate; since it has not been possible to identify one of the exist-
ing projections with this medium of predication, an empty functor is smuggled into the repre-
sentation and is then taken to be responsible for the predicative relation.81 The further devel-
opment of SC-theory has largely given up the reduced-clause hypothesis and has attempted to 
fit SCs even more strongly into the architecture of ordinary clauses. 
5.3.4 Small clauses as IPs: do SCs contain an empty copula? 
Largely parallel to the formulation of the reduced-clause hypothesis, some SC-theoreticians 
have suggested analysing SCs as ordinary IPs (Aarts 1992: 180; Staudinger 1996: 144). As in 
non-finite clauses, the I-node is held to be marked [-tense] because SCs cannot establish an 
independent tense domain and I does not assign nominative Case to its subject; as in finite 
clauses, however, I is specified as [+Agr] to account for the agreement relation normally hold-
ing between NP2 and XP (Aarts 1992: 180-1). I is further maintained to select a VP in the same 
way as canonical clauses; the distinguishing mark of SCs is that this VP is projected from an 
empty copula verb BE, which takes XP as its complement (126) (Aarts 1992: 181).82 The 
predicative relation between NP2 and XP is thus not attributed to an agreement projection, but 
is seen as a function of the abstract predicator BE in the same way as in normal copula sen-
tences (Aarts 1992: 181). 
                                                 
81 Within a minimalist framework, there is also the possibility that the functional head ν could establish the 
predication relation between NP2 and XP (cf. footnote 75; Thomas Hoffmann, p.c.). 
82 NP is in the [SPEC,IP]-position and is thus in a SPEC-head configuration with I. This relation guarantees the 
number agreement between NP and XP because the agreement features of I are thought to be lowered onto BE and 
then transmitted to XP (Aarts 1992: 181). 
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(126)     IP = SC 
  
  NP   I' 
 
    I  VP 
      [-tense, +Agr] 
     V  XP 
 
John    BE  a fool 
The conjunction/preposition as can be represented in two ways in this system. It could be ar-
gued that as is the formal instantiation of the abstract copula (Emonds 1984: 127). This would 
explain the predicative relation holding between NP2 and XP in the [NP2 as XP]-construction as 
well as the fact that the putative preposition as can be followed by APs and PPs in addition to 
NPs because copulas can also be followed by all kinds of phrases (Ogawa 1994: 444-5). How-
ever, one would miss many of the specific properties of this construction if one analysed as as 
a quasi-verbal element initiating a predication between the phrases preceding and following it. 
That as is not a "counterpart to be" (Emonds 1984: 127) can be demonstrated with sentences 
where as is followed by being (for examples see (52) in 4.3.) because such sentences would 
have to be analysed as containing two consecutive copulas (Ogawa 1994: 445). Alternatively, 
it could be claimed that as is an inflectional element positioned in I (Aarts 1992: 182), in 
much the same way that proponents of the reduced-clause hypothesis interpret as as the spell-
out of the agreement node. In analogous sentences with for instead of as (e.g. He mistook her 
for a secretary), for would also be treated as an inflectional element (Aarts 1992: 123). The 
relative ease and flexibility with which as can be identified as an abstract copula or a func-
tional item in SC-theory should cause suspicion, though. Incorporating words such as for and 
as into the class of inflectional elements on a par with auxiliaries means stretching this class 
to a point where it becomes almost meaningless; to mention just one difference, auxiliaries 
such as be or have can be inflected for number, while as and for are morphologically invari-
ant. As is not simply a formal device that some verbs use optionally or obligatorily to estab-
lish a subject/predicate relationship between two phrases. Section 11.4.6.2 will show that as 
also has a characteristic semantic load that is completely neglected in such an analysis. 
New developments in the theory of government and Case in the wake of Chomsky's Bar-
riers (1986b) allowed a more sophisticated account of how the SC-subject can be exception-
ally Case-marked by the matrix verb in the IP-version of SCs (for the unsuccessful attempts to 
rationalise ECM in the LP-approach, see footnote 71). A verb such as consider can be argued 
to take a CP-complement when the complement clause is finite (127a), but an IP-complement 
when the clause is non-finite (127b) (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 101, 108). Since there is 
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no complementiser or finite verb in an SC, such constructions could be regarded as IPs 
marked [-tense] like infinitival clauses (127c).  
(127) a.  I consider [CP that [IP John is a fool]]. 
  b.  I consider              [IP John to be a fool]. 
  c.  I consider              [IP John a fool]. 
In (127a), John is assigned Case by finite I under a SPEC-head agreement relation, while John 
in (127b, c) must be exceptionally governed and Case-marked by the matrix verb consider, 
non-finite I not being a Case-assigner. That the maximal projection IP, unlike CP, is transparent 
to outside government is explained in the following way: in (127b, c), consider governs and 
theta-marks an IP-complement; on the assumption that I and IP are related on a projection line 
(Sternefeld 1991: 17), consider also governs the non-finite and SC-head I, respectively. The 
infinitival subject in (127b) and the SC-subject in (127c) are in the specifier position of IP and 
thus in a SPEC-head relation with the node I, which implies that they share the features of I. As 
a result, the matrix verb can be claimed to govern the specifier position of IP as well and thus 
to be able to assign accusative Case to it (Aarts 1992: 185; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 135-
6). In (127a), on the other hand, consider governs and theta-marks a CP-complement, and thus 
cannot govern or assign Case to the specifier of the lower maximal projection IP. The CP-
projection consequently acts as a 'barrier' between the matrix verb and the specifier of the 
lower projection IP (Grewendorf 2002: 93-4; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 136; Stowell 1989: 
237). John in (127a) is therefore not Case-marked by consider, but receives its (nominative) 
Case within the finite IP. 
If consider is used in a passive sentence, it cannot assign accusative Case; both the infini-
tival and the SC-subject must consequently move from their D-structure position in the sub-
ordinate clause to the subject position of the matrix clause at S-structure, where they can be 
assigned nominative Case by the finite I-node of the matrix clause (128a, b) (Basilico 2003: 4; 
Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 203-7; Staudinger 1996: 161). As in Stowell's account, the ac-
cusative marking of the SC-subject and the fact that it can be transposed in the sentence inde-
pendently of the SC-predicate are therefore not thought to be evidence of the direct-object 
status of NP2 or the non-constituency of the SC, but are explained as S-structure phenomena 
that can be attributed to the requirements of Case theory. 
(128) a.  Johni is considered [IP ti to be a fool]. 
  b.  Johni is considered [IP ti a fool]. 
The IP-hypothesis of SCs thus proposes a close relationship between non-finite and small 
clauses, the chief difference between them being that non-finite clauses contain an overt cop-
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ula while SCs only include an abstract BE.83 The explanation that the predicative relationship 
obtaining in an SC is established by a copula as in related non-finite complement clauses is 
deceptively simple, but it is empirically untestable. In many putative SC-constructions the 
copula can never be explicit (e.g. The waitress wiped [the table (*to become) clean]; John 
drank [his coffee (*to be) hot]), so the assumption that the two elements of the SC are medi-
ated by abstract BE is purely stipulative (Contreras 1987: 229). Furthermore, while infinitival 
structures allow identity predications and the inversion of NP and XP (cf. I consider the chair-
man to be John/ I consider John to be the chairman), this is not possible in SCs (*I consider 
the chairman John/ *I consider John the chairman) (Moro 1995: 112). To explain these dif-
ferences with the absence of an overt verb in SCs (cf. Starke 1995: 265-6, footnote 27) is cir-
culatory. Finally, if SCs and non-finite clauses with to be are basically the same construction, 
it is puzzling that they should not have the same distribution in a sentence. To take just one 
example: while non-finite clauses can appear in the subject position when they are introduced 
by the preposition for (For John to lose would be a pity), this is not possible for SCs (*For 
John a loser would be a pity). Despite these striking mismatches, the idea that non-finite and 
small clauses are identical underlyingly and both contain inflectional projections seems to 
have won the day — and this has not even been the boldest step taken in the direction of 
clausal uniformity, as the following chapter will show. 
5.3.5 Small clauses as CPs: are full and small clauses identical? 
The controlling idea of an influential study by Starke (1995) is that not only non-finite and 
small clauses, but all clauses have the same structural make-up at D-structure. Starke thus 
makes the strong claim that the underlying architecture of a SC does not differ from that of a 
finite clause (129) (1995: 238-9).  
(129) a.  John believes    [CP that [IP Mary [VP is [AP intelligent]]]]. 
 b. John considers  [CP        [IP Mary [VP     [AP intelligent]]]]. 
This proposal has two rather sweeping consequences. Firstly, all arguments that receive a 
propositional θ-role can now be treated uniformly as CPs; this implies that the Projection Prin-
                                                 
83 If the copula is treated as a raising verb, as is standardly done in generative grammar (cf. [Johni is [ti a fool]], 
non-finite complement clauses must be argued to be basically SCs as well. In a raising account, be is a one-place 
predicate that selects an SC; the SC-subject must move to the [SPEC,IP] position in order to be exceptionally 
Case-marked by the matrix verb (see e.g. Moro 1995: 120-1): 
I consider [IP Johni to be [SC ti a fool]]. 
What this account gains in systematicity, it loses in explanatory power, though: while the standard IP-hypothesis 
of SCs argues that the predicative relation between NP2 and XP is mediated by an abstract copula, the raising 
version needs to find another medium for predication, such as the empty predicative node in Moro's account (see 
5.3.3; for more criticism on the raising representation, see Hatakeyama 1997: 31-2). 
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ciple can be interpreted in its most rigid sense because the subsidiary mechanism of CSRs has 
been made superfluous: propositional θ-roles are invariably instantiated as CPs, and marked 
structural realisations as IPs or SCs need no longer be specified in the lexicon. Secondly, all 
construction-particular variation with regard to clauses can be dispensed with if it is assumed 
that clauses have identical internal structure as CPs, no matter if they are finite, non-finite, or 
small (Starke 1995: 250): "Just as structure must be built out of uniform X-bar units, structure 
is built out of uniform 'clausal' units; i.e., syntactic structures are constructed of a (categori-
cally underspecified) CLAUSAL SKELETON" (Starke 1995: 248). In a similar vein, Sportiche 
maintains that there is a mutual relation between the notions 'predicate' and 'clause' in the 
sense that a predicate is always associated with a full clause (i.e., a CP) and every full clause 
contains a predicate (1995: 288).  
Although the suggestion that SCs could be CPs (or S's in the older notation) has been ven-
tured before (Coopmans and Stevenson 1991: 365-6; Kitagawa 1985: 210), Starke's and Spor-
tiche's studies are the first detailed explications of this hypothesis. Starke's central piece of 
evidence concerns the existence of the morpheme as in some SC-constructions. He argues 
that as can be analysed as the spell-out of the complementiser node like that in finite clauses 
and for in non-finite structures (1995: 248; similarly Rafel 2001: 477-8). As is what he calls a 
"functional preposition", which unlike lexical prepositions such as in or after, but similar to 
for, is phonologically light and has only fuzzy semantics (1995: 245). Starke presupposes a 
complementary distribution between complementisers such as that and if, which occur only in 
finite clauses, and the functional prepositions as and for, which are restricted to non-finite and 
small clauses (1995: 247). The fact that as can be followed by APs and PPs is no counter-
argument to Starke's theory because as does not directly select an AP or PP complement, but 
another functional projection such as IP (Rafel 2001: 478; Starke 1995: 246). 
As a consequence, a main verb assigning a propositional θ-role always subcategorises for 
a CP and, by extension, a complementiser element such as the preposition as (Starke 1995: 
240). What kind of complementiser is selected — e.g. that, for, as, or even ∅ — is strictly a 
function of the specific verb (cf. 130) (Starke 1995: 263, footnote 9).  
(130) John regards [CP=SC Mary [C' [C0 as [IP ... [VP... [AP ... intelligent]]]]]].84 
 
                                                 
84 Recently, the CP-system has been split up into smaller functional projections as well (Grewendorf 2002: 66). 
These functional projections include, among other things, a focus projection (FOCP) and a topic projection 
(TOPP) (Grewendorf 2002: 69). I will continue using 'CP' as a shorthand representation although the 'split CP-
hypothesis' has made its impact on SC-theory as well. Basilico, for example, argues that the highest functional 
projection in an SC is a TOPP and that the SC-subject must occupy the [SPEC,TOPP]-position at some point in the 
derivation (2003: 8-9).  
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The representation of (130) is, of course, not detailed enough because it does not make ex-
plicit what functional projections are hidden behind the shorthand 'IP' and what verbal element 
an SC is supposed to include. Starke's answer to the first question is rather striking: "If SCs 
are CPs, not only do they contain a functional projection ..., but they contain the full set of 
functional projections (under the standard hypothesis that there can be no 'holes' in structure, 
i.e., that the presence of a high functional projection entails the presence of all the projections 
it is taken to dominate ...)" (1995: 248). How can this bold statement be reconciled with the 
findings of the reduced-clause hypothesis that SCs do not contain functional projections such 
as TP or NEGP? Starke's forceful contention is that all of these projections are present underly-
ingly, but do not have any morphological content (1995: 260; similarly, Sportiche 1995: 288). 
Since the functional categories for tense and negation are never spelled out in an SC, they 
have default values and therefore never set the tense or negation parameters independently of 
the main clause (Starke 1995: 260). In the extreme case, all functional categories in SCs are 
represented by silent morphemes restricted to their respective default setting. In addition to 
containing the full range of functional projections, SCs are claimed to include a null copula 
BE like in the IP-hypothesis of SCs (Starke 1995: 249); this abstract predicator then selects the 
SC-predicate XP. Both in small and copula clauses, the predication relation between the sub-
ject NP and predicate XP is thus established by a verbal element (Starke 1995: 250).  
The CP-hypothesis Starke's study has set in motion has become rather influential because 
it seems to be a perfect correlate to the so-called 'VP-internal subject hypothesis' that governs 
the current understanding of canonical clauses. Classical GB-theory has tolerated an asymme-
try by generating object arguments of a verb within the VP-projection, but having the subject 
argument originate in the [SPEC,IP]-slot. The VP-internal subject hypothesis has remedied the 
situation by speculating that the subject argument is base-generated in the [SPEC,VP]-position 
and only moves to [SPEC,IP] for Case reasons (Bowers 1993: 592; Grewendorf 2002: 51). The 
unifying consequence of this hypothesis is that all arguments of a verb originate within the 
maximal projection VP. Although generative grammarians frequently mention the empirical 
vulnerability, or rather untestability, of the VP-internal hypothesis (Sportiche 1995: 290), it 
has acquired something like a communis opinio status in recent years.85 As a consequence of 
                                                 
85 The factual basis of the VP-internal subject hypothesis is extremely tenuous. The main empirical argument is 
derived from so-called 'floating quantifiers' (e.g. all), which are hypothesised to originate in [SPEC,VP] together 
with the NP they quantify and to be left stranded in this position when the rest of the NP moves to [SPEC,IP] 
(Bowers 1993: 618; Grewendorf 2002: 48-9). Such an analyis assumes synonymy between sentences where the 
quantified NP has been moved as a whole (All the prisoners have escaped) and those where the quantifier has 
remained in situ (The prisoners have all escaped) (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 288). Although such pairs of 
sentences deserve more extensive analysis, I venture an alternative proposal that takes these sentences as instan-
CHALLENGING SMALL-CLAUSE ANALYSES 
 
121
this theory, the D-structure position of subjects in both small and canonical clauses is differ-
ent from its surface position. (131) contains an X'-representation of SCs as CPs which also 
integrates the VP-internal subject hypothesis (the default inflectional categories have been 
conflated under an I-node). 
(131)  
    matrix clause 
 
     CP 
 
   SPEC  C' 
 
    C  IP  
 
    SPEC  I' 
 
     I  VP 
              [default] 
      SPEC  V' 
 
         V  XP 
 
    regard               as       John       BE             a fool 
Some researchers have even flirted with the idea of generalising the VP-internal subject hy-
pothesis to an XP-internal subject hypothesis: they argue that there is no verb in an SC and 
that the SC-subject is base-generated in the [SPEC,XP]-position (Basilico 2003: 5; Rafel 2001: 
481-2; Sportiche 1995: 290).86 In this view, "small clauses become the norm" (Sportiche 
1995: 290) because all clauses are originally 'small' in the sense that they consist of a lexical 
projection (VP or NP/AP/PP) that is augmented by functional projections (Haegeman and 
Guéron 1999: 326; Wilder 1994: 227). As Stowell notes, SC-theory was originally invented to 
explain an uncanonical type of clause, "but in the end something like the opposite has hap-
pened, as the syntax of virtually all sentence-types is now standardly analysed in terms of 
layers of small clause-like structures" (1995: 272). In many respects, the contemporary analy-
sis of SCs is a combination of Stowell's bare LP-approach and Starke's CP-approach: SCs are 
                                                                                                                                                        
tiations of two semantically different constructions. In the sentence All the prioners have escaped, the prisoners 
are presupposed as an entity (e.g. as all the prisoners of a certain prison, a certain cell etc.) before something new 
is predicated of them. In the sentence The prisoners have all escaped, on the other hand, the prisoners are treated 
as a collection of individuals, which only behave as an entity with respect to what is predicated of them in a 
specific instance. The quantifier in the latter sentence, which appears in an adverbial position, is stressed to em-
phasise the fact that the individuals mentioned in the subject NP exceptionally show the same behaviour with 
respect to the predicate. For more problems associated with a derivational approach between quantifiers that are 
part of the subject NP and those that are in a more rightward position in the sentence, see Bobaljik (to appear). 
86 While the VP-internal subject hypothesis can at least be argued to be weakly confirmed by 'floated quantifiers' 
(see preceding footnote), there is nothing in the way of empiry corroborating the XP-internal subject hypothesis. 
Sentences such as ??John regards the kids all as a nuisance (Starke 1995: 252) have been classified as marginal 
at best by my informants (ROS: 55). 
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lexical projections of a category X, whose subject is in the [SPEC,XP]-position, but they are 
extended by functional projections up to the CP-level. Such XP-internal subject analyses, how-
ever, have to assume that the subject/predicate relationship is not contingent on the presence 
of a verb (even if it is only an abstract copula), but is a primitive of grammar (Raposo and 
Uriagereka 1995: 181-2), and would then also have to explain how and why NPs can be predi-
cates as well (Bowers 1993: 593) — a problem that has already been tackled unsuccessfully 
by Stowell (cf. 5.3.2) and which is not sufficiently addressed in recent theories. 
Of course, no matter if the subject is taken to originate in [SPEC,VP] or [SPEC,XP], the D-
structure representation of (131) does not resemble the S-structure of NP2 XP-strings very 
closely; in empirically observed sentences, the NP John is in the pre-as position and has the 
accusative Case of direct objects. To achieve the required S-structure configuration, Starke 
invents the following scenario: [SPEC,VP] is not a Case-position, so the SC-subject must move 
to the closest position where it can receive Case (Starke 1995: 252). It passes through all the 
specifier positions of the functional projections assumed in the clause (such as [SPEC,AGRP]87, 
[SPEC,TP] or [SPEC,NEGP]) to the highest specifier position of the I-system (e.g. 
[SPEC,AGRSP]). For finite clauses, this is also the derived subject position because finite I can 
check the nominative Case of an NP in its specifier (Grewendorf 2002: 51; Haegeman and 
Guéron 1999: 232). The subject of small clauses, however, cannot receive Case in [SPEC,IP] 
because neither is non-finite I a Case-assigner nor can the matrix verb Case-mark an NP across 
a CP-boundary. The subject NP will therefore continue to move to the [SPEC,CP]-position; yet 
this cannot be its ultimate landing site either because the subject can be displaced independ-
ently of the as XP-string (e.g. Who do you regard as a fool?), something that would be impos-
sible if it were the specifier of this maximal projection (Starke 1995: 252). Starke therefore 
speculates that the SC-subject leaves its clausal domain and moves to the [SPEC,AGROP]-
position of the matrix clause, where its accusative Case can finally be checked (132) (1995: 
252; similarly, Basilico 2003: 17; Sportiche 1995: 293). As in the preceding theories, the SC-
subject must further move to [SPEC,IP] of the matrix clause if the main verb is in the passive. 
The scenario depicted for SCs holds for the subjects of infinitival complements as well (Gre-
wendorf 2002: 165; Martin 2002: 156; Starke 1995: 252). 
(132) John regards [AGRoP Maryi .... [CP = SC ti [C' as [IP ti ... [VP ti BE intelligent]]]]].
88 
                                                 
87 The [SPEC,AGRP]-position assumes a central place in this derivation (as in the reduced-clause hypothesis) 
because it is here that the number features of the SC-subject are checked so that an agreement relation between 
NP2 and XP can be established (Rafel 2001: 483; Sportiche 1995: 291). 
88 In many respects, the generative treatment of predicative NP2 XP-strings has come full circle: as in Postal's 
raising analysis, NP2 is the deep structure subject of a complement clause and the derived object of the main 
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The upshot of Starke's account is that SCs are not small, but "full-fledged clauses"; in other 
words, they are "full but rather empty clauses" (Starke 1995: 260); conversely, it could also be 
said that full clauses are essentially SCs as well (Sportiche 1995: 290). It is difficult to sculpt 
irrefutable arguments against the CP-theory of SCs because this theory does not lend itself 
well to empirical testing; it is a theory that can only fall to the ground of its own weight be-
cause the postulation of empty morphemes and default parametric settings remains, in the 
final analysis, non-explanatory. I will therefore restrict my criticism to a few remarks on the 
major innovation of Starke's theory, namely the claim that as is a complementiser that consti-
tutes the highest functional node in an SC.  
The definition of as as a complementiser is another attempt to arrive at a specification of 
this word within the rigid template of X'-theory, but it is subject to the problem already cited 
with respect to the treatment of as in the reduced-clause and IP-hypotheses: attempts to as-
similate as to theoretical notions such as 'agreement node' or 'complementiser node' usually 
meet with very limited empirical success. To begin with, true complementisers and as differ 
in their distributional behaviour in the sentence: while that or for occur at the beginning of a 
subordinate clause in front of the subject (e.g. I think that he.../ I want for him to...), the puta-
tive complementiser as is placed after the subject (e.g. I consider him as...). Further counting 
against the complementiser-analysis of as is the fact that SCs can never be introduced by 
complementisers such as that, if, whether or for (e.g. *I didn't consider whether it suitable), 
so we do not have any independent piece of evidence that as must belong into the same func-
tional class (Radford 1988: 327). Similarly, the fact that SCs after regard-type verbs do not 
even commute with finite that-clauses or non-finite for-clauses (*I regard that John is a fool/ 
*I regard for John to be a fool) would go completely unexplained in the CP-hypothesis. The 
most serious objection against analysing as as a functional preposition occupying the C-slot is 
that as does not assign Case to the SC-subject. This problem is rendered all the more acute 
when we include the functional preposition for: when for introduces an infinitival clause, it 
assigns Case to the subject of the clause (e.g. I'm waiting [for him to arrive]), but for does not 
Case-mark an SC-subject (e.g. *He took [for him a fool]). This problem has been noticed by 
Starke as well, yet his explanation for the mismatch remains impressionistic. Starke claims 
that the functional preposition cannot Case-mark the SC-subject because it needs to assign 
Case independently to the SC-predicate if XP is realised as an NP (1995: 254-6). This argu-
                                                                                                                                                        
verb. If I see it correctly, the use of functional categories such as AGROP is a way to circumvent the requirements 
of the Projection Principle because NP2 can move to a position in the main clause that has not been subcatego-
rized for by the matrix verb. In the MP, which no longer contains the Projection Principle, an SC-analysis and a 
raising-analysis are compatible (Kleanthes K. Grohmann, p.c.). 
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ment is flawed, however. As has already been illustrated for German in 4.3 (cf. (53b-b'')), the 
case of the NP in the XP-position is not determined by als or für in German, but covaries with 
the case of NP2. The only element that consequently needs to be assigned Case is NP2, but it is 
not Case-marked by the putative functional prepositions as, for or ∅. In sum, attempting to 
define as as the spell-out of the agreement node, the predicative node, the abstract copula BE 
or the complementiser node is guesswork run riot.89  
Starke's theory manages to overcome most of the distributional mismatches of the SC-
analysis, but to the detriment of empirical testability. To account for the accusative Case on 
NP2, Starke has this phrase move in various steps out of its clausal domain to a position in the 
matrix clause where its Case can be checked.90 SCs are saved as clausal constituents only at 
the cost of dissociating thematic relations posited at D-structure from empirically observed 
features, which are relegated to a more peripheral surface representation. As has been laid out 
in 3.2, solving distributional mismatches on separate representational levels and with the help 
of various abstract subtheories challenges, in the end, the aim of explanatory adequacy itself. 
The SC-account sketched in the following section, for example, is clearly beyond both de-
scriptive and explanatory adequacy. 
5.3.6 Small clauses as complex clauses: are some SCs larger than full clauses? 
Rafel has followed up on Starke's CP-analysis of SCs but theorises that SCs introduced by an 
overt complementiser are actually more complex than canonical clauses. In his view, the fol-
lowing alternative structural representation of SCs selected by regard-type verbs is called for 
(2001: 481): 
                                                 
89 It is, by the way, difficult to establish the limits of speculation. Another unorthodox suggestion is made by 
Ogawa, for example, who claims that as is the subject NP of the SC (1994: 446). Ogawa admits that "[a]t first 
sight, this seems to be absurd" (1994: 445), but I feel forced to add that this analysis remains quite absurd even 
after closer examination. The starting-point for Ogawa's proposal are sentences in which as serves as a relative 
pronoun taking the whole matrix clause as its antecedent (e.g. "He is a foreigner, as is evident from his accent"; 
Ogawa 1994: 447). In an attempt to find a common denominator for all uses of the polyvalent word as, Ogawa 
analyses the postverbal string of regard-type sentences as follows:  
I regard    him       as    a fool  
                  NP [SC PRO     XP]                   (from Ogawa 1994: 449) 
In this view, as is an empty pronominal subject of the SC, which takes the NP him as its antecedent in much the 
same way as a relative pronoun (Ogawa 1994: 450-1). But there is absolutely no functional or distributional 
foundation for an analysis of as as an NP in such sentences, and it is not clear that it is desirable to reduce the 
diversity of uses of this word to only one function. 
90 There is even a technical flaw in Starke's account, as Rafel has observed (2001: 479). The SC-subject moves 
from its base-generated position in the specifier of VP to the [SPEC,AGRoP]-position in the matrix clause, passing 
through [SPEC,CP] on its way. The [SPEC,CP] position, however, is commonly assumed to be an A'-position (cf. 
footnote 68) and thus to be not eligible as a landing site for argument NPs. Since mixed [A, A', A] chains are 
disallowed (Basilico 2003: 6), Starke's proposed movement operation is illicit from a theoretical point of view as 
well.  
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(133)  
    matrix clause 
 
     CP = Complex SC 
 
   SPEC  C' 
 
    C  IP = SC  
 
      I' 
 
     I  XP  
               
      SPEC  X' 
 
    regard   Johni as       PROi                a fool 
Rafel is a proponent of the XP-internal subject hypothesis and assumes that the SC-subject is 
base-generated in the [SPEC,XP]-position. His major contention is that an [NP2 as XP]-string is 
actually composed of two SCs, each establishing its own subject/predicate relationship. He 
identifies the lower SC with the lexical XP-shell, which is extended by functional projections 
of the I-system, and argues that this projection contains a relationship between a PRO-
subject91 and a predicate such as a fool (Rafel 2001: 482). The subject of the higher or com-
plex SC is an NP such as John, which is base-generated in [SPEC,CP]92; the predicate of this NP 
is claimed to be a predication itself, namely the lower SC [PRO a fool]. The complex SC in 
(133) thus contains two predications: a lower (or internal) predication holding between PRO 
and a fool, and a higher (or external) predication obtaining between John and the lower SC 
(Rafel 2001: 482). The two predications are kept together by a co-indexing mechanism: the 
lower subject is an empty pronoun that is obligatorily co-referential with the higher subject 
NP. Rafel compares this control pattern to similar relationships holding in infinitival construc-
tions, e.g. "Peteri doesn't want PROi to be a fool" (Rafel 2001: 487). 
In Rafel's theory, the additional higher predication is the major difference between com-
plex SCs and ordinary SCs without an overt complementiser (e.g. I consider John a fool). 
Both types of SC have a property predicated of a subject, but in complex SCs the situation 
contained in the lower SC is then predicated of an additional subject (Rafel 2001: 492). 
                                                 
91 In contrast to traces, which only occur at S-structure as the result of derivational processes, PRO is a base-
generated empty element (Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 390). In order to be interpretable, PRO must normally 
be co-indexed with an overt argument that controls its meaning. 
92 An argument NP could not be base-generated in this A'-position in classical X'-theory, of course. Rafel works 
with the MP-notion of merging, so the NP and C' are simply merged and result in the more complex projection 
CP. The distinction between A-positions and A'-positions consequently no longer holds in the MP (Cook and 
Newson 1996: 314-5). 
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Rafel's semantic argument for the two predications allegedly initiated by the SC-complement 
in The committee took you for intelligent runs as follows:  
as a modal head, the particle for here indicates that the state of affairs that it introduces, namely 
[PRO intelligent], is a presumed situation. That is, a situation that holds in a possible world, say 
W2. The syntactic configuration of the CSCl ['complex small clause'; H.S.] ..., then, allows this 
presumed state of affairs to be predicated of the individual that the CSCl subject refers to. 
(Rafel 2001: 492) 
In Rafel's opinion, the regular SC-complement in The committee considered you intelligent 
only attributes the property intelligent to the SC-subject you, while the complex SC in The 
committee regards you as intelligent attributes a presumed situation to the subject (Rafel 
2001: 492). To substantiate this semantic hypothesis, Rafel adduces sentences such as The 
committee regarded you as if you were intelligent, which he argues make the semantics of 
complex SCs more explicit syntactically because they contain two subject positions after the 
main verb (Rafel 2001: 494). 
Rafel's account is only the last link in a long chain of SC-hypotheses that have increas-
ingly moved away from sound empirical and semantic judgements. The representation of 
(133) is based on three aligned ideas that do not square well with linguistic intuitions and em-
pirical facts. Firstly, there are no semantic grounds for assuming that an [NP2 as XP]-string ac-
tually contains two predications. The postulated higher predication between the subject and a 
presumed situation is illusory: the predication in I regard you as a fool does not have a more 
hypothetical truth status than that in I consider you a fool; what is more, the sentences con-
taining qualifying as are not synonymous with sentences containing counterfactual as if. In 
the examples of (134), the phrases following as if do not ascribe a property or role to the 
postverbal NPs, but give a counterfactual description of these phrases: 
(134) a.  The old man was regarding him as if he were a strange species behind bars (BNC 
   K8R: 1881). 
 b. First of all the tenth-century reformers should not be viewed as if they were 
        eleventh-century papal reformers (BNC ADC: 1339). 
If there is no semantic difference between SCs with 'overt complementisers' and those with 
'covert complementisers', two different SC-representations are unwarranted. All SCs are either 
CPs containing one predication or CPs containing two predications, with the latter analysis 
turning our intuitions about the relative complexity of SCs upside down, though. 
Secondly, the control relation posited to exist between the co-indexed higher NP-subject 
and the lower PRO-subject is empirically untestable and syntactically unsound. Control rela-
tionships are usually established when the subjects of two subclauses within a complex clause 
construction share the same referent and the subject expression of one clause is not syntacti-
cally realised (e.g. Ii want PROi to come). The empirical basis for the control structure is the 
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fact that the second subject can and must be overtly realised when it is not co-referential with 
the first subject (e.g. I want John to come). Postulating a control relationship within the same 
clause does not make any sense syntactically because there is no way that the putative second 
subject can be different from the first (*I regard Johni as Maryj a fool). The predicative rela-
tionship holds directly between NP2 and (as) XP, and is not mediated by an additional PRO-
subject.93  
Thirdly, Rafel's claim that his representation (133) overcomes the movement and Case-
problems of Starke's theory is not convincing. Rafel's explanation why as cannot assign Case 
to NP2 is no less impressionistic than Starke's suggestions (see Rafel 2001: 489-91), and he 
simply argues that "PRO presumably checks some kind of null Case by default" (Rafel 2001: 
484). As in Starke's theory, the subject of the higher SC must move from [SPEC,CP] to [SPEC, 
AGROP] in the main clause to check accusative Case (Rafel 2001: 486). 
Rafel's analysis drastically misrepresents the object of investigation, so we are well-
advised not to adopt such excrescent theoretical entities as 'complex small clauses' into our 
analysis of NP2 as XP-constructions. 
5.4 Problems of classifying small-clause patterns 
Chapter 4.1.4 has illustrated the difficulties descriptive grammarians have in coming to grips 
with the different semantic relationships underlying consider-type sentences, depictive struc-
tures and resultative patterns. Such semantic questions are given a wide berth by most genera-
tive grammarians as well, and like in descriptive grammars, most of the generative debates on 
depictive and resultative structures are posed in terms of a rather fruitless complement/adjunct 
distinction. 
SC-theoreticians have positioned themselves at two different points in this debate. Like 
Jespersen in his theory of dependent-nexus structures, Hoekstra (1988; 1992) and Kayne 
(1985: 121-2) do not make a distinction between SCs selected by consider, paint or eat; in all 
three of these patterns, they argue, the matrix verb subcategorises for the whole SC and not a 
direct-object NP2: 
(135) a. John considers [SC Mary intelligent]. 
  b.  John painted [SC the door red]. 
  c.  John ate [SC the meat hot]. 
Like descriptive grammarians, Hoekstra and Kayne are confronted with the problem that the 
XPs in (135b) and (135c) are not obligatory elements in the structure (cf. John painted the 
                                                 
93 The PRO-hypothesis is, incidentally, not as new as it seems; it has already been put forward and rejected by 
Chomsky (1981: 109). 
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door; John ate the meat). Hoekstra maintains that "the implications ... that e.g. the door is 
painted ... result from what I call a shadow interpretation" (1988: 117); in other words, a verb 
such as paint can either select a direct object NP2 or an SC-argument, and the two expressions 
are not reducible to one another. When the verb subcategorises for a subject/predicate rela-
tionship, "the SC denotes a state of affairs which is presented as a consequence of the activity 
or process denoted by the verb" (Hoekstra 1988: 121). According to this reasoning, the main 
verb does not assign a θ-role to NP2, but some kind of 'resultant-event' or 'concomitant-event' 
θ-role to the whole NP2 XP-string. What is frequently adduced as evidence in favour of the 
analysis of (135) is the existence of resultative sentences such as The joggers ran the pave-
ment thin or He laughed himself silly, where the NP2 cannot be a direct-object argument of the 
main verb in isolation (*The joggers ran the pavement; *He laughed himself) (Hoekstra 1988: 
116-7, 1992: 150-1; Staudinger 1996: 180-1; Wilder 1994: 222).94 
The main problem with what Carrier and Randall have dubbed the "binary SC-analysis" 
of sentences (135b, c) (1992: 175) is overgeneration. If SCs can denote states of affairs that 
result from the verb's action or are concomitant with the event denoted by the verb, it is not 
clear why some SC-complements are permissible while others are not: 
(136) a.  *John painted [SC the door sticky]. (ROS: 73) 
  b.  *John ate [SC the meat delicious]. (ROS: 100) 
Similarly, this analysis forces us to allow complement clauses for verbs that have traditionally 
been analysed as intransitive (laugh [SC oneself silly]) or transitive requiring an object NP 
(drink [SC the tea hot]) as well (Rivière 1982: 686), without, however, proposing a convincing 
semantic relation between the main-verb event and the SC-event. Some rather technical solu-
tions have been put forward to tackle these problems. For resultative sentences, Hoekstra pro-
poses that the final temporal slice tn of the main-verb event can be identified with the resulta-
tive event by θ-marking; while an inherently bounded event such as that denoted by kill θ-
marks tn itself, tn is not θ-marked by an unbounded activity verb like drink. Here tn may be θ-
marked by being bound to an SC-event that denotes a state of affairs holding at the end of the 
drinking event (e.g. John drank [SC himself stupid]) (Guéron and Hoekstra 1995:101; Hoek-
stra 1992: 161-2). Hoekstra expands on his account by suggesting that NP-objects in sentences 
such as John ate the cake are also SCs underlyingly ('John ate the cake, with the result that the 
cake was gone at the end of the event'), which bind tn of the matrix clause (1992: 163). If this 
                                                 
94 While the transitive verb paint can be taken to assign Case to the subject of the SC in John painted [the door 
red], things are little bit more complicated with intransitive verbs. It must be assumed that an intransitive verb 
such as run potentially has the ability to Case-mark a postverbal NP, even if this NP can never be its thematic 
argument (Rothstein 1992: 127). 
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proposal can add weight to the binary SC-hypothesis is questionable, however: to classify a 
verbal event as inherently bounded or unbounded is a very tricky and often impossible busi-
ness (see 9.2.1); moreover, it is not clear how an inherently unbounded predicate can have a 
final temporal slice at all (Goldberg 1995: 157).  
The binary SC-hypothesis for resultative and depictive sentences is unimplementable for 
other reasons as well. A matrix verb such as paint assigns the same θ-role to a postverbal NP 
no matter if an XP is present or not. As Carrier and Randall have shown, the sentence *The 
bears frightened the campground empty is ungrammatical because the NP2 the campground 
goes against the selectional restrictions imposed by the main verb (1992: 187-8). Even in a 
sentence such as John drank himself into a stupor, it is not clear that the main verb does not 
subcategorise for the NP2 himself. As Bowers has observed, the parallel sentence *Mary drank 
Bill into a stupor is ungrammatical, suggesting that the main verb imposes restrictions on the 
postverbal NP; under the binary SC-account, the main verb would subcategorise for the sub-
ject of a complement clause, an otherwise unattested fact (1993: 621-2). Furthermore, if a 
verb assigns a resultative or concomitant θ-role, there is no way of combining the meanings of 
the main and small clauses: why does John painted the door red by necessity imply 'John 
painted the door, and the door became red as a result' and does not mean 'John was involved 
in the activity of painting (something), thereby causing, among other things, the door to be-
come red' as the binary-SC analysis would suggest?  
The binary SC-hypothesis is not the dominant mode of thinking on resultative and depic-
tive patterns, though. Most SC-theoreticians do not provide a uniform analysis for all predica-
tive NP2 XP-strings. They argue that since the sentences John painted the door red and John 
ate the meat hot entail 'John painted the door' and 'John ate the meat', respectively, the post-
verbal NPs should be analysed as direct objects (Aarts 1992: 48-9; Rothstein 1995: 31). Still, 
Aarts does not wish to revert to a descriptive analysis where NP2 is a direct object and XP is an 
additional complement or adjunct because this could not explain the subject/predicate rela-
tionship between the postverbal phrases the door and red or the meat and hot. Instead, he pro-
pounds a modified SC-analysis for resultative and depictive verbs: 
(137) [VP [VP V NPi] [SC PROi XP]]         (from Aarts 1992: 67)  
In this representation, the NP adjacent to V is assigned a θ-role by the matrix verb and is there-
fore its direct object. The SC is not an argument of the verb, but an adjunct of the minimal VP, 
creating another VP-segment. The subject of the SC contains the empty pronominal anaphor 
PRO, which is co-indexed with the direct object and consequently controlled by it (Aarts 
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1992: 67, 1997: 336; Chomsky 1981: 110-1).95 On the basis of this analysis, the door in 
(135b) would be the direct-object argument of paint and the VP painted the door would be 
modified by an adjunct SC, the subject of which is co-referential with the door and the predi-
cate of which is red. The representation of (137) strictly observes the Theta-Criterion: the 
direct object does not receive two θ-roles, one from the main verb and one from the SC-
predicate, but is assigned its unique θ-role by the main verb; the subject θ-role of the SC-
predicate is assigned to PRO. The co-indexing mechanism guarantees that the direct-object NP 
and PRO have the same referent. With regard to special cases such as John walked his shoes 
threadbare, proponents of the control analysis are more conservative and suggest a binary 
structure, with the main verb walked selecting for the SC his shoes threadbare; a control-
structure seems to be excluded because the postverbal NP is not semantically selected by the 
matrix verb (Carrier and Randall 1992: 210; Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 2001: 769; Roth-
stein 1992: 127; Staudinger 1996: 179). On the model of the traditional analysis of control 
and ECM-infinitives (I persuaded himi [PROi to go] vs. I expect [him to come]), Wechsler 
draws a distinction between 'control resultatives', where NP2 is a direct object and controls the 
PRO-subject of the SC, and 'ECM resultatives', where NP2 is not a direct object of the main 
verb but exclusively the subject of the SC (1997: 309).96 Like the binary SC-hypothesis, the 
ECM-analysis cannot explain the link between the main-clause event and the SC-event, 
though. 
The adjunct analysis of control-SCs runs headlong into the same obstacles as the adjunct 
analysis offered in descriptive accounts. If XP is not selected by the verb, it is difficult to ac-
count for constraints such as *The waitress wiped the table stained (Carrier and Randall 1992: 
183-4). There are only two conceivable solutions to this dilemma: one is to uphold the adjunct 
analysis and to appeal to some vague "extra-grammatical principles" filtering out ungram-
                                                 
95 The PRO-theorem requires PRO to appear in an ungoverned position; PRO is thus in complementary distribu-
tion with overt NPs that must appear in positions governed by a Case-assigner (Stowell 1983: 287). More recent 
theories argue that PRO must also be Case-marked so that it can become visible for theta-assignment (Haegeman 
and Guéron 1999: 505; Martin 2002: 144). In order to account for the complementary distribution of PRO and 
NPs in this revised version of Case, generative grammarians speculate that PRO is assigned minimal or null Case, 
which is not sufficient for overt NPs (Cook and Newson 1996: 337; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 403). Minimal 
Case can be assigned by non-finite I; if SCs are taken to contain a non-finite I-system, PRO can be argued to 
receive minimal Case in (137). 
96 The distinction of ECM-resultatives and control-resultatives has led to some technical problems, though. In 
order for the subject NP of the ECM-resultative The joggers ran their shoes threadbare to receive Case, it must 
be exceptionally governed by the matrix verb, and in order to be governed by the matrix verb, the SC [their 
shoes threadbare] must be a θ-marked complement of ran (Carrier and Randall 1992: 210-1). The PRO-subject 
of a control-resultative such as John painted the doori PROi red or John ate the meati PROi raw, on the other 
hand, must be ungoverned, i.e. the SCs [PRO red] and [PRO raw] must be adjuncts of VP (Aarts 1992: 50; 
Staudinger 1996: 217; Stowell 1983: 305). The semantically unconvincing conclusion that ECM-resultatives are 
complements and control-resultatives are adjuncts therefore throws a wrench into this proposal. 
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matical sentences (Aarts 1992: 62) — as Aart's review of the largely unsuccessful attempts to 
formulate such general semantic or pragmatic constraints shows, however, these restrictions 
would be of a highly volatile nature (1992: 59-63). The other alternative is to argue that at 
least resultative constructions require a complement SC (Stowell 1983: 306)97; such a com-
plement-proposal for resultatives is put forward by some descriptive grammarians as well. To 
say that depictive XPs are adjuncts is too simplistic as well, though: the adjunct-complement 
problem is thrown into particular relief by sentences such as I described Mary as an intelli-
gent woman: Aarts thinks that the NP2 is a direct object here (cf. I described Mary), but the 
putative SC [PROi as an intelligent woman] does not seem to be an adjunct as in eat-type sen-
tences, but a second postverbal complement because it seems to be semantically selected by 
the main verb described (Aarts 1992: 116-8, 1995: 81; similarly, Napoli 1989: 122).98 The 
complement criteria 'obligatoriness' and 'semantic selection' are opportunistically torn apart 
here as in comparable suggestions in descriptive grammar (for a non-discrete analysis of sen-
tences with describe-type verbs, see 11.2.4). 
History repeats itself in various guises: the SC-theoreticians who have rebuffed descrip-
tive analyses for their many inconsistencies become entangled in exactly the same comple-
ment/adjunct debate as the one depicted for descriptive grammars in 4.1.4. This is not surpris-
ing because discrete notions such as 'complement' or 'adjunct' are bound to be stumbling 
blocks for any syntactic framework: 
The distinction between complements and adjuncts is a highly vexed distinction, for several 
reasons, one of which is that no diagnostic criteria have emerged that will reliably distinguish 
adjuncts from complements in all cases — too many examples seem to "fall into the crack" be-
tween the two categories, no matter how theorists wrestle with them. (Dowty 2000: 53) 
What is even more difficult to tolerate than the problems of definition is that the comple-
ment/adjunct distinction does not contribute very much to elucidating the reasons for the se-
mantic differences between the secondary-predicate constructions of (135). 
 
The present chapter has amply illustrated that SC-theory is not primarily based on empirical, 
but theoretical arguments: "[P]ublications on SCs tend to focus very heavily upon theory-
internal assumptions ..., with invented sentences used as vehicles for highly abstract consid-
                                                 
97 Stowell opts for a solution where NP2 is a direct-object argument and [PRO XP] a second subcategorized post-
verbal argument. He then has to provide some means to guarantee that PRO can be ungoverned in a subcatego-
rized position (1983: 306-7). Confronted with the same problem, Hornstein and Lightfoot have proposed that 
PRO may be governed in some environments (1987: 26), a suggestion that has not caught on, however. 
98 Aarts attempts to protect the PRO-subject in the SC-complement from being governed by the matrix verb by 
suggesting that the SC is a CP and thus opaque to outside government here, while other SCs are IPs and thus 
transparent to outside government (1992: 117-8). A distinction between IP-SCs and CP-SCs is purely stipulative, 
though, and has become irrelevant in the CP-stage of SC-theory. 
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erations" (Schneider 1997: 36). None of the constituency and subjecthood-tests suggested by 
adherents of SCs stands up to closer empirical scrutiny (even if special rules can always be 
invoked to patch things up in generative accounts), and the attempts to integrate SCs into the 
framework of generative grammar are predominantly propelled by the necessity to satisfy 
theoretical principles such as the Theta-Criterion, the Projection Principle, and the binary-
branching requirement. As the gamut of views on the categorial status of SCs shows, NP2 XP-
strings can only be specified as clauses if their underlying structure is taken to differ substan-
tially from their surface appearance — which also implies that such proposals are difficult, if 
not impossible, to test empirically. Similarly, the empirically observed non-constituency be-
haviour of the NP2 XP-string and the direct-object characteristics of NP2 can only be accounted 
for if they are explained away opportunistically as surface-structure reflexes of theoretical 
principles such as Case Theory. 
Constructs with such tenuous claims to reality as SCs should be excised from the gram-
mar. I therefore fully agree with Pullum, who claims that "if you believe in small clauses, you 
probably eat steak with a spoon" (1986: 411). 
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6. Challenging complex-predicate analyses of secondary-predicate 
constructions 
6.1 Complex-predicate analyses in early descriptive and generative studies 
Both the complex-transitive and the small-clause analysis implement important insights at a 
cost: a complex-transitive analysis adequately treats NP2 and XP as two separate constituents, 
but it cannot account convincingly for the subject/predicate relationship holding between 
them; an SC analysis, on the other hand, neatly explains the predicative relation, but is unable 
to reveal any clausal structure underlying NP2 and XP. There is another way of analysing the 
syntax of secondary-predicate constructions, which holds out the promise of rectifying the 
defects of both theories. If the matrix verb and XP are assumed to form a complex predicate 
which selects NP2 as its direct-object argument, not only is the predicative relationship be-
tween NP2 and XP trivially accounted for, but these postverbal phrases also automatically fall 
out as two separate constituents, with XP forming part of a complex predicate and NP2 acting 
as the direct object. 
Complex-predicate analyses have been argued for by descriptive grammarians from time 
to time. House and Harman, for example, acknowledge that in a sentence such as "He ap-
pointed Harris manager", the NP manager both "completes the action expressed in the verb 
and refers to the direct object" (1950: 250). They suggest analysing manager as part of a 
complex verb "appointed-manager", which as a whole subcategorises for the direct object 
Harris (1950: 251). In some instances, they maintain, such complex predicates can be re-
placed with a synonymous simple verb: in the sentence "The sunlight made the apple red", for 
instance, "made-red is about the equivalent of reddened" (1950: 250). Visser essentially 
shares the same view when he claims that the pronoun him in the sentence I made him happy 
is not the object of the verb made alone, but of the complex predicate made-happy (1963: 
552). A similar analysis has been proposed, among others, by Pence and Emery (1963: 50). 
(138) provides some notational representations of complex-predicate analyses as offered in 
descriptive grammars.  
(138) a.  We | thought/safe and sound | the boat.           (from House and Harman 1950: 253) 
     b.  I [made happy]: him.                                (from Visser 1963: 552) 
     c.  He washed + clean the window.                (from Pence and Emery 1963: 50) 
A complex-predicate analysis of secondary-predicate constructions has also been brought up 
time and again by Chomsky in a generative framework. Interestingly, Chomsky considered an 
equivalent of the modern small-clause analysis as early as in The Logical Structure of Lin-
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guistic Theory, but rejected it for technical reasons (1975: 479-80). As an alternative, he rea-
soned that consider a fool in the sentence "They consider John a fool" could be a "compound 
verb" on a par with phrasal verbs (1975: 479-80), a solution he had already adopted in Syntac-
tic Structures (1957: 76). Similarly, in Knowledge of Language Chomsky tentatively suggests 
that there may be "compositional s-selection" of the direct object NP2 by the main verb and the 
XP (139) (1986a: 91-2). 
(139) We [consider-intelligent]       John 
 
 
While these early proposals in descriptive and generative grammars are very speculative in 
nature and have remained largely programmatic, the complex-predicate analysis has been 
more rigidly formalised in two syntactic frameworks: contemporary generative grammar and 
Categorial Grammar. 
6.2 Complex-predicate analyses in modern generative grammar 
Although a de facto consensus has emerged in modern generative grammar that NP2 and XP 
form an SC, a small parade of generative grammarians has attempted to make a case for com-
plex-predicate analyses as a viable alternative to SC-theory by putting Chomsky's early sug-
gestions on a more formal footing. Complex-predicate analyses have achieved some promi-
nence in generative grammar after Larson's (1988) influential proposals concerning double-
object constructions. The two postverbal objects of the ditransitive construction (cf. John gave 
Mary the book) and of the prepositional or indirect-object construction (cf. John gave the 
book to Mary) have traditionally been analysed as complements of the verb give and conse-
quently as structurally on a par. Larson has challenged this standard view by proposing that in 
the indirect-object construction, the verb give and the indirect object to Mary form a complex 
constituent, which selects the direct object the book as a whole. He has effected this analysis 
by distinguishing between two kinds of theta-assignment: the matrix verb takes the indirect 
object as its complement and directly θ-marks it; the resulting phrase is reanalysed as a com-
plex lexical item which then indirectly θ-marks the direct object. Viewed from a slightly dif-
ferent angle, the complex predicate give-to-Mary takes the direct object a book as its 'subject' 
argument and thus forms a clause-like subject/predicate structure with it: '[a book] [give-to-
Mary]' (Larson 1988: 342), roughly meaning 'x (= a book) come to be under control of y (= 
give-to-Mary)' (Hale and Keyser 1992: 109). The sentential or external subject John is then 
predicated of the clause-like structure a book give-to-Mary with the help of an abstract causa-
tive verb, usually formalised as the functional head 'ν' (cf. footnote 75; Grewendorf 2002: 54; 
compositional s-selection
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Larson 1988: 342). The following tree diagram illustrates the fairly complex underlying struc-
ture that is credited to indirect-object constructions in Larson's account:99 
(140)  
     νP 
 
    external subject/   ν' 
    sentential subject 
      ν   VP 
 
       inner subject/    V' 
                 direct object 
          V             PP 
 
      John             ∅       a book             gave        to Mary 
Larson himself suggested that this D-structure representation for indirect object constructions 
could be extended to secondary-predicate constructions such as Mary considers John foolish 
as well (1988: 349). In this view, the matrix verb consider assigns a direct θ-role to its sister 
XP in V'. The V' constituent is reanalysed as a complex predicate (Larson 1988: 348-9), which 
then, as a whole, discharges an indirect θ-role to the direct object NP2 in the specifier position 
of VP. The direct object would thus constitute the inner 'subject' of the clause-like configura-
tion [John] [considers-foolish]. This subject/predicate structure is then predicated of the sen-
tential or external subject Mary: 
(141) [νP Mary [ν' ν [VP John [V' considers foolish]]]]. 
 
This D-structure representation of a secondary-predicate construction differs crucially from 
the corresponding surface structure, where NP2 is placed between the matrix verb and XP. We 
will look at how this problem is tackled in generative accounts in 6.4.  
The Larsonian analysis of secondary-predicate constructions has been picked up by sev-
eral linguists in slightly modified forms. Contreras, for instance, opts for a combination of the 
small-clause and complex-predicate analyses: if XP is realised by an AP, she theorises, NP2 and 
AP form a small clause, but if XP is realised by an NP, the matrix verb and NP combine as a 
complex predicate (1995: 136). The argument she adduces for this split analysis of secondary-
                                                 
99 Larson hypothesises that the ditransitive construction John gave Mary the book can be derived from the D-
structure representation of the indirect-object construction by some sort of 'passive' transformation, where the 
object of the clause-like VP a book gave to Mary — (to) Mary — becomes the derived inner 'subject', and the 
original inner 'subject', a book, becomes an adjunct of V'. We thus get the 'passive' verb phrase [VP Maryi [V' a 
book [V' gave ti], which, after the main verb has been moved to ν, results in the surface structure gave Mary a 
book (Larson 1988: 351-3). While this transformational account has been readily seized on by generativists, it 
has come under heavy attack from functionalist and cognitive grammarians because it blurs the semantic distinc-
tions between the ditransitive construction and the indirect-object construction (for a description of these distinc-
tions see, e.g., Lee 2001: 74-5; Wierzbicka 1988: 359-87). 
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predicate constructions is rather tenuous, though. She makes the claim that only SCs headed 
by APs constitute binding domains (142a), while structures with NPs in the XP-position are 
transparent for the purposes of binding (142b) (1995: 136). As has been shown in 5.2.2, how-
ever, it is tricky to use binding evidence for the demarcation of structural domains: contra 
Contrera's assumptions, a reflexive in AP can indeed be bound by the matrix subject (142c), 
and a reflexive in NP can be bound by NP2 (142d). 
(142) a.  We*i consider Maryi proud of herselfi.             (from Contreras 1995: 136) 
   b.  Theyi consider John*i each other'si friend.                       (from Contreras 1995: 136) 
   c.  Johni considers Mary*i superior to himselfi. (ROS: 20) 
   d.  John*i considers Maryi a danger to herselfi. (ROS: 0) 
The most elaborate analysis of secondary-predicate constructions in the complex-predicate 
paradigm to date has been submitted by Rapoport (1993, 1995). Her main argument for ana-
lysing the matrix verb and XP as a complex predicate is that the semantics of the main verb are 
not complete enough for independent predication and that, as a consequence, "[t]he second 
predicate is crucial to the interpretation of the action; the description of the action is not com-
plete, or possible, without the participation of this second predicate phrase" (1993: 160). In 
contrast to Larson, she does not analyse XP as a complement of the main verb, but as a verb-
modifier, and goes on to claim that the position of sister to the verb is, as a rule, not a com-
plement position, but one that "modifies the action (or state or process) of the verb; it is part 
of the description of the action, narrowing that description" (1995: 160).100 After the verb has 
incorporated its modifier XP, which is situated in its sister position, V' can act as a single com-
plex predicate, assigning a combined θ-role to the direct object NP2 in [SPEC,VP] as in Larson's 
account (1993: 165, 168, 1995: 161). Unlike Contreras, Rapoport does not make a distinction 
between APs and NPs in the XP-position; however, she does assume that not all secondary-
predicate constructions should be treated uniformly. While she thinks that sentences with 
qualifying and resultative verbs lend themselves neatly to a complex-predicate analysis be-
cause the respective XPs complete the description of the verbs' events (Mary considers-foolish 
John; The waitress wiped-clean the table) (1993: 164, 167), she posits a ternary analysis for 
                                                 
100 Rapoport thinks that the verb-modifier position can only be occupied by what she calls 'non-specific' elements 
such as adverbials or adjectives, but not, for example, by referential noun phrases. The way she effects the dis-
tinction between non-specific noun phrases, which can act as verb-modifiers, and specific ones, which can only 
serve as the subject or object arguments of a verb, is very elaborate, but in the end not particularly convincing 
(1995: 154-61). Similar to Stowell, she assumes a distinction between specific noun phrases or complements as 
DPs and non-specific noun phrases or verb-modifiers as NPs (1995: 166; cf. 5.3.2) — a distinction that has not 
worked in Stowell's account and does not work in hers, either. Moreover, it is doubtful that "anything that can 
narrow or complete the verb's description of an event" (Rapoport 1995: 171) should receive uniform treatment as 
a verb-modifier; Rapoport would, for instance, analyse the highlighted elements in hit the ball hard, build a 
house, consider sb. a genius as performing the same function of modifying the verb (1995: 168-9). 
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depictive constructions, arguing that the XPs do not specify the description of the verb's event 
here (John ate the steak hot) (1993: 169-70; see 7.2).  
A third way of combining the complex-transitive analysis with existing analyses has been 
proposed by Stowell. He maintains that NP2 XP-strings form small clauses at D- and S-
structure, but are re-constructed to complex predicates at LF (1991a: 185). The main motiva-
tion for this suggestion resides in scope effects (Stowell 1991a: 199-200), which can be illus-
trated with the sentences in (143). The existential quantifier someone in (143a) allows only a 
wide-scope construal over the matrix clause (143a'), but its scope cannot be construed nar-
rowly as extending over the putative SC only (143a''). This differs from the scope-relations in 
that-clauses (143b), where the scope of the quantifier is restricted to the subordinate clause 
(143b') and cannot extend over the main clause (143b'').101  
(143) a.   Mary considers someone angry at John. 
   a'.  = ∃x [Mary considers x angry at John].  
   a''.  ≠ Mary considers ∃x [x is angry at John]. 
   b.   Mary believes that someone is angry at John. 
   b'.  Mary believes ∃x [x is angry at John]. 
    b''.  ≠ ∃x [Mary believes x is angry at John]. 
Stowell correctly concludes that "the unavailability of the narrow scope construal must hinge 
on the exclusion of the small clause as a possible domain of quantification" (1991a: 201). In-
stead of giving up the SC-analysis as such, however, he retains this analysis for the D- and S-
structure representations of consider-type sentences, but speculates that the SC is eliminated 
at LF because the predicative head X adjoins to and incorporates into the main verb, so that 
they form a complex predicate at this level (1991a: 185, 201; see also Basilico 2003: 18; Endo 
1991: 63-4; Staudinger 1996: 56). Consequently, a quantifier can and must have scope over 
the matrix clause at LF since the clause-union effect of the restructuring process has made the 
SC unavailable as a scope domain at this level (1991a: 202). Stowell's implementation of SC-
restructuring is purely ad hoc and based on many technicalities (1991: 208-11); an alternative 
explanation for the scope phenomena illustrated in (143) will be provided in section 11.3. 
The complex-predicate analysis plays a minor role in generative grammar and is, as we 
have seen, usually combined with SC-analyses in one way or the other. Complex predicates 
                                                 
101 The notation used here is derived from the formal semantic representation of sentences and helps to clearly 
disambiguate the different scope properties of someone (see, e.g., Cann 1993: 151-4). Someone is a free variable 
because, unlike an individual constant such as John or the book, it does not have a fixed interpretation. A free 
variable must be bound by an operator/quantifier, in this case the existential operator ∃ (the restriction of the 
range of x to human beings is presupposed). The operator is written to the left of the bracketed expression over 
which it has scope. The relative placement of the operator, its scope position, thus shows whether it has scope 
over the whole sentence as in (143a') and (143b'') or only over an embedded clause to its right as in (143a'') and 
(143b'). 
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are, however, the predominant way of analysing secondary-predicate constructions in Cate-
gorial Grammar. 
6.3 Complex-predicate analyses in Categorial Grammar 
Before we can look at a typical Categorial Grammar representation of a consider-type sen-
tence, it is helpful to review some fundamental notions of formal semantics and Categorial 
Grammar first.  
Disappointed by Chomsky's heavy focus on syntax and spurred by Richard Montague's 
(1930-1971) groundbreaking studies on the logic of natural languages, linguists and logicians 
have for the first time seriously attempted to apply formal semantic techniques to interpreting 
the meaning of a natural language such as English (Cann 1993: 2). Formal semantics is a 
paradigm case of linguistic discreteness because it rigorously adheres to the 'Principle of 
Compositionality', which stipulates that "[t]he meaning of an expression is a ... function of the 
meaning of its parts and the way they are put together" (Cann 1993: 3; see also Bach 1979: 
527). More consistently than any other linguistic theory, formal semantics aims to pair syntac-
tic expressions with their respective semantics at every point in the derivation of a complex 
expression (Chierchia and Turner 1988: 277; Dowty 2000: 55). The 'Rule-to-rule hypothesis' 
requires that "[f]or each syntactic rule there is a corresponding semantic rule" (Cann 1993: 5). 
As Bach puts it, "Chomsky's Thesis" was that natural languages like English "can be de-
scribed as a formal system", while "Montague's Thesis" was that they "can be described as 
interpreted formal systems" (1989: 7-8). 
The grammatical framework that is most frequently employed to derive sentences in 
formal-semantics analyses is Categorial Grammar, which follows rather straightforward syn-
tactic principles and lends itself more easily to a consistent pairing of syntactic phrases with 
semantic expressions than the more complex syntactic theories developed by generative 
grammarians. The basic principles of syntactic derivation in Categorial Grammar are rather 
simple. Linguistic expressions are built up progressively via 'functional application' (Bach 
1979: 516; Dowty 2000: 55): two syntactic constituents combine to form a third; in the asso-
ciated semantics, one expression, the functor, is applied to another expression, its argument, 
to derive a more complex semantic expression. In other words, "the syntactic and the semantic 
rules come together as a package, and the unmarked package is a binary phrase structure rule 
with functional application semantics" (Jacobson 1987: 44). The rule of functional application 
is usually formalised in the following way: a functor is an expression that consists of an or-
dered pair of types <a, b>; the first element (a), or input type, indicates the type of argument 
the functor must combine with, and the second element (b), or output type, shows the type of 
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the complex expression that results after functional application has taken place. Functional 
application thus cancels the type of the argument with the first type of the function, and the 
type of the result expression is indicated by the uncancelled second type of the function. The 
result expression can itself be a function that has to combine with another argument to derive 
an even more complex expression (Cann 1993: 85-6). (144) illustrates a two-stage binary 
derivation on the basis of functional application: 
(144) a.  <a,<b,c>> + a ⇒ <b,c> 
     b.  <b, c>       + b ⇒ c 
The syntactic categories of Categorial Grammar are also defined in terms of their combinato-
rial requirements with other categories to produce a more complex syntactic category. Since 
syntax, unlike logical semantics, is a directional system, it is important to distinguish if the 
argument is concatenated to the right or left of its functor: a category of the form X/Y (with 
the slash leaning to the right) combines with a category Y to its right to form a phrase of cate-
gory X; conversely, a category X\Y (with the slash leaning to the left) combines with a cate-
gory X on its left to form an expression of category Y (Bach 1979: 516; Dowty 2000: 55).  
(145) illustrates how the sentence Mary considers John a fool is progressively built up in 
a Categorial Grammar framework. According to the Rule-to-rule hypothesis, each syntactic 
rule is mechanically matched with a semantic translation rule; the primed lines therefore state 
the corresponding semantic derivations.102 The verb consider with the expression 
((NP\S)/NP)/PREDP combines with a predicative phrase PREDP to its right to give a transitive 
verb phrase (NP\S)/NP (145a).103 This transitive verb phrase consists of the complex predicate 
consider a fool, which is treated as syntactically equivalent to a simple transitive verb such as 
love (Bach 1979: 517-8). The transitive verb phrase then combines with an NP to its right to 
produce a verb phrase NP\S (145b).104 In the final step, an NP is concatenated to the left of the 
verb phrase NP\S to yield the whole sentence S (145c). 
                                                 
102 The superscript prime (') following the words and phrases in the derivation signifies the logical semantic 
expression that translates an English expression (Cann 1993: 33); it thus indicates that we are not dealing with 
actual words in the object language English, but with an equivalent expression in the logical semantic metalan-
guage (Cann 1993: 35). 
103 A transitive verb phrase (NP\S)/NP is a phrase that first requires an NP to its right and then an NP to its left. In 
descriptive terminology, a transitive verb phrase corresponds to a bivalent or transitive verb that requires a di-
rect-object argument and a subject argument. 
104 A verb phrase NP\S is a phrase that requires an NP to its left. In descriptive terminology, a verb phrase corre-
sponds to a monovalent or intransitive verb that requires a subject argument. 
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(145) a.   ((NP\S)/NP)/PREDP + PREDP ⇒ (NP\S)/NP 
   a'.  consider'               + a-fool' ⇒ (consider' a-fool') 
   b.   (NP\S)/NP   + NP  ⇒ NP\S 
   b'  (consider' a-fool')  + john' ⇒ ((consider' a-fool') john') 
   c.   NP  + NP\S  ⇒ S    
   c'.  mary'  + ((consider' a-fool') john') ⇒ (mary' ((consider' a-fool') 
               john')) 
Since we are chiefly concerned with the first two steps of the derivation, we can economise by 
substituting the expression NP\S with VP and ignore the fact that a verb phrase is also a functor 
that requires an NP to form a sentence. (146) provides the simplified version of the derivation 
of the VP consider John a fool: 
(146) a.   (VP/NP)/PREDP  + PREDP ⇒ VP/NP 
   a'.  consider'               + a-fool' ⇒ (consider' a-fool') 
   b.   VP/NP   + NP  ⇒ VP 
   b'.  (consider' a-fool')  + john' ⇒ ((consider' a-fool') john') 
As with the generative complex-predicate analyses, the resultant string consider a fool John 
deviates from the empirically observed word order of the sentence. We will look at attempts 
to rectify this situation within the Categorial Grammar framework in the following. 
6.4 Evidence for complex predicates and attempts to cope with distributional 
mismatches 
The complex-predicate analysis gives the impression of being founded almost exclusively on 
conceptual and theoretical arguments because the empirical evidence given for it is rather 
paltry. To begin with, the additional structure that is assumed to exist between the main verb 
and XP is sometimes claimed to be reflected in several constructions: in a passive, the two 
parts of the postulated complex predicate show up as a continuous syntactic string (147a) 
(Chomsky 1975: 481; Jacobson 1987: 32); the same observation holds true for questions 
(147b) and the so-called 'Heavy NP-shift' construction (147c) (Jacobson 1987: 32; Larson 
1988: 349). 
(147) a.  [T]he daughter's education is considered irrelevant (BNC A6V: 2178).    
   b.  "What do you consider a fair price, Madame?" (BNC FSF: 2457)          
   c.  I consider foolish John and all his little children.       
Moreover, since a complex-predicate analysis presupposes that NP2 is a direct object, it can 
easily account for such empirical direct-object properties as accusative case marking and the 
ability to serve as the subject in passives. These surface direct-object properties have been 
responsible for making Chomsky question the SC-analysis and ponder a complex-predicate 
analysis in the first place (1975: 481-2, 1986a: 91). A complex-predicate analysis also has the 
conceptual advantage of bringing the two predicative elements contained in the sentence, the 
matrix verb and XP, together in one complex predicative constituent. 
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There are, however, several serious complications to the complex-predicate picture. First 
of all, it is not clear where complex predicates should be formed. To assume that such strings 
as consider-foolish or wipe-clean are created in the lexicon by some sort of lexical rule (e.g. 
Simpson 1983: 143) strikes one as counter-intuitive because this would expand the lexicon 
beyond all measure (Aarts 1992: 49; Staudinger 1996: 54). Complex predicates must thus be 
argued to be constructed in the syntax, as is done by both Larsonian and Categorial Grammar 
analyses: after the verb and XP have been combined by some syntactic process, they are as-
sumed to be reanalysed as a complex lexical category that can assign a single theta-role to the 
direct object (Larson 1988: 349; Rapoport 1995: 161). This is where the semantic problems 
start, however, because it is anything but obvious that a string such as wipe clean constitutes a 
bivalent semantic unit that as a whole selects a subject argument The waitress and a direct-
object argument the table. Carrier and Randall rightly level criticism at the idea of a "combo-
role" that would have to be claimed to be assigned by the complex predicate to the direct-
object argument (1992: 231). In the sentence The waitress wiped the table clean, the argument 
the table is both the object of the subject's action and the subject of the resultant property 
clean, and it is not transparent how these two semantic relations could be conflated into one 
complex thematic role. What is more, we would have to exert considerable pressure on the 
notion 'complex predicate' if we wanted to include sentences such as John drank himself crazy 
or John ate the meat hot in such an account, because it would be difficult to impute coherent 
semantic content to the putative complex predicates drink crazy or eat hot. 
All of this appears to be some strain on the claim that the matrix verb and XP form a 
complex predicate. The main problem with the complex-predicate hypothesis, however, is 
that the matrix verb and XP do not form a syntactic constituent at surface structure in most 
unmarked constructions. Passives, questions, and 'Heavy NP-shift' constructions are pragmati-
cally marked structures: in the passive, the 'direct object' NP occupies the sentential subject 
position because the passive exceptionally foregrounds the 'direct object' argument relative to 
the 'subject' argument; in a wh-question, the 'direct object' occupies the clause-initial position 
because it serves as the topic of the sentence, and in the 'Heavy NP-shift' structure the 'direct 
object' is placed towards the end of the sentence because it is long and informationally salient. 
To argue that these structures reflect a more basic word order of secondary-predicate con-
structions (e.g. Larson 1988: 349; Jacobson 1987: 32) is therefore rather far-fetched. Adher-
ents of the complex-predicate analysis, who claim that the verb and XP do form a constituent 
at some more abstract syntactic level, are forced to argue that they are discontinuous at sur-
face structure for independent syntactic reasons.  
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Generative grammarians arrive at the right word order by various circuitous transforma-
tional paths. In Chomsky's early proposals, an obligatory transformational separation rule obsepT  
applies to a string such as Mary — considers a fool — John and has the effect of interchang-
ing the XP-part of the complex predicate and the direct object, yielding the well-formed sur-
face expression Mary — considers — John — a fool (1957: 76-7). Such mechanical, purely 
descriptive transformations are no longer acceptable in contemporary generative accounts, of 
course. The transformation engineered by Larsonian analyses, which is the same as that ap-
plied to the indirect-object construction, does not carry much greater conviction, however. It 
is argued that the main verb raises from its D-structure position in V to the functional projec-
tion ν in order to pick up the causative semantics associated with this functional head and to 
be able to assign Case to the direct object or inner subject (148) (Contreras 1995: 141-2; Gre-
wendorf 2002: 54-5; Hale and Keyser 1992: 109; Larson 1988: 335; Rapoport 1993: 178, 
footnote 4). 
(148)     νP 
 
external subject/   ν' 
sentential subject 
      ν   VP 
 
       inner subject/   V' 
                 direct object 
          V             NP 
 
     Mary                       considersi        John                           ti          a fool 
 
Both the D-structure representation and the above transformation to obtain the right surface 
word order come over as stipulative and counter-intuitive. This is not surprising if one con-
siders that Larson's analysis of the indirect-object construction, which is used as a model for 
the complex-predicate analysis, rests on very shaky empirical foundations itself.105 This is not 
the place to suggest an alternative analysis of double-object constructions, but it is clear that a 
Larsonian analysis of secondary-predicate constructions creates distributional mismatches that 
can only be resolved opportunistically on different syntactic levels.  
                                                 
105 Larson's arguments substantiating the idea that the two postverbal objects are on different structural levels are 
of a rather dubious nature. Like SC-theoreticians, he uses conjunction data such as John sent a letter to Mary and 
a book to Sue to argue that a letter to Mary and a book to Sue are constituents, with the verb sent having been 
raised from the two conjuncts to ν (1988: 345). An analysis of this sentence as an instance of a pragmatically 
marked non-constituent conjunction construction could easily challenge this claim, however. Larson also makes 
much of binding evidence such as I showed Maryi to herselfi to contend that Mary is the inner subject of the 
clause-like structure Mary show to herself (1988: 336-9). Again, binding evidence constitutes a tenuous basis for 
structural claims because binding relations may have to be stated in semantic rather than syntactic terms, as has 
been illustrated in the discussion of small clauses above (cf. 5.2.2).  
CHALLENGING COMPLEX-PREDICATE ANALYSES 
 
143
Similarly, the Categorial Grammar analysis of (146) derives a verb phrase which con-
tains discontinuous constituents, with the direct object being placed between the two elements 
of the complex predicate making up the transitive verb phrase. The word order of English 
does not support the assumption that the verb and the predicative phrase together form a tran-
sitive verb phrase to the exclusion of NP2. The question as to how the correct word order can 
be arrived at consequently arises in Categorial Grammar as well (Jacobson 1987: 28; Kang 
1995: 61). There have been several interesting ventures in the Categorial Grammar frame-
work; I will briefly look at three of them. 
Jacobson submits a 'verb promotion' analysis that bears many similarities to Larson's 
transformational account. As in the standard Categorial Grammar derivation above (146), a 
PREDP first combines with a consider-type verb to give a transitive verb phrase made up of a 
complex predicate (149a, a'). When the transitive verb phrase combines with a direct object 
NP to yield a VP, the NP is not just concatenated to the right of the transitive verb phrase as in 
the default case; rather, Jacobson assumes, the verbal part of the transitive verb phrase is pro-
moted to the beginning of the resultant VP by a marked rule of verb promotion (149b) (1987: 
44-5), in a similar way that the verb is raised to ν in Larson's account. In the corresponding 
semantic representation (149b'), the resultant semantic expression is composed of the mean-
ings of three equal elements because the complex predicate has been eliminated at this point 
(Jacobson 1987: 52). 
(149) a.   (VP/NP)/PREDP  + PREDP ⇒ VP/NP 
   a'.  consider'               + a-fool' ⇒ (consider' a-fool') 
   b.   VP/NP   + NP  ⇒ VP → V (promoted) NP PREDP 
   b'.  (consider' a-fool')  + john' ⇒ consider' john' a-fool' 
A different explanation for the discontinuity of the complex predicate has been offered by 
Bach. He assumes that transitive verb phrases that consist of a complex predicate do not sim-
ply combine with a direct-object argument by concatenating it to its right, but by inserting it 
after the lexical verb (1979: 516, 518). This 'Right Wrap'-operation (150) is, like Jacobson's 
rule of verb promotion, a marked way of combining syntactic expressions; it could be moti-
vated by a requirement that a direct object must be adjacent to a lexical verb (Hoeksema 
1991: 702). Unlike the verb-promotion account, the marked rule of Right Wrap does not 
eliminate the complex predicate but only infixes an element into it.  
(150) VP/NP + NP ⇒ VP → V [NP (right wrapped)] PREDP 
Still another analysis is submitted by Hoeksema (1991), who thinks that besides ordinary 
categories, there are categories to be liberated. When such categories, which are notationally 
enclosed in square brackets, combine with an argument, the expression of the bracketed cate-
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gory is not maintained as a constituent. The first step in Hoeksema's derivation of a secon-
dary-predicate construction is identical to the other proposals: a verb such as consider com-
bines with a PREDP to give a transitive verb phrase [VP|NP], which is made up of a complex 
predicate (151a). Since this transitive verb phrase is a bracketed category, its constituents V 
and PREDP are 'liberated', i.e. not preserved as a complex predicate, when the transitive verb 
phrase is combined with the direct-object argument NP; all three elements (the verb, the 
PREDP and the NP) thus become immediate constituents of the VP (151b) (Hoeksema 1991: 
666). The word-order facts are handled by an independent mechanism in this account: in con-
trast to the previous proposals, Hoeksema claims that functional application does not deter-
mine the order of the categories; hence the use of | instead of slanted slashes in the syntax and 
the use of curly brackets indicating an unordered string in the semantics (1991: 666). The or-
der of the elements in the VP is determined by two independent precedence rules instead: first, 
V precedes (<) all other elements; and second, V immediately precedes (<<) NP (1991: 671). 
These precedence rules guarantee the right order of the constituents in the syntactic and se-
mantic representations of the VP (151c, c').  
(151) a.   [VP|NP]|PREDP  + PREDP ⇒ [VP|NP] 
   a'.  consider'               + a-fool' ⇒ {consider' a-fool'} 
    b.   [VP|NP]   + NP  ⇒ VP → V PREDP NP 
   b'.  {consider' a-fool'}  + john' ⇒ {john' consider' a-fool'} 
     c.   V < X; V << NP  ⇒ VP → V NP PREDP 
     c'.    ⇒ (consider' john' a fool') 
Whatever their local disagreements about the most adequate formulation of the rule combin-
ing a direct object with a complex-predicate transitive verb phrase, all of the above proposals 
agree that a marked rule of combination can explain the word-order fact that the elements of 
the complex predicate do not form a constituent in surface syntax. In passives, questions, and 
'Heavy NP shift' constructions, on the other hand, the direct object is claimed to have simply 
been concatenated to the right of the transitive verb phrase by default and no such marked rule 
as verb promotion, wrapping or liberation has had to apply. 
The word-order mismatches necessitated by complex-predicate analyses are thus re-
solved by rather stipulative transformational rules in generative grammar and idiosyncratic 
combinatorial rules in Categorial Grammar.106 These solutions leave themselves open to 
charges of opportunistic and untestable methods. SC-theories and complex-predicate theories 
                                                 
106 Kang hypothesises that consider should be represented as VP/PREDP/NP in Categorial Grammar, which means 
that the verb and the PREDP do not form a complex predicate, but that the verb first combines with the direct 
object NP and then with the PREDP, yielding the right surface word order without any marked rules of combina-
tion (1995: 70). It is doubtful, however, that the string [consider John] has any more empirical validity than the 
complex predicate [consider a fool] or the SC [John foolish]. 
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have reached varied conclusions about the nested constituent structure underlying secondary-
predicate constructions. Yet neither the additional structure between NP2 and XP in small-
clause approaches (152a), nor the additional structure between the matrix verb and XP in 
complex-predicate accounts (152b) can be established empirically and must therefore be de-
fended by theory-internal assumptions instead. If we do not want to posit such phantom struc-
tures as 'small clause' or 'complex predicate', we are left with the flat structure in (152c), 
where the four elements of a secondary-predicate construction are all on the same structural 
level. This is the only structure that can be revealed empirically, and, pending very good rea-
sons to the contrary, the only structure syntacticians should rely on and work with.  
(152) a.  [ NP1 V [NP2 XP]] 
 
   b.  [NP1 [V XP] NP2] 
 
   c.  [NP1 V NP2 XP] 
The problem for a syntactically discrete account is to explain how the elements in (152c) are 
tied together syntactically and semantically. Descriptive grammars claim that the verb selects 
the other three phrases as its arguments, but this assumption runs into insuperable difficulties 
because it cannot explain the semantic subject/predicate relationship holding between NP2 and 
XP and forces one to allow a predicate to select another predicate, even in cases where such 
selection is not particularly convincing (e.g. John drank his tea hot). The following chapter 
will look at one more syntactically discrete analysis of secondary-predicate constructions, 
which is ternary in nature like the complex-transitive analysis, but tries to avoid the problems 
created in traditional descriptive accounts. 
? 
?
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7. Challenging Predication-theory analyses of secondary-predicate 
constructions 
7.1 Semantic definition of predicative relations in Predication theory 
As additional structure between NP2 and XP or the matrix verb and XP cannot be established 
empirically, some generative grammarians have looked for new ways to explain the predica-
tive relationship holding between the postverbal phrases of secondary-predicate constructions. 
Like descriptive grammarians, they presuppose a flat structure for [NP1 V NP2 XP]-patterns, but 
they do not think that the matrix verb simply selects the three other phrases as its arguments. 
Their alternative proposal, which has been spearheaded by the work of Williams (1980, 
1983), has come to be known under the term 'Predication theory'. Williams and his adherents 
work within a loose version of GB-theory, in which some of the principles that have forced an 
SC-analysis in mainstream generative grammar have been modified or abandoned. 
As we have seen in chapter 5.1, the conspiracy of the Theta-Criterion, the Projection 
Principle and the binary-branching requirement have made the acceptance of SCs virtually 
inescapable in a strict GB-framework. These principles have turned the notion 'clause' into a 
primitive of generative grammar because every subject/predicate relationship must now be 
structurally reflected by a clause, even by a canonical CP in some more recent approaches. 
The "ruling motto of the SC theory" is therefore that "[a]ll subjects are structural subjects" 
(Williams 1983: 289), i.e. NP2, which receives a subject θ-role from XP, must be structurally 
defined as the subject of a (small) clause. Williams, however, disputes this contention of SC-
theory that predicative relationships must invariably be identified with clausal configurations, 
and "takes the subject-predicate relation to be basic and the notion 'clause' to be derivative" 
instead (1983: 292). His Predication theory does not only acknowledge predicative relation-
ships that are mirrored by clausal structure, but also predicative relations that are not mediated 
structurally (1983: 288). While the subject/predicate relation obtaining between the subject NP 
and the VP of a canonical sentence is thought to be instantiated by a clause, the predicative 
relation between the postverbal phrases of secondary-predicate constructions is not assumed 
to be necessarily reflected by syntactic structure (Carrier and Randall 1992: 174; Schein 1995: 
63; Williams 1983: 307).  
This bold move to divorce semantic relations from syntactic structure in a generative 
framework means that Williams must devise an alternative way to account for the predicative 
nexus between NP2 and XP, a task that descriptive grammars opting for a ternary analysis have 
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failed to fulfil so far. Several of Williams' ideas are incommensurable with standard GB-
notions; most importantly, Williams proposes a non-clausal definition of the terms 'predica-
tive relation' and 'subject'. In his framework, a predicate is an unsaturated grammatical entity 
that requires a subject expression to make it complete; a subject is defined as the external ar-
gument of the predicate, and the predicate and its subject argument are semantically identified 
by bearing the same index. Williams assumes an additional level of representation, 'Predicate 
Structure', which is derived from S-structure by a 'Rule of Predication' co-indexing subjects 
with their respective predicates (1980: 205, 1983: 291-2). The term 'subject' is thus redefined 
relationally as 'subject of predicate' instead of configurationally as 'subject of clause' (Roth-
stein 1990: 599). 
Since the relation between subject and predicate is no longer characterised in terms of 
clauses, Williams needs to triangulate the right conditions that can identify an NP as the exter-
nal argument of a predicate with which it can be co-indexed. He maintains that the subject 
argument is that NP outside the maximal projection of the predicate that symmetrically c-
commands that maximal projection (1980: 205, 1983: 287-8; see also Culicover and Wilkins 
1986: 121; Mallén 1992: 5). This configuration is claimed to hold both in full clauses (153a) 
and between the postverbal phrases of consider/wipe/eat-type verbs (153b).107  
(153)  a. [NP John]i [VP kickedi the dog]i. 
      IP 
 
 
  NPi    VPi 
 
     Vi  NP 
 
    John             kicked             the dog 
 
  b. (The waitress served) [NP the fish]i [AP freei of bones]i. 
  
    NPi     APi 
 
      Ai  NP 
 
    the fish               free          (of) bones 
In (153a), the verb kicked assigns its subject θ-role to the NP John, which is outside the maxi-
mal projection of the verb, VP, and symmetrically c-commands this projection.108 The direct-
                                                 
107 These and the following representations have been simplified for expository purposes: all nodes that are not 
necessary for the case at hand (e.g. I' and I) are not depicted in the diagrams. 
108 The idea behind the symmetric c-command relation is that the thematic requirements of a predicate (e.g. V or 
A) are projected to the respective maximal projection (VP and AP), so that the maximal projection itself can be 
argued to assign a θ-role to the external argument in a symmetric c-command configuration.  
symmetric  
c-command 
symmetric 
c-command 
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object argument the dog, on the other hand, is located inside the maximal projection VP and, 
of course, does not c-command it. The only NP that can therefore be co-indexed with the VP as 
its subject argument is John. In this case, the subject/predicate relation between John and the 
VP is also instantiated by a clause (IP); as a consequence, John is both a grammatical and a 
thematic subject, and the verb is both structurally and thematically a predicate and is therefore 
often called a 'primary predicate' (Mallén 1992: 5; Napoli 1989: 88). In (153b), the adjective 
free assigns its subject θ-role to the NP the fish, which is outside the maximal projection AP 
and symmetrically c-commands this projection; the NP bones, by contrast, is inside the maxi-
mal projection AP and therefore not in a c-command relation with it. In this case, the predica-
tive relationship between the fish and the AP is not reflected by a (small) clause. The fish is 
consequently not a grammatical, but only a thematic subject; similarly, XP is merely a the-
matic or 'secondary' predicate (Demonte 1987: 1; Napoli 1989: 89; Rothstein 1995: 29-30).  
The analyses propounded by predication theorists necessitate giving up some of the 
mainstays of standard GB-theory. The NP the fish receives a subject or external θ-role from 
the maximal projection of the adjective, but it structurally functions as the direct object of 
served and also receives a direct object or internal θ-role from this verb (154). In other words, 
the postverbal NP is assigned θ-roles both from the primary and the secondary predicate at 
Predicate Structure (Mallén 1992: 4-5), which goes expressly against the Theta-Criterion, 
which legislates against multiple θ-role assignment to a single NP.  
(154)     VP 
 
   Vi  j
i
NP    APj 
 
                        
 
                served                 the fish         free of bones 
Proponents of Predication theory trade off the strict thematic requirements of the Theta-
Criterion for the more liberal principles of what is variously known as the "restricted Theta 
Criterion" (Williams 1983: 300) or "relativized Theta Criterion" (Carrier and Randall 1992: 
180): while a lexical item can still only be assigned one θ-role within the same argument 
complex, it can receive two θ-roles on condition that they are discharged by two predicates 
within different argument complexes (Culicover and Wilkins 1986: 123; Napoli 1989: 72-3; 
Schein 1995: 50). In (154), the fish receives one θ-role from the primary predicate served and 
another from the secondary predicate free; since these predicates are not thematically related, 
i.e. they do not form a complex predicate and none of them selects the other, the configuration 
external θ-role internal θ-role 
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is in accord with the requirements of the relativized Theta-Criterion (Napoli 1989: 73; Wil-
liams 1983: 301). 
The Predication-theory analysis of secondary-predicate constructions also violates the 
constraints imposed by the Projection Principle (Culicover and Wilkins 1986: 120; Williams 
1983: 307). At D- and S-structure, the fish is the grammatical and thematic direct object of 
served (155a); at Predicate Structure, however, the fish is not only the thematic direct object 
of served but also the thematic subject of free (155b). There is thus no isomorphism between 
syntax and semantics at all levels of representation as in SC-theory: although NP2 and XP stand 
in a subject/predicate relation at Predicate Structure, they do not constitute a structural sub-
ject/predicate configuration at D- and S-structure.  
(155) a.  The waitress [served [the fish]] [free of bones]. 
  b.  The waitress [servedi the fishi/j free of bonesj]. 
One final GB-principle that at least some predication theorists no longer hold firm to is the 
binary-branching requirement. If NP2 and XP need not form a clause, they can be analysed as 
sisters to the matrix verb under VP (or V') in a ternary configuration (Carrier and Randall 
1992: 225), as is also illustrated in (154). 
When we strip Predication theory off such technical notions as 'maximal projection' or 'c-
command', we can see more clearly how it scores over the traditional ternary analysis of sec-
ondary-predicate constructions discussed in chapter 4: verbs such as consider, wipe and eat 
assign two thematic roles, one to their subject arguments and one to their direct-object argu-
ments, but not a third one to the highly problematic entity 'predicative complement' as in de-
scriptive accounts. XP is itself a predicate that assigns a thematic role to its subject argument, 
which is identical with the direct object of the matrix verb. It is thus not necessary to assume 
that the main verb selects another predicate, let alone the XPs of sentences such as John drank 
himself crazy or John ate the meat hot. If there is no selectional relation between the primary 
and the secondary predicate, an alternative way of holding these two phrases together in a flat 
structure must be proposed. NP2 can be argued to act as a bridge between the argument struc-
ture of the primary predicate and that of the secondary predicate because it fulfils a dual func-
tion as direct object of the main verb and subject of XP. Since the external argument of the 
secondary predicate is also the internal argument of the primary predicate, the secondary 
predicate "will not be semantically floating — it will be tied into the thematic structure" of the 
primary predicate (Napoli 1989: 120). While the subject, the direct object, and the internal 
argument of XP are bound into the construction because they are selected by their respective 
predicates, the secondary predicate is said to be 'licensed' by the primary predicate because it 
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bears a thematic relation to a lexical NP that is itself thematically related to the primary predi-
cate (156) (Rapoport 1993: 159). 
 
(156)     served            free 
 
 
   the waitress        the fish   of bones 
All of this looks promising in theory because it conforms to the empirical findings that the 
main verb, NP2 and XP are separate constituents not bound together in any way by additional 
structure. If we try to put the ideas of Predication Theory into practice, however, disillusion-
ment sets in rather quickly. 
7.2 Treatment of depictive patterns in Predication theory 
Rapoport is a proponent of the complex-predicate analysis for consider-type and wipe-type 
sentences (cf. 6.2), but she decisively prefers a predication account for depictive patterns be-
cause it is intuitively implausible to argue that eat-raw or drink-cold, for instance, form se-
mantically coherent complex predicates (1993: 169). In Predication theory, the primary predi-
cate and the secondary predicate neither constitute a complex predicate nor does one select 
the other; rather, they are tied together in the sentence via the licensing relation effected by 
their shared argument (Rapoport 1993: 170; Williams 1983: 301). The shared argument in 
depictive patterns can be either NP2 (157a) or NP1 (157b). 
(157) a.  Johni atei the meati/j hotj. 
    b.  Johni/j atei the meati drunkj. 
Object-related depictive XPs like hot are also sometimes referred to as O-predicates, and sub-
ject-related depictives like drunk as S-predicates, for short (Staudinger 1996: 49). If the pre-
dictions made by Predication theory are correct, the right co-indexing relations can be estab-
lished in a structural configuration where the subject of the secondary predicate is outside the 
maximal projection of that predicate and symmetrically c-commands it. Early predication 
theorists have submitted the following phrase-structure trees to show that these predictions are 
indeed borne out (e.g. Demonte 1987: 13)109: in (158a), the maximal projection of the adjec-
tive hot, AP, is a sister to the main verb and the direct-object NP within VP. The direct object 
the meat is accessible as the external argument of hot because it is outside its maximal projec-
tion and symmetrically c-commands this projection. The sentential subject John, on the other 
hand, is on a higher structural level than AP and therefore not in a relation of symmetric c-
                                                 
109 The following diagrams only show the co-indexing relations between the secondary predicate and its external 
argument, not those between the primary predicate and its arguments. 
selection selection 
licensing 
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command with it. In (158b), the maximal projection of the adjective drunk, AP, is on the same 
structural level as the sentential subject and the VP. As a consequence, the sentential subject 
John can serve as the external argument of drunk because it symmetrically c-commands its 
maximal projection AP. The direct object the meat, on the other hand, is on a lower structural 
level than the maximal projection of the secondary predicate and therefore not available for a 
symmetric c-command relation with it. 
(158) a. John ate the meati hoti. 
                 IP 
 
 
  NP        VP 
 
     V     NPi     APi 
 
    John               ate          the meati      hoti 
 
  b. Johni ate the meat drunki. 
  
    IP 
 
 
  NPi             VP   APi 
 
          V   NP     
 
  Johni        ate             the meat             drunki 
These representations of the respective structural positions of S- and O-predicates are in ac-
cordance with the symmetric c-command requirements of Predication theory, but they are 
unsustainable empirically. The verb and its direct object do not form a constituent to the ex-
clusion of an S-depictive, as (158b) has us believe; rather, there is ample evidence that both 
O- and S-depictives must be positioned inside VP: when the VP is fronted, an S-depictive must 
obligatorily be fronted along with it in the same way as an O-depictive (159a, a'); similarly, 
when the VP occupies the focus position in a wh-cleft construction, both an S-depictive and an 
O-depictive must be located in this position as well (159b, b') (Roberts 1988: 704-5). A final 
test that indicates that S-depictives are also part of VP relies on the scope relations of VP-
negators. To take an adverbial example first: the adverb deliberately can be part of VP and be 
within the scope of a VP-negator (John [didn't kiss his wife deliberately]), but may also be 
outside VP and modify the whole proposition, so that the scope of a VP-negator does not ex-
tend over it (John deliberately [didn't kiss his wife]). As (159c, c') illustrates, only the first 
option is open to secondary predicates, i.e. depictive adjectives are always within the scope of 
a VP-negator, no matter if they refer to the subject NP or the direct object NP (Roberts 1988: 
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707). In other words, (159c) cannot mean that John didn't eat his steak because he was drunk 
and (159c') cannot imply that John didn't eat his steak, which was hot at the same time.110 
(159) a.   I expected John to eat the steak drunk, and eat the steak drunk he did.  
   a'.  John wanted to eat the steak hot, and eat the steak hot he did. 
   b.   What John did was eat the steak drunk.  
   b'.  What John did was eat the steak hot. 
   c.   John [didn't eat his steak drunk]. 
   c'.  John [didn't eat his steak hot]. 
What all of these findings indicate is that S-depictives are not on a higher structural level than 
O-depictives. If the S-depictive drunk in representation (158b) must be positioned within VP, 
however, the traditional machinery of Predication theory no longer works because the senten-
tial subject John does not symmetrically c-command the maximal projection of drunk in such 
a configuration. There have been several attempts to find ways around this problem. Carrier 
and Randall (1992: 221-2) and Rapoport (1993: 170-1), for example, suggest a more relaxed 
definition of the co-indexing requirements between subject and predicate in terms of symmet-
ric m(aximal)-command in lieu of symmetric c-command. Two constituents are said to sym-
metrically m-command each other if the first maximal projection that dominates one constitu-
ent also dominates the other constituent. The relation between an O-depictive and its subject 
can easily be redefined in terms of m-command: in configuration (158a), the NP the meat and 
the O-depictive hot are both dominated by VP as the first maximal projection. To establish an 
m-command relation between an S-depictive within VP and the sentential subject outside VP, 
some ingenuity has to be employed. Carrier and Randall believe that the S-depictive is posi-
tioned in VP, but they maintain that it is adjoined to the lower maximal projection VP1. Since 
AP is then dominated by only a segment of the verb phrase (i.e., VP2), they go on to claim that 
the first full maximal projection dominating it is IP. As a consequence, the sentential subject 
John becomes accessible for a symmetric m-command relation with the S-depictive drunk 
(1992: 221). 
                                                 
110 Secondary predicates can be outside the scope of VP-negation in a slightly different construction that will be 
discussed in 10.3.2: In Angry at the cook, John didn't eat his steak, the scope of the VP-negator does not extend 
over the S-predicate angry at the cook. 
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(160) Johni ate the meat drunki. 
  
                  IP 
 
NPi                      VP2  
 
     VP1     APi 
 
                     V                 NP 
 
Johni                  ate                              the meat   drunki 
This is a very contrived solution indeed. Fortunately for predication theorists, the more recent 
VP-internal subject hypothesis (cf. 5.3.5) has made the use of m-command superfluous again: 
if it is assumed that the sentential subject occupies the [SPEC,VP]-position at D-structure, it 
can symmetrically c-command an S-predicate within VP. The direct-object NP is, according to 
standard X'-theory, thought to be located within the V'-projection, so it cannot interfere as a 
potential candidate for symmetric c-command (161a). An O-depictive is also situated in V', 
where it stands in a symmetric c-command relation with the direct object of the main verb 
(161b) (Mallén 1992: 13, 26; Rothstein 2000: 243). 
(161) a. Johni ate the meat drunki. 
     VP 
 
 
  NPi   V'    APi 
 
   V       NP     
 
    Johni      ate            the meat                        drunki 
 
  b. John ate the meati hoti. 
  
                 VP 
 
 
  NP                                  V'    
 
            V                 NPi     APi 
 
   John              ate                        the meati      hoti 
Owing to the VP-internal subject hypothesis, it is possible to retain the symmetric c-command 
relation in a predication account by simply moving it to a lower structural level than in the 
original configuration: while an S-predicate and the sentential subject were both generated 
under IP in the older format (158b), they are now positioned under VP (161a); in a similar vein, 
an O-predicate and the direct object were originally located in VP (158a), and are now thought 
to be situated within V' (161b). While this new configuration equally fits the bill with respect 
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to the symmetrical c-command requirement, it is, like the VP-internal subject hypothesis itself, 
not amenable to empirical testing. The factual arguments that have been provided for the 
claim that an S-predicate is located within VP and an O-predicate within V' do not stand up to 
closer examination. Mallén, for instance, argues that while a verb and its direct object cannot 
be deleted independently of an O-predicate because they are all part of the V'-constituent 
(162a), a verb and its direct object can be deleted to the exclusion of an S-predicate, which is 
outside V' (162a') (1992: 8-9). This non-constituent coordination evidence is not convincing, 
however. (162a) is ungrammatical with the relations indicated because the sentence is open to 
two other interpretations that cancel the desired reading: Bill can be interpreted as a coordi-
nated direct object that is modified by the O-predicate sober in the same way that the first 
conjunct Mary is modified by the O-predicate drunk; somewhat less likely, drunk and sober 
can also be understood as S-predicates modifying the sentential subject John. When these 
additional readings are not available, a verb and its direct object can in fact be deleted inde-
pendently of an O-predicate; for pragmatic reasons, raw and well-done in 162a'' cannot refer 
to John as S-predicates, and well-done cannot refer to Mary as an O-predicate (unless John is 
a cannibal), so there is nothing that prohibits a reading where John ate the steak raw and Mary 
ate the steak well-done. The test Rothstein adduces for the putative distinction between O-
predicates within V' and S-predicates outside V' does not fare much better. She claims (contra 
159b) that S-predicates can be left stranded in a wh-cleft construction (162b)111, while O-
predicates cannot (162b') (2000: 242-3). This argument is inadmissible for a rather straight-
forward reason, though: a cleft construction splits a simple sentence into a complex one with 
two verbs; the S-depictive within the first subclause of (162b), What John did drunk, can re-
fer to the subject John, but the predicative hot in the first subclause of (162b'), What John did 
hot, has no direct object it can relate to.  
(162) a.   *John saw Maryi drunki and Bill ∅ soberi. 
   a'.  Johni sang the song drunki and Billj ∅ soberj. 
   a''.  John ate the steaki rawi and Mary ∅ well-donei.  
   b.   What John did drunk was eat the steak. 
   b'.  *What John did hot was eat the steak. 
The structural licensing conditions proposed by Predication theory for secondary predicates in 
depictive constructions are thus not convincing. As S- and O-depictives cannot be distin-
guished structurally, the symmetric c-command relation thought to underlie the co-indexing 
between a secondary predicate and its external argument cannot be upheld in its present form.  
                                                 
111 This sentence is not accepted by all native speakers, though (ROS: 50). 
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7.3 Treatment of resultative and qualifying patterns in Predication theory 
While the idea that depictive secondary predicates are not selected, but licensed by the argu-
ment complex of the primary predicate is intuitively appealing (even if it is difficult to cali-
brate the right structural conditions for the relation between the depictive predicate and its 
external subject), we have cause to question the licensing account for resultative and qualify-
ing patterns offered in Predication theory.  
Resultative secondary predicates, which can only refer to direct objects, are thought to be 
subject to the same structural configurations as O-depictives, i.e. they are situated in V' to-
gether with their external argument, the direct object of the primary predicate (cf. 161b). 
There are, however, quite noticeable thematic differences between resultative and depictive 
patterns: in a sentence such as (163), the resultative AP red seems to bear a rather specific se-
mantic relation to the primary predicate painted; if this is so, it is at least arguable that resulta-
tives are selected by the main verb (Carrier and Randall 1992: 183-4; Rothstein 1995: 30; 
Simpson 1983: 149) — otherwise it would not be possible to explain why the semantic rela-
tion between a depictive XP and its primary predicate is much looser than that between a re-
sultative XP and its primary predicate.  
(163) Johni paintedi the doori/j redi/j. 
The analysis of (163) clearly falls behind the Predication theory account of depictives, though, 
and is not superior to the standard descriptive treatment of resultative sentences. What syntac-
ticians advocating the configuration of (163) frequently do not mention is that this structure is 
in fact at odds with the principles of Predication theory: the NP the door receives a θ-role from 
two predicates, the primary predicate painted and the secondary predicate red. However, since 
the secondary predicate is selected by the primary predicate, these two predicates are not the-
matically independent and the the door consequently receives two θ-roles within the same 
argument complex, in opposition to the requirements of the relativised Theta-Criterion. The 
above analysis thus runs into exactly the same obstacles as the respective descriptive account 
because the resultative XP is a predicate but is treated on a par with complements: "there 
would be a problem if we allowed lexically selected secondary predicates because such predi-
cates would be both arguments and predicates. We would then be faced with the anomaly that 
because they are arguments secondary predicates must get a θ-role from the verb, but because 
they are predicates they must not" (Aarts 1995: 97). Moreover, since sentences with O-
depictives and those with resultative XPs are assigned the same structure, Predication theory is 
not able to explain the semantic differences between depictive and resultative constructions; 
saying that the secondary predicate of the former pattern is only licensed by the matrix verb, 
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while that of the latter is actually selected by it, does not explain the depictive vs. resultative 
semantics. For these reasons, syntacticians such as Rapoport think that a Predication-theory 
account is not adequate for resultative constructions and suggest other treatments, such as a 
complex-predicate analysis, instead (cf. 6.2). 
In a resultative construction such as (164), where the main verb does not seem to have a 
thematic relation with the postverbal NP, Carrier and Randall speculate that the NP is not the 
thematic direct-object argument of the primary predicate. As in ordinary resultative patterns, 
the resultative XP is thought to be selected by the primary predicate and to take the postverbal 
NP as its external argument (1992: 184). 
(164) Johni rani his shoesj threadbarei/j. 
There are two problematic facets to this representation, though: first of all, it is not clear how 
a licensing account should work if his shoes is not an argument of both predicates at the same 
time (cf. 156); and second, it is doubtful that the semantic relation between run and thread-
bare is any stronger than that between eat and hot in a depictive construction.  
Most predication theorists are also hesitant to analyse qualifying constructions as (165a), 
i.e. with the main verb selecting a direct-object argument and the secondary predicate assign-
ing its external θ-role to the direct object. Like SC-theoreticians, they suppose that there is not 
really a semantic relationship between a verb such as consider and its postverbal NP and con-
sequently submit structure (165b) for qualifying sentences, which is identical to that proposed 
for exceptional resultative patterns such as (164) (Carrier and Randall 1992: 226-7; Napoli 
1989: 119-21; Wechsler 1997: 318; Williams 1983: 300). 
(165) a.  Johni considersi Maryi/j intelligentj. 
    b.  Johni considersi Maryj intelligenti/j. 
In this representation, the primary predicate consider does not select Mary as its direct object 
argument, but only assigns θ-roles to the sentential subject John and the qualifying XP intelli-
gent. The secondary predicate, in its turn, assigns an external θ-role to the postverbal phrase 
Mary. (166) shows the structural and thematic configuration believed to underlie a typical 
qualifying sentence, ignoring the sentential subject. 
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(166)    VP 
 
   V NP AP 
 
           consider             Mary               intelligent 
 
 
 
As in SC-theory, the claim that the postverbal NP of consider-type verbs has no semantic rela-
tion with the matrix verb is mainly based on the feeble semantic argument that John does not 
consider 'Mary' (cf. 5.1). However, I do not see that it is intuitively more plausible to claim 
that John considers 'intelligent'. Napoli herself admits that "it is difficult to find arguments for 
Williams' ... position", but she nevertheless bows to his authority and assumes that it is basi-
cally "correct" (1989: 119). What also detracts from the above configuration is the curious 
syntactic status of the postverbal NP, which must be claimed to occupy a position subcatego-
rised, but not θ-marked by the main verb (Williams 1983: 307). Wechsler argues that if a 
predicate XP does not get a local subject through the argument of the verb, "a non-thematic ... 
subject is added to the verb's valence list" (1997: 319) — which seems to be a rather ad hoc 
explanation. As Stowell already noted, "[i]f verbs were permitted to subcategorise for com-
plements to which they assign no thematic role, then subcategorisation would have to be 
treated as an independent mechanism in the verb's lexical entry, thus increasing the complex-
ity of the lexicon" (1983: 300). Last but not least, the analysis of (166) is doubtful because the 
primary predicate must again be assumed to select another predicate as in the predication 
analysis of resultative sentences (163, 164). In face of these difficulties, many syntacticians 
that choose a predication account for depictives shy away from a predication analysis for 
qualifying patterns and prefer an SC-analysis instead (e.g. Rothstein 1995: 30-1). 
While a licensing account thus works to a certain degree for depictive patterns, it runs 
into insuperable difficulties with resultative and qualifying constructions. Syntacticians who 
want to stick to Predication theory are therefore forced to adopt mixed analyses for secon-
dary-predicate constructions, for instance a licensing analysis for depictive sentences, a com-
plex-predicate account for resultative patterns and an SC-analysis for qualifying construc-
tions. Since these three constructions do not show variable syntactic behaviour, such an ap-
proach is rather stipulative and, what is more, the different syntactic analyses do not really 
explain the different meaning relationships underlying the three secondary-predicate construc-
tions. 
 
θ-role 
θ-role 
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For syntacticians who, like Green, are interested in the proper syntactic analysis of secondary-
predicate constructions, the conclusions that must be drawn from part I of this dissertation are 
rather sobering. Every conceivable analysis of the [NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern has been put forward, 
but each of them results in distributional mismatches that can only be resolved opportunisti-
cally. Neither is there any additional structure between certain elements of this pattern (such 
as between NP2 and XP or between V and XP), nor is there a convincing way to argue that some 
element(s) in the structure (such as the main verb or the main verb and the secondary predi-
cate) select(s) the others. Secondary-predicate constructions are not singular in this respect, 
though. To take just one other complex structure, the syntax of double-object constructions 
commands as little consensus in discrete grammars as the syntax of secondary-predicate con-
structions. To begin with, there are two different complex-predicate analyses for this pattern: 
while Larson hypothesises that in the sentence John gave a book to Mary the verb give forms 
a constituent with the indirect object in V', which then theta-marks the direct object a book as 
its inner 'subject' (cf. 6.2), other generative grammarians maintain that the verb give forms a 
constituent with the direct object a book in V', which takes the indirect object (to) Mary as the 
inner 'subject' (e.g. Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 124-5). Still others have come up with an 
SC-analysis for double objects: Kayne and Hoekstra, for example, both speculate that give 
selects an SC with possessive semantics such as [a book to Mary] (Hoekstra 1988: 135-7; 
Kayne 1984: 133-4). Since the additional structure provided by complex-predicate and SC-
accounts of double-object constructions is as difficult to establish as for secondary-predicate 
constructions (cf. footnote 105), Jackendoff sharply criticises that Larson's "proposed analysis 
... introduces a great deal of structure that is not evident from the surface of the dative con-
struction" (1990b: 453). He therefore opts for a ternary analysis, in which the main verb se-
lects the three arguments John, a book and (to) Mary. Yet a selection account begins to en-
counter problems with sentences such as John threw Mary the ball or Sally baked Bill a cake 
because it is not plausible to argue that the NPs Mary and Bill are selected by their respective 
matrix verbs. All of this gives the impression of arbitrariness because none of the possible 
building-block analyses seems to be intrinsically superior to the others, and the decision for 
one particular analysis over another appears to rest on the aims of the syntactician and not on 
the linguistic situation (see also Langacker 1987: 318). If we do not want to arrive at the cyni-
cal conclusion that one syntactic analysis is as good as any other because distributional mis-
matches can always be brushed aside or explained away by some theory-internal mechanisms, 
it is time to realise that there is something seriously amiss with discrete syntax and to prepare 
the way for non-discrete accounts of grammatical constructions. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II: 
 
Towards a Non-discrete Account of the 
Resultative, Depictive and Qualifying Constructions  
in English 
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8. A critique of intersystemic and epistemological discreteness 
8.1 A critique of intersystemic linguistic discreteness 
8.1.1 The functionalist criticism of the modular architecture of grammar 
Thus far we have criticised the premises of the discreteness paradigm operative within the 
system of syntax. Before we can start to propose non-discrete analyses in a Construction-
grammar framework, there are two more discreteness assumptions that need to be taken issue 
with in this and the following sections. 
Generative grammarians theorise that the so-called language faculty, like the mind as a 
whole, has a modular architecture, i.e. that it consists of separate, autonomous systems with 
their own distinctive properties (Cook and Newson 1996: 30-1; Fanselow and Felix 1993: 
173; Fodor 1983: 64-86). This hypothesis implies that the grammatical system can and should 
be subdivided into distinct components or "languages of the mind" (Jackendoff 1997: 41), 
each operating in a discrete fashion: "Each of these 'languages' is a formal system with its 
own proprietary set of primitives and principles of combination, so that it defines an infinite 
set of expressions ... For each of these formats, there is a module of mind/brain responsible 
for it" (Jackendoff 1997: 41). By analogy with the computational model, the distinct formats 
are regarded as closed systems that only interact with the other systems on the level of input 
and output structures (Linz 2002: 216). 
To Chomsky and his followers, the central component of the language faculty is syntax, 
which he claims is governed by its own self-contained principles and which can therefore be 
studied for its own sake, i.e. independently of meaning and use in communication (Fanselow 
and Felix 1993: 67). The other representational levels are considered output structures of syn-
tactic derivations only and are thus of minor significance to the overall system: "The language 
is embedded in performance systems that enable its expressions to be used for articulating, 
interpreting, referring, inquiring, reflecting, and other actions" (Chomsky 1995: 2). All of 
these performance components, including semantics, are taken to be external systems that are 
cognitively independent of syntactic competence (Grewendorf 2002: 14). While the semantic 
aspects operative on the level of Logical Form, which is designed as an interface to semantics 
proper, are characterised by Chomsky as "pure syntax" (2000: 125), the function of the actual 
semantic component is merely to interpret syntactically generated structures, without its hav-
ing major generative capacities of its own. The bottom line is that Chomsky and his followers 
restrict core grammar to the formal descriptions provided by the syntactic component, banish-
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ing questions of meaning and use to some inferior position in the system: "In the minimalist 
model ... it is axiomatic that semantics has no place in the derivational history ... Our ap-
proach, thus, is blind to semantic motivation, although it is not immune to semantic conse-
quence. Our main motivation ... is that this is the correct order of things, and not the other 
way around" (Raposo and Uriagereka 1995: 179-80). 
Such a narrow focus on syntax has not gone unchallenged within the generative school 
itself. The most formidable opponent of this "syntactocentric architecture" of grammar is 
Jackendoff (2002: 107), who accuses Chomsky of "emasculating semantics — of giving the 
messages conveyed by language a far lesser role than the messenger" (2002: 269). Jackendoff 
holds that the representational formats provided by the linguistic system must minimally in-
clude phonological, syntactic and semantic/conceptual structures, each equipped with its own 
generative system (2002: 5-7). These formats are conjectured to be independent of one an-
other in that they consist of distinct primitives and rules of combination (2002: 121-3), but to 
be related by a set of interface rules that link some, but by no means all, aspects of two repre-
sentational levels (2002: 123). In a similar vein, Bierwisch and Lang's two-level approach to 
meaning posits a distinct representational format called 'Semantic Form', which determines 
the grammatically relevant part of meaning and functions as an interface between syntax and 
conceptual structure (1987: 664). Unlike GB-theory and the MP, these models do thus not 
equate grammar with syntax but postulate interconnected formal and conceptual structures. 
Nevertheless, Jackendoff's and Bierwisch and Lang's theories are also set up in accord with 
the axioms of the discreteness paradigm. Not only do the separate representational formats 
operate over their own structured sets of linguistic primitives and rules, but the formats exist 
independently of one another and are only partially related by interface rules. This sort of in-
dependence between different grammatical systems will be called 'intersystemic discreteness' 
(cf. Linz 2002: 14). 
The notion of intersystemic discreteness has come in for harsh criticism with functional-
ist grammarians. Functionalists oppose the view that there are distinct representational com-
ponents such as syntax and semantics that could be described on their own terms. Bolinger, 
for instance, finds fault with the idea that language should "establish a lunacy ward in its 
grammar or lexicon where mindless morphs stare vacantly with no purpose other than to be 
where they are" (1977:ix), and Wierzbicka laments "the meaningless universe of arbitrary, 
blind rules, and arbitrary, blind exceptions to the rules" (1988: 7) that have been created by 
generative syntax. The separation of syntax and semantics into two different linguistic com-
ponents is not considered to do justice to language; Jäger criticizes "die charakteristische Sig-
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nifikanten-Reduktion des sprachlichen Zeichens, das qua Signifikant nur der prinzipiell nach-
träglichen Repräsentation sprachunabhänger Erkenntnisinhalte, der Signifikate, dient" (1993: 
81). 
A basic tenet of functionalist grammars, including cognitive and constructional gram-
mars, is that syntax is not a self-contained, autonomous system, but that formal structures are 
systematically motivated by their semantic and pragmatic functions (Croft 1991: 4, 2001: 9; 
Duffley 1992: 15). The stipulation of different representational levels or derivational rules is 
therefore incompatible with functionalist analyses, which attempt to explain the surface struc-
tural features of a particular construction in terms of the functions it performs (Croft 1991: 31-
2; Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988: 534). Contrary to Chomsky's syntactocentricsm, the 
semantics of grammatical constructions are a prime concern of functionalist studies: "The 
central question ... is how linguistic expressions and the concepts they express can be mean-
ingful" (Lakoff 1987: 266; see also Langacker 1987: 12). Syntactic form is not a discrete, 
arbitrary level of grammatical representation, but is inextricably intertwined with semantics 
and pragmatics. To stress the important insight that syntax and semantics are like flip sides of 
a coin, Wierzbicka has renamed syntax into "grammatical semantics" (1988: 1). 
While Wierzbicka is a vocal critic of the paradigm of intersystemic discreteness, she does 
not at the same time oppose semantically discrete analyses. Her approach to semantics is re-
ductionist because she works with what she calls "an alphabet of human thoughts" (1988: 11), 
a small set of semantic primitives and determinate rules of combination. Most other function-
alist grammarians reject such semantic primitives because they do not think that complex 
meanings are decomposable into atomic elements (e.g. Fauconnier 1997: 70; Lee 2001: 89); I 
concur with the view that no semantic formula can ever hope to exhaust the meaning of a 
complex syntactic construction. Lexical items contain "frame semantic meanings ... rich with 
world and cultural knowledge" (Goldberg 1995: 27), which cannot easily be captured by 
paraphrases or formal semantic representations. Functionalist descriptions of the meaning of 
syntactic constructions therefore favour rather holistic concepts such as prototypes and image 
schemata (Lakoff 1987: 372). Such concepts are directly endowed with meaning because they 
derive from fundamental physical experiences which human beings make in their environ-
ment (Lakoff 1987: 271). Syntactic constructions thus code inherently meaningful and inte-
grated aspects of reality: "The 'basic logic' of image schemas is due to their configuration as 
gestalts — as structured wholes which are more than mere collections of parts. Their basic 
logic is a consequence of their configurations" (Lakoff 1989: 116). The non-discrete or gestalt 
semantics of syntactic structures is a basic tenet of Construction grammar that will also be 
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adhered to in the conceptual analyses of the RESULTATIVE, DEPICTIVE, and QUALIFYING Con-
structions in the following chapters. 
It is important to realise the interconnectedness of syntax and semantics, and not to make 
the same mistake as Chomsky in the opposite direction by simply replacing his primacy of 
syntax with primacy of meaning. Language is not merely a system to encode pre-existing 
conceptual contents; rather, meaning cannot be considered independent of linguistic form:  
Konstitutives Bestimmungsmoment sprachlicher Zeichen ist nicht das Formale, sondern viel-
mehr die Form, d.h. das Vermögen der Sprache, die Vielzahl fragmentarischer Wissenskompo-
nenten in sinnlich wahrnehmbarer Form zu binden und dadurch als formgebendes Medium zu 
fungieren. (Linz 2002: 226) 
This non-discrete view of form and meaning is well in tune with current research in the neu-
rosciences. As has already been noted in 3.4, Damasio does not make a sharp distinction be-
tween linguistic and non-linguistic entities because lexical items and constructions are only 
accessible to the mind in the form of acoustic and visual images — a connectionist perspec-
tive that is clearly at odds with the generative notion of an autonomous language faculty (cf. 
Cook and Newson 1996: 30-1). The neurons firing synchronously in response to some experi-
ence code a host of disintegrated, multimodal pieces of information including visual stimuli, 
motor activity, somatic reactions evaluating the experience, and also words/constructions as-
sociated with that experience (Damasio and Damasio 1992: 83). In contrast to the traditional 
view (expressed most prominently in Fodor 1983), linguistic items are not held to be stored in 
distinct neuro-anatomical sites, but to be represented in a similarly disintegrated fashion to the 
objects and events they denote. The convergence zones that index certain experiences thus 
record linguistic information alongside the temporally related non-verbal information. In light 
of these findings, the assumption of a modular architecture of the linguistic system is as prob-
lematic as the notion of some isolated language faculty itself; linguistic knowledge is rather to 
be seen as part of general cognition. 
Chomsky is, of course, aware of the fact that generative theories as they presently stand 
do not readily translate into the modern neuroscientific models. However, he unflinchingly 
regards this theoretical divide as "a problem for biology and the brain sciences, which, as cur-
rently understood, do not provide any basis for what appears to be fairly well established con-
clusions about language" (1995: 2). I do not think that it is a problem for biology to explain 
the nature of the syntactic and intersystemic discreteness postulated by contemporary genera-
tive models; since these models are far from being "well-established" because they have to 
rely on opportunistic analyses and controversial intratheoretical premises, the question may 
more reasonably be put if there is any compelling reason to believe that they are still on the 
right track themselves. 
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8.1.2 Construction-independent linking rules — a way out for intersystemic discrete-
ness? 
Before dismissing the paradigm of intersystemic discreteness completely, we must examine a 
device that has only been touched on so far, but that serves as a loophole for discrete gram-
matical models: the notion of 'interface rules'. Interface rules (also commonly known as 'cor-
respondence' or 'linking' rules) have been integrated into the modular architecture of genera-
tive grammar in order to relate independent, parallel representational levels with one another. 
Jackendoff, for instance, has designed semantics and syntax as two autonomous and funda-
mentally different generative systems, and is at pains to "evacuate all semantic content from 
syntactic structure" (2002: 124). At the same time, however, he posits an interface that estab-
lishes the necessary correspondences between certain aspects of the two representational tiers 
(Jackendoff 2002: 124). Thus, while each system contains essentially domain-specific primi-
tives and rules, there are "bi-domainspecific" interface processors that can read information 
contained in two separate systems (2002: 220). This bi-domainspecificity of the interfaces is 
strictly limited in scope, though, and does not neutralise the fundamental autonomy of syntax 
and semantics. Interface rules only establish correspondences between narrowly circum-
scribed aspects of two representational formats, yet are blind to many other details: "An inter-
face module communicates between two levels of encoding, say L1 and L2, by carrying out a 
partial translation of information in L1 form into information in L2 form" (Jackendoff 1997: 
42; see also Jackendoff 2002: 123).  
Few generative grammarians are prepared to work on such a grand theoretical scale as 
Jackendoff. In most syntactic studies, the discussion about the interface linking syntax and 
semantics boils down to a more limited, albeit central question: to what extent is the syntactic 
behaviour of lexical items in a sentence determined by their semantic properties (Kaufmann 
1995: 377; Pinker 1989: 62; Tenny 1994: 1-2)? The interaction between syntax and semantics 
is typically characterised in the form of rules describing regular correspondences between 
thematic roles and syntactic positions. Syntacticians attempt to construct so-called 'argument 
structure representations' of verbs, which only code the grammatically relevant aspects of 
their meaning such as the number and nature of the arguments they require (Pustejovsky 
1995: 63; Tenny 1994: 7). These representations must then "interface in some manner with 
semantic representations on the one hand, and with syntax on the other hand" (Tenny 1994: 
8). 
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(167b) contains an example of an argument-structure representation for the verb put, with 
(167a) and (167c) providing the corresponding semantic and syntactic structures, respectively 
(adapted from Carrier and Randall 1993: 122). 
(167) a. CAUSE (x, [INC BE ( y, [PLACE-c AT  [z] ])]) 
 
 
 b.              x                (y,                 z) 
 
  c.               [NP Sue]   put [NP the books] [PP into crates]. 
 
The semantic formula in (167a) roughly reads as follows: 'An entity x causes an entity y to 
begin to be at the place denoted by z'. In the related argument-structure representation (167b), 
put is defined as requiring the three arguments the semantics refer to, namely x, y and z. The 
diacritics in the representation indicate how the arguments wind up in the syntax: the argu-
ment x, which is placed outside the brackets (the 'external argument', i.e. external to the VP), 
will be linked to the syntactic subject position and be realised by an NP; the argument y, which 
is inside the brackets and underlined (the 'internal direct argument', i.e. internal to the VP and 
not introduced by a preposition), will materialise as the direct object and also be realised by 
an NP; finally, the argument z, which is inside the brackets but not underlined (the 'internal 
indirect argument'), will be mapped onto a prepositional object position and be introduced by 
a locative preposition (Carrier and Randall 1993: 122-3). As is typical of such analyses, all 
three representational formats rely heavily on discrete notions that are held to be specific to 
the respective level, e.g. 'CAUSE' in the semantics, 'external argument' in the argument struc-
ture and 'subject NP' in the syntax.112 Verbs with identical argument-structure representations 
can be put into coherent classes because they show similar syntactic behaviour (in our exam-
ple, this would include verbs such as place, lay or throw). Semantic differences that do not 
have syntactic reflexes are invisible to the linking rules: "The conceptual structure is pared 
down to the necessary meaning of the verb; and only the necessary meaning that is relevant to 
syntax at that" (Tenny 1994: 186).  
The use of linking rules is not exclusive to generative grammar. In fact, the monostratal, 
non-derivational model of Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG) has primarily been developed 
                                                 
112 This is another example where formalist and descriptive grammars can be seen to be much closer to each 
other than is usually assumed: descriptive grammars also make a distinction between the semantic and syntactic 
levels of representation (e.g. Allerton 1982: 41-2; Radden 1989: 422-3). While semantic relationships are charac-
terised by thematic roles such as AGENT and PATIENT, syntactic relationships are identified by functions such 
as 'subject' and 'direct object'. Descriptive grammarians are anxious to point out that there is no one-to-one corre-
spondence between syntactic function and semantic role, as becomes immediately evident when one compares 
active and passive versions of a sentence: John [AGENT/subject] killed the dog vs. The dog [PATIENT/subject] 
was killed by John.  
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to capture correspondences between the semantics and syntax of sentences (Goldberg 1995: 
113). LFG is a constraint-satisfaction theory that works with a parallel correspondence archi-
tecture (Bresnan 2001: 3-4): the a(rgument)-structure characterises the participants required 
by the predicate in an eventuality (and is thus similar to the subcategorisation frames of 
valency grammar); the f(unctional)-structure models the syntactic relations obtaining within 
the sentence, and the c(ategorial)-structure describes the overt expression of syntactic func-
tions in a specific language (Bresnan 2001: 19-22). The way elements of one structure map 
onto elements of another structure is explicated by general principles formulated as con-
straints. It is outside of my remit to provide a detailed account of the constraints operative in 
LFG, so an illustrative example with the verb put must suffice. Moreover, I will restrict my-
self to the correspondences between a-structure and f-structure.  
The a-structure representation of a sentence such as Sue put the books into crates con-
tains the predicate (PRED) put, which requires the three thematic roles AGENT, THEME and 
LOCATIVE (168a). Thematic roles are assigned the abstract, constraining features [± r] (se-
mantically restricted/unrestricted113) and [± o] (objective/non-objective) (Bresnan 2001: 308) 
on the basis of their position within a proposed thematic hierarchy and on the basis of intrinsic 
semantic properties (168b). THEME roles are intrinsically [-r] and AGENT roles are [-o] 
(Bresnan 2001: 308). The highest thematic role on the semantic hierarchy is assigned a [-r] 
feature by default; since the three roles relevant here are arranged in the order AGENT > 
THEME > LOCATIVE (Bresnan 2001: 307), the AGENT argument receives the [-r] feature. 
The [-r] feature is thus by default given to the AGENT as the highest thematic role, but is also 
inherently assigned to the THEME role. When there are two roles with the [-r] feature, the 
highest thematic role classified [-o], the AGENT in our sentence, is mapped onto the subject 
position in f-structure (Bresnan 2001: 311). The THEME role, which has the feature [-r; +o], 
then maps onto the (semantically unrestricted) object position, while the LOCATIVE role 
carrying the features [+r; -o] winds up in the (semantically restricted) oblique (prepositional) 
position (168c) (Bresnan 2001: 311). 
                                                 
113 Thematic roles are unrestricted if they can be realized by the syntactic functions 'subject' or 'object', which 
can code a large variety of thematic roles. Semantically restricted roles, on the other hand, must be coded by 
rather specific syntactic functions. 
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(168) a. a-structure: put <AGENT,  THEME,  LOCATIVE> 
 
 
 b. constraints:   [-r; -o] [-r; +o] [+r; -o] 
 
 
  c. f-structure:        [PRED   SUBJ   OBJ     OBL]               
Formalist grammarians claim that linking rules such as those illustrated in (167) or constraints 
like those sketched in (168) can capture construction-independent relations between the dis-
crete representational formats of syntax and semantics (Carrier and Randall 1993: 119-20; 
Levin and Rapoport 1988: 275; Pinker 1989: 94-5). There is, however, a flaw in this reason-
ing, which will become manifest from the following discussion. 
8.1.3 Symbolic relations as construction-specific linking rules 
It is commonly claimed in linking accounts that the complement structure of a verb is predict-
able from the verb's lexical semantics and general correspondence rules. But the same verb 
frequently appears in quantitatively and/or qualitatively different complement configurations. 
It must then be assumed that we are dealing with different verb senses or verbal sememes, 
which are created by lexical rules that systematically relate the meaning of one sememe to 
that of another (cf. 169 a, b): "A lexical rule associates one kind of lexical entry with another; 
it can be seen as taking one lexical entry as input and producing a second as output" (Pinker 
1989: 72). As a result, an additional verb sense must be posited for each new complement 
structure a verb occurs in (Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1991: 146; Pinker 1989: 63). 
(169)   
      a. John whistled/John whistled down the street.  b. Mary smiled/Mary smiled her thanks. 
        whistle1    whistle2     smile1           smile2 
       lexical rules 
Levin and Rapoport have submitted a theory of how lexical rules might create extended 
senses of a verb. In a process they call "lexical subordination" (1988: 280), the basic sense of 
a verb is subordinated under a new semantic component. The meanings of whistle and smile 
in the syntactic configurations John whistled and Mary smiled are changed to those assumed 
in the configurations John whistled down the street and Mary smiled her thanks by the lexical 
subordination rules sketched in (170) (adapted from Levin and Rapoport 1988: 283 and Levin 
and Rappaport-Hovav 1991: 138). 
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(170) a.  whistle2: 'move WHILE emitting the characteristic sound of the basic meaning  
                       whistle1' 
  b.  smile2: 'express something BY performing the activity of the basic meaning  
                       smile1' 
When a verb manifests an extended meaning, it will take on the syntactic behaviour associ-
ated with the semantics of that additional meaning (Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1991: 138-
9). In our examples, the basic sememes of whistle and smile are both related to intransitive 
syntactic constructions, while the extended sememe of smile is associated with a transitive 
pattern and the extended meaning of whistle with a prepositional-object construction. 
The same overall flavour recurs in every account of lexical rules, although there are sub-
stantial differences in detail. To give one more example of a semantic correspondence rule, 
this time couched in the lexical decomposition framework of Role and Reference Grammar: 
the basic meaning of the verb run as exhibited in the construction John ran is given in (171a); 
the participant x is involved in the activity (expressed by the formal semantic expression do') 
of running. The extended meaning of run, which is assumed to underlie the pattern John ran 
to the store, is derived by adding the operators CAUSE and BECOME to the basic meaning 
(171b); x is involved in the activity of running, which causes this entity to change its location 
(cf. Van Valin 1990: 228-30; 2001: 210-1). 
(171) a.  run1: do' (x. [run' (x)]) 
  b.  run2: do' (x. [run' (x)]) CAUSE [BECOME at the store' (x)] 
Syntax-semantics interfaces and lexical rules seem to be an ingenious means to uphold the 
idea of intersystemic discreteness, but the form of argumentation provided by such linking 
accounts is circular. The reason for assuming that there are different senses of verbs such as 
whistle, smile or run is that they can appear in diverse syntactic configurations. The differ-
ences in complementation patterns are then ascribed to the postulated underlying verbal se-
memes. This is where the circularity arises: these verb senses, which are deduced from sur-
face distributional data, are now taken to explain exactly these distributional data. It is 
claimed that a verb has different verbal sememes because it is encountered in different syntac-
tic configurations, and that we find distinct syntactic configurations because there are distinct 
verbal sememes (cf. Goldberg 1995: 11).  
Clearly such a form of reasoning has little to recommend it. It is important to realise that 
what is considered the meaning of a sememe is "contextual meaning[.]" because it cannot be 
described independently of the context it appears in, i.e. independently of the specific argu-
ment-structure configuration we are examining (Schneider 1988c: 158). What is more, these 
contextual meanings are "the only real manifestations of the semantic level of a language in a 
text" (Schneider 1988c: 158). Instead of assuming linguistic constructs such as lexical rules 
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and extended verb meanings, it is thus more empirically adequate to claim that the number 
and form of syntactic complements is not determined by the meaning of some postulated ver-
bal sememe, but by the surface syntactic construction the verb and its complements appear in.  
Apart from circularity, there are other problems that detract from the usefulness of link-
ing rules, such as the need to posit improbable verb senses. Is it, for instance, really feasible to 
assume that the lexicon contains separate entries for 'whistle' and 'move while whistling', 
'smile' and 'express by smiling' or 'run' and 'change one's location by running'? We can dis-
pense with such implausible conclusions if we accept that it is not the verb alone that is re-
sponsible for the semantics of a syntactic structure, but the integration of the verbal meaning 
into some constructional meaning: "Thus it is possible to recognize that to a large extent, verb 
meaning remains constant across constructions; differences in the meaning of full expressions 
are in large part attributable directly to the different constructions involved" (Goldberg 1995: 
19; see also Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear). The movement component in the semantics 
of the sentence John whistled down the street need then not be attributed to a special sememe 
of the verb whistle, but to a syntactic construction that is also instantiated by sentences such 
as John [walked/danced/skipped etc.] down the street. 
The lexical-rule approach also loses much of its raison d'être if we consider that it is next 
to impossible to define a clear number of verbal meanings. On the basis of different thematic 
roles, Levin and Rappaport-Hovav distinguish, for example, between the basic meaning of 
bake as a "change of state verb" (as in bake the potatoes), and its extended sense as a verb of 
"creation" (as in bake a cake), which is derived by the lexical subordination rule "create by 
means of change of state bake" (1991: 138). But there does not seem to be a natural point at 
which we could stop splitting verb meanings and postulating additional lexical rules: "Theo-
retically the number of sememes of a word is infinite" because "in several occurrences of a 
word its meaning is always slightly different" (Schneider 1988a: 159). This implies that we 
would need an interface or linking rule for every observed construction in the language. This 
reductio ad absurdum is, I think, the appropriate starting point for the alternative account of-
fered by Construction grammar.  
Construction grammar dismisses cross-constructional linking rules and constraints such 
as those proposed in generative grammar or LFG, and, for that matter, lexical rules creating 
extended verb senses. The only 'linking rules' that are assumed to exist are those establishing 
correspondences between the form and meaning of specific constructions. These are nothing 
else than the symbolic relations which, in componential grammars, are held to obtain only in 
non-complex lexical items (Jackendoff 2002: 131). In contrast to the paradigm of intersys-
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temic discreteness, syntactic and semantic structures do not exist independently, but make up 
an inseparable symbolic whole (Linz 2002: 146). Similarly, there are no general correspon-
dence rules that operate across a large number of different constructions, but only symbolic 
relations internal to a specific construction: 
Figure 2: Symbolic relations within a syntactic construction 
 
 
 
 
       
          
          
        
 
 
 
 
 (adapted from Croft 2001: 176) 
There is a symbolic relation between the syntactic and semantic structure of the whole con-
struction as well as symbolic relations between elements of the syntactic structure and ele-
ments of the semantic structure (Croft 2001: 21; Langacker 1987: 76-7). Again, it is necessary 
to emphasise that while constructions consist of smaller symbolic units, the whole has an in-
dependent claim to reality: "Despite its internal complexity, a unit constitutes for the speaker 
a 'prepackaged' assembly; because he has no need to reflect on how to put it together, he can 
manipulate it with ease as a unitary entity" (Langacker 1987: 57). Constructions are complex 
form-meaning units and thus Saussurean signs like more substantial lexical items. In contrast 
to the discrete approaches criticised in part I, the RESULTATIVE, DEPICTIVE, and QUALIFYING 
patterns will be treated as separate constructions on account of their different semantics even 
though they are syntactically similar. 
Since our approach is based on the premise that the linguistic system is made up of lexi-
cal items of varying internal complexity, which are organised in an associative network, we 
are compelled to re-evaluate syntactic relations familiar from constituency and dependency 
grammars. In a strictly constructional system, the only syntactic relations necessary are the 
part-whole relations between syntactic elements and the roles they occupy within a construc-
tion (Croft 2001: 5). Syntactic configurations such as 'subject of', 'dependent on' or 'sister to' 
do not have any theoretical status within such a framework because they are not thought to 
constitute cross-constructionally valid relations (Croft 2001: 54). As with all discrete notions, 
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it is not possible to come up with clear and empirically adequate definitions of dependency or 
constituency relations because they always depend on the tests a particular theory has chosen 
to use (Croft 2001: 179). It has become clear from the discussion in part I that each of the four 
constituency analyses for secondary-predicate constructions is based largely on theoretical 
assumptions and not on established fact, so none of them is empirically superior to the others 
— unless we are prepared to work opportunistically, of course. Yet there is virtue in avoiding 
the discrete syntactic theories that are currently in use "because the endless circle of syntactic 
theories witnessed in the last century is a consequence of the futile search for the mirage of 
the 'right' universal template or set of universal categories, relations, and syntactic structures" 
(Croft 2001: 61; see also Langacker 1987: v).  
I follow Croft in using capitalised names such as SUBJECT and DIRECT OBJECT if I simply 
want to refer to constructional roles (Croft 2001: 51), and will restrict the lower case terms 
'subject' and 'direct object' to discussions of syntactic analyses working within the paradigm of 
linguistic discreteness. Although SUBJECT and OBJECT "could be named 'Rosencrantz' and 
'Guildenstern'" (Croft 2001: 54) as well, it is mnemonically more convenient to stick to the 
traditional terms but to use them as proper names identifying certain roles in a specific con-
struction. 
Construction grammar thus departs radically from mainstream syntactic analyses. Overt 
syntactic features that are usually assumed to be signs of underlying syntactic relations are 
systematically reinterpreted in such a non-discrete framework. Since this line of research is 
still in its infancy and the possibility that some purely syntactic relations will have to be ad-
mitted at the end of the day (as is vehemently argued for by Jackendoff 2002: 428), I must 
restrict myself to a few tentative remarks on case forms and linear order. Both phenomena 
could be claimed to be not syntactic in nature, but to reveal symbolic relations between syn-
tactic elements and the corresponding semantic elements (Croft 2001: 176). Case is a formal 
device that serves to distinguish symbolic units by differentiating, for example, between two 
participants that are typically involved in the semantics of a specific construction. The seman-
tic relations obtaining between the elements of a construction can likewise be highlighted by a 
relatively fixed linear word order (Croft 2001: 240). In this view, case and linear order are not 
indicative of syntactic relations, but are formal devices that guide the hearer to identify a spe-
cific construction and to understand the symbolic and semantic relations coded by that con-
struction (Croft 2001: 234). As I will hopefully be able to demonstrate in the following chap-
ters, "symbolic relations are where what is interesting about grammar takes place" (Croft 
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2001: 203), not syntactic relations and primitives such as 'predicative complement', 'small 
clause', 'complex predicate' or 'symmetric c-command'. 
8.2 A critique of epistemological discreteness 
8.2.1 The cognitive criticism of objectivist semantics 
Formalist grammars implement the notion of linguistic discreteness by stipulating separate 
representational formats such as syntax and semantics and by ascribing to each of these for-
mats distinct linguistic primitives and rules. There is another manifestation of the discreteness 
paradigm, which is more philosophical in nature but has far-reaching repercussions on the 
analysis of language phenomena nevertheless; I will call it 'epistemological discreteness'. 
The central idea behind this form of discreteness is that linguistic expressions have an 
'extension' in the sense that they directly refer to an ontology or "things in the world" (Cann 
1993: 1). In logical parlance, linguistic expressions can be interpreted with respect to a 
'model', i.e. a representation of some state of affairs in the world; a 'denotation assignment 
function' is thought to be able to rigidly associate linguistic expressions with their extensions 
in the ontology of the model (Cann 1993: 39). A linguistic statement can then be assessed as 
either true or false, depending on whether it corresponds to the state-of-affairs represented in 
the respective model on a particular occasion or not (Cann 1993: 15; Saeed 1997: 82). The 
tradition of objectivist, truth-conditional semantics thus holds that linguistic items directly 
refer to things, properties and events in the outside world. Objectivist or referential semantics 
reifies language by making it independent of its human users; all that has to be figured out is 
the denotational relation between independently existing linguistic labels and aspects of the 
external world. Space does not allow me to go into the many philosophical and linguistic 
paradoxes created by this position (see, e.g., Jackendoff 2002: 294-303; Lakoff 1987: 294-6); 
intuitively, however, the claim that words such as beautiful, to love or happiness directly refer 
to something that is objectively present in the 'real' world seems to be pushing common-sense 
plausibility to an unacceptable degree. 
If we want to dismiss the idea that the world, the human beings that live in it as well as 
language are discrete entities which are related in objective ways, we arrive by necessity at 
the conclusion of cognitive linguistics which insists on "pushing 'the world' down into the 
mind of the language user ..., right along with language" (Jackendoff 2002: 303). This con-
ceptual or constructivist approach holds that human beings actively construct their reality and 
impose meaning on it, and that language is one of the central mechanisms that helps human 
beings to make their environment meaningful to themselves (Jackendoff 2002: 308; Lakoff 
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1987: 296; Lee 2001: 77; Linz 2002: 143-4): "Meaning is something that the human brain 
attributes to the world. Things outside the brain do not have meaning in themselves" (Turner 
1991: 30). This Kantian insight is increasingly accepted by neuroscientists as well, who real-
ise  
daß den physiochemischen Umweltereignissen, die auf die sensorischen Epithelien auftreffen, 
als solchen keinerlei objektive Bedeutung für das Nervensystem zukommt ... Bedeutungen von 
Signalen werden erst durch das Gehirn konstituiert. In diesem Sinne ist das Gehirn kein infor-
mationsaufnehmendes, sondern ein informationsschaffendes System. (Roth 1991: 361) 
I do not want to advocate linguistic relativism, however. Although there are undoubtedly in-
terindividual differences in the conceptualisations of reality, these differences are limited in 
extent because human beings possess the same basic conceptual structures (Lakoff 1987: 268) 
and constantly have to adjust their conceptualisations of reality to those of others in commu-
nication (Jackendoff 2002: 332). 
It is fairly easy to conceptualise concrete objects on the basis of perceptual discontinui-
ties: "from the point of view of 'everyday' confrontation with the physical world, it is quite 
reasonable to say that there is a general human tendency to regard certain relatively constant 
and discrete 'Gestalten' made up of ('spatiotemporally contiguous' ...) properties, as 'things'" 
(Lyons 1966: 213). It is much less straightforward, however, to individuate events, i.e. occur-
rences in our experience, because events are not spatially isolated like objects; what is more, 
they are not even temporally isolated because they are part of a complex network of occur-
rences (Croft 1991: 261). The isolation of a non-linguistic, external event and the association 
of a linguistic construction with that event therefore requires a great amount of conceptual 
work (Croft 1991: 261). The individuation of objects and complex situations does not differ in 
kind, but in the degree of sometimes arbitrary mental constructions that are necessary for their 
respective conceptualisations. To isolate an event from the network of occurrences in the 
world, it is unavoidable to make generalisations, simplifications, and to impose a certain per-
spective on the event. Lakoff calls these cognitive constructs which structure experience in a 
conventionalised way "idealised cognitive models" (ICM) (1987: 68).  
Human beings do not just carve out any occurrence from their experience and shape it 
into a discrete event or ICM, but preferably conceptualise those event types that are somehow 
"essential to human experience" (Goldberg 1995: 39) or that represent conceptual "arche-
types" (Langacker 1991: 294). Goldberg, Casenhiser and Sethuraman (to appear) have been 
able to show that the earliest constructions children acquire designate basic patterns of experi-
ence. Linguistic constructions like those examined in this dissertation can thus be expected to 
code such cognitively privileged scenes, which are relevant to our everyday experience or 
reasoning and which help to actively make sense of our environment. Once such significant 
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events have been isolated and paired with a linguistic construction, they can be used as the 
basis for less prototypical event types (Croft 1991: 273; Goldberg 1995: 43; Langacker 1991: 
295). 
It is the task of linguistic research to reveal the meaning constructions that lie behind 
language data because "visible language is only the tip of the iceberg of invisible meaning 
construction that goes on as we think and talk" (Fauconnier 1997: 1). Language is an invalu-
able source of data when we want to gain a deeper understanding of the complex conceptual 
principles and mechanisms operative in our cognitive system (Fauconnier 1997: 2-4) because 
it "serves the semiological function of allowing conceptualizations to be symbolized by means 
of sounds and gestures" (Langacker 1999b: 14). The examination of the conceptualisations 
that underlie the RESULTATIVE, DEPICTIVE and QUALIFYING Constructions will be a modest 
contribution to this enterprise. 
8.2.2 Comparing constructions on functional maps 
Pivotal to the understanding of a syntactic construction is the nature of the symbolic link 
which relates its form and meaning, i.e. the question of how semantic relations are reflected in 
syntactic structure. Prototypically this link is iconic because, as has been suggested above, 
word order can aid the hearer in identifying a particular construction and the semantic rela-
tions underlying it. Despite the great variety of word-order rules across languages, syntactic 
structures are most frequently direct representations of semantic structures (Croft 2001: 236; 
Langacker 1987: 361; Lee 2001: 77). Of the constructions discussed in this book, the syntax 
of the RESULTATIVE Construction comes closest to directly reflecting the structure of experi-
ence. Care must be taken, however, not to stretch the notion of iconicity too far, because we 
are only talking about the relation between syntax and the semantic structure of an experience 
as conceptualised by our minds, not about some sort of homomorphism between language and 
reality as described by natural scientists. 
It is one of the defining characteristics of language that it may not only provide an iconic 
or near-iconic mapping of experience, but that it can also be conducive to viewing the same 
experience from different perspectives or to highlighting various aspects of that experience 
(Croft 2001: 236; Goldberg 1995: 43; Langacker 1987: 39-40); this is, for example, one of the 
main functions of the DEPICTIVE Construction. Differences in information structure are sys-
tematic deviations from form-meaning congruities that allow speakers to impose that structure 
on a scene which is best adapted to their specific communicative purposes. Language is there-
fore not a device that merely encodes pre-existing cognitive concepts, but is one of the central 
tools helping to create and organise these concepts in the first place: "Conceptually, there are 
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countless ways of construing a given event ... Linguistically, a variety of grammatical devices 
... [is] usually available as alternate ways of coding a given conception" (Langacker 1991: 
294). The active function language performs in construing experience becomes even more 
evident when we turn from the encoding of experiences in the external world to the conceptu-
alisation of mental reasoning processes. Mental construals, as we will see from the analysis of 
the QUALIFYING Construction, are frequently not dependent on an external model but are cre-
ated and structured by the instruments of the cognitive system itself. 
When the same experience can be construed in different ways, it does not make sense to 
deal with a specific syntactic construction in isolation. The semantic and pragmatic functions 
of a construction cannot exhaustively be described without taking into account the alternative 
conceptualisations provided by other constructions in the language. For a systematic compari-
son of the functions of related constructions, I will draw on the method employed in linguistic 
typology to map out functionally similar constructions on what is called a "conceptual space" 
there (Croft 2001: 8), and what I, more modestly, will name a 'functional map' because I am 
only looking at functional variation in English and not at conceptual universals. Syntactic 
constructions mark out areas on a functional map which can either be discrete or overlapping 
(Croft 2001: 92-4). As may be expected from the associative network model of the neurosci-
ences, functional maps are multidimensional because the same construction can contrast with 
several sets of constructions along several functional dimensions.  
It is a matter of general agreement in cognitive linguistics that constructions differing in 
form never express the same conceptualisation of experience, i.e. that they must define dis-
tinct regions on a functional map. This premise is known under various names, such as the 
"Principle of Contrast" (Croft 2001: 111), or the "Principle of No Synonymy" (Goldberg 
1995: 67), but the form of argumentation behind it is basically the same: when there are two 
lexical items (words or constructions) in a language that conceptualise the same entity or 
event, language users will invariably attribute some sort of semantic or pragmatic difference 
to them. The Principle of Contrast is a corollary of the "Principle of Maximized Expressive 
Power" (Goldberg 1995: 68): distinct linguistic forms tend to be reserved for the expression of 
semantic and pragmatic differences in order to increase the communicative power of the lan-
guage. 
To conclude, Construction grammar does not describe syntactic and semantic building-
blocks of a language plus the respective rules of combination. Instead, it examines the syntax 
and semantics of individual constructions and compares their specific functions in conceptual-
ising experience to those performed by semantically related constructions. Since the concep-
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tual explanation of a construction and its comparison to related constructions is a large-scale 
undertaking, I will devote most space to the RESULTATIVE and QUALIFYING Constructions, 
and restrict myself to a rather terse discussion of the DEPICTIVE Construction. 
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9. A force-dynamic account of the Resultative Construction 
9.1 Introducing the model of force dynamics 
The RESULTATIVE Construction (RC) is made up of four syntactic components: a SUBJECT NP, 
a VERB, an OBJECT NP, and a RESULTATIVE XP (172a). As a rule, the resultative phrase is real-
ised by an AP (or, less frequently, a PP) when it expresses a property that holds of the OBJECT 
(172b, b'), but by an NP when it denotes a function or name attributed to the OBJECT (172c, 
c').114 
(172) a.   [[SUBJECT NP] [VERB] [OBJECT NP] [RESULTATIVE XP]]. 
 b.   [[John]  [painted]  [the door]  [red]]. 
  b'.  [[John]  [stabbed]  [Bob]  [to death]]. 
 c.   [[The members]  [appointed] [Mary]  [director]]. 
 c'.  [[The parents]  [named]  [their child]  [Peter]]. 
To come away with a deeper understanding of the RC, it is necessary to reveal the semantic 
relations underlying and tying together these four syntactic components. Loosely speaking, 
sentences instantiating the RC express the state that holds of the OBJECT-entity as a result of 
the action denoted by the verb (173). 
(173) a.  John washed his shirt white. 
 b.  Mary pushed the door open. 
  c.  The potter baked the clay hard.         (from Jackendoff 1990a: 226) 
 d.  The machinist filed his chisels sharp.         (from Jackendoff 1990a: 226) 
 e.  The gardener sprinkled the shoots wet.                            (from Randall 1983: 81) 
  f.  John blew his hair dry. 
  g.  Mary combed her hair smooth. 
  h.  Bob sliced the cheese thin. 
Discrete grammars do not usually provide a coherent semantic analysis of the RC and are, as 
we have seen, content to describe the putative syntactic relations obtaining between the con-
structional elements, such as the valency relation between the main verb and its arguments 
and the status of the resultative XP as a complement or adjunct. Since non-discrete grammars 
dispense with syntactic relations, they must look for the 'glue' holding together the elements 
of the RC in the semantics. 
There are several approaches in modern linguistics which bring a focus to bear on the 
meaning of sentences instead of their syntax. To mention just one prominent representative of 
sentential semantics: event or situation semantics seeks to categorise sentences into distinct 
classes of events such as activities or states, and to closely explain the semantic structure of 
                                                 
114 This categorial distribution holds almost exceptionless; cases in which a property is expressed by a (pre-
modified) NP such as Mary painted the barn a pale shade of green are few and far between, and I know of no 
instances where a function or name could be realised by an AP. 
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these events (Pustejovsky 1995: 67-75; Saeed 1997: 107-8). This approach usually operates 
within the framework of formal or objectivist semantics (cf. 8.3), and is based on the assump-
tion "that there are nonlinguistic things in the world corresponding to ... linguistic items ...: 
there are, in the world, events, processes, and states" (Parsons 1990: 20). A particular sen-
tence thus refers to an exemplar of some event type in the world. The idea of describing the 
meaning of sentences in terms of non-linguistic events goes back as far as Aristotle and has 
been revived in the philosophical and linguistic literature since the 1960s (Parsons 1990: 34).  
Rothstein has recently submitted a semantic analysis of the RC within an event-based 
framework, using the resultative sentence Mary painted the house red as an example (174) 
(2000: 253-4).  
(174) ∃e [∃e1 ∃e2 [e = S(e1     e2) ∧ PAINT(e1) ∧ Ag(e1) = MARY ∧ Th(e1) = THE HOUSE ∧ 
   RED(e2) ∧ Arg1(e2) = THE HOUSE ∧ PART-OF(cul(e1),e2) ∧ PAST(e)]  
                             (from Rothstein 2000: 254) 
Although Rothstein's semantic representation bristles with imposing symbols, the gist of it is 
actually quite easy to understand. At the risk of being long-winded, we can work through the 
above formula step by step. The event expressed by the sentence Mary painted the house red 
consists of two subevents e1 and e2, which are combined by a summing operation (S) to yield 
the complex event e. The summing operation is conditioned by the PART-OF operator, which 
guarantees that the two events are not simply added together, but that they overlap, with the 
culmination point of e1 becoming part of e2. Both the subevents and the complex event are 
expressed by variables that are existentially quantified to make clear that the event type de-
noted by the sentence is instantiated by one specific, temporally and spatially bounded exem-
plar (cf. Parsons 1990: 23). PAINT and RED are the respective predicates of the two 
subevents, and they denote sets of 'painting' and 'be red' events. The predicates combine with 
a certain number of individuals participating in the respective events; those participants are 
assigned thematic roles illustrating the nature of their participation, such as AGENT (Ag), 
THEME (Th), or simply ARGUMENT (Arg). The conjuncts that add the thematic roles to the 
formula make it possible to define subsets of the set of events denoted by the verbs (cf. Roth-
stein 1998: 2), in this case the subset of painting events that have Mary as AGENT and the 
house as THEME, and the subset of 'be red'-events that have the house as ARGUMENT. The 
operator PAST at the end of the formula indicates that the sentence is true when the state of 
affairs expressed by it held true at some previous point in time (cf. Parsons 1990: 27-8). In 
plain, but stilted English, the logical translation of the resultative sentence Mary painted the 
house red conveys the following meaning: 'There was a particular event, which consisted of 
an event of Mary painting the house and an event of the house being red; the culmination of 
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the event of Mary painting the house was part of the event of the house being red, i.e. the 
house was red at the culmination of the painting event' (cf. Rothstein 2000: 254).  
While Rothstein's analysis directly engages the meaning relations behind the RC and not 
just its syntax, it does not, in my judgement, furnish a satisfactory answer to the semantic sub-
tleties and intricacies of resultative sentences. The meaning of the RC is formulated within a 
semantic framework that does not show any systematic connections with the syntactic form of 
the sentence and relies on unexplicated semantic primitives such as AGENT, THEME, and 
PART-OF. In particular, there is no necessary connection between Mary and the house, i.e. 
the fact that the house is changed by Mary's volitional action is only introduced via thematic 
roles; similarly, no necessary connection exists between the predicate paint and the predicate 
red, i.e. the fact that the house is red as a result of the action of painting is merely imposed on 
the semantics by the primitive PART-OF relation. The acceptance of such primitives could 
lead to the abandonment of the otherwise fruitful hypothesis that the semantics of a construc-
tion is a symbolic reflection of its syntactic form, i.e. that syntax and semantics are not two 
discrete systems that could each be described in its own terms, but form an interrelated sym-
bolic whole. An intersystemically non-discrete approach would therefore not consign the in-
terpretation of a sentence to some formal metalanguage, but attempt to reveal the symbolic 
relations holding between the syntactic and semantic components of the sentence in a concep-
tually plausible fashion (cf. figure 2 in 8.1.3).  
I propose that the conceptual model underlying the RC is best described by the notion of 
'force dynamics', which has been introduced into the linguistic literature by Talmy (1976) and 
expanded upon by Croft (1991: 162-3). Force dynamics is "one of the preeminent conceptual 
organizing categories in language" (Talmy 1988: 96), and expresses human beings' conceptu-
alisation of causality as "individuals acting on individuals, with some notion of transmission 
of force determining which participant is 'first' in the causal order or causal chain" (Croft 
1991: 162). The notion of force dynamics, which is widely used by cognitive linguists (e.g. 
Langacker 1999b: 46) and has been successfully applied to a variety of linguistic phenomena 
such as modal meaning (Talmy 1988), can be effectively used to elucidate the semantic rela-
tions behind the RC as well. 
A force-dynamic event contains two participants, with one (the 'initiator') acting on the 
other (the 'endpoint'). Drawing on Talmy (1976), Croft develops a system of causation types 
modelled on the notion of force dynamics (1991: 167). In this system, four causation types 
can be differentiated on the basis of the status of the participants as physical or mental entities 
(table 9). 
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Table 9: Classification of force-dynamic causation types 
Initiator Endpoint Causation Type 
physical physical physical 
mental physical volitional 
physical mental affective 
mental mental inducive 
                                      (from Croft 1991: 167) 
In a physical causation type, a non-sentient entity acts on another non-sentient entity (e.g. 
175a), while in a volitional causation event, a mental entity affects a physical entity (e.g. 
175b). An affective causation type is the reverse of volitional causation because it refers to 
events in which a physical entity acts on a mental entity (e.g. 175c). Finally, an inducive event 
describes a situation in which a mental participant acts on another mental participant (e.g. 
175d). It is important to note that force-dynamic relations do not describe real-world physical 
and psychological events, but pertain to commonsense notions of physical or psychological 
occurrences in our experience (Talmy 1988: 91-5). 
(175) a.  The ball hit the window. 
  b.  John kicked the ball. 
  d.  The buildings captured John's attention. 
  e.  John persuaded Mary to stay. 
The causation type relevant to the RC is volitional causation: in (172b), the mental entity John 
exercises his will to act on the physical entity the door. In (172b', c), both the initiators and 
the endpoints are sentient entities, but the endpoints do not act as volitional participants in the 
events: when John stabs Bob to death or the members appoint Mary director, Bob and Mary 
are simply acted upon by the SUBJECTs' actions and do not initiate any action of their own. In 
a similar vein, a sentence such as John kicked Bob (for 175b) would still constitute an instance 
of volitional causation.115 Volitional causal chains can also be circular when the initiator is 
identical to the endpoint, i.e. when the first participant acts on himself or herself (176a, a') (cf. 
Croft 1991: 172), and they can be parallel when one initiator acts on two endpoints (176b) or 
two initiators act on one endpoint (176b') (cf. Croft 1991: 174). 
(176) a.   John painted himself red. 
  a'.  Mary appointed herself director. 
                                                 
115 The idea that certain objects belong to two taxonomic classes has been formalised by Pustejovsky's 'dotted 
types' (1995: 93). This notion may be illustrated with the example of a book, which can be both a physical object 
(That book is heavy!) and an information-bearing object (That book is interesting!), a double nature that is indi-
cated by the following representation: [physical object ● information object]. Similarly, human beings are both 
volitional and physical entities and can therefore be represented as dot objects as well: [volitional object ● 
physical object] (see also Jackendoff 2002: 374). 
A FORCE-DYNAMIC ACCOUNT OF THE RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
 
181
  b.   John stabbed Mary and Bob to death. 
  b'.  John and Mary appointed Bob director. 
All of these sentences express a single resultative event that is abstracted from the network of 
occurrences in our experience. Note that the RC can only code one causally linked event: the 
action denoted by the VERB must directly cause the change of state of the OBJECT, i.e. "causa-
tion must be direct; no intervening time in a causal sequence is possible" (Goldberg 1991: 82). 
In other words, the RC John scrubbed the pots shiny cannot mean that John was involved in 
the activity of scrubbing the pots, but that the pots became shiny only after some intermediary 
time interval, or even that they became shiny only because Mary scrubbed them again after-
wards (cf. Croft 1991: 160; Goldberg 1991: 81-2; Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear). Two 
events that are causally or temporally unrelated must be expressed in two separate clauses: 
John scrubbed the pots, and they became shiny after a few hours; John scrubbed the pots, and 
after Mary scrubbed them again, they became shiny. 
To arrive at an empirically reliable and conceptually convincing non-discrete description 
of the RC, it is necessary to examine which lexical items can be associated with the four roles 
of this construction. In the sections that follow, I will do this groundwork by elaborating on 
each of these conditions in relatively full detail. The various constraints on the roles of the RC 
should not be seen as a random assortment of isolated facts, but as systematically deriving 
from the force-dynamic semantics underlying the whole construction.  
9.2  Constraints on the constructional slots of the Resultative Construction 
9.2.1  The VERB-slot 
We can begin by looking at the semantic classes of verbs that are tolerated or, conversely, not 
tolerated by the VERB-slot of the RC. One restriction that has frequently been noted is that the 
verb must not be stative (177a, b) (Demonte 1987: 3; Rothstein 2000: 260-1; Wechsler 1997: 
308). 
(177) a.  *John loved Mary crazy.              (from Rothstein 2000: 261) 
  b.  *John lives with his parents poor. 
Verbs appearing in the RC must be able to express an activity, because only activities can be 
interpreted as transmitting some kind of force from the SUBJECT to the OBJECT. Stative verbs, 
on the other hand, are restricted to constructions that express a homogeneous relation between 
two entities; a relation is homogeneous when it holds constant at all subparts of a certain in-
terval. The hallmark of the RC, however, is that there is a dynamic relation between a SUB-
JECT and an OBJECT, in the sense that the OBJECT is changed by the SUBJECT's activity. Proto-
typically stative verbs such as love and live are primarily associated with constructions that 
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have "no a priori causal directionality" (Croft 1991: 219), and where the SUBJECT may there-
fore not be regarded as inducing some sort of change affecting the OBJECT. 
Similarly, perception verbs cannot usually be associated with the VERB-slot of the RC 
(178a, b) (cf. Goldberg 1995: 181; Rothstein 2000: 261). 
(178) a.  *John noticed Mary upset.             (from Rothstein 2000: 261) 
  b.  *He watched the TV broken.               (from Goldberg 1995: 67) 
In contrast to situations expressed by stative verbs, the relation between John and Mary or 
between He and the TV is not necessarily homogeneous. Nevertheless, perception verbs such 
as see, watch, taste or notice do not normally express transmission of force, but a relation be-
tween an experiencer and a stimulus. John in (178a) cannot be seen as initiating an activity 
that could change Mary's mental state; rather, he simply reacts to the stimulus Mary in an 
event that does not have any duration to speak of. In (178b), the duration of the TV-watching 
event is more extended, but it is not the case that the SUBJECT He is the initiator of this event 
and the OBJECT the TV the passive endpoint. Constructions including perception verbs actu-
ally express "a two-way causal relation" because "the experiencer must direct his or her atten-
tion to the stimulus, and then the stimulus (or some property of it) causes the experiencer to 
be (or enter into) a certain mental state" (Croft 1991: 219).  
Not all mental verbs are automatically barred from the RC, though. When the verb has a 
dynamic meaning component, it may well be associated with the VERB-slot of the RC (179a, 
b).  
(179) a.  John frightened Mary to death. 
  b.  Medusa stared the hero into stone. (ROS: 20)           (from Simpson 1983: 154, fn. 6) 
In contrast to the sentences Mary feared John and Medusa saw the hero, which express two-
way causal relations, the SUBJECTS of (179) can be interpreted as having more control over 
the respective event than the OBJECTS, and the OBJECTS can be understood as going through a 
change of state as a result of the SUBJECTS' (mental) actions.  
What is of paramount importance, then, is that the elements occupying the VERB-role in 
the RC are "dynamic, i.e. require a continual input of energy if they are not to come to an 
end" (Comrie 1976: 13). There are few complications to this picture, though, because dy-
namic verbs do not constitute a uniform class. The most common verb typologies distinguish 
between at least two aspectual categories of dynamic verbs: while activities (or imperfective 
verbs), which are ongoing in time, denote undelimited events, accomplishments (or perfective 
verbs), which have a definite duration and an inherent endpoint, express delimited events (cf. 
Comrie 1976: 13; Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 52; Parsons 1990: 183; Tenny 1994: 4-5). 
Activities can thus be "protracted indefinitely or broken off at any point", whereas accom-
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plishments "have a terminal point" when the situation "automatically terminates" (Comrie 
1976: 44). There are a number of tests that are sensitive to the distinction between activities 
and accomplishments: the atelic durational phrase for x time normally occurs with activities 
(180a), but not with accomplishments (180a'), while the telic durational phrase or frame ad-
verbial in x time is more at home with accomplishments (180b) than with activities (180b') 
(Mittwoch 1982: 115; Pustejovsky 1991: 61-2). Frame adverbials are felicitous with accom-
plishments because they measure the interval between the duration part and the culmination 
part of the accomplishment; activities, however, have no culmination and can therefore only 
be modified by an atelic durational. Similarly, when the adverb almost modifies an activity, 
we interpret the sentence to mean that the activity has not even started (180c); when it modi-
fies an accomplishment, on the other hand, an ambiguity arises because either the activity has 
not started at all, or it has started but has not reached its culmination yet (180c') (Pustejovsky 
1991: 71). Almost can thus modify either the culmination part of an accomplishment or both 
the duration and the culmination part, while an activity only has a duration part that is open to 
modification (Pustejovsky 1991: 71-2; see also Parsons 1990: 171). Lastly, while inferences 
between progressive and perfective versions of activity-sentences are valid, they are invalid 
for accomplishments (180d, d') (Parsons 1990: 169-70; Saeed 1997: 112). Activities have the 
"subinterval property" because "whenever they are true at a time interval, then they are true at 
any part of that interval" (Krifka 1998: 197): the activity John is kicking the dog therefore 
implies that John has kicked the dog during every subinterval of the kicking-event. The subin-
terval property does not hold of accomplishments, which consist of both a duration and a 
culmination component: when John is engaged in the activity of killing the dog, he has not 
killed the dog in every subinterval of this event but only at the culmination of the whole 
event. On the basis of these tests, we see that the RC clearly patterns with accomplishments, 
and not with activities (180e-e''). 
(180) a.   John kicked the dog for ten minutes. 
  a'.  ??John killed the dog for ten minutes. 
  b.   John killed the dog in ten minutes. 
  b'.  ??John kicked the dog in ten minutes. 
  c.   John almost kicked the dog. 
  c'.  John almost killed the dog. 
  d.   John was kicking the dog. ⊃ John has kicked the dog. 
  d'.  John was killing the dog ⊃ John has killed the dog. 
  e.   John painted the door red in an hour/ ??for an hour. 
  e'.  John almost painted the door red. 
  e''.  John was painting the door red ⊃ John has painted the door red. 
Several linguists dealing with the semantics of the RC maintain that only verbs expressing 
accomplishments can be used in the RC because a resultative sentence such as (181a) denotes 
a delimited event, while "[a]ctivity verbs, which are inherently atelic and therefore cannot in 
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principle code a result state ..., do not take resultative predicates" (Van Valin 1990: 255). 
Since a verb such as paint can also be used as an activity verb (181b), a number of semanti-
cists argues that paint in (181a) expresses an extended sense of the verb as an accomplishment 
and can therefore be used in the RC.  
(181) a.  John painted (accomplishment) the door red. 
  b.  John painted (activity) the door. 
The usual tenor of formalist grammarians is that every verb intrinsically belongs to one spe-
cific event type (Pustejovsky 1991: 55-6), and that there are lexical rules which systematically 
shift an activity verb into an accomplishment verb (Pustejovsky 1991: 64-5). Tenny, for in-
stance, argues that resultative phrases "make their parent verbs into change-of-state of verbs" 
(1994: 37), and Rothstein maintains that "resultative predication can force an aspectual shift 
in an activity verb producing an accomplishment" (2000: 260). The lexical rule creating an 
extended accomplishment sense for an activity verb (cf. 182a) has been formalised in various 
ways. Levin and Rapoport, for example, engineer the argument structure of the extended verb 
sense with the help of their Lexical Subordination Rule (1988: 282), which has already been 
described in 8.1.3; the representation in (182b') roughly means that John causes the door to 
become red by performing the activity expressed by paint1 (182b). A slightly different lexical 
representation of the extended sense of water in the resultative sentence The gardener wa-
tered the tulips flat has been proposed by Carrier and Randall. While the lexical structure of 
the basic activity verb water1 can be represented as (182c), meaning 'The gardener caused 
water to come to be on the tulips', the "Resultative Formation" rule creates the extended ac-
complishment sense of water2, which may be formalised as (182c') (Carrier and Randall 1993: 
125). In plain English, the meaning of water2 is "the gardener's watering the tulips caused the 
tulips to become flat" (Carrier and Randall 1993: 125). In contrast to Levin and Rapoport's 
Lexical Subordination Rule, the agent of the resultative/accomplishment sentence is thus 
thought to be not an individual, but the whole activity expressed in the basic sememe, with 
some special linking rules guaranteeing that the agent activity is only represented by the sin-
gle NP the gardener in the syntax (Carrier and Randall 1993: 129; for other formalisations of 
the activity/accomplishment contrast, see Guéron and Hoekstra 1995: 99-101 and Randall 
1983: 85-6). 
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(182) a.   paint1 (activity) ⇒ paint2 (accomplishment) 
  b.   paint1: [John 'paint' the door]  
  b'.  paint2: [John CAUSE [the door BECOME (AT) red] BY paint1]. 
  c.   water1: CAUSE ([the gardener], [INC BE (WATER [PLACE-c AT [P ON the  
      tulips]])]) 
  c'.  water2: CAUSE ([water1], [INC BE (the tulips, [PLACE-a AT [flat]])]) 
An important consequence of lexical rules changing an activity verb into an accomplishment 
verb is that the argument structure of the verb is also changed: while an activity verb is biva-
lent, requiring a subject and a direct object, an accomplishment verb is trivalent, subcategoris-
ing for a resultative phrase in addition to the subject and object arguments. The activity verbs 
paint1 and water1 take only two arguments, yet the accomplishments paint2 and water2 require 
the additional resultative arguments red and flat, respectively. Along the same lines, Simpson 
contends that the sentence John hammered the metal contains the bivalent activity sememe of 
the verb (183a), while John hammered the metal flat is an instance of the trivalent accom-
plishment sememe (183a') (1983: 148-9).  
(183) a.  hammer1: <hammerer (Subject), thing hammered (Object)> 
  a'.  hammer2: <hammerer (Subject), thing hammered (Object), result (Xcomp)> 
                 (from Simpson 1983: 148-9) 
The lexical-rule approach, which is used by grammarians to defend the idea that the sentence 
is built up from the verb, is fraught with difficulties (cf. 8.1.3). It is, as we have seen, a circu-
lar approach because the only basis for ascribing different senses and valencies to verbs is 
their appearance in different syntactic contexts. In a non-discrete framework, it is not neces-
sary that "the verb in isolation" (Wechsler 1997: 308) can be established as an activity or an 
accomplishment. As some grammarians have pointed out, the distinction between aspectual 
verb classes does not depend on the verb alone, but on the whole verb phrase (Comrie 1976: 
45-6; Parsons 1990: 38-9). A Construction-grammar framework goes even further and claims 
that the meaning of a verb such as paint can be kept constant across different syntactic envi-
ronments, and that the activity or accomplishment semantics of sentences such as (181a, b) 
must be attributed to the meaning of the respective constructions. Since an RC always denotes 
an event in which one entity is changed through the force transmitted by that entity, its mean-
ing is necessarily that of an accomplishment. By the same token, non-discrete syntax does not 
distinguish between valencies of verbs in isolation. The SUBJECT, OBJECT, and RESULTATIVE 
phrases are not arguments of the verb, but are, like the verb itself, roles within the RC.116 
                                                 
116 In an alternative approach that retains argument structures for verbs, the argument structure of a resultative 
sentence "is determined by the composite effects of the verb and the construction"; in a particular sentence, the 
arguments of the construction and the arguments of the verb get fused (Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear). A 
more radical constructional approach does not work with independent argument structures for verbs, but that 
does not mean that the concept of valency must be relinquished altogether. Without a doubt, constructional roles 
differ as to whether they are referential and denote a participant in the event, or predicative and express a relation 
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The need for constructions is also accepted by a generative grammarian like Jackendoff, 
who criticises the lexical-rule approach that posits additional accomplishment sememes for 
intransitive activity verbs: "To say this is in the lexicon in the sense 'stored in long-term 
memory' makes the otiose claim that every appropriate verb carries around yet another argu-
ment structure frame" (2002: 176). Rather, he asserts that "the lexicon contains an idiomatic 
resultative construction" that is "a lexical item in its own right that undergoes free combina-
tion with verbs" (2002: 176). By rejecting syntactic and semantic discreteness with respect to 
resultative sentences, Jackendoff comes very close to a Construction-grammar account. There 
is a point where his account parts company with the analysis of resultative sentences proposed 
here, though: Jackendoff works in an intersystemically discrete framework because he pre-
supposes separate levels for syntactic and semantic representations. Syntax and semantics do 
not form an interrelated functional whole in his framework, but are treated as separate systems 
that are only partially related by interface rules (cf. 8.1.2). (184a) presents his and Goldberg's 
syntactic representation of the RESULTATIVE Construction, which consists of a subject, a verb, 
a postverbal NP and an AP. When we take the sentence The gardener watered the plants flat as 
an example, the semantic representation in (184b) reads as follows: there is an event in which 
an entity X ('the gardener') causes the event of an entity Y ('the plants') to come to be in a cer-
tain state Z ('flat'). This causative event is modified by a means event: the event of the gar-
dener's watering the plants is the means by which the main event (the gardener's causing the 
plants to become wet) comes about. To simplify greatly, Jackendoff and Goldberg's semantic 
structure conveys the sense that the gardener caused the plants to become wet by watering 
them. In order to bring together the syntax and the semantics of the resultative construction, 
Goldberg and Jackendoff suggest correspondence rules, which relate some elements in the 
syntactic representation with some elements in the semantic representation (these relations are 
shown by indices on the respective elements) (to appear). 
(184) a.  Syntax:  NP1 V NP2 AP3 
  b.  Semantics:  X1 CAUSE [Y2 BECOME Z3] 
    MEANS: [verbal subevent]  
                                         (from Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear) 
Goldberg and Jackendoff's semantic representation is much more complex than the syntax of 
resultative sentences suggests because it consists of a main event (the "constructional 
subevent") and a modifying means event (the "verbal subevent"). Only a loose fit can be 
                                                                                                                                                        
between participants. It would lead us too far afield to describe the concept of valency in ways that are palatable 
to Construction grammar here. A good reassessment of the notions 'predicate' and 'valency' from a cognitive 
point of view, which also allows for gradience and prototypicality, has been provided by Langacker, for instance 
(1987: 277-327). 
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found between syntax and semantics in (184): the main verb in the syntactic representation is 
demoted to a position in the modifying verbal subevent, and the predicate of the main con-
structional subevent is the abstract operator CAUSE. There are also many elements in the 
semantic structure that do not have a counterpart in the syntax, such as the operators CAUSE, 
BECOME and MEANS. Goldberg and Jackendoff's semantic representation consorts ill with 
a strictly functional approach because it does not seem to describe the semantics of the resul-
tative sentence The gardener watered the plants wet, but rather the semantic relations behind 
the paraphrase The gardener caused the plants to become wet by watering them, which 
Jackendoff and Goldberg argue to underlie the resultative sentence. Although the jury is still 
out on the issue of intersystemic discreteness, functional grammars consider it more adequate 
to treat syntactic and semantic elements as symbolic units, and they therefore neither allow 
the high degree of non-isomorphism between syntax and semantics evident in (184), nor the 
use of abstract operators. The extralinguistic model of force transmission is a way of achiev-
ing a maximally close fit between syntax and semantics. The controversy over intersystemic 
discreteness vs. non-discreteness aside, both Goldberg and Jackendoff's and my account share 
the view that it is not the verb in isolation, but the whole construction that is responsible for 
the resultative semantics. What is necessary is that the verb can denote transmission of force, 
not that it is an accomplishment in isolation. 
Not every dynamic verb that can express transmission of force is compatible with the 
RC, though. There is a clearly circumscribed aspectual class of dynamic verbs in English that 
cannot fill the VERB-slot of the RC. In (185a), John was involved in the activity of drinking 
his coffee, and the event was finished when the coffee was completely consumed. The verb 
drink, however, is not licit in an RC such as (185a'), meaning that John drank his coffee until 
it got cold. Similarly, in (185b) Mary was engaged in the activity of building a house, which 
terminated when the house was complete; again, build is incompatible with the RC (185b') 
and cannot be used in a sentence conveying the sense that Mary built a house until it was big.  
(185) a.   John drank his coffee. 
  a'.  !John drank his coffee cold. 
  b.   Mary built a house. 
  b'.  *Mary built a house big. (ROS: 88) 
The entities filling the OBJECT-slots in the construction illustrated by sentences (185a) and 
(185b) measure out the events referred to by the verbs drink and build by providing a scale 
along which the event progresses over time until the endpoint of the scale has been reached 
(Tenny 1994: 94-5). For verbs of consumption (e.g. drink or eat) this is the point when the 
referent of the OBJECT has been completely consumed; for verbs of creation (e.g. build or 
draw), it is the point when the referent of the OBJECT has been completed. For verbs of per-
A FORCE-DYNAMIC ACCOUNT OF THE RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
 
188
formance such as sing (an aria) or play (a game of chess), to mention another related seman-
tic verb class, the terminal point is reached when the entity in the OBJECT-slot has been com-
pletely 'passed through' (Tenny 1994: 17-8). The construction instantiated by sentences such 
as John ate an apple and Mary built a house can be called INCREMENTAL-THEME Construction 
because "increments of the house or the apple, as they are created or consumed, correspond to 
the temporal progress of the event. Moreover, there is a final increment which marks the tem-
poral end of the event" (Tenny 1994: 15). In other words, material increments of the entities 
in the OBJECT-slot are associated with temporal increments of the activities denoted by the 
verbs up to a final increment of the entity that corresponds to the temporal end of the event 
(Krifka 1998: 213; Tenny 1994: 18).  
Caution must again be taken to associate the incremental-accomplishment meaning not 
with the verbs in isolation, but with the semantics of the INCREMENTAL-THEME Construction 
as a whole. It is an important characteristic of this construction that the OBJECT-slot must be 
filled by quantified NPs such as an apple or two houses because only quantified NPs are spa-
tially bounded and therefore possess a final increment. Since verbs such as eat, build or read 
may also be found in constructions that express undelimited activities such as John likes eat-
ing ice cream, Mary builds houses as a profession or John is reading in the garden (Mittwoch 
1982: 114; Tenny 1994: 44), it cannot be the verbs in isolation that inherently express incre-
mental accomplishments, but the combination of the verb and the construction it appears in. 
When paint and eat are both found in activity and accomplishment constructions, the 
question automatically arises why the canonical accomplishment construction for paint is the 
RC, while the typical accomplishment construction for eat is the INCREMENTAL-THEME Con-
struction. The association between a lexical item and a constructional role is based on the de-
gree of semantic compatibility between the lexical item and the construction. Verbs such as 
build (a house) or eat (an apple) have traditionally been said to take 'effected objects' which 
are created or consumed during the event (Schopf 1976: 29), while verbs such as paint (the 
door) or wipe (the table) take 'affected objects', which are only changed with respect to some 
specific property during the event. The force denoted by paint and wipe only changes a par-
ticular aspect of the entity in the OBJECT-slot, while the force expressed by eat and build 'goes 
through' the entity in the OBJECT-slot as a whole, consuming or creating it by increments in 
the process. While verbs that can be associated with the RC must be able to express a force 
that can change the property of an entity, with the new instantiation of the property being 
named by the RESULTATIVE phrase (186a, a'), verbs that can be associated with the INCRE-
MENTAL-THEME Construction need to denote a force that can pass through increments of an 
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entity. Verb particles such as up or through are a close analogue of the RESULTATIVE phrase 
in the INCREMENTAL-THEME Construction because they underscore the fact that the end of the 
scale denoted by the entity in the OBJECT-slot has been reached at the end of the event (186b, 
b') (Green 1973: 272; Kilby 1984: 103; Tenny 1994: 36-7). Alternatively, the final increment 
can also be explicitly mentioned in a prepositional phrase (186c, c') (Tenny 1994: 74). 
(186) a.   The farmer ground the corn fine. 
  a'.  Mary pounded the pancake flat. 
  b.   John ate the apple up. 
  b'.  Mary read through the magazine. 
  c.   John ate the apple to the core. 
  c'.  Mary read the magazine to the final page. 
Overall, then, verbs that can fill the VERB-slot in the RC are not usually found in the VERB-
slot of the INCREMENTAL-THEME Construction and vice versa. Only verbs that can direct the 
force they express onto a specific property of an entity are compatible with the RC, while 
verbs that target an entity as a whole, thereby incrementally creating, consuming or passing 
through it, are commensurate with the INCREMENTAL-THEME Construction.117 
One final constraint on the activity expressed by the verb needs mentioning. In addition 
to activity and accomplishment verbs, event grammarians also distinguish so-called achieve-
ment verbs. Achievement verbs do not have any internal temporal structure and may therefore 
be described as accomplishments without the duration component, i.e. the change of state 
expressed by them happens instantaneously (187a) (Parsons 1990: 24; Tenny 1994: 5). 
Achievements are consequently not felicitous with the progressive aspect and can be modified 
by point adverbials (187b, b') (Parsons 1990: 35-6; Pustejovsky 1991: 50). Let me stress again 
that it is not the verb by itself that is responsible for the achievement semantics, but that this 
meaning rather depends on the construction the verb appears in (cf. 187c and c'). 
(187) a.  John reached the summit. 
  b.  ??John was reaching the summit. 
  b'.  John reached the summit at noon. 
  c.   Grandpa died at noon. 
  c'.  Grandpa was dying for months. 
While reach and die do not express transmission of force, achievement verbs such as break or 
explode do. Such verbs are nevertheless rare in the RC because resultative sentences typically 
code a situation where the SUBJECT acts on the OBJECT for an extended period of time before 
                                                 
117 The sentence He ate the apple whole, which Green (1970: 272) mentions as a secondary-predicate construc-
tion, is not a counter-example: whole does not denote a property that holds of the apple at the end of the eating-
event, but merely underscores the fact that the apple has been completely consumed. It is therefore functionally 
similar to the particle up (cf. He ate the apple up). The sentence Sue read the magazine to tatters is slightly more 
complicated to explain, but can be handled by the notion 'dot object' (cf. footnote 115). A magazine is both an 
information-bearing entity and a material object. As the former, it appears in the INCREMENTAL-THEME Con-
struction (Sue read through the magazine), but as the latter, it can be found in the RC (Sue read the magazine to 
tatters). 
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a property of the OBJECT is changed, while break and explode denote instantaneous changes. 
(188a, b) may nevertheless be regarded as unprototypical instances of the RC. 
(188) a.  John broke the window to pieces. 
  b.  ?The soldier exploded the bomb to pieces. 
Taking stock: verbs that can be associated with the RC must have a dynamic meaning com-
ponent, and not denote a homogeneous, stative relation between two entities; the dynamic 
meaning component must be able to express the asymmetry that inheres in the notion of 
transmission of force, and not denote a two-way causal relation; the verb's activity should last 
through an extended period of time so that the SUBJECT's extended activity may be construed 
as changing the OBJECT after some time; last but not least, the force expressed by the verb 
must be directed onto a specific property of an entity in the OBJECT-slot, and not 'pass 
through' increments of the entity as a whole. Verbs that are prototypically associated with the 
RC such as wipe or paint consequently express dynamic, asymmetrical activities that can last 
for an extended period of time and target a specific aspect of an entity.  
9.2.2  The SUBJECT and OBJECT-slots 
The property expressed by the RESULTATIVE phrase can only refer to the entity in the OBJECT-
slot (189a), but not to that in the SUBJECT-slot (189b). Neither is there a corresponding intran-
sitive RC in which the changed property might apply to the SUBJECT in the absence of a com-
peting OBJECT-entity (189c). 
(189) a.  The waitress wiped all the tables clean. 
  b.  *The waitress wiped all the tables to exhaustion. 
  c.  *At his wedding, he smiled sore.             (from Goldberg 1995: 181) 
Syntactically discrete accounts have argued that resultative sentences are subject to what 
Levin and Rappaport-Hovav have dubbed the "Direct Object Restriction" (DOR) (1995: 34). 
According to the DOR, a typical resultative sentence constitutes an "object-oriented transi-
tive-based pattern" (Rappaport-Hovav and Levin 2001: 767), and may therefore not contain a 
resultative predicate that is subject-oriented as in (189b); since the DOR requires a resultative 
phrase to be predicated of a direct object, resultative sentences may not be realised by intran-
sitive-based patterns such as (189c), either (cf. also Aarts 1995: 84-5; Simpson 1983: 144-5; 
Staudinger 1997: 79; Tenny 1994: 58). While the DOR is a purely syntactic explanation of the 
restrictions evident in (189) because it asserts that "the NP which a result XP can be predicated 
of is determined solely by its grammatical function — direct object — and not in terms of its 
semantic role" (Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 2001: 769), other grammarians couch the restric-
tion in semantic terms and speak of, for instance, an "Affected Theme Restriction" (Wechsler 
1997: 308). This modification is more cosmetic than substantial, however, because neither the 
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DOR nor the Affected Theme Restriction is derived from any more general principles and 
must therefore be introduced as a primitive syntactic or semantic constraint on the RC. Simp-
son, for instance, hypothesises that the requirement that the resultative phrase must refer to 
the direct object is a "language-particular restriction" because there does not seem to be any 
general reason prohibiting sentences such as (189b, c); in fact, she argues, these sentences are 
not semantically anomalous because they could be rephrased with until-clauses (1983: 144): 
The waitress wiped all the tables until she was exhausted and At his wedding, he smiled until 
he was sore. 
The model of force dynamics that is proposed to underlie the semantics of the RC pro-
vides a straightforward explanation for the constraint that only the entity in the OBJECT-slot, 
but not that in the SUBJECT-slot, can be changed by a resultative event. Transmission of force 
is an asymmetric relation, with one entity, the initiator, acting on another entity, the endpoint 
(Croft 1991: 173). The order of the syntactic components mirrors the order of the entities in 
the force-dynamic semantic event because the SUBJECT must be placed before the OBJECT in 
syntax. Figure 3 illustrates how the syntactic components of the RC are aligned according to 
the force-dynamic semantic relations behind them (symbolic relations are indicated by the 
double arrows): the SUBJECT-slot codes the initiator or force transmitter of the resultative 
event; the VERB-slot contains a dynamic verb expressing the force transmitted from the initia-
tor (dependent on the restrictions detailed in 9.2.1), and the OBJECT-slot hosts the endpoint or 
force recipient, i.e. the entity that serves as the target of the transmitted force and is changed 
by it. 
Figure 3: Model of force dynamics underlying the typical RESULTATIVE Construction 
 
  SUBJECT    VERB    OBJECT         RESULT XP 
 
 
 
 
The RC is an instance of volitional causation (cf. 9.1) because the initiator is typically a voli-
tional, i.e. human or at least animate entity that is able to translate his or her will into physical 
or mental force: "The will is the source (ultimate cause ...) of the force and therefore is clearly 
the initiator, not the endpoint" (Croft 1991: 171). The endpoint is formed by a physical entity 
that is the recipient of the transmission of energy initiated by the volitional force-transmitter. 
The asymmetry shown by the RC, where the force-transmitter must be aligned with the SUB-
JECT and the force-recipient with the OBJECT, is thus a direct reflection of our commonsense 
view of causality in which entities are not usually changed when they initiate an action, but 
direction of force transmission
Initiator Force   Endpoint Result state 
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only when they are acted upon by another entity. The DOR and the Affected Theme Restric-
tion consequently receive a more general conceptual explanation in the framework of force 
dynamics: only (189a) is compatible with the causal chain illustrated in figure 3, while the 
other two sentences would code events in which the force-transmitters direct energy onto an-
other entity (189b) or onto no entity at all (189c), and are changed themselves in the process. 
Such configurations contradict our commonsense notion of causality and are therefore not 
coded by a specific linguistic construction. Simpson's until-sentences can bring out such 
meanings, but only by using a combination of two clauses: He smiled until he was sore ex-
presses two events, the activity He smiled and the temporally subsequent categorical predica-
tion he was sore, but this complex meaning cannot be conflated into a single causal event 
structure such as that encoded by the RC. 
When undertaking to formulate a non-discrete analysis of the RC, I attempt to refrain 
from as many a priori theoretical commitments as possible, even when they concern notions 
hallowed by tradition such as 'AGENT' or 'THEME'. Rather, I intend to start with only the 
bare outlines of a semantic theory and develop my analyses in the best way possible to ac-
count for the data. Discrete grammars typically regard thematic roles as semantic primitives 
that must be listed along with the verb in the lexicon, and that are mapped in predictable ways 
onto syntactic slots in the syntactic representation of the sentence (Givòn 1993: 90; Tenny 
1994: 182). The central questions that have concerned linguists since the idea of thematic 
roles was first proposed are "(1) what thematic roles are there? and, (2) how do we tell which 
NPs have which thematic roles in a given case?" (Parsons 1990: 73). The discrete research 
programme cannot answer these two questions in a principled, theory-independent and unop-
portunistic fashion. There have been conflicting conclusions on the number of thematic roles 
that should be assumed: while Van Valin identifies just two macro-roles, ACTOR and UN-
DERGOER (1990: 226), Parsons distinguishes between six thematic roles (AGENT, 
THEME, GOAL, BENEFACTIVE, INSTRUMENT, EXPERIENCER) (1990: 73-4), and 
"each type may have finer and finer sub-types, ad infinitum" (Givòn 1993: 91). There does not 
seem to be any empirical way of defining the right level of specificity for the identification of 
thematic roles because, as with any putatively discrete entity, a sharp delimitation fails to 
emerge between them (Tenny 1994: 183). It has proved similarly impossible to agree on ques-
tion (2), the right mapping between thematic roles in the semantics and NPs in the syntax of a 
sentence, no matter if the linking rules are based on semantic features (e.g. 'the entity with the 
greatest number of AGENT-characteristics maps onto the subject') or thematic hierarchies 
(e.g. 'the highest role in the hierarchy maps onto the subject') (cf. Saeed 1997: 152-3; Tenny 
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1994: 118-9). Although there have been grand schemes such as the 'Universal Alignment Hy-
pothesis' in Relational Grammar and the 'Universal Theta Assignment Hypothesis' in GB, 
which assert that there exist general, universal principles that map thematic relationships onto 
structural relationships (cf. Tenny 1994: 117; Wechsler 1997: 312), these have been largely 
programmatic claims that are met with countless distributional mismatches. Unless a fixed set 
of primitive thematic roles along with a rigidly defined syntax-semantics interface can be es-
tablished, such hypotheses make at best speculative, and at worst blatantly false claims about 
the putative syntax-semantics interface.  
In view of these problems, the utility of thematic roles for a theory of grammar has been 
questioned, and a number of linguists have argued that such roles should be dispensed with 
altogether (cf. Tenny 1994: 183). A Construction-grammar framework offers a somewhat 
different slant on the notion 'thematic role' because it disputes that there is a rigidly definable 
number of thematic roles that have a cross-constructional claim to reality; rather, thematic 
roles do not seem to exist independently of the specific constructions that instantiate them. 
Looked at in this way, it is possible to identify the initiator of the RC as an AGENT and the 
endpoint as a PATIENT, but these semantic roles would be defined exclusively with respect to 
the RC, in the same way that the syntactic elements SUBJECT and OBJECT are defined as con-
structional roles. The AGENT of the RC has many of the features that are prototypically asso-
ciated with the discrete thematic role AGENT: it is a volitional, usually human entity that 
initiates an event by transmitting some kind of force. Similarly, the PATIENT is associated with 
many of the characteristics of the thematic role PATIENT: it is a physical entity that receives 
the force transmitted from the AGENT and undergoes a change of state as a result. In Construc-
tion grammar, these semantic features are not derived from some abstract catalogue of the-
matic-role characteristics, but are directly abstracted from the meaning of the RC. The asym-
metric semantics of the force-dynamic event also explains the alignment of the AGENT with 
the SUBJECT and of the PATIENT with the OBJECT, as well as prohibiting in a principled way 
that both participants of the RC could be AGENTS or PATIENTS. 
The RC does not refer to some causal chain in the real world, but codes the way we con-
ceive of causal relations in everyday reasoning. The asymmetry between initiator and end-
point in the model of force dynamics is part of "language-based conceptualizing", but "has no 
counterpart in physical theory" (Talmy 1988: 91). The network of causality in the physical or 
mental world is extremely complex, and cannot be reduced to single events in which one en-
tity is clearly the active initiator and another entity is clearly the passive endpoint. The RC is 
based on a form of naive physics or naive psychology and performs the vital function of cate-
A FORCE-DYNAMIC ACCOUNT OF THE RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
 
194
gorising the highly complex and confusing network of occurrences in reality into separate 
causal events (Talmy 1988: 92-3). Similarly, there is no way of objectively determining the 
right degree of specificity for the entities in the SUBJECT or OBJECT-slots: why should the 
waitress be referred to as the force transmitter who wipes the table, and not her arm, her hand, 
the cloth, the combination of cloth and water, etc.? The reason why the linguistic representa-
tion of force-dynamic events refers to basic-level concepts such as human beings as initiators, 
and basic-level objects such as the table as endpoints can be explained with the notion of 
'granularity': "The concept of levels of granularity in conceptualizing 'objective' reality allows 
one to ignore finer-level semantic details in lexical analysis when they are irrelevant to the 
conceptualization of the event" (Croft 1991: 164). The RC thus constitutes an Idealized Cog-
nitive Model in Lakoff's sense (1987: 68) because it describes an idealised causal chain with 
idealised participants, which lends itself well to everyday conceptualisation. 
The exact activities the force transmitter performs when acting on another entity are usu-
ally underspecified: in (190a), we learn that Mary performed some 'wiping'-activity, but we 
do not know if she wiped the table with a cloth, a sponge or with her hand, if she used water 
or not etc. The activity performed by John in (190b) is even more underspecified because we 
are not told if John broke the vase accidentally or on purpose, if he let it drop or kicked it with 
his foot etc. (cf. Tenny 1994: 86-7).  
(190) a.  Mary wiped the tables clean. 
  b.  John broke the vase to pieces. 
Most constructions allow some degree of elaboration on their semantics, however. Although 
the exact activities of Mary and John in the resultative events of (190) are underspecified, 
they can be detailed in an optional fifth constructional role, the INSTRUMENT-slot, which is 
placed after the RESULTATIVE phrase (191).118 Our commonsense view of the world tells us 
that Mary and John did not perform their respective activities mentally by some sort of teleki-
nesis, but that there must have been some intermediate participants such as body parts or in-
struments, which are "conceptualized as extensions of the agent's body" (Croft 1991: 170). 
The INSTRUMENT-role is placed at the end of the construction although it comes before the 
ENDPOINT in the conceptualisation of the causal chain ('Mary, using a sponge, wiped the ta-
bles clean') (cf. Croft 1991: 185). This non-iconicity between the order of the participants in 
                                                 
118 In a generative framework, Pustejovsky calls such arguments, which "participate in the logical expressions ..., 
but which are not necessarily expressed syntactically", 'default arguments' (1995: 63). In a descriptive frame-
work, Allerton likewise points to a type of argument that need not appear in the sentence as long as it is "recov-
erable from the (linguistic or situational) context" (1982: 34). Construction grammarians call this phenomenon 
"free null instantiation" (Croft 2001: 276). Free null instantiation "is not really associated with any particular 
construction", but "is simply the principle that any component of the semantic structure of a construction that is 
left unspecified ... is interpreted freely" (Croft 2001: 278). 
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the force-dynamic event and the linear order of the constructional roles can be explained by 
information structure: instruments are not usually mentioned explicitly in a resultative event 
because they carry less significance than the initiator and the endpoint and can frequently be 
inferred from the context (Talmy 1976: 94-5), but when the speaker insists on mentioning 
them, they are typically informationally salient and therefore rightly placed at the end of the 
sentence.  
(191) a.  [Mary]  [wiped]  [the tables] [clean]       [with a sponge]. 
  b.  [John]   [broke]   [the vase]    [to pieces]  [with his fist]. 
Another sort of constructional elaboration is provided when the RC is combined with the 
CAUSATIVE Construction. A causative situation can be defined as a "causal correlation be-
tween two events", one of which is the "causing event" and the other the "caused event" (Ku-
likov 2001: 886). The CAUSATIVE Construction consists of three slots: a CAUSER NP, a 
CAUSATIVE verb and the CAUSED EVENT, which is a construction in itself and can be filled by, 
for example, the RC (192a, b).  
(192) a.  [CAUSER NP]  [CAUSATIVE verb]  [CAUSED EVENT]. 
  b.  [[John]  [made]    [[Mary] [wipe] [the tables] [clean]]]. 
A CAUSATIVE Construction conveys the sense that the CAUSED EVENT would not have taken 
place if it had not been for the event initiated by the CAUSER (cf. Talmy 1976: 51). Thus, a 
causative situation consists of two force-dynamic events: the volitional-causation event of, for 
example, the RESULTATIVE Construction, and the inducive-causation event (cf. table 9) of the 
CAUSATIVE Construction (cf. Talmy 1976: 52-4). The CAUSER is typically a mental entity that 
acts on another mental entity, in this case the initiator of the RC, who in turn acts on a physi-
cal entity, the endpoint of the RC. These force-dynamic relations behind a causative situation 
are illustrated in figure 4: 
Figure 4: Model of force dynamics underlying a causative situation 
  John     made   Mary      wipe           the tables         clean. 
 
  Causer/ Initiator 1    Force 1     Endpoint 1/ Initiator 2      Force 2         Endpoint 2      result state 
 
         
   
The research on how constructions can be elaborated upon and combined with other construc-
tions is still in its infancy, and the above remarks on the INSTRUMENT-role and the merger of 
the CAUSATIVE and RESULTATIVE Constructions may serve as first tentative illustrations. In 
RESULTATIVE Construction:
volitional causation 
CAUSATIVE Construction: 
inducive causation 
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the following section, we turn to the constraints on the RESULTATIVE phrase, which have re-
mained largely intractable to discrete grammars. 
9.2.3  The RESULTATIVE-slot 
The dynamic force coded by the VERB changes the OBJECT-entity in one of its properties. To 
understand the relation between force transmission and change of property, we must briefly 
look at how ontological entities are constructed mentally. Since it would take us too far afield 
to go into complex linguistic or psychological theories on this issue, I will restrict myself to a 
few cursory remarks, mainly drawing on Kaufmann (1995) and Pustejovsky (1995). 
A mental schema of an ontological entity represents a systematic conceptualisation of the 
features of this entity, which could be formalised along the lines of Pustejovsky's qualia struc-
ture (1995: 85-104). Of the four different quales Pustejovsky differentiates, the "constitutive" 
and "formal" quales are most significant in our context because they are responsible for in-
formation on the structural attributes of an entity (1995: 85-6). The constitutive and formal 
quales define the set of property dimensions that are characteristic of a specific kind of entity; 
an important subset of these property dimensions is defining in the sense that it is "necessary 
for the conceptualization of an object" (Kaufmann 1995: 380). Defining property dimensions 
fall into three categories. Some dimensions can only be set in one particular way for a certain 
kind of entity; for the class of balls, for example, the dimension 'shape' must necessarily be set 
to the property 'round'. Other property dimensions can have more variable instantiations, but 
only a particular one for every element of the kind; some balls may be made of leather and 
others of rubber, but the setting of the property dimension 'material' is fixed for every individ-
ual member of the class of balls. The third kind of defining property dimension is of prime 
concern to our discussion. Entities are also endowed with properties that can have different 
instantiations at different points in time along a certain scale. The same ball may, for instance, 
be white at one point in time but grey at another: "The specific instantiations of the object 
defining properties ... define the constitution of the object at a specific point in time" (Kauf-
mann 1995: 381). An important consequence is that "any change affecting a specific object 
defining property may only lead to another quality (or 'instantiation') of this property" (Kauf-
mann 1995: 380). In other words, defining properties must always be displayed by an entity in 
some way, i.e. a ball cannot not be of a certain colour, for example. In addition to defining 
properties, there are also optional properties that an entity of a certain kind may or may not 
display at some point in time; such properties are optional because "if an individual object 
lacks them, no consequences follow for its specific objecthood, even though it may poten-
tially display them" (Kaufmann 1995: 386). 'Angry', for instance, is an optional property for 
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human beings because it is not associated with a specific parameter that must always be set in 
some way or other.  
The RESULTATIVE phrase encodes the new setting of a property dimension which holds 
of the OBJECT-entity at the end of the resultative event. The linear position of this phrase after 
the OBJECT iconically reflects the order of a causal event as conceptualised by language: the 
initiator acts on the endpoint by transmitting some energy onto it, and the endpoint manifests 
a new property as a result of this transmission of force. Linguists dealing with resultative sen-
tences have continuously been troubled by the "apparently idiosyncratic restrictions" condi-
tioning the properties that can be expressed by the RESULTATIVE phrase (Green 1972: 83; see 
also Rothstein 2000: 263). (193) gives an impression of these restrictions: while (193a, b, c) 
represent acceptable instances of the RESULTATIVE Construction, the properties expressed by 
the RESULTATIVE phrases in the primed examples render the respective sentences ill-formed. 
(193) a.  He painted the door red. 
  a'.  *He painted the door sticky. (ROS: 73) 
  b.  He hammered the metal flat. 
  b'.  *He hammered it beautiful. (ROS: 100)                           (from Green 1972: 84) 
  c.  John wiped the table clean. 
  c'.  *He wiped it stained. (ROS: 93)                         (from Green 1972: 84) 
These constraints have mystified syntacticians since Green first noticed them:  
Wiping objects with damp, dirty, or stain-filled rags are not unusual activities, and one expects 
the objects to become damp, dirty, or stained, respectively, as a result. Yet speakers have firm 
and clear intuitions that sentences like ... [193c'; H.S.] are ungrammatical. What do they know 
about these constructions that permits them to make these judgements without hesitation? 
(Green 1972: 89).  
Discrete grammars have approached this problem by arguing that the main verb subcatego-
rises for the resultative property as one of its arguments and therefore places selectional re-
strictions on it. As has been illustrated with respect to all four discrete approaches in part I, a 
complement/adjunct account cannot be applied to the RESULTATIVE phrase in an unopportun-
istic fashion because this element fulfils both typical adjunct criteria such as omissibility and 
categorial realisation by an AP, and typical complement criteria such as the fact that it is se-
mantically restricted and that only one resultative phrase is possible in a given sentence (cf. 
table 4 in 4.1.4).  
The complement/adjunct distinction is immaterial to a non-discrete framework because a 
"construction-grammar analysis of government and subcategorization eliminates the direc-
tionality that supports the head-dependent or even functor-argument asymmetry" (Croft 2001: 
247). The RESULTATIVE phrase is not a complement of the main verb or an adjunct in the sen-
tence, but is a role of the RESULTATIVE Construction. As a consequence, restrictions on the 
lexical items that can be associated with this role must be explained in terms of the semantics 
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of the construction as a whole. This holistic perspective allows a rather straightforward expla-
nation of the situation sketched in (193): the VERB denotes transmission of force, and it speci-
fies onto which dimension of the OBJECT-entity the energy is directed. Paint describes some 
force that is directed onto the colour dimension of a material object; hammer identifies energy 
that is targeted at the shape of an entity, and wipe denotes transmission of energy onto the 
surface of a material object, which is, among other things, characterised by a dimension speci-
fying its degree of cleanness. The RESULTATIVE phrase denotes the new instantiation of the 
property dimension after transmission of force has taken place: the door in (193a) must have 
been changed with respect to its colour dimension; sticky, however, does not describe a colour 
and can therefore not be the canonical result of the transmission of force expressed by paint, 
even if it is a common side-effect of painting. Similarly, the activity of hammering makes the 
shape of an object flat (193b); the object may well be more beautiful than before it has been 
hammered, but this aesthetic quality is not a property that belongs to the shape-dimension. 
Things are a little more complicated with (193c) because stained does denote an instantiation 
of the cleanness-dimension. Yet transmission of force is inherently directional, so the activity 
specified by wipe can only change the setting of the cleanness-dimension in one direction, in 
this case towards the 'clean'-pole. The property expressed by the RESULTATIVE phrase must 
therefore be compatible both with the property dimension that the force denoted by the verb 
applies to, and with the direction of this force. While the noun in the OBJECT-slot denotes a 
kind of entity and evokes the property-dimensions that are potentially associated with it, the 
activity expressed by the verb profiles or activates one of these dimensions by directing its 
energy onto it.119 The property denoted by the RESULTATIVE phrase must then be compatible 
with this profiled dimension of the force recipient. 
The force-dynamic semantics of the RESULTATIVE Construction, coupled with a notion of 
how ontological entities are mentally represented, helps us to achieve a systematic characteri-
sation of the semantic constraints on the RESULTATIVE phrase. We no longer need ad hoc ex-
planations of the sort that verbs that can occur in the RC must be "marked in the lexicon with 
the feature [± resultative]" (Aarts 1992: 64) or that a resultative sentence such as *Bill broke 
the vase worthless is ungrammatical because break is a "nonrepeatable point-event verb" that 
cannot have a result property (Jackendoff 1990a: 240). The sentence is unacceptable because 
                                                 
119 That verbs select for certain aspects of their objects, creating "'sense in context' phenomena" is also stressed 
by Pustejovsky within his framework of qualia structure (1995: 86-92). In the sentences Mary painted the door 
and Mary walked through the door, the verbs paint and walk activate different aspects of the qualia structure of 
the door (Pustejovsky 1995: 91). The same effect can be illustrated with the sentences "The newspapers attacked 
the President for raising taxes" and "Mary spilled coffee on the newspaper" (Pustejovsky 1995: 91-2).  
A FORCE-DYNAMIC ACCOUNT OF THE RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
 
199
break directs its force onto the material-integrity dimension of physical objects (cf. Bill broke 
the vase to pieces), and not on its value-dimension.  
The dimensional (and directional) constraint is not the whole story, however, because it 
does not rule out the following dubious or unacceptable sentences: 
(194) a.  *John shot the tiger wounded. (ROS: 100) 
  b.  ??John wiped the table a little bit clean. (ROS: 53) 
  c.  *How wet did the gardener sprinkle the tulips? (ROS: 73) 
The result property must express the upper or lower bound of the dimensional scale the 
VERB's energy has applied to, so the adjectives in the RESULT-slot do not normally refer to a 
medial position on the scale (194a), and are not typically graded or modified by an intensifier 
(194b) (Goldberg 1995: 195-6; Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear); by the same token, the 
degree of the result property is not usually asked for by how (194c). The RESULTATIVE Con-
struction thus codes a force-dynamic event in which energy is transmitted onto some dimen-
sion of an entity until the end of the dimensional scale has been reached. While the force re-
cipient provides the scale along which the force-dynamic event is measured out, the RESUL-
TATIVE phrase marks the endpoint on that scale. This end-of-scale constraint seems to be arbi-
trary at first sight, yet it is clearly motivated by the respective conceptualisations underlying 
ACTIVITY and RESULTATIVE Constructions. The activity sentence Mary was wiping the table 
implies that the table got cleaner in the course of the event, but the focus is on the manner of 
activity and not on any result state. The resultative sentence Mary wiped the table clean, on 
the other hand, profiles both the manner of the activity and its result. Since resultative sen-
tences have an accomplishment-reading because they imply that the activity stops once a re-
sult has been reached, the result property must code a canonical or prototypical end-state as 
otherwise the activity would not normally have stopped. Conceptualisations of events are 
ICMs, and constructions first and foremost reflect such idealised models in linguistic form. 
Less typical end-states are not coded by one specialised construction-type but usually require 
a combination of two clauses: John shot at the tiger, and it was wounded as a result. 
There is another restriction that has proved difficult to handle for discrete frameworks. 
The RESULTATIVE-phrase cannot be filled by either present or past participles (195) (Goldberg 
1995: 197; Green 1972: 89). 
(195) a.   *Mary pushed the door opening. (ROS: 82) 
  a'.  *Mary scrubbed the pots shining. (ROS: 83) 
  b.   *Mary pushed the door opened. (ROS: 100) 
  b'.  *Mary scrubbed the pots polished. (ROS: 100) 
Green says that she "cannot imagine the reason for this constraint ... except that it is so regular 
that surely it follows from something" (1972: 89), and Randall claims that these constraints 
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"must be idiosyncratically interpreted" (1983: 89); similarly, Carrier and Randall see them as 
another illustration of the fact that the resultative phrases must be semantically selected by 
their respective verbs (1992: 184). A look at the RESULTATIVE Construction as a whole per-
mits a revealing account of these restrictions, however. The RESULTATIVE phrase must denote 
an end-state, and states cannot be expressed by present participles. A present participle de-
scribes an event that is gradually developing and is therefore not compatible with the seman-
tics of the RESULTATIVE-phrase. If (195a) is divided up into a sequence of two events, a pre-
sent participle becomes possible: Mary pushed (on) the door, which was opening then. It is 
trickier to explain why past participles are barred from the RESULTATIVE Construction be-
cause past participles do code result states. Yet when we look more closely at the semantics 
typically associated with past participles, we see that their use in the RESULTATIVE Construc-
tion would yield an aspectual clash. A sentence such as The window was opened "expresses a 
state implying a previous event (action or process) it has resulted from" (Nedjalkov 2001: 
928). The window was open, on the other hand, "express[es] a state of an entity without im-
plying a previous event" (Nedjalkov 2001: 928). The past participle opened thus indicates a 
state that is the result of the activity denoted by the verb stem; the sentence The window was 
opened implies that the window has been a participant of an opening-event at some time in the 
past. Since the past participle inherently contains resultative semantics, (195b, b') would mean 
that the door was opened as a result of an opening-event and the pot was polished as a result 
of a polishing-event. The RESULTATIVE Construction, however, conveys the sense that the 
end-states expressed by the RESULT phrases follow from the force transmitted by the matrix 
verbs push and scrub, respectively, so the use of past participles in the RESULT-slot is actually 
redundant. 
While some property dimensions allow various settings, others only tolerate one specific 
instantiation. Although a ball must be round to be identified as a ball, a sentence such as 
(196a) is nevertheless possible because our conceptualisations of reality need not be identical 
with physical reality. The NP the ball can still be used as a reference point for the new prop-
erty because it served as the endpoint of the activity that created the new state in the first 
place. In many comparable cases, the RESULT-phrase is not realised by an AP, but by the 
preposition to plus an NP which introduces a new term for the entity that has been changed in 
one of its constitutive properties. When a city is completely burned, ice is melted or coffee 
beans are ground fine, the city, the ice and the coffee beans lose their material integrity and 
cannot felicitously be referred to as city, ice or coffee beans any longer. The to NP-RESULT 
phrases are used to introduce new denotations for these entities after they have lost their 
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physical integrity (196b-d). While adjectives in the RESULT-slot typically denote properties of 
endpoints that have been changed along parameters with variable settings, NPs introduced by 
the preposition to refer to the new kind of entity that has been created by a force-dynamic 
event which has destroyed the previous endpoint. 
(196) a.  John pounded the ball flat.  
  b.  The soldiers burned the city to cinders. 
  c.  John melted the ice to a liquid.  
  d.  John ground the coffee beans into a fine powder. 
In addition to such verbs as wipe or paint, which activate one specific dimension of the force 
recipient, the RESULTATIVE Construction also tolerates verbs that express transmission of 
force, but do not specify onto which dimension of an entity this force is directed. When a 'de-
fault resultative verb' such as make is found in the VERB-slot, the RESULTATIVE property is 
much less restricted because it can refer to almost any property dimension of the OBJECT-
entity:120 
(197) a.  Mary made the table stained. (ROS: 17) 
  b.  Bill made the metal beautiful. (ROS: 23) 
  c.  John made the wall blue. (ROS: 20) 
  d.  John made Mary angry. (ROS: 0) 
While the property stained refers to the instantiation of a defining property dimension of the 
entity the table, the properties beautiful, sticky and angry highlight optional properties of the 
entities the metal, the door and Mary, respectively. The force-transmission event changing the 
colour dimension of an object such as the door is lexicalised by paint because this change of 
state can apply to a large number of different entities that all display the defining property 
dimension 'colour'. The reason why there are no lexical verbs in the English language that 
code transmission of force onto the 'stickiness' or 'beauty'-dimensions of material objects is 
that such changes do not occur regularly and therefore do not lend themselves to a systematic 
conceptualisation; in other words, there does not seem to be a motivation for lexicalising 
verbs expressing these specific changes. If such changes are to be described linguistically, a 
default resultative verb such as make can be used, which denotes transmission of force in an 
underspecified way.121 Such verbs also come in handy when the exact manner of the force-
transmission event is not significant; a sentence such as They made Mary director leaves open 
                                                 
120 Jackendoff (p.c.) treats these verbs as 'verbal resultatives' that have the same argument structure and meaning 
as the RESULTATIVE Construction; to him, the RC is an abstraction from these verbal resultatives. Goldberg (p.c.) 
shares my view that verbs such as make are just very general instantiations of the verbal slot. She has been able 
to show that semantically light verbs such as make, go, do, put and give play a key role in children's learning the 
meaning of constructions (Goldberg, Casenhiser and Sethuraman, to appear). 
121 Some generative grammarians have concluded from this that there is no semantic relationship between a verb 
such as make and its postverbal NP and that this NP cannot therefore be its direct object (Aarts 1995: 76; Carrier 
and Randall 1993: 133-4; Wilder 1994: 222). This conclusion is unwarranted, however, because there clearly is a 
force-dynamic relationship between make and the postverbal entity. 
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the exact way in which the function of the human entity Mary has been changed (by appoint-
ing, electing, etc.). 
While make is the most frequent default resultative verb, it is not the only one in English. 
Render similarly expresses an underspecified kind of force; in contrast to make, however, it 
typically has a directional component favouring negative results (198a). Other default resulta-
tive verbs such as drive are restricted to specific collocations, in this case "negative and ex-
treme mental states" (Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear) (198b). 
(198) a.  It rendered them speechless/impotent/??alive/??free.          (from Goldberg 1995:196) 
  b.  John drove Mary crazy/bananas/*happy/*sick. 
                     (from Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear) 
The characterisation of make and render as default resultative verbs also helps to clear up a 
difficulty that has long plagued discrete treatments of these verbs. While resultative phrases 
are usually omissible (John painted the door), they are obligatory when they follow make (in 
the sense of change, not that of creation) and render: !John made the door; *John rendered 
Mary. Discrete grammars handle this divergent behaviour by claiming that paint and render 
must have radically different subcategorisation frames, with the former subcategorising for a 
direct object NP and the latter for an SC (Aarts 1995: 76). The constructional account offers 
up a new way of approaching these differences. While sentence (199a) highlights the result of 
force transmission from John towards the door, (199a') profiles the manner of force transmis-
sion. Since render does not lexicalise a manner component, it is only possible in the RESUL-
TATIVE Construction (199b), but not in a construction that focuses on the manner of an activ-
ity (199b'). This distribution touches on the more general principle that a sentence must be 
sufficiently meaningful to be acceptable. As Goldberg and Ackerman have recently shown, 
some passive sentences need an "obligatory adjunct" to make them informationally satisfying 
(199c, c'); similar remarks hold for constructions with cognate objects, which are only felici-
tous when the cognate object is modified somehow (199d, d') (2001: 799).  
(199) a.   John painted the door red. 
  a'.  John painted the door. 
  b.   John rendered Mary sad. 
  b'.  *John rendered Mary. 
  c.  This house was built in the last century. 
  c'.  ?This house was built. 
  d.   John laughed a hearty laugh. 
  d'.  ?John laughed a laugh. 
Phrases such as in the last century and hearty straddle the argument-adjunct distinction be-
cause they are semantically adjunct-like, but obligatory in (199c, d). What forces their ap-
pearance in these instances is that the respective sentences would not otherwise be informa-
tive: "It is not normally necessary to utter sentences without a focus, since all information 
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would be redundant or recoverable; thus such sentences are typically infelicitous" (Goldberg 
and Ackerman 2001: 806). By the same token, a RESULTATIVE phrase can only be 'omitted' if 
the corresponding ACTIVITY Construction is informative in its own right; this is the case with 
(199a'), but not with (199b'), which has no manner-of-activity component that could be pro-
filed in the absence of a resultative meaning. 
The restrictions on the elements of resultative sentences have hitherto been discussed in 
relative isolation from each other instead of receiving an integrated viewing. The force-
dynamic model behind the RESULTATIVE Construction brings out the interconnectedness of 
the various restrictions and thus minimises crucial reliance on idiosyncratic constraints: 
Figure 5: Force-dynamic explanation of the constraints on the slots of the RESULTATIVE Construction 
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I will conclude the discussion of the RC with a brief foray beyond prototypical instances. 
Since non-discrete grammar treats constructions as complex lexical items, constructions are 
expected to be radial/polysemous categories like words. In addition to the prototypical force-
dynamic event in which a volitional entity acts on a physical object and changes one of its 
properties as a result, there are also less typical force-dynamic events that can be accounted 
for with respect to the prototype. 
One extension from the prototypical core codes acts of social force-transmission between 
human beings. The force that is transmitted from the initiator can be regarded as a more ab-
stract social force in such instances; to effect the asymmetry inherent in force dynamics, the 
initiator must be an authority that conventionally has control over the change of state he or 
she imposes on the force recipient. We can profitably consider two specific verbs that are 
compatible with the idea of social force-transmission, declare and appoint, in some detail. In 
constructions including the performative verb declare, the initiator must be an authority 
whose utterance can cause a change of state in the endpoint (cf. Searle's discussion of illocu-
tionary speech acts (1979: 19-20)). As Borkin has shown, sentences with performative verbs 
become odd when the SUBJECT-slot is not filled by an authority: 
(200) a.  The judge declared Mary Stultz insane. 
  b.  ?Mrs Grass declared Mary Stultz insane.                   (from Borkin 1984: 81) 
Initiator Force       Endpoint 
Result state 
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RESULTATIVE Constructions including declare are typically found in a number of clearly de-
fined semantic contexts. Of the 170 instances of this construction that I extracted from the 
BNC, 47 (28%) belong to a political or administrative context, in which an executive author-
ity changes the state of another entity (201a, a'); 42 examples (25%) come from the legal area, 
in which a court changes another entity by virtue of its juridical powers (201b, b'); another 11 
sentences stem from medical contexts, where a doctor decides on the physical or mental state 
of a patient (201c). In addition, 6 sentences are from the world of sports (201d), another 6 
from religious contexts (201e), and 10 from the context of meetings and sessions (201f). 
(201) a.   1360 The Ottilia of Talabecland declares herself Empress (BNC CN1: 190). 
  a'.  The rally, which the government had declared illegal, was nonetheless attended by  
       some 6,000 at a stadium in Nairobi (BNC HKW: 265). 
  b.   Until the seventeenth century the courts would declare Acts of Parliament void if 
         they considered them contrary to natural law (BNC EVK: 187). 
  b'.  Refusing to accept defeat when his early pamphlets were legally declared 
    immoral in 1909, he continued his writing (BNC BN1: 5). 
  c.  Unlike some countries, where a person may be declared clinically dead when the 
        brain stops functioning, Indian doctors are only allowed to certify death when the 
   heart has stopped beating (BNC HH3: 13940). 
  d.  "At least the race was completed and did not have to be declared void," 
    Arkwright added (BNC CBG: 7762). 
  e.  At the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553, Theodore and all his works were 
   officially anathematised and declared heretical (EDY: 2011). 
  f.  I declare this meeting closed! (FR1: 1922). 
An NP XP-structure is not a typical complementation for speech-act verbs, but when the sen-
tences above are analysed as instances of the RESULTATIVE Construction, this structural pat-
tern can be accounted for. Declare is also associated with SPEECH-ACT Constructions — this 
is, in fact, the more prototypical association because my corpus findings include only 170 
instances with declare in the RESULTATIVE Construction, as compared to 410 sentences in 
which this verb is used in a SPEECH-ACT Construction: 
(202) Soon she declared that the sauna was suffocating; after repeating oncemore [sic!] 
   how she hated modesty, she got up and left (ABS: 1719). 
When we compare minimal pairs in which declare is followed by an NP XP-string and a that-
clause, respectively, the differences between the resultative and speech-act semantics become 
obvious (203). Discrete accounts would have to argue that these sentences contain different 
sememes of the verb declare, while a Construction-grammar framework can ascribe these 
differences directly to the respective constructions. 
(203) a.   The doctor declared that John was dead. 
  a'.  The doctor declared John dead.                               (from Green 1970: 276) 
  b.   Sam declared that Mary was insane. 
  b'.  Sam declared Mary insane.                (Borkin 1984: 57) 
When human beings instead of physical entities form the force-recipient, they are frequently 
not changed in a property, but in one of the functions that are conventionally associated with 
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them. In addition to property-dimensions, the mental construct of a human being crucially 
contains the social functions he or she performs as well (as brother, professor, tax payer, etc.). 
In a resultative event in which the VERB-slot is filled by appoint, the initiator must be an au-
thority that can assign a new function to the endpoint (204a, b). According to a BNC search, 
the new function is introduced by as in about a third of all instances (204c, d). As NPs cannot 
be used in the RESULTATIVE-slot to denote a property, but the "unity-fractioning" semantics of 
as (Schneider 1997: 38) makes it a good device to highlight one of the functions of a human 
being.122 
(204) a.  If the candidate obtains an absolute majority, he is appointed Chancellor by the 
    Federal President (BNC FA7: 1430). 
  b.  In 1552 Sir William Parr ... appointed him his provost marshal in Surrey (BNC 
     GT5: 274). 
  c.  You have recently been appointed as a salesperson for the industrial division and 
   have been asked to visit a new potential client (BNC K94: 321). 
  d.  After the great fire, he was appointed as one of the supervisors of the rebuilding of 
   the City (BNC GT4: 760). 
Although plain NPs and as NPs are often interchangeable, my corpus data reveal a slight ten-
dency for plain NPs to be used when a person is assigned a unique function (cf. 204a); as NPs, 
on the other hand, are more frequent when a person is appointed to a kind of post that many 
other people occupy as well (cf. 204c). 
Still further removed from the prototypical core of the RC are what I call 'prospective' re-
sultatives. The VERB-slot of this more peripheral RC is filled by verbs such as want, order 
and expect, which transmit a mental or volitional force on the OBJECT-entities: 
(205) a.   They want a memorial erected on the site in honour of the pilot (BNC K1V: 860). 
  a'.  Our King always wanted Buckingham dead (BNC H90: 1766). 
  b.   Even Fouché doesn't order people killed just for the hell of it (BNC B20: 89). 
  b'.  He ordered the entire city rased (BNC CM1: 1056). 
  c.   I'll expect you at the Presbytery in a few days with your donation (BNC CR6: 2816). 
There are a number of differences between the prospective RC and sentences such as John 
wants Mary to visit him: in the prospective resultative, the subject is interpreted as having 
more control over the future situation and as anticipating a closer, sometimes even physical 
experience with the object; in addition, the time-span between the wish or order and its ex-
                                                 
122 Human beings are more interested in the results of events than in their beginning. This is the reason why there 
is no INCEPTIVE Construction comparable to the RESULTATIVE Construction (Rothstein 2000: 255). Seppänen has 
been able to show, however, that social resultatives profiling the functions of persons are exceptional in this 
respect; in addition to the social RC (They appointed John chairman), there is a construction that highlights the 
loss of a function: They dismissed John as chairman; They fired him as sales manager (1998: 468). Seppänen 
calls the as-phrases in this construction 'discontinued attributes' because they "denote[.] a position or function 
which the person in question loses as part of the event depicted" (1998: 468). This pattern is rather new and 
seems to have derived from sentences such as They dismissed John from his function as chairman (Seppänen 
1998: 475, footnote 2); it obviously fills the need to have a linguistic construction corresponding to an event 
where an authority acts on a person in order to deprive that person of a function. 
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pected accomplishment is telescoped into a rather short period of time (Borkin 1973: 52-3). 
All of these characteristics can be claimed to stem from the force-dynamic semantics of the 
prototypical RC. A significant indication that we are dealing with a more marginal instance of 
the RC is that the RESULT-phrase is usually realised by a past participle in prospective resulta-
tives, something that is not possible in ordinary resultative sentences. The past participle ful-
fils an important semantic function here: while the verb only denotes the mental force that is 
directed to some unnamed intermediate agent(s) that will initiate the event, the verb stem of 
the past participle expresses the actual physical force that will have to be transmitted to the 
OBJECT-entity so that the result state (coded by the past-participle form) can be achieved. 
To conclude, constructions are like words in having a prototypical semantic core with ra-
dial extensions. Another similarity to words is that the exact meaning of a construction, or 
rather the conceptualisation behind it, can only be understood if its place within the network 
of functionally related constructions is mapped out, a task that will be undertaken in the fol-
lowing sections. 
9.3  Mapping out the functional space of resultative and related constructions 
In the typical RESULTATIVE Construction, which I will call TRANSITIVE RESULTATIVE Con-
struction (TRC) to distinguish it from other resultative patterns, the SUBJECT codes the initia-
tor, who volitionally directs his or her force onto a specific dimension of the OBJECT-entity, 
thereby changing a property of that dimension. Aside from the central TRC, there are a num-
ber of subsidiary resultative constructions and several other force-dynamic constructions 
whose conceptualisations can be compared to that of the TRC on three functional maps. The 
first functional map (9.3.1) comprises four resultative constructions that differ with respect to 
the relative prominence accorded to the initiator or the endpoint, and with respect to the inten-
tionality of the force transmission; the second functional map (9.3.2) includes force-dynamic 
constructions that code events in which the energy transmitted from the initiator does not 
change the endpoint in one of its properties, but in its location in space. The third functional 
map (9.3.3) cuts across the other two and distinguishes force-dynamic constructions on the 
basis of the relative prominence accorded to the manner of force transmission and the result of 
force transmission, respectively. 
9.3.1  Functional map I: relative prominence of initiator and endpoint 
9.3.1.1  The Passive Resultative Construction 
The first functionally related resultative construction can be dealt with fairly briefly because 
its main characteristics are familiar from traditional grammar. While (206a) shows the align-
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ment of the four constructional slots in the TRC, (206b) illustrates the order of these slots in 
the PASSIVE RESULTATIVE Construction (PRC).123 
(206) a.  [[Mary] [wiped] [the table]   [clean]]. 
  b.  [[The table] [was wiped] [clean] ([by Mary])]. 
In an ordinary force-dynamic event (206a), the relation between the initiator and the endpoint 
is built up with reference to the initiator because the initial focus is on the volitional entity 
transmitting energy, and when the focus is shifted towards the endpoint, the initiator still 
serves as the anchoring point of the relationship. The reason for the unmarked status of the 
TRC vis-à-vis the PRC seems to be the fact that the former iconically reflects our conceptuali-
sation of force-dynamic events, with energy flowing from a volitional source to a physical 
endpoint, whereas the latter violates this causal order. Langacker interprets the active/passive 
relation as a "case of figure-ground reversal" (1999b: 47). The major functional motivation 
behind the PRC is that it does not put the initiator, but the endpoint in the first constructional 
role: the initial focus of the PRC is consequently on the entity undergoing the change, and the 
force transmitter, who is conceptualised with reference to the endpoint, is relegated to an op-
tional fourth constructional slot at the end of the construction. The PRC thus reflects an event-
conceptualisation in which the initiator and the force it transmits are backgrounded, and the 
endpoint and its resultant state are profiled (figure 6) (cf. also Croft 1991: 248-9). 
Figure 6: Force-dynamic conceptualisation of the TRANSITIVE RC and the PASSIVE RC 
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123 There is no pat answer to the question whether the PRC is a primitive construction or is, as Goldberg and 
Jackendoff (to appear) suggest, "formed by composing the passive ... constructions with resultative construc-
tions" because a decision depends on the degree of mental entrenchment of the construction. A deeply en-
trenched construction could well be used as an automatic routine and need not be viewed as being composed 
from two more primitive constructions every time it is used. 
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This figure/ground reversal is linguistically effected by linear order and other grammatical 
devices: the endpoint occupies the prominent first slot in the construction, while the initiator 
is demoted to an optional final slot and is realised not by a plain NP, but a by-phrase. Since it 
is not the flow of energy from initiator to endpoint that is foregrounded, but the impact the 
energy has on the endpoint, the VERB-slot does not include an active, but a passive verb form, 
which is structurally similar to copula predications in categorical judgements, which also fo-
cus on one entity, and not on the relation between two entities (cf. The table was wiped clean 
and The table was clean). 
9.3.1.2  The Autonomous Resultative Construction 
The result property is invariably predicated of the OBJECT-entity in the TRC, and not of the 
SUBJECT-entity. As has been noted above, some discrete grammars invoke the Direct Object 
Restriction to account for these constraints, while the non-discrete approach adopted here 
points to the asymmetric force-dynamic relations coded by the resultative construction. There 
is, however, a pattern which does not contain an OBJECT-slot and in which the result property 
is predicated of the SUBJECT-entity (207). These sentences call for an explanation in discrete 
and non-discrete accounts alike because the RESULTATIVE phrase cannot normally refer to the 
SUBJECT-entity in intransitive sentences (cf. *John ran to exhaustion or *John shouted 
hoarse). 
(207) a.  The ice-cream froze solid. 
  b.  The vase broke to pieces. 
  c.  The butter melted to a liquid. 
  d. Mary blushed red. 
  e.  The door slammed shut. 
  f.  The animal bled to death. 
Discrete grammars point to the fact that it is not only with respect to the tolerance of resulta-
tive phrases that intransitive patterns do not form a unified class; there is, in fact, a whole 
bundle of semantic and syntactic properties that seems to indicate that intransitive clauses fall 
into at least two distinct categories, a phenomenon that has come to be known under the label 
'split intransitivity'. The fact that the subjects of some intransitive patterns share a number of 
characteristics with the subjects of transitive clauses, while other intransitive subjects are 
more similar to direct objects (Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1992: 247), prompted the idea 
that the subject of so-called 'unergative' intransitive verbs can be likened to the subject of 
transitive verbs, while the subject of 'unaccusative' intransitive verbs may be equated with the 
direct object of transitive verbs (figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Split intransitivity 
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A series of tests is frequently adduced to show that the subjects of unaccusative verbs do in-
deed behave similarly to the objects of transitive verbs, and not to the subjects of unergative 
and transitive verbs. To begin with, the past participle of unaccusative verbs can be used to 
premodify the subject of the clause in the same way that the past participle of transitive verbs 
can modify the direct object (208a). The past participle of unergative verbs cannot modify the 
subject, however, and the past participle of transitive verbs cannot refer to the subject either 
(208a') (Hoekstra 1988: 112; Kaufmann 1995: 402). Moreover, unergative and transitive 
verbs can be transformed into agentive –er-nominalisations, which have the same reference as 
the subject of the respective unergative or transitive clause (208b). Such nominalisations are 
not felicitous for unaccusative verbs, and they cannot have the same reference as the object of 
transitive verbs either (208b') (Kaufmann 1995: 397). Finally, the fact that resultative XPs can 
refer to the subject of unaccusative and the direct object of transitive clauses, while the sub-
jects of unergative and transitive sentences do not tolerate them (208c, c'), is also frequently 
taken as a diagnostic of split intransitivity (Bresnan 2001: 313; Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 
1992: 255). 
(208) a.   frozen ice-cream (The ice-cream froze.); a wiped table (The waitress wiped a 
        table.) 
  a'.  *a worked man (The man worked.); *a wiped waitress (The waitress wiped a 
        table.) 
  b.   a worker (The man worked.); a killer (Bob killed John.) 
  b'.  !a freezer (The ice-cream froze.); !a killer (Bob killed John.) 
  c.   The ice-cream froze solid.; The waitress wiped the table clean. 
  c'.  *John worked to exhaustion. *The waitress wiped the tables to exhaustion. 
Since discrete grammars work with cross-constructional syntactic primitives, they argue that 
the above tests identify the subject of unaccusative verbs as a direct object underlyingly, 
which has only been moved to the subject-position at S-structure, while the subject of unerga-
tive verbs, like the subject of transitive verbs, is a subject both underlyingly and at surface 
(Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1992: 247). The movement operation sketched in (209) is moti-
vated analogously to passive clauses: the sole argument of freeze is claimed to be base-
generated in the direct-object position; unlike active transitive verbs, but similar to passive 
transitive verbs, an unaccusative verb is not thought to be a Case-assigner. Hence, the NP in 
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the object-position must move to the empty subject-slot, where it can be assigned nominative 
Case (Grewendorf 2002: 64; Haegeman and Guéron 1999: 242-3; Hoekstra 1988: 112; Staud-
inger 1997: 80). 
(209)  D-structure: ∅ froze the ice-cream solid. ⇒ S-structure: The ice-creami froze ti solid. 
When the subject of unaccusative verbs is considered a direct object underlyingly, the DOR 
can be upheld; all that is necessary is that this restriction is "formulated in terms of underlying 
rather than surface objects" (Rappaport-Hovav and Levin 2001: 768). The application of the 
DOR to underlying objects has the additional advantage that it affords a unified account of 
resultative phrases in unaccusative (The pondi froze solid ti) and passive sentences (The tablei 
was wiped ti clean): the surface subjects of both passives and unaccusatives are D-structure 
objects and therefore tolerate resultative XPs (Aarts 1995: 84; Rappaport-Hovav and Levin 
2001: 768). At the same time, the DOR rules out resultative phrases related to underlying sub-
jects in transitive (*Mary wiped the tables to exhaustion) and unergative patterns (*Mary sang 
hoarse) (Aarts 1995: 85). 
From a non-discrete stance, the identification of some intransitive subjects as underlying 
direct objects is opportunistic for two reasons. Firstly, because it must rely on different levels 
of structural representation, and secondly, because it presupposes that the unaccusa-
tive/unergative criteria clearly distinguish two sets of intransitive verbs. This assumption be-
gins to encounter problems when we look at the putative criterial tests more closely, however. 
NPs premodified by past participles, -er-nominalisations and intransitive resultative construc-
tions are motivated by their own idiosyncratic semantic characteristics and do not converge to 
single out two discrete classes of intransitive verbs. Without going into particulars, I will 
show that there are a number of distributional mismatches that cast doubt on the attempt to 
define a verb as unaccusative or unergative independently of the specific construction it is 
found in. 
A past participle expresses the state that has resulted from the event denoted by the base 
verb. It can only be used prenominally if it is possible to conceive of the preceding event as 
having a salient result state that can serve to characterise the noun. The event described by 
freeze, for instance, has a visible result state that can be used to characterise the noun pond (a 
frozen pond). Activities such as run or laugh, on the other hand, do not imply result states, 
and it is therefore odd to characterise NPs with the past participles of these verbs (*a run man; 
*a laughed child) (Kaufmann 1995: 402). The "typical perfect participle that can be used at-
tributively is one that leaves a mark on something" (Bolinger 1967b: 9), and it is difficult to 
think of the mark that activities like running or laughing leave on the entities that perform 
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them. Not all verbs that are usually identified as unergatives are barred from the formation of 
prenominal past participles, though. When the activity denoted by the putative unergative 
verb is more closely specified, it can function as a prenominal past participle characterising its 
head NP (e.g. a run-away child). Similarly, not all past participles of transitive verbs make 
good nominal premodifiers: *a scratched head is odd because the activity of scratching one's 
head does not leave a mark that could be used to characterise the head (Bolinger 1967b: 9). 
The nominalisation test is also subject to distributional mismatches. A prerequisite to the 
formation of –er-nominalisations is that the referents of these nominals perform the described 
activities habitually or professionally and may therefore be identified by their activities (a 
runner; a baker) (Kaufmann 1995: 399). Putative unaccusative verbs do not allow –er-
nominalisations because it would be unusual to characterise individuals by the change of state 
they undergo; ice that melts will therefore not be described as *melter, but as melting ice 
(Kaufmann 1995: 400). However, not all verbs that are usually classified as unergatives can 
undergo –er-nominalisations. Activities that are not normally performed habitually do not 
form felicitous nominals: *laugher and *clapper are ruled out because it is difficult to con-
ceive of people who could be identified by their habitual participation in laughing or clap-
ping-events (Kaufmann 1995: 398).  
In short, verbs should not be inherently categorised as unaccusative or unergative on the 
basis of a battery of syntactic tests. What is vital is a characterisation of the cluster of distinc-
tive semantic properties that is associated with such constructions as premodified NPs and –er-
nominalisations; in the same vein, what I will call the AUTONOMOUS RESULTATIVE Construc-
tion (ARC) should not be used as a criterial test for the identification of a putatively discrete 
class of unaccusative verbs, but be characterised in its own semantic terms in order to under-
stand why the result state can exceptionally refer to the SUBJECT-entity in this construction. 
The ARC (e.g. The vase broke to pieces) profiles the state of the endpoint that results 
from the force it receives. In contrast to the PRC, the initiator is not merely backgrounded, but 
completely left out of the conceptualisation (figure 8).124  
                                                 
124 As in the PRC (The vase was broken to pieces), the force that leads to the result state is backgrounded in the 
ARC (The vase broke to pieces). If the force is to be left completely out of the conceptualisation, a premodified 
NP such as the broken vase must be used, which only focuses on the result state (cf. Croft 1991: 170). 
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Figure 8: Force-dynamic conceptualisation of the AUTONOMOUS RESULTATIVE Construction 
 
   
 
 
 
 
The ARC thus presents an event as happening to the endpoint autonomously, i.e. without be-
ing caused by a force transmitter. This construction is a decausativising device that indicates 
that something happens of its own accord, without someone being responsible for it. An ini-
tiator may be inferred, but is not part of the conceptualisation of the ARC per se. Linguistic 
constructions can impose a perspective on an event that is in marked contrast to the occur-
rences in the world, where "everything is an unbroken causal continuum" (Talmy 1988: 93). 
Autonomous events are therefore not a scientific, but a linguistic and conceptual notion 
(Talmy 1976: 47-8).125 
We can account for the fact that resultative phrases refer to the SUBJECTs of some intran-
sitive patterns, but not to those of others, by assuming different pairings of the force-dynamic 
roles with the SUBJECT-slot. In the two-participant TRC (210a), the SUBJECT codes the initia-
tor and the OBJECT the endpoint of a force-dynamic event. In the one-participant INTRANSI-
TIVE ACTIVITY Construction (210b), the SUBJECT-slot likewise hosts the initiator, but the en-
ergy flowing from it is not directed towards another participant, so there is no endpoint in this 
construction. The AUTONOMOUS RESULTATIVE Construction (210c) shares characteristics with 
both of these constructions: like the INTRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construction it only has one par-
ticipant coded as the SUBJECT. This single participant does not have an initiator role, however, 
but has the semantics of an endpoint like the OBJECT-entity in the TRC. The comparison of 
these three constructions thus clearly illustrates why 'subject' is not a cross-constructional 
primitive, but must be defined with respect to particular constructions: while it codes the force 
transmitter in (210a) and (210b), it codes the force-recipient in (210c). Since a force-dynamic 
event profiles the result state of the endpoint, a result XP can refer to the SUBJECT only in the 
ARC. 
(210) a.  TRANSITIVE RESULTATIVE Construction: The waitress wiped the table clean. 
          [SUBJECT/Initiator] [VERB] [OBJECT/Endpoint]  
  b.  INTRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construction: John laughed. 
       [SUBJECT/Initiator] [VERB]  
                                                 
125 The ARC is not the only linguistic construction that depicts events as happening autonomously. The MIDDLE 
Construction likewise codes an event in which something happens to an entity in the absence of an explicitly 
mentioned initiator: The book sells well; This sort of orange peels well. 
Force Endpoint Result state
VERB OBJECT RESULT XP 
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  c.  AUTONOMOUS RESULTATIVE Construction: The vase broke to pieces. 
       [SUBJECT/Endpoint] [VERB] 
The process denoted by a verb that can potentially be associated with the ARC must be con-
ceivable as something that does not require a volitional initiator. Activities such as run, shout, 
laugh or work cannot be conceived of as happening autonomously, but must necessarily be 
conceptualised with respect to an initiator (211a); as a consequence, typical activity verbs are 
not found in the ARC (211a'). The events expressed by verbs such as blush or freeze, on the 
other hand, are more felicitous with the autonomous interpretation coded by the ARC (211b) 
than with the TRC, which also foregrounds an initiator (211b'). In addition, there are some 
verbs that lie midway between run and blush because they denote events that may be concep-
tualised as having a force-transmitter (211c) or as happening by themselves (211c'). 
(211) a.   John was running/ laughing/ shouting/ working etc. 
  a'.  *John laughed silly./ *John shouted hoarse. 
  b.   John blushed red./ The river froze solid. 
  b'.  *John's blood blushed him red./ ?Cold temperatures froze the river solid. 
  c.   John slid the door open./ John broke the vase to pieces. 
  c'.  The door slid open./ The vase broke to pieces. 
The conventional wisdom on pairs such as those in (211c, c'), sometimes known as examples 
of the "causative/ inchoative alternation" (Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1992: 262-3), has it 
that the respective verbs possess both an intransitive and a transitive sememe. From a Con-
struction-grammar perspective, the difference does not lie in the verb, but in the two different 
constructions it can be associated with. Whether the event denoted by a verb is open to alter-
native conceptualisations as initiated by a force transmitter or as happening autonomously 
depends on the way the event is conceived of by a linguistic community. 
9.3.1.3  The Excessive Resultative Construction 
As it stands, the generalisation that sentences including typical activity verbs such as shout or 
dance do not tolerate resultative phrases is not quite correct. (212) shows that resultative XPs 
are compatible with activity verbs, but only if the sentence also contains a reflexive pronoun 
in the postverbal position. 
(212) a.  John shouted himself hoarse. 
  b.  Mary danced herself tired. 
  c.  Bob worried himself sick. 
  d.  Mary cried herself to sleep. 
  e.  The Alberta liquor laws laid down that no minors might drink, but it was not difficult 
          to obtain beer or liquor, and he had often drunk himself silly (BNC CDN: 1461). 
  f.  If the Smiths had only produced sunny, cuddly stuff like 'Heaven knows'..., they 
         would have merely presaged the perky negligibility of The Housemartins, the 
         sound that grins itself to death (BNC AB3: 209). 
Rappaport-Hovav and Levin call this the "reflexive intransitive-based pattern" and speculate 
that a sentence such as John shouted himself hoarse is acceptable because it satisfies the 
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DOR, in contradistinction to *John shouted hoarse (2001: 767). In the examples above, the 
resultative XP can be argued to be predicated of the intransitive subject indirectly, mediated by 
a reflexive pronoun as direct object (Staudinger 1997: 79-80). Following Simpson, these re-
flexives are commonly called "fake reflexives" (1983: 145) because they are not thought to be 
semantically selected by the main verbs, but to be added to the structure solely "to fulfill the 
syntactic need for the resultative phrase to be predicated of an object" (Levin and Rappaport-
Hovav 1992: 255).  
The syntactic explanation given for (212) is also applied to sentences such as those in 
(213), which contain transitive verbs that are not followed by their usual direct objects, but by 
'fake reflexives' like the intransitive verbs above (Rappaport-Hovav and Levin 2001: 794). 
The resultative phrases may again be argued to be predicated of the subject-entities via the 
reflexive pronouns. 
(213) a.  John ate himself sick. 
  b.  Mary drank herself senseless. 
In addition to the reflexive patterns, there is what Rappaport-Hovav and Levin call the "non-
subcategorized NP intransitive-based pattern" illustrated by (214), in which the DOR seems to 
be satisfied by the inclusion of a putatively non-thematic direct object (2001: 769). The direct 
objects John, their Nikes and his handkerchief are considered to be subcategorised, but not 
theta-marked by their respective intransitive matrix verbs (Staudinger 1997: 173).126 
(214) a.  The dog barked John awake. 
  b.  The joggers ran their Nikes threadbare.          (from Carrier and Randall 1992: 173) 
  c.  He sneezed his handkerchief completely soggy.  
               (from Carrier and Randall 1992: 173) 
The syntactic account of these unusual resultative patterns is informed by the idea that the 
reflexives in (212) and (213), as well as the postverbal NPs in (214), are athematic elements 
that are added to the structure in order to satisfy the DOR or some other syntactic or semantic 
principle (Simpson 1983: 146; Rothstein 2000: 242). Discrete grammars do not have much 
choice but to treat the postverbal phrases as athematic: if verbs such as dance, shout or bark 
are considered to be inherently intransitive, they cannot have a thematic direct object in some 
instances, otherwise the building block 'intransitive verb' would lose its raison d'être (cf. 
Rivière 1982: 686). Similarly, if a verb is transitive, its direct-object argument is semantically 
specified in the lexicon. Eat and drink select edible and drinkable object arguments, respec-
tively, so a reflexive direct object violates these selectional restrictions (Rivière 1982: 686).  
                                                 
126 The pattern in (214) is not accepted by everyone, but represents the judgement of "a fairly tolerant speaker" 
(Randall 1981: 101, footnote 3). The ROS values are 37 for (214a) and 10 for (214b). (214c) is only accepted by 
a small minority of speakers (ROS: 83). 
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Carrier and Randall advance three tests that they claim are sensitive to the distinction be-
tween thematic and non-thematic direct objects (1992: 188-204). While transitive resultatives 
form acceptable middles (215a), intransitive resultatives do not undergo middle formation 
(215a'). In addition, transitive, but not intransitive resultatives allow Adjectival Passive For-
mation (215b, b'), and only transitive resultatives can undergo Nominal Formation (215c, c'). 
These tests seem to buttress up the claim that the postverbal NPs in (212-214) are athematic 
arguments of their respective verbs (see also Wilder 1994: 232-3). 
(215) a.   This metal hammers flat easily. 
  a'.  *Competition Nikes run threadbare easily.        (from Carrier and Randall 1992: 191) 
  b.   the hammered-flat metal 
  b'.  *the danced-thin soles.            (from Carrier and Randall 1992: 195) 
  c.   The hammering of the metal flat is a tiresome job. 
  c'.  *The drinking of oneself sick is commonplace in one's freshman year.  
               (from Carrier and Randall 1992: 201) 
If the thematic/nonthematic direct object distinction is feasible, resultative sentences would 
indeed be subject to the purely syntactic DOR. Note that the Affected Theme Restriction 
would not be able to explain the patterns in (212-4) because the direct objects are not thought 
to be thematic arguments of the main verbs, and the subjects are clearly AGENTS, not 
THEMES. 
Rappaport-Hovav and Levin have recently distanced themselves from the DOR and sug-
gested an event-based approach to account for fake reflexives and non-thematic NPs in resul-
tative sentences. They propose that an intransitive resultative sentence describes a complex 
event that is made up of the subevent denoted by the verb and the subevent represented by the 
resultative phrase. Building on this assumption, they claim that each of the two subevents 
must be identified by an element in the syntactic structure of the sentence, in accordance with 
the "argument-per-subevent condition" (2001: 779). An intransitive resultative such as (216a) 
violates the argument-per-subevent condition because the subject Mary would be associated 
both with the matrix event and the resultative event. As a consequence, a direct-object NP 
must be inserted into the structure so that each subevent can be identified by its own argument 
in the syntax (216b, b') (2001: 780). The fake reflexive in (216b) guarantees that the two 
subevents share referentially identical participants, while the athematic NP in (216b') intro-
duces a referentially distinct argument (2001: 780, 791). 
(216) a.   *Mary1/2 sang1 hoarse2. 
  b.   Mary1 sang1 herself2 hoarse2. 
  b'.  The dog1 barked1 John2 awake2. 
In corroboration of their claim that typical resultative sentences constitute complex events, 
Rappaport-Hovav and Levin argue that "the subevents need not be temporally coextensive, 
nor need they unfold at the same rate" (2001: 775). In other words, (216b) expresses an event 
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in which Mary sings, and an event in which Mary becomes hoarse, but the time course of 
Mary's becoming hoarse need not be dependent on Mary's singing, i.e. Mary need not become 
increasingly hoarser while she sings, but may only be hoarse at the end of the singing-event. 
Rappaport-Hovav and Levin contrast the event structure of such resultative sentences with 
that of what I have called the AUTONOMOUS RESULTATIVE Construction. They assert that the 
sentence The door slid open consists of two co-identified subevents because the door's sliding 
and the door's becoming open are temporally dependent, and therefore the single syntactic 
argument the door suffices for the co-identified 'slide-open' event (2001: 777).  
Let me briefly take on Rappaport-Hovav and Levin's event-based approach. The argu-
ment-per-subevent condition which Rappaport-Hovav and Levin claim is operative in the 
mapping from event structure to syntax is not well-grounded. As Goldberg and Ackerman 
have been able to show, sentences with simple event structures such as ?The claim was be-
lieved or ?The book was read are infelicitous even though the verbs' events are sufficiently 
identified by the subject arguments, and it seems to be pragmatic rather than event-structure 
factors that are responsible for the acceptability of such sentences. It is therefore not clear that 
the unacceptability of (216a) must be attributed to the complexity of the underlying event 
rather than to other factors (2001: 802-3). In addition, the claim that the sentence in (216b) 
consists of two subevents ('Mary's singing caused her to become hoarse') requires some addi-
tional means to guarantee the semantic nexus between the subevents. In a force-dynamic ac-
count, the direct object is the endpoint of the matrix verb's event, and not just the argument of 
the result state. Finally, I doubt that sentences such as The door slid open and Mary sang her-
self hoarse can be distinguished by the notion of temporal (in)dependence: the door is open as 
a result of the sliding-event, and Mary is hoarse as a result of the singing-event; the result 
phrases contain adjectives expressing final states (cf. 9.2.3), and not events that are contempo-
raneous with the matrix event (cf. the ungrammaticality of *The door slid opening). Resulta-
tive sentences thus always code single force-dynamic events, and the separation into two tem-
porally independent subevents has an artificial flavour. 
Both the DOR and the event-approach are purely formal accounts, and they both rely on 
the assumption that there is no semantic relation between the matrix verb and the postverbal 
NP. As with the putative distinction between unaccusative and unergative verbs, however, 
there are a large number of distributional mismatches that constitute counter-evidence to Car-
rier and Randall's claim that their tests (cf. 215) yield a two-term distinction between thematic 
and athematic direct objects. The first objection that must be raised is that Middle Formation, 
Adjectival Passive Formation and Nominal Formation do not invariably apply to all transitive 
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resultatives (217a-c) (Goldberg 1991: 69-70; 1995: 182-3; Jackendoff 1990a: 236-7). The 
distributional mismatches come out in full relief when we include environments such as the 
passive, which can foreground the PATIENT/force recipient of both transitive and intransitive 
resultatives alike (217d, d') (Jackendoff 1997: 544). 
(217) a.   *The washer loads full easily.                           (from Goldberg 1995: 182) 
   b.   *washed-clean clothes           (from Jackendoff 1990a: 236) 
  c.   *the driving of him crazy              (from Goldberg 1995: 183) 
  d.   The table has been wiped clean. 
  d'.  The soles had been walked off Wally's shoes by the time he finished the Walk for 
         Hunger.              (from Jackendoff 1997: 544) 
My second objection concerns the use of syntactic tests/constructions as a means to factor out 
two clearly distinguished classes of direct objects. It is imperative that each of these 'tests' be 
regarded as a construction in its own right, conditioned by semantic principles that are part 
and parcel of the construction as a whole. Goldberg has extensively characterised the MIDDLE 
Construction, and I refer to her discussions in Goldberg 1991 (72-3) and 1995 (183-5) at this 
point. Let me briefly offer a few remarks on the MIDDLE Construction to illustrate the Con-
struction-grammar opposition to the syntactic tests in (215): a sentence such as The metal 
hammers flat easily requires that the unexpressed initiators be indefinite, that the SUBJECT-
entity has some inherent quality that favours the event denoted by the verb, and that the event 
is intended by the unexpressed initiators (Goldberg 1995: 183-4). In a sentence such as *John 
eats sick easily, however, the initiator is explicitly mentioned and anything but indefinite, 
there is no inherent quality in John that favours his getting sick, and this result state is cer-
tainly not intended by him (cf. Goldberg 1995: 184-5). To use a construction such as the 
MIDDLE to establish a distinction between two classes of arguments without taking into ac-
count the particular semantics of this construction is therefore opportunistic. 
Since the evidence that Carrier and Randall have brought to bear on the postverbal NPs of 
the resultative sentences in (212-4) does not support the athematic status of these NPs, other 
grammarians have tried a different tack. Rothstein argues that an intransitive activity verb is 
shifted into an accomplishment when it is found in a resultative sentence because only ac-
complishments, but not activities, can have a result state: "The resultative forces the aspectual 
class of the matrix verb to shift in order to allow the resultative to be interpreted" (2000: 257). 
In order to shift an activity verb such as sing into an accomplishment verb, a THEME argu-
ment must be added to the lexical representation of the verb (218a, b). More precisely, in the 
resultative sentence Mary sang the baby asleep, Mary performs the activity of singing, which 
results in the baby being asleep at the culmination point of the singing activity (Rothstein 
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2000: 258).127 The THEME argument is provided so that "the baby's progress along the path 
to sleep" may serve as "the scale of measuring the singing event", and the resultative phrase 
denotes the property of the THEME argument at the culmination point of the accomplishment 
(Rothstein 2000: 259).  
(218) a.  Mary sang ⇒ Mary sang the baby asleep. 
  b.  SHIFT (λe.(DO(SING))(e) ∧ Ag(e)=x)   =   λyλe.SING(e) ∧ Ag(e)=x ∧ Th(e)=y  
                  (from Rothstein 2000: 257) 
Rothstein's lexical-rule account has against it that it must rely on two different sememes of the 
verb sing, one of which expresses an activity and the other an accomplishment. Lexical rules 
have already been criticised in various places (cf. 8.1.3 and 9.2.1), so a few critical remarks 
will suffice here: in the first place, the accomplishment sense of sing requires us to buy an 
improbable verb meaning ('x performs the activity of singing, affecting another entity'). 
Moreover, the accomplishment sememe of sing can only be deduced from the appearance of 
this verb in contexts where it is followed by an NP and a resultative phrase; on a construc-
tional account, this syntactic pattern is not a projection of the accomplishment semantics of 
sing, but constitutes a special construction that the verb sing can be associated with:  
Instead of positing a new sense every time a new syntactic configuration is encountered and 
then using that sense to explain the existence of the syntactic configuration, a constructional ap-
proach requires that the issue of interaction between verb meaning and constructional meaning 
be addressed. (Goldberg 1995: 12) 
My analysis of what I will call the EXCESSIVE RESULTATIVE Construction (ERC) comes out 
differently from the discrete accounts discussed so far. The force-dynamic event underlying 
the ERC is the same as that posited for the TRC. As a consequence, the postverbal NP in the 
ERC is assumed to bear a semantic relation to the verb like the OBJECT in the TRC, namely as 
the endpoint of the force transmitted from the SUBJECT-entity. The conceptualisation of the 
ERC is not identical to that of the TRC in all respects, though: while the initiator in the sen-
tence John painted the door red volitionally directs his force at the endpoint the door, with 
the intention of changing a property of its colour dimension, Mary does not intend to become 
hoarse by singing in the sentence Mary sang herself hoarse. Rather, the initiator performs her 
activity so excessively (cf. Simpson 1983: 145) that part of the force that she emits is uninten-
tionally redirected onto another entity, which is thereby changed in one of its properties. 
                                                 
127 For an earlier formulation of a causative rule turning an intransitive verb into a causative verb with a direct 
object and a resultative XP, see Randall (1983: 84). 
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Figure 9: Model of force dynamics behind the EXCESSIVE RESULTATIVE Construction 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
In the canonical case, the excessively performed activity has repercussions on the initiator 
itself. Since a person fulfils two functions in such a construction, it is not represented as a 
unitary entity, but is divided up into a sentient initiator-self and a physical endpoint-self. The 
endpoint-self is usually represented by a reflexive pronoun (John ate himself sick), but can 
also be indicated by a body part only (e.g. Mary cried her eyes blind). In some cases, the ex-
cessive activity may also be construed as having an unintended effect on another entity (The 
dog barked the baby awake).128 Whether we need to assume a distinct ERC or whether it 
would be sufficient to regard the relations diagrammed in figure 9 as a semantic extension of 
the prototypical TRC is open to discussion. 
Some final remarks are necessary on what might have motivated such an uncanonical 
construction as the ERC. In the great preponderance of instances, English verbs are associated 
with force-dynamic constructions that are 'transitive' in the sense that they denote an event of 
force transmission from a SUBJECT to an OBJECT (219a, a'). 'Intransitive' force-dynamic con-
structions, describing events in which a SUBJECT-entity emits energy that is not directed at 
another entity, are instantiated by only a small number of verbs (219b) (for a discussion of the 
prototypicality of transitive sentences in a descriptive framework, see Biber et al. 1999: 392). 
To put it another way, transitive constructions have a high type frequency because a large 
number of different verbs can be associated with them, while only a small number of verbs is 
regularly associated with intransitive constructions. As a consequence, there seems to be a 
tendency for intransitive constructions to adjust to the more prototypical construction-type by 
developing transitive spin-offs (see also Croft 1991: 265-7): verbs typically associated with 
the INTRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construction are also found in the transitive Way-Construction 
(219c), the COGNATE-OBJECT Construction (219c') and the PATH-OBJECT Construction 
                                                 
128 Boas raises the question of what principles determine whether the OBJECT-entity must be a reflexive (He 
talked himself/ *Joe blue in the face) or can be realised by both a reflexive and a non-reflexive NP (Jenn danced 
herself/ Pat tired) (2002: 37). Although idiosyncrasy certainly plays a role in such an exceptional construction, 
the choice of OBJECT-entity also depends on our world knowledge — excessive talking does not make another 
entity blue in the face. Incidentally, it is possible to use a non-reflexive NP after talk (Joe talked his audience into 
a stupor). 
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(219c''). What all of these constructions have in common is that they provide transitive force-
dynamic contexts for prototypically intransitive activity verbs by enriching the intransitive 
construction-type with an OBJECT-slot that incrementally measures out the activity denoted by 
the verb (for a more extensive characterisation of these constructions, see Tenny 1994: 38-
43). This account carries over straightforwardly to the ERC, with the one reservation that this 
is not an INCREMENTAL-THEME Construction, but a RESULTATIVE Construction, in which the 
OBJECT-entity is changed in a specific property named by the resultative phrase (219d, d'). 
(219) a.  John kicked the dog. (TRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construction) 
  a'.  John painted the door red. (TRANSITIVE RESULTATIVE Construction) 
  b.   John was laughing. (INTRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construction) 
  c.   John laughed his way across the room. (transitive Way-Construction) 
  c'   John laughed a mirthless laugh. (transitive COGNATE-OBJECT Construction) 
  c''.  John and Mary walked the trail. (transitive PATH-OBJECT Construction) 
  d.   Mary laughed herself silly. (transitive EXCESSIVE RESULTATIVE Construction) 
  d'.  The machines pounded us deaf. (transitive EXCESSIVE RESULTATIVE Construction) 
Since transitive constructions are the 'ideal' or "superprototypical" English construction-type 
(Croft 1991: 270), intransitive constructions are sometimes coerced into transitive frames to 
accommodate them to the prototype. The primary determinant of whether a construction-type 
is productive and can create constructional spin-offs is therefore its type frequency (Goldberg 
1995: 134). 
Yet type frequency is only part of the story. Although transitive constructions have a 
high type frequency, whereas the INTRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construction, for example, is only 
associated with narrowly restricted verb classes (such as the verbs of motion and the verbs of 
sound emission/speech production), the latter construction is anything but infrequent in Eng-
lish. This seems to be due to its high token frequency: even if there is only a small number of 
verbs that typically occurs in it, verbs such as run, shout or cry are high-frequency verbs that 
guarantee the deep entrenchment of this construction in the system of English grammar. The 
strong association of the verbs of speech production/sound emission and the verbs of motion 
with the INTRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construction makes the use of these verbs in transitive con-
structions rather unconventional, even if this represents the more prototypical construction-
type: "Because memory is associative, similar verbs used in the same constructions are classi-
fied together by general categorization processes" (Goldberg 1995: 133). The ERC may be 
closer to the prototypical transitive construction type, but it has a low token frequency be-
cause vanilla verbs such as run, shout and cry are resistant to being used in other than the IN-
TRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construction with which they are almost exclusively associated: "peo-
ple tend to use lexical items in the same constructions in which they have heard those items 
used by others" (Goldberg 1995: 133). As a consequence, the ERC is not a very frequent con-
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struction and is subject to a high degree of collocational restriction (Goldberg 1995: 192), 
with even minor divergences leading to ungrammaticality (220).  
(220) a.   Mary ran herself to exhaustion. 
  a'.  ?Mary ran herself exhausted. (ROS: 40) 
  b.   He shouted himself hoarse. 
  b'.  *He shouted himself angry. (ROS: 88) 
  c.   She cried herself to sleep. 
  c'.  ??She cried herself calm. (ROS: 53) 
  d.   He ate himself sick. 
  d'.  ??He ate himself full. (ROS: 67) 
9.3.1.4  Overview of functional map I 
Table 10 provides a systematic overview of the four RESULTATIVE Constructions discussed in 
the previous sections. Like Goldberg and Jackendoff (to appear), I assume that resultative 
patterns do not constitute "a unified phenomenon", but should be treated as "a family of sub-
constructions, united by related but not identical syntax and by related but not identical se-
mantics". In my force-dynamic analysis of resultatives, these constructions differ as to which 
of the two participants, the initiator and/or the endpoint, is profiled in the conceptualisation of 
the resultative event (profiled participants are printed in boldface). Both the ERC and the TRC 
put the initial focus on the initiator and the second focus on the endpoint, but whereas the re-
sult state is intended in the TRC, it is an unintended side-effect in the ERC. As has been sug-
gested above, these two constructions could also be folded into one construction-type, with 
the TRC forming the prototypical core and the ERC an unprototypical extension.129 The PRC 
profiles the endpoint and places only an optional second focus on the initiator, while the ARC 
conceptualises a resultative event as happening of its own accord, without anyone being re-
sponsible for it. 
                                                 
129 This move might also be descriptively more adequate because there seem to be instances of the ERC in which 
the initiator actually intends the result by performing an activity to excess: John wiggled himself loose./ Mary 
wiggled her tooth loose. 
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Table 10: Functional map of Resultative Constructions differing on the profiling dimension 
Participants profiled in the  
resultative event 
Resultative construction types 
Initiator and endpoint profiled 
(unintended result) 
EXCESSIVE RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
Mary sang herself hoarse./ The dog barked the baby awake. 
Initiator and endpoint profiled 
(intended result) 
TRANSITIVE RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
The waitress wiped the table clean./ John made Mary happy. 
Endpoint profiled  
Initiator backgrounded  
(or second focus) 
PASSIVE RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
The table was wiped clean (by the waitress). 
Endpoint profiled 
Initiator not conceptualised 
AUTONOMOUS RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
The bottle broke to pieces. 
9.3.2  Functional map II: Resultative and Motion Constructions 
There is hardly a publication on resultative sentences that does not also evoke the issue of 
motion patterns like those in (221): 
(221) a.  Mary pushed the car to the garage. 
  b.  John threw the ball onto the roof. 
  c.  The children chased the cat behind the house. 
Intuitively, there is a semantic similarity between (221a) and a resultative sentence such as 
Mary wiped the table clean: in the latter, the resultative XP denotes the final state of the direct 
object at the end of the wiping-event, while the PP to the garage expresses the final location of 
the object at the end of the pushing-event. Two common approaches are usually taken by dis-
crete grammars trying to relate resultative and motion sentences. One is to argue that locative 
PPs are resultative predicates as well (e.g. Wechsler 1997: 313-4). Interestingly, this idea is 
not only articulated in formal grammars where the PP is regarded as a predicate taking the 
postverbal NP as its subject argument (Aarts 1997: 337), but the same note is sounded in a 
considerable number of descriptive grammars as well. Huddleston and Pullum, for example, 
maintain that "assigning a location to something is comparable to assigning it a property" 
(2002: 257), and Burton-Roberts lumps together the resultative and locative phrases in 
"Melvin made the pudding too sweet" and "Stella put the fudge cake under the bed" as "ob-
ject-predicatives" (1991: 160; cf. also Brown and Miller 1991: 332; Downing and Locke 
2002: 53-4; Young 1980: 130-1).130 Alternatively, result states are sometimes argued to con-
stitute abstract places (e.g. Carrier and Randall 1993: 121).  
                                                 
130 Other reference grammars classify locative PPs as 'obligatory adverbials' (e.g. Biber et al. 1999: 131; Ek and 
Robat 1984: 319; Quirk et al. 1985: 55). This term opens a nasty can of worms for discrete grammatical frame-
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I argue that the unification of states and places is missing too much because it cannot ac-
count for the different conceptualisations behind RESULTATIVE and MOTION Constructions. In 
a TRANSITIVE RESULTATIVE Construction, there are only two participants, an initiator and an 
endpoint, while there are three participants in the TRANSITIVE MOTION Construction (TMC) 
illustrated by (221), namely an initiator, an endpoint, and a location (Napoli 1989: 50). Result 
states are not participants that could be conceptualised independently of other participants, but 
merely denote properties of one of the participants in the event.131  
Drawing on Croft (1991: 198-9), I will utilise the notions of 'figure' and 'ground' to ana-
lyse the force-dynamic event behind the TMC. In the event conceptualised by the sentence 
Mary pushed the car to the garage, Mary is the initiator, who transmits physical force onto 
the endpoint the car. As a result of this force transmission, the car changes its location in 
space. The TMC conceptualises this change of location by setting the car against the back-
ground of another entity, in this case the garage. In figure/ground terminology, the car is the 
figure, whose movement in space is measured against a static ground, the garage. The prepo-
sition to makes explicit that the figure entity approaches the ground entity, and the force-
dynamic event is completed when the figure has reached the ground. Other prepositions can 
express different relations between figure and ground: the figure can also be conceptualised as 
moving away from the ground (John pushed the pram out of the house; John brushed some 
bread-crumbs from his chin; Mary pulled the sticker off the bottle) as well as coming into a 
variety of other relations with it (John threw the ball onto the roof; Bob pushed the Playboy 
under the sofa). 
                                                                                                                                                        
works, though: locative PPs defy easy classification because they are semantically adjunct-like, but are obliga-
tory like complements. 'Obligatory adverbial' may capture these oscillating qualities of locative PPs, but it is a 
"contradiction in terms" for most discrete grammarians (Aarts 1997: 333). 
131 In contrast to resultative PPs, locative PPs do not show any predicative qualities. While it is odd to refer to a 
resultative PP with a personal or relative pronoun (cf. a, b), this is unproblematic for locative PPs (cf. a', b'). 
a. ?John broke the glass to pieces. They were all over the floor. (ROS: 46) 
a'.   Mary pushed the car to the garage. It was a squalid place. (ROS: 19) 
b.   ?John broke the glass to pieces, which he later picked up. (ROS: 39)  
b'.  Mary pushed the car to the garage, which was owned by a seedy-looking man. (ROS: 19) 
Although the claim that locative PPs are no predicates is a minority view, it is also shared by Bresnan (2001: 275-
6). 
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Figure 10: Conceptualisation behind the TRANSITIVE MOTION Construction 
           
 
 
            
       
 
 
         
  
 
The major difference between the TRC and the TMC resides in the way that the initiator's 
force is transmitted onto the endpoint: in the TRC, the force is directed onto one of the dimen-
sions making up the conceptualisation of the OBJECT-entity. In the TMC, on the other hand, 
the force is targeted at the endpoint as a physical entity that can be transposed in space. Verbs 
such as paint and wipe activate a particular region within an entity, whereas verbs such as 
push and throw profile the entity as a movable physical object132; as a consequence, the end-
point is changed in one of its properties in the TRC, and in its location in space in the TMC. 
Since location in space is not an inherent quality of the endpoint, the new location cannot be 
expressed by an AP, but must be indicated through a comparison with another entity in a fig-
ure/ground configuration.133 As sentences such as Fred stuffed the papers in the envelope and 
Sam squeezed the rubber ball inside the jar demonstrate, the conceptualisation diagrammed in 
figure 10 is not a projection of the lexical properties of the main verb, but stems from the se-
mantics of the construction as a whole (Goldberg 1995: 158-9). 
The TMC has a number of similar characteristics to the TRC. To begin with, the VERB-
slot can also be instantiated by what I will call 'default motion verbs' in analogy to 'default 
resultative verbs' (cf. 9.2.3). While verbs such as push, roll and throw specify the manner in 
which a physical entity is moved, the verbs lay, put and set only indicate that the initiator 
                                                 
132 Goldberg and Jackendoff (to appear) point to a class of sentences in which the movable object remains im-
plicit: Bill spit out the window; Bill bled on the floor; The toilet leaked through the floor into the kitchen below. 
133 It is important to note that the figure/ground configuration pertains to the relation between endpoint and loca-
tion, and not to the relation between initiator and location, which is inconsequential to the conceptualisation 
behind the TMC. It is true that in the sentence Mary pushed the car to the garage Mary also ends up at the ga-
rage, but she obviously does not end up on the roof in the sentence Mary threw the ball onto the roof. The former 
sentence represents an instance of what Talmy calls "extent causation" because the initiator must impinge on the 
endpoint throughout the event, while the latter sentence exemplifies Talmy's "beginning-point causation"; it is 
enough that the initiator applies force to the endpoint at the beginning of the event in order to set the entity in 
motion (1976: 63-4, 70-2). Whether a sentence represents an instance of extent causation or beginning-point 
causation is part of our world knowledge: we know that it is not enough to give a broken car a single push for it 
to move to a garage, whereas our experience tells us that a ball can fly somewhere on its own after sufficient 
force has been applied to it. 
to 
direction of force  
transmission 
Initiator Force
SUBJECT    VERB OBJECT LOCATIVE PP 
Endpoint (Figure)   
Location 
(Ground) 
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transmits force onto a movable entity, but contain only minimal information on the exact 
manner of force transmission (222). Like the default resultative verbs, the default motion 
verbs cannot be used in a corresponding ACTIVITY Construction (*John was putting the vase), 
while other motion verbs are compatible with this construction (Mary was pushing the car). 
The reason for this divergent behaviour seems to be that the low manner-component in the 
semantics of default motion verbs makes them pragmatically insufficient for the ACTIVITY 
Construction (cf. Tenny 1994: 204-5).134 On this account, we do not need to take recourse to 
problematic terms such as "obligatory adverbial" (Biber et al. 1999: 151) or "subcategorized 
adjunct" (Dowty 2000: 59) to explain the behaviour of sentences with verbs such as make or 
put.  
(222) a.  Mary laid the magazine on the table. 
  b.  John put the vase on the floor. 
  c.  The waitress set a plate of food down in front of the guest. 
Again like the TRC, the TMC has a prototypical core in which the force transmission is 
physical (223a), and extensions where the force has a more abstract social quality (223b-d).  
(223) a.  Mary pushed the car to the garage. 
  b.  Sam asked him into the room.              (from Goldberg 1995: 161) 
  c.  Sam sent him to the market.              (from Goldberg 1995: 161) 
  d.  Sam showed him into the livingroom.             (from Goldberg 1995: 162) 
The 'prospective' verbs want and order, which we already encountered in the TRC (cf. 9.2.3), 
crop up in the TMC as well (224). Both are actually more frequent in motion than resultative 
sentences in my BNC extract; when we only compare the appearance of want and order in the 
TMC and the TRC, want appears in over 65%, and order in over 80% of all cases in the 
TMC.135 Again, there are subtle semantic differences between these verbs in infinitive con-
structions such as Mary wants/orders John to visit her and the TMC. In the TMC, "some kind 
of receiving, possessing or experiencing" of the OBJECT entity is implied (Borkin 1973: 53), 
and the time-span between the utterance of the wish or order and its expected fulfilment is 
rather strongly telescoped (Borkin 1973: 52).  
(224) a.  I want everyone out of here except Staff Sergeant Gordon and me (BNC HTJ: 
        3153). 
  b.  I don't want you in my home (BNC H8F: 143). 
  c.  When he came to the car, Ana had established herself in the back with Mitch and 
        he would have needed to be extremely unpleasant to order them out (BNC HGK: 3032). 
                                                 
134 Interestingly, the event of a figure moving away from the ground seems to be pragmatically sufficient for an 
ACTIVITY Construction even in the absence of more specific manner information in the verb: Sally is removing 
the mud is as acceptable as Sally removed the mud from her shoes. 
135 Nevertheless, compared to infinitive constructions such as John wants/orders Mary to come back and direct-
object constructions such as John wanted/ordered tea, the TRC and the TMC are marginal constructional frames 
for want and order. Of almost 2,000 instances of want extracted from the BNC, only 52 show this verb in the 
TRC and the TMC; similarly, order appears in the TRC and TMC in just 33 out of about 1,000 instances.  
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  d.  [O]rdering her roughly out of the car, they marched her to the command post where 
        a fat sergeant ... looked her up and down (BNC CK8: 1944). 
Like resultative sentences, motion patterns form a family of related constructions that can be 
distinguished along the profiling dimension. In addition to the TMC, which profiles both the 
initiator and the endpoint, there is a PASSIVE MOTION Construction (PMC) that focuses on the 
endpoint of the motion event and puts the initiator into the background (225a). In analogy to 
the ARC, there is an AUTONOMOUS MOTION Construction (AMC), which conceptualises a 
figure object as moving to a ground location by itself (225b, b'). Figure 11 illustrates the con-
ceptualisation behind the sentence The ball rolled into the river. 
(225) a.  The car was pushed to the garage (by Mary). 
  b.  The ball rolled into the river. 
  b'.  The oil floated onto the coast. 
Figure 11: Force-dynamic conceptualisation behind the AUTONOMOUS MOTION Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
The autonomous meaning is not inherent in a verb such as roll, but stems from the semantics 
of the AMC. Motion events allow various event views: the sentence The child rolled the ball 
into the river profiles both the initiator and the endpoint, whereas The ball rolled into the 
river leaves the initiator and her force out of the conceptualisation, focusing on the change of 
location of the ball instead. 
The TMC conceives of the initiator as intending the change of location of the physical 
object. The sentences in (226) illustrate the EXCESSIVE MOTION Construction (EMC), in 
which the initiator performs an activity to excess, thereby unintentionally causing the change 
of location of another entity (the conceptualisation is the same as that of the ERC in figure 9, 
with the only difference that it is not a property, but the location of an entity that is changed). 
As in the ERC, the unintentionally affected entity can be referentially identical to the force 
transmitter (usually in metaphorical sentences such as 226a) or referentially distinct (226b-d). 
to
Force
    VERB   OBJECT LOCATIVE PP
Endpoint (Figure)   
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(226) a.  He drank himself into the grave. (ROS: 9)             (from Simpson 1983: 145) 
  b.  I ran the soles off my shoes. (ROS: 14) 
          (from Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1992: 256) 
  c.  The jury laughed the singer out of the room. (ROS: 7) 
  d.  Frank sneezed the tissue off the table. (ROS: 30)                    (Goldberg 1995: 152)  
Table 11 presents an overview of the family of MOTION Constructions, which differ as to 
whether the initiator and/or endpoint is profiled and whether the change of location is in-
tended or not. Again, it would be conceivable to treat the TMC and the EMC as the same type 
of construction. 
Table 11: Functional map of Motion Constructions differing on the profiling dimension 
Participants profiled in the motion 
event 
Motion construction types 
Initiator and endpoint profiled 
(unintended result) 
EXCESSIVE MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
John worked himself into the grave./ Mary sneezed the tissue off 
the table. 
Initiator and endpoint profiled 
(intended result) 
TRANSITIVE MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
Mary pushed the car to the garage./ John put the vase on the floor. 
Endpoint profiled  
Initiator backgrounded (or second focus) 
PASSIVE MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
The car was pushed to the garage (by Mary). 
Endpoint profiled 
Initiator not conceptualised 
AUTONOMOUS MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
The ball rolled into the river. 
It has long been observed that resultative and motion patterns are mutually exclusive, i.e. that 
a single sentence cannot contain both a resultative XP and a motion PP (227). 
(227) a.  *The drawer slid into the opening shut. (ROS: 93)  
                 (Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1992: 258) 
  b.  *Lilly yanked out the drawer loose. (ROS: 85)                     (from Randall 1983: 87) 
  c.  *John danced Mary out of the room tired. (ROS: 100)  
Various explanations have been offered for this rather general constraint.136 Tenny, seconded 
by Levin and Rappaport-Hovav (1992: 257-8), argues that any event may be delimited only 
once; for this reason, a sentence may not contain two resultative phrases (*Mary wiped the 
table clean dry) or two directional phrases (*John flew to Munich to Nuremberg); ceteris 
paribus, it may not include both a resultative and a directional phrase as in (227) (1994: 78-
81).137  
                                                 
136 This is not an absolute restriction, however. The following sentence, which Randall marks as ungrammatical, 
was not rejected by most speakers: 
The campers patted down their sleeping bags flat. (ROS: 14)                 (from Randall 1983: 87) 
137 Conjoined resultative or directional phrases are of course possible: Mary drove to California and (to) Mexico 
is "one event of driving with one endpoint having two ingredients" (Tenny 1994: 80; cf. also Parsons 1990: 48); 
a similar analysis holds for Mary wiped the table clean and dry. 
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The single delimiting constraint is, however, invalidated by sentences such as "*Sam 
kicked Bill black and blue toward the door" (Goldberg 1995: 86) and John broke the vase to 
pieces. In the former example, the directional PP only specifies the direction but does not de-
limit the event, yet the sentence is ungrammatical nevertheless (Goldberg 1995: 86); in the 
latter sentence, the event is already delimited without the resultative phrase, but the addition 
of a resultative PP does not render the sentence ill-formed. Goldberg therefore tries to come at 
the problem from a different angle. She maintains that a locative phrase denotes a concrete 
path, while a resultative phrase describes a metaphorical path, with the result phrase being a 
"metaphorically interpreted goal phrase" (1995: 84). If we further assume that a single event 
can only describe a unique path, the sentences in (227) are ruled out because they describe a 
concrete and a metaphorical path at the same time (Goldberg 1995: 83).  
Maybe so, but I am hesitant to give resultative and directional phrases a unified concep-
tual treatment. The force-dynamic model offers a more straightforward explanation of why 
resultative and directional phrases are mutually exclusive in the same sentence than the rather 
speculative notion of a figurative path. In resultative sentences, the force denoted by the verb 
is directed at a specific property dimension of the OBJECT-entity, while it is directed at the 
entity as a movable physical object in motion patterns. In a single event, however, the same 
force cannot target different aspects of the endpoint at the same time, but can highlight only 
one aspect of a conceptually complex entity. A sentence such as (227c), which forces us to 
focus on Mary as a movable entity and on her physical condition at the same time, is therefore 
ruled out. This restriction also explains why the RESULTATIVE Construction cannot be com-
bined with TRANSFER Constructions (228). In a TRANSFER Construction, the initiator (who is 
only implied in (228c)) moves a physical object towards a new (intended) possessor. As a 
consequence, the OBJECT-entities the vase, the egg and the letter are conceived of as movable 
objects, and are not highlighted in one of their property dimensions, outlawing the combina-
tion with the RESULTATIVE Construction. 
(228) a. *I sent John the vase broken. (on resultative reading)       (from Simpson 1983: 147) 
  b.  *John cooked Mary the egg hard.        (from Bresnan and Zaenen 1990: 53)138 
  c.  *Mary received the letter flat. (on resultative reading) (from Jackendoff 1990a: 230) 
Before leaving the family of MOTION Constructions, we must turn to a group of motion pat-
terns that have become hot spots of syntactic discussion in the last few years. As has been 
indicated above (9.3.1.3), Rappaport-Hovav and Levin have recently revisioned the DOR and 
argued for an event-based approach. This new line of analysis has, among other things, been 
                                                 
138 John cooked the egg hard for Mary (ROS: 3) is an ordinary TRC that is elaborated with a beneficiary. In 
contrast to *John cooked Mary the egg hard (ROS: 87), this sentence does not imply a transfer-sense. 
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triggered by patterns in which the locative phrase refers to the subject NP, although there is 
also a direct-object NP in the sentences (229). Rappaport-Hovav and Levin call this the "sub-
ject-oriented transitive-based pattern" (2001: 771). 
(229) a.  John and Mary danced the tango across the room.  
  b.  Bob flew British Airways to London. 
  c.  Mary followed Pierce Brosnan into the store. 
The direct objects in (229) are not force recipients, but constitute exceptional realisations of 
the object position. In (229a), the direct object the tango describes the performance denoted 
by the matrix verb more closely (cf. also John ran a marathon to Athens). The object British 
Airways in (229b) supplies the means by which the motion event is performed (cf. also Bob 
took the car to London). In (229c), Pierce Brosnan determines Mary's path, and the sentence 
has approximately the meaning that 'Mary walked into the store behind Pierce Brosnan' (cf. 
also Mary accompanied her husband into the store). A more extensive discussion of these 
cases can be found in Goldberg and Jackendoff (to appear), who analyse the dance-the-tango-
cases as complex predicates and suggest additional subconstructions for the fly-British-
Airways and follow-Pierce-Brosnan-cases. 
The patterns in (229) are closely related to an objectless motion sentence such as Mary 
ran to the door, which is a subject-oriented intransitive-based pattern (Wechsler 1997: 312). 
Discrete grammars classify the verb run (or its VP) in the sentence Mary ran as an activity 
(230a-a''), but as an accomplishment in the sentence Mary ran to the door (230b-b'') (Hoekstra 
1992: 157-8; Parsons 1990: 182-5; Pustejovsky 1991: 62-3). The two verb senses are again 
frequently related by lexical processes; Levin and Rappaport-Hovav, for example, argue that 
directional run2 can be derived from the activity verb run1 by a Lexical Subordination Rule: 
[x GO TO y BY [run1]] (1992: 260; see also Pustejovsky 1991: 63; Van Valin 1990: 225). 
(230) a.  Mary ran for 30 minutes. 
  a'.   Mary almost ran. (unambiguous) 
  a''.  Mary is running. ⊃ Mary has run. 
  b.   Mary ran to the door in five seconds. 
  b'.  Mary almost ran to the door. (ambiguous) 
  b''.  Mary is running to the door. ⊃ Mary has run to the door. 
Whether they contain a direct object or not, subject-oriented motion patterns are unusual be-
cause, unlike in an object-related sentence such as Mary pushed the car to the garage, the 
subject is both the initiator of the activity and is changed in her location. There have been 
various attempts to accommodate subject-oriented motion patterns more closely to the better 
understood object-oriented patterns. One option is to argue that in subject-oriented patterns, 
"agent and affected theme semantics are conflated on a single argument", i.e. that the subject 
is both an AGENT and a THEME in Mary ran to the store (Wechsler 1997: 313; see also Par-
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sons 1990: 80-1); on this view, it would be possible to argue that the locative phrase refers to 
an affected theme in object and subject-oriented patterns alike. Yet the contention that the 
subject is both an AGENT and a THEME contradicts the asymmetry of force-dynamic events. 
The same person can serve both as the initiator and the endpoint in a single event, but the 
endpoint must then necessarily be expressed by a reflexive pronoun: John threw himself in 
front of the train; Mary dragged herself to school.139 While all of these sentences indicate that 
a volitional initiator acts on his or her body, this meaning is not apparent in Mary ran to the 
door and cannot normally be brought out by a reflexive pronoun (cf. *Mary ran herself to the 
door). 
Rappaport-Hovav and Levin opt for their event-based analysis instead (cf. 9.3.1.3). The 
one-argument-per-subevent condition requires every subevent to be identified by an argument 
in the syntax, but only when the two subevents are not temporally dependent (cf. John drank 
himself silly). In sentences such as John danced across the room, Rappaport-Hovav and Levin 
theorise, the dancing-event and the across-the-room-event "are temporally co-extensive and 
unfold at the same rate. The event denoted by the verb begins when the progress towards the 
result begins, and it necessarily extends until the result is achieved" (2001: 775). They go on 
to claim that the verb and the locative phrase act as co-predicators of a "coidentified" event 
(2001: 782); more precisely, the sentence John danced across the room represents a co-
identified 'dance-across-the-room' event. As a consequence, the shared participant of the co-
identified subevents need not be expressed twice, but can show up only once in the syntactic 
representation of the sentence (2001: 782). In fact, Rappaport-Hovav and Levin maintain that 
the shared participant is obligatorily realised only once because this gives the sentence "the 
tightest event structure", which is claimed to be in harmony with Grice's maxim of quantity 
(2001: 782). I have already criticised the idea of temporal dependence and event co-
identification above (cf. 9.3.1.3); a sentence such as Mary ran to the door denotes only one 
event of Mary's running, and (to) the door expresses the final location of the participant in the 
running-event, but is not an event in itself. Moreover, to evoke Grice's maxim of quantity to 
explain why the shared participant is expressed only once begs the question; if there were 
really two subevents, whether co-identified or not, it is not clear why the maxim of quantity 
should override the principle of iconicity in systematically ruling out sentences such as *Mary 
ran herself to the door. 
                                                 
139 The reflexive object can always be replaced with a non-reflexive NP in these cases (Sue dragged her daughter 
to school; John threw Bob in front of the train). This is also possible in the unusual sentence John danced him-
self out of the room (ROS: 30), which evokes John as a volitional initiator and a physical endpoint (cf. John 
danced Mary out of the room; ROS: 27). 
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Tenny pursues still another idea. She points to the fact that verbs of motion also appear in 
the PATH-OBJECT Construction, in which a direct object incrementally measures out the event 
denoted by the verb (e.g. Mary ran a mile; John climbed the ladder) (1994: 17). This observa-
tion leads to her assertion that a sentence such as Mary ran to the garage represents a case 
where the incremental direct object is implicit and denotes the distance to the garage (1994: 
77). The basic idea behind the incremental-theme analysis has recently been reproposed by 
Rothstein, who hypothesises that "the locational expression denotes a path which is the in-
cremental argument of the verb, and which is 'used up' gradually as the event unfolds" (2000: 
262). If the incremental-path analysis were somewhere around the right track, we must ask 
ourselves why the putatively implicit path can almost never be overtly supplied (*Mary ran 
the street to the store). For a further difficulty, the sentence Mary ran to the garage does not 
mean that Mary directs energy onto the path between her and the garage, gradually using it up 
in the course of the event, but that Mary puts energy into the running-activity and ends up at 
the garage at the end of the event.140 
None of the attempts to bring sentences such as Mary ran to the garage more in line with 
object-related directional patterns (Mary pushed the car to the garage) or INCREMENTAL-
THEME Constructions (Mary climbed the ladder to the last rung) offers any pioneering solu-
tions to the problems posed by subject-related motion patterns. I think that there has been 
scholarly overemphasis on the fact that the subject in these motion patterns is both the initia-
tor of the activity and the entity that is changed in her location. Drawing on my approach to 
the TMC, I venture a different analysis of what I will call the SPONTANEOUS MOTION Con-
struction (SMC).  
While the initiator transmits force onto an endpoint in a TRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construc-
tion (Mary was pushing the car), the force created in the INTRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construc-
tion (John was running) is not directed at another entity, but goes into the activity the initiator 
performs. The same verbs can usually appear not only in these activity constructions, but also 
in related accomplishment constructions: a verb such as push is found both in the atelic 
TRANSITIVE ACTIVITY Construction and the telic TMC (Mary was pushing the car; Mary 
pushed the car to the garage), and a verb such as run can appear both in the atelic INTRANSI-
TIVE ACTIVITY Construction and the telic SMC (John was running; John ran to the store); the 
accomplishment senses of the TMC and the SMC stem exclusively from the meaning of these 
                                                 
140 Of course, there are INCREMENTAL-THEME sentences such as Mary ran the long road to the next village or 
John climbed the ladder to the last rung, in which the force of the initiator indeed goes through the path by in-
crements, and in which the last increment of the path is named by the PP. My sense is that these cases are analo-
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constructions, and not from putative accomplishment sememes of the respective matrix verbs. 
The TMC conveys the sense that when the initiator stops supplying energy at the end of the 
event, the endpoint is at a different location than before, but it does not specify the final loca-
tion of the initiator, which can, however, be inferred from our naive understanding of physics 
(cf. John pushed the car to the garage vs. John threw the ball onto the roof; cf. footnote 133). 
Along the same lines, the SMC denotes a motion activity that comes to an end when the ini-
tiator stops putting energy into the activity. Again, the fact that the initiator ends up at a dif-
ferent location at the end of the motion activity is part of our world knowledge, and it is not 
necessary to force an additional THEME-role onto the subject or to claim that subject-
oriented motion sentences consist of an activity subevent plus a change-of-location subevent. 
In the sentence Mary ran to the garage, the NP the garage serves as the ground that identifies 
the location of the figure Mary at the end of the event, and the preposition to makes explicit 
that the figure moves towards the ground as in the TMC (figure 12); different prepositions 
again signal different relations between figure and ground: Mary ran out of the house; John 
jumped onto the car; The cat walked behind the house. 
Figure 12: Conceptualisation behind the SPONTANEOUS MOTION Construction 
           
 
 
            
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
Although there is a close analogy between the families of RESULTATIVE and MOTION Con-
structions, there is no such thing as a subject-related SPONTANEOUS RESULTATIVE Construc-
tion, in which the initiator performs some activity and is thereby changed in one of her prop-
erties. While our experience tells us that a person normally changes his or her location by per-
forming a motion activity, there are hardly any experientially grounded events that are com-
patible with a situation in which a person is changed in one of her properties by performing 
                                                                                                                                                        
gous to INCREMENTAL-THEME sentences such as Mary ate the apple to the core and The school theatre per-
formed the play to the final act, but not to motion patterns like Mary ran to the garage. 
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some activity. Apparent counter-examples, which are adduced by Rappaport-Hovav and 
Levin as arguments in favour of their event-based approach, are more profitably analysed in 
different ways. 
In (231a, a'), the VERB-slot of the SMC is filled by a verb of sound emission. These sen-
tences are best analysed as instances of the SMC in which a sound stands metonymically for 
the motion activity (cf. 'The truck drove onto the driveway with a rumbling noise'). A condi-
tion for having a sound stand for a motion activity is that the sound is salient and that "the 
motion causes the sound to be emitted" (Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear); a sentence such 
as *The dog barked out of the room is ungrammatical because "the sound is not a result of the 
subject's motion" but is "a separate volitional act" (Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear). The 
sentences in (231b, b'), on the other hand, are not examples of a SPONTANEOUS RESULTATIVE 
Construction (cf. Rappaport-Hovav and Levin 2001: 773-4), but are more convincingly ana-
lysed as instances of the ARC (cf. 'The line went dead with a click'; 'The garage door went 
open with a rumble'), i.e. in contrast to (231a, a'), the SUBJECT codes an endpoint and not an 
initiator. 
(231) a.   The truck rumbled onto the driveway. 
  a'.  The knee replacement candidate groaned up the stairs.  
               (from Goldberg and Jackendoff, to appear) 
  b.   The line clicked dead.                        (from Rappaport-Hovav and Levin 2001: 774) 
  b'.  The garage door rumbled open. 
Rappaport-Hovav and Levin also point to minimal pairs involving verbs such as wiggle, 
wriggle and kick, which can appear both in the ERC with a (reflexive) direct object (232a) and 
in a subject-related resultative pattern (232a') (2001: 774). The latter example seems to sug-
gest that there is a SPONTANEOUS RESULTATIVE Construction, in which the initiator John per-
forms a kicking-activity and is changed in one of his properties as a result. Rappaport-Hovav 
and Levin in fact put forward the claim that both sentences have initiators as subjects, but that 
(232a) contains two temporally independent subevents and (232a') two temporally co-
identified subevents (2001: 777-8). Let me offer a different analysis of these examples. Sen-
tences with inanimate SUBJECT-entities are more felicitous without a direct object (232b, b'), 
suggesting that we are dealing with an instance of the ARC in (232b). If the SUBJECT is filled 
by a volitional entity, on the other hand, a reflexive or non-reflexive direct object is preferred, 
as is typical of the ERC (232c, c'; cf. also 232d).141 Minimal pairs such as those in (232a, a') 
are therefore extremely uncommon. 
                                                 
141 The numbers given in parentheses behind the sentences indicate the number of native speakers who chose one 
or the other sentence (out of a total of 30 speakers). The results are in line with an example given by Goldberg 
and Jackendoff (to appear), who contrast the sentences The mechanical doll wiggled itself loose, in which the 
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(232) a.   John kicked himself free. 
  a'.  John kicked free. 
  b.   One of the race cars wiggled loose inside the transporter. (ROS: 18)  
                  (from Rothstein 2000: 261) 
  b'.  One of the race cars wiggled itself loose inside the transporter. (ROS: 12) 
  c.   He desperately tried to pull free. (ROS: 6) 
  c'.  He desperately tried to pull himself free. (ROS: 24) 
  d.   He tried to kick his legs free, but their grips were firm and his efforts made them 
         laugh even louder (BNC FSH: 1665). 
9.3.3 Functional map III: Constructions focusing on the manner or the result of an  
  activity 
Thus far, we have mapped out resultative and motion constructions along two parameters: 
first, whether they express force transmission that changes the state of the endpoint (the fam-
ily of RESULTATIVE Constructions) or the location of the endpoint/initiator (the family of 
(SPONTANEOUS) MOTION Constructions); and second, which of the two participants in the 
resultative or motion event, the initiator and/or the endpoint, is foregrounded in the respective 
conceptualisation of the scene: the TRANSITIVE RESULTATIVE/MOTION Constructions have the 
initial focus on the initiator and the second focus on the endpoint; the PASSIVE RESULTA-
TIVE/MOTION Constructions place the initial focus on the endpoint and an optional second 
focus on the initiator; the AUTONOMOUS RESULTATIVE/MOTION Constructions focus exclu-
sively on the endpoint. Since SPONTANEOUS MOTION Constructions merely have one partici-
pant, an initiator, and do not include an endpoint, there cannot be an AUTONOMOUS SPONTA-
NEOUS MOTION Construction and only an impersonal PASSIVE SPONTANEOUS MOTION Con-
struction. While English does not have such an impersonal passive, it can be formed in Ger-
man (Es wurde zu den Ausgängen gerannt). RESULTATIVE and (SPONTANEOUS) MOTION Con-
structions can be compared along at least one more dimension: it is not only possible to fore-
ground or background a particular participant in the event, but also to place emphasis either 
on the manner of force transmission plus the result of the event or only on the result of the 
event.142 
Levin and Rappaport-Hovav pose the question whether verbs of removal form a natural 
class in English. What verbs such as wipe and clean have in common is that they "can de-
scribe the removal of a substance or physical object ... from a location" (233a, b) (1991: 126).  
                                                                                                                                                        
mechanical doll can instigate its own wiggling, and *The ball wiggled itself loose, where the ball cannot be con-
strued as instigating a wiggling action, and where the use of a reflexive direct object is therefore infelicitous. 
142 There is no RESULTATIVE or MOTION Construction that foregrounds the manner of activity and backgrounds 
the result state or location because this would contradict the telicity of these constructions. The manner of activ-
ity can be foregrounded in a special ACTIVITY Construction, the so-called CONATIVE Construction: John cut at 
the cheese; Mary ate at the apple; The waitress rubbed at the counter (see Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1991: 
135; Tenny 1994: 45-6). 
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(233) a.  The waitress wiped/sponged etc. the table clean. 
  b.  The waitress cleaned/cleared etc. the table. 
Many grammarians propose that the sentences in (233a, b) can be given causative para-
phrases. (234a) is an argument-structure representation for the TRC adapted from Van Valin 
(1990: 255; see also Carrier and Randall 1993: 124-5; Jackendoff 1997: 544; Pustejovsky 
1991: 65), which conveys the sense that the event of the waitress's wiping the table causes the 
table to become clean. A causative paraphrase is also standardly given for sentences with 
clean-type verbs (234b) (Parsons 1990: 107-10).  
(234) a.  [wipe' (the waitress)] CAUSE [BECOME clean' (the table)] BY wiping it. 
  b.  The waitress caused the table to become clean (by wiping it). 
When we look at the causative paraphrases in (234), resultative sentences with wipe-type 
verbs and sentences with clean-type verbs come out as more or less synonymous. Although 
the paraphrases in (234) may be intuitively appealing, I have two objections against them. In 
the first place, I disagree with the excessive use that is made of causative paraphrases in mod-
ern syntax. A causative paraphrase for resultative sentences makes wrong predictions because, 
as Green already noted (1972: 90-1), the AP in a resultative sentence is much more restricted 
than in the causative paraphrase. In other words, a causative paraphrase is possible in many 
cases in which a TRC would be infelicitous (235a, b). The reason for this is that a verb such 
as wipe directs its force onto a specific dimension of the OBJECT-entity, while cause is like the 
default resultative verb make in not highlighting a specific dimension of the endpoint, and is 
therefore compatible with a much broader range of result states. 
(235) a.  *The waitress wiped the table stained (ROS: 93) /damp (ROS: 77). 
  b.  The waitress caused the table to become stained (ROS: 13)/ damp (ROS: 10) by 
          wiping it.  
Although verbs such as clean are standardly given a causative paraphrase and are thought to 
lexicalise a causative event structure (they are, as a consequence, frequently called 'lexical 
causatives') (cf. Lyons 1968: 352), I also challenge the accuracy of causative paraphrases for 
these verbs. Let me briefly cast a few spotlights on the semantic differences between sen-
tences with clean and their putative causative paraphrases, which should serve as an effective 
check against using causative paraphrases too rashly: (236a) denotes a single event, and no 
time delay between the waitress's activity and the result is admissible; such a time delay is, 
however, acceptable in a causative construction, which combines two events, a causing and a 
caused subevent (236a') (cf. Wierzbicka 1980: 164-6). In addition, the SUBJECT of a clean-
type sentence must be the force transmitter (236b), something that is not necessary in a causa-
tive construction (236b') (cf. Wierzbicka 1980: 163). I therefore side with Wierzbicka, who 
disputes the grounds on which causative paraphrases are made: "the existence or non-
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existence of such paraphrases as 'cause to become clean, broken, open, dead' is no argument at 
all; all these paraphrases are either highly inaccurate or superficial or both" (1980: 173; cf. 
also Kulikov, who argues that so-called 'lexical causatives' like clean or open are not "causa-
tives sensu strictu" (2001: 888-9)). For this reason, I opt for an extremely puristic use of the 
term 'causative' in syntactic description: causative constructions in English are dependent on 
overt causative verbs such as make or cause, which introduce an additional causing subevent. 
While causative constructions consist of a causing and a caused subevent (which can have 
different initiators and need not be temporally contiguous), sentences with so-called 'lexical 
causatives' describe a single force-dynamic event; in other words, clean and open are not any 
more causative than, for example, wipe and push (cf. Randall 1983: 83; Wierzbicka 1980: 
173-6). 
(236) a.   *The waitress cleaned the tables on Monday by putting a magic cleaning substance 
           on them on Sunday. 
  a'.  The waitress caused the tables to become clean on Monday by putting a magic 
         cleaning substance on them on Sunday. 
  b.   *The waitress's perseverance cleaned all the tables. 
  b'.  The waitress's perseverance caused all the tables to become clean. 
My second objection against causative paraphrases for wipe-type and clean-type sentences 
concerns the fact that the use of such paraphrases blurs the distinction between these two 
types of sentence. Levin and Rappaport-Hovav rightly decide against treating wipe-type verbs 
and clean-type verbs as a natural class of 'verbs of removal' because there is a systematic dif-
ference between them: the meaning of a wipe-type verb makes explicit the way in which the 
substance is removed from a location because it includes a manner-component (wipe, scrub, 
sweep...) or an instrument-component (sponge, mop, vacuum ...) (Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 
1991: 130-1); clean-verbs, on the other hand, lexicalise a resultant state, but do not "make[.] 
explicit how the resultant state is achieved" (Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1991: 130). From a 
force-dynamic perspective, the TRC illustrated by Mary wiped the table clean specifies both 
the manner of force transmission (wipe), and the result of force transmission (clean), while 
the sentence Mary cleaned the table leaves the manner unspecified and foregrounds only the 
result. Similar to a passive, the manner or instrument of the activity can be supplied in a sub-
ordinated by-clause, but this is an optional device. I will call resultative Constructions that 
emphasise the result of force transmission and leave the manner unspecified or in the back-
ground LEXICAL RESULTATIVE Constructions (LRC). (237) provides a number of examples 
which illustrate that the same situation can be conceptualised by either putting the initial focus 
on the manner of force transmission and the second focus on the result (TRC), or by putting 
the initial focus on the result and demoting the manner of force transmission to an optional 
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second focus (LRC).143 (237d') contains one of the few English cases in which the verb in the 
LRC is not morphologically related to the adjective in the TRC. 
(237) a.  John hammered the metal flat. 
  a'.  John flattened the metal (by hammering it). 
  b.  Mary shovelled the road clear.  
  b'.  Mary cleared the road (by shovelling it). 
  c.   John pushed the door open.  
  c'.  John opened the door (by pushing it). 
  d.  Mary stabbed John to death. 
  d'.  Mary killed John (by stabbing him). 
This analysis of the LRC also explains the redundancy constraint observed by Randall that a 
resultative phrase is only licit if the verb does not already code the result state itself (238a, b) 
(1983: 96). There are apparent exceptions to this constraint (238c, d), but they can be ac-
counted for by arguing that stone-dead in (238c) and good and wet in (238d) do not just reit-
erate the result states already implied by the matrix verbs, but serve to place particular empha-
sis on these final results (Randall 1983: 103, footnote 19). 
(238) a.  *The gardener watered the tulips wet. (ROS: 90)                (from Randall 1983: 96) 
  b.  *The maid cleaned the porch clean. (ROS: 100)                (from Randall 1983: 96) 
  c.  John killed Bob stone-dead. (ROS: 20)         
  d.  ?The gardener watered the tulips good and wet. (ROS: 40) 
           (from Randall 1983: 103, fn. 19) 
The relationship between the TRC and the LRC is mirrored in the family of MOTION Con-
structions. While the TMC puts an initial focus on the manner of the motion activity, and a 
second one on the change of location, there is a LEXICAL MOTION Construction that fore-
grounds the change of location and puts the manner of motion into the background (239).144 
(239) a.   John placed the books in a box/ on a shelf. 
  a'.  John boxed/shelved the books. 
  b.  The police threw the prisoners into jail.  
  b'.  The police jailed the prisoners. 
  c.   Mary poured the wine into bottles. 
  c'.  Mary bottled the wine. 
                                                 
143 Not every event has both a manner and a result component that could equally well be foregrounded. The 
event expressed by the sentence The sun ripened the fruit is more common in the LRC because it is difficult to 
conceptualise the manner component that is responsible for the result; the respective TRC would have to resort 
to a default resultative verb that leaves the manner similarly unspecified: The sun made the fruit ripe. Con-
versely, not every sentence in the TRC has a counterpart in the LRC: there are no sentences such as *John blued 
the wall or *The farmer fined the corns in analogy to John painted the wall blue and The farmer ground the 
corns fine because 'blue' and 'fine' do not seem to be result states salient enough to warrant lexical verbs of their 
own. While the relationship between the TRC and the LRC is rather systematic, there are, thus, pockets of idio-
syncrasy as well. 
144 Note that I do not claim that corresponding cases of the TMC and the LMC or of the TRC and the LRC are 
synonymous with the exception that one foregrounds the manner of the activity and the other the result. Al-
though the constructions are systematically related along this parameter, constructions are like words in taking 
on additional meanings as well. The sentence John boxed the books is not compatible with a violent manner 
component (cf. John threw the books into boxes), for instance. An even more extreme case of non-synonymity is 
exemplified by John placed the plan on the table and John tabled the plan, which are semantically quite distinct. 
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In addition to the LMC, (240) illustrates the SPONTANEOUS LEXICAL MOTION Construction 
(SLMC). The unprimed sentences are instances of the SMC and specify both the manner of 
the spontaneous motion activity and the change of location; the primed sentences exemplify 
the SLMC, which foregrounds the final location and puts the manner of the motion activity 
into the background. Verbs such as enter, leave, cross and arrive only code the direction of 
the movement, and the respective direct objects (or prepositional object in the case of arrive) 
characterise the location. In other words, while the direction is coded by the preposition and 
the final location by the NP it governs in the SMC, the direction is coded by the verb and the 
final location by its direct object in the SLMC (241) (cf. Jackendoff 2002: 365). 
(240) a.  John ran into the room. 
  a'.  John entered the room (by running into it). 
  b.  John stomped out of the room. 
  b'.  John left the room (by stomping out of it). 
  c.   Mary dashed across the street. 
  c'.  Mary crossed the street (by dashing across it). 
  d.   John shuffled to his house. 
  d'.  John arrived at his house (by shuffling to it). 
(241) John ran  into the room. 
   John  entered the room. 
  John  arrived at his house. 
 
 
 
The LEXICAL RESULTATIVE/MOTION Constructions also have passive counterparts, in which 
the endpoint serves as the initial focus and the initiator as the optional second focus. (242a) 
illustrates the PASSIVE LEXICAL RESULTATIVE Construction, and (242b) the PASSIVE LEXICAL 
MOTION Construction. Since SPONTANEOUS MOTION Constructions do not have an endpoint, 
the initial focus is on the new location in the PASSIVE LEXICAL SPONTANEOUS MOTION Con-
struction (242c). 
(242) a. The table was cleaned (by the waitress). 
  b. The books were shelved (by John). 
  c. The room was entered (by Mary). 
Finally, there is also an AUTONOMOUS LEXICAL RESULTATIVE Construction (ALRC) (243a, 
a'), which does not conceptualise an initiator, but presents an event as happening to the end-
point by itself. I did not find unambiguous examples of an AUTONOMOUS LEXICAL MOTION 
Construction (ALMC), possibly because there is no final location that is typically conceptual-
ised as being reached by an endpoint of its own accord (243b and b' could be regarded as in-
stances of an ALMC, though), and there is, of course, no autonomous lexical variant of the 
SPONTANEOUS MOTION CONSTRUCTION because spontaneous patterns do not contain an end-
point. 
final locationdirectionmanner of 
motion 
initiator
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(243) a.  The soup cooled. 
  a'. The door closed. 
  b.  In an infamous storm on 7th January, 1839, which sank many boats in the Firth, 
          Clytus was blown away from her moorings in Troon harbour and went aground on 
          Barassie beach (BNC BM6: 464). 
  b'. They point to a real wage drop of 10 to 12 per cent from 1790 to 1795, then a slight  
          recovery to around 5 per cent below the 1790 level over 1797-8, followed by a 
          plunge bottoming in 1800-1 at 30 per cent below the 1790 level (BNC HXC: 1029).  
The constructional view allows us to dispense with the hypothesis that verbs such as cool 
have transitive-causative (John cooled the soup) and intransitive-inchoative variants (The 
soup cooled) (Parsons 1990: 105-6; Pustejovsky 1991: 57-8; Saeed 1997: 71-2); result-
oriented constructions can either conceptualise the event as having an initiator (LRC/LMC) or 
as happening of its own accord (ALRC/ALMC). The autonomous-lexical construction types 
are rather restricted because they are subject to two preconditions: first, the result must be 
salient enough to warrant a lexical verb of its own (cf. footnote 143), and second, it must be 
conceivable that the result can be achieved autonomously. The second condition depends cru-
cially on the SUBJECT-entity as well: (244a) is acceptable because we do not intuitively con-
ceive of meteorological occurrences as being caused by something, whereas (244b) is un-
grammatical — we know from experience that a table will not become clear unless a person 
clears it (see also Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 1991: 134). 
(244) a.  The sky cleared. 
  b.  *The table cleared. 
Table 12 gives an overview of the family of RESULTATIVE and (SPONTANEOUS) MOTION Con-
structions along the parameters that have been characterised in this chapter.145 
 
                                                 
145 Participants (initiator and endpoint) are printed in boldface; the endpoints are bracketed in the first column 
because spontaneous constructions do not include an endpoint. The manner of force transmission and the result 
are underlined.  
  
 
Table 12: Overview of resultative and motion constructions 
dimensions of variation Endpoint: change of state Endpoint: change of location Initiator: change of location 
initiator first focus;  
(endpoint second focus) 
manner and result specified 
TRANSITIVE RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
John pushed the door open. 
 
TRANSITIVE MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
Mary placed the books into boxes. 
 
SPONTANEOUS MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
Mary ran into the room. 
initiator first focus;  
(endpoint second focus) 
only result specified 
LEXICAL RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
John opened the door. 
LEXICAL MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
Mary boxed the books. 
LEXICAL SPONTANEOUS MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
Mary entered the room. 
(endpoint first focus);  
initiator optional second focus 
manner and result specified 
PASSIVE RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
The door was pushed open (by John). 
PASSIVE MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
The books were placed into boxes (by Mary). 
 
(PASSIVE SPONTANEOUS MOTION CONSTRUCTION) 
Es wurde (von allen) zu den Ausgängen gerannt. 
(endpoint first focus);  
initiator optional second focus 
only result specified 
PASSIVE LEXICAL RESULTATIVE  
CONSTRUCTION 
The door was opened (by John). 
PASSIVE LEXICAL MOTION  
CONSTRUCTION 
The books were boxed (by Mary). 
 
PASSIVE LEXICAL SPONTANEOUS  
MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
The room was entered (by Mary). 
only endpoint  
manner and result specified 
AUTONOMOUS RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
The door swung open. 
AUTONOMOUS MOTION CONSTRUCTION 
The books fell into the box. 
∅ 
 
only endpoint  
 
only result specified 
AUTONOMOUS LEXICAL RESULTATIVE  
CONSTRUCTION 
The door opened. 
AUTONOMOUS LEXICAL MOTION CONSTRUC-
TION 
Oil prices bottomed at $12 a barrel. 
∅ 
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10. A figure/ground account of the Depictive Construction 
10.1  Zeroing in on the semantics of the Depictive Construction 
When we bear in mind that the terms for constructional roles are proper names, we can label 
the four roles of the DEPICTIVE Construction (DC) as SUBJECT, VERB, OBJECT and DEPICTIVE 
XP (245a). In the large majority of cases, DEPICTIVE phrases are realised by APs (245b), but 
PPs are also sometimes found (245c). The use of plain NPs as DEPICTIVE phrases is marginal in 
modern English146, yet NPs commonly occur in two functionally related constructions, the 
DETACHED DEPICTIVE Construction and the As-DEPICTIVE Construction (see 10.3). The DC is 
not governed by the restriction that only the OBJECT-entity can be predicated of by the XP; in 
addition to OBJECT-related DEPICTIVE XPs (245b, c), there are also SUBJECT-related DEPICTIVE 
phrases (245d, e). As in chapter 7, I will refer to SUBJECT-related DEPICTIVE XPs as S-
depictives, and to OBJECT-related DEPICTIVE XPs as O-depictives for the sake of convenience. 
In a few cases, a DEPICTIVE phrase may be ambiguous between an S-depictive and an O-
depictive (245f).  
(245) a.  [SUBJECT] [VERB] [OBJECT] [DEPICTIVE XP] 
  b.  Mary ate the soup hot. 
  c.  John saw Mary in a blue dress. 
  d.  Mary ate the soup  drunk. 
  e.  Mary wrote the article in high spirits. 
  f.  The police arrested John drunk.   
Like a RESULTATIVE phrase, a DEPICTIVE XP assigns a property to a participant in the event. 
Apart from that, the meaning of the DC differs markedly from that of the RC: (245b) does not 
communicate the sense that the soup became hot as a result of Mary's eating it, but that the 
soup was hot at the time that Mary ate it. It is commonly asserted that this temporal semantic 
relationship between the DEPICTIVE XP and one of the participants in the event indicates that 
DEPICTIVE phrases are adverbial in nature (e.g. Aarts 1992: 120). In addition to temporal rela-
tionships (246a), DEPICTIVE phrases can also convey other senses typically associated with 
adverbials, such as a conditional meaning (246b) (Aarts 1995: 78; Halliday 1967: 78). When 
we turn to As-DEPICTIVES for a moment, it is possible to postulate even more adverbial rela-
tions: as a painter in (246c) could be argued to have "the feel of an adjunct of manner" (Aarts 
1995: 81), and as his pupil in (246d) might be characterised as an adjunct of reason. 
                                                 
146 There is a depictive subconstruction that does not include an OBJECT (John went jogging naked; Mary arrived 
dead), and this subconstruction is also more tolerant of DEPICTIVE NPs: He was born the son of rich parents 
(ROS: 4); John returned a happy man (ROS: 4).  
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(246) a.  John drank the beer cold ('while it was cold'). 
  b. I can only carry the crate empty ('if it is empty'). 
  c.  I described Jim as a painter ('in the manner of a painter'). 
  d.  Mr Smith gave John a good mark as his best pupil ('because he was his best pupil'). 
There are a number of snags with an adverbial analysis, though. While the depictive sentence 
in (247a) entails that John was drunk, the adverbially modified sentence in (247a') does not 
necessitate such an entailment relation (Rothstein 2000: 245). Even apparently subject-
oriented adverbials only characterise the way that the subject-entity performs an activity, and 
do not entail that this entity possesses a certain property (247b) (Rothstein 2000: 245); the 
same is true of apparently object-related adverbials (247b'). As a result of the different func-
tions of adverbials and DEPICTIVE phrases, only DEPICTIVE XPs need an overtly expressed par-
ticipant in the sentence that they can refer to (247c), while adverbials do not require a lexi-
cally expressed NP to refer to (247c') (Rothstein 2000: 245). 
(247) a.   John drove the car drunk. ⇒ ??John drove the car drunk, although he was sober. 
  a'.  John drove the car drunkenly. ⇒ John drove the car drunkenly, although he was 
         sober.                (from Rothstein 2000: 245) 
  b.   John greeted Mary enthusiastically, although he was secretly very reluctant to meet 
         her.                 (from Rothstein 2000: 245) 
  b'.  John read the poem beautifully, although the poem itself was terrible. 
  c.   ??The car went round the corner drunk.             (from Rothstein 2000: 245) 
  c'.  The car went round the corner drunkenly.             (from Rothstein 2000: 245) 
All things considered, DEPICTIVE phrases refer primarily to an NP and do not modify the 
whole sentence or verb phrase as adverbials do. Adverbials modify events (Parsons 1990: 54-
8; Rothstein 2000: 246), while DEPICTIVE phrases predicate of participants in events. Like 
Napoli, I therefore assume a distinction between modification and predication (1989: 11). 
Modifiers could be regarded as parts of predicates (Napoli 1989: 12), or else modification 
might be seen as some higher-order form of predication, with the adverbial predicating of the 
whole event (cf. John drove the car. This happened drunkenly), but I take no position on the 
matter at present. What is of relevance in our context is that DEPICTIVE phrases do not modify 
an event, but predicate of the SUBJECT or OBJECT-entity in the clause. The adverbial semantics 
that have been extrapolated from the sentences in (246) cannot therefore be directly attributed 
to the DEPICTIVE phrases, but follow from the fact that the SUBJECT or OBJECT-entity is both a 
bearer of the depictive property and a participant in the clausal event. In (246a), the AP cold 
characterises a participant that is part of a dynamic event, with the consequence that the prop-
erty is interpreted as holding of the participant contemporaneously with its participation in the 
event; the AP empty in (246b) refers to the participant of a potential situation and is therefore 
interpreted as a property that conditions the realisation of the situation. An adverbial under-
standing of DEPICTIVE phrases is consequently a "chance possibility" that depends on the kind 
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of event which the characterised NP is part of, but is by no means a "necessary condition" 
(Schneider 1997: 38). 
Depictive sentences, even more so than resultative patterns, have been the focus of a 
rather fruitless complement/adjunct debate; a thorough characterisation of their semantics, on 
the other hand, has never been a major scholarly preoccupation. An exception in this respect 
is Rothstein, who has not only provided a logical representation of the RC, but of the DC as 
well. (248) contains her semantic analysis of the subject-related depictive sentence John drove 
the car drunk. 
(248) ∃e ∃e1 ∃e2 [e=S(e1    e2 ∧ DROVE(e1) ∧ Ag(e1) = JOHN ∧ Th(e1) = THE CAR ∧  
 DRUNK(e2) ∧ Exp(e2) =JOHN ∧ PART-OF(e1, e2)]; PART-OF(e1, e2) iff (i) τ(e1) ⊆ 
   τ(e2) and (ii) θm(e)1 = θn(e)2                 (from Rothstein 2000: 250) 
Let me briefly bring out the articulated nature of this logical representation. Rothstein presup-
poses that the depictive sentence consists of two subevents, an event of the AGENT John 
driving the THEME the car, and an event of the EXPERIENCER John being drunk. Both 
events are combined with the help of a summing operation to yield one complex event, and 
both the subevents and the complex event are existentially quantified. A mere addition of e1 
and e2 is not sufficient, however, because the two subevents are temporally dependent in the 
sense that "the event introduced by the verb must be temporally contained within the event 
introduced by the secondary predicate" (Rothstein 2000: 248). Condition (i), which specifies 
the PART-OF relation between e1 and e2, is supposed to guarantee that the run-time (symbol-
ised by τ) of the verbal subevent is properly contained in the run-time of the adjectival 
subevent (Rothstein 2000: 248-9). This condition alone does not faithfully predict the seman-
tics of depictive sentences because it would not preclude cases such as *John drove Mary 
drunk, in which John was involved in the activity of driving and Mary was drunk at the same 
time. Additionally, and crucially, there must be a condition that requires the two subevents to 
share a participant (in this case the participant John). A depictive sentence expresses the com-
bination of two events "which do not just overlap temporally, but which are inextricable [sic!] 
attached to each other since they share a thematic participant which is involved in both these 
events at the same time" (Rothstein 2000: 249), a prerequisite that is specified under condition 
(ii) of the PART-OF-relation. 
Rothstein's logical representation is a useful ploy for disentangling the various semantic 
threads of the DC, but it is at loggerheads with the basic tenet of functional and cognitive 
grammar which states that the syntax of a sentence is a more or less direct reflection of its 
meaning. While (248) brings out much of the nuanced semantics of the DC, it relies heavily 
on stipulative, primitive notions such as thematic roles and the two subconditions of the 
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PART-OF relation. From the perspective of cognitive and functional grammars, I am averse 
to the use of logical symbols and think that the subconditions of temporal relatedness and ar-
gument-sharing, as well as the rest of the semantics of the DC, are explicable on conceptual 
grounds.  
I propose that the semantic relationships underlying the DC can be illuminated by the 
model of force-dynamics, which also controls the RESULTATIVE and MOTION Constructions, 
in tandem with the figure/ground model that is familiar from Gestalt psychology. To take an 
example for the latter model from the perceptual domain, a book lying on a table constitutes a 
figure that stands out against the ground formed by the table: "The ground serves as a frame-
work in which the figure is suspended and thereby determines the figure" (Koffka 1935: 184). 
The figure/ground relation is not only a controlling organising principle for the visual senses, 
but holds for all the other senses as well (Koffka 1935: 200-1). Since cognitive grammars do 
not assume a strict division between the perceptual and cognitive domains, it can be hypothe-
sised that the figure/ground asymmetry is also a pervasive principle in language. A figure is 
that element in a semantic relationship that first catches our attention and is interpreted in re-
lation to a ground element. A whole number of linguistic phenomena such as adverbial rela-
tions have already been profitably approached from the figure/ground perspective (Croft 
2001: 329-35; Langacker 1999b: 41-2).  
In the DC, a force-dynamic event serves as the basis or ground for the property denoted 
by the DEPICTIVE phrase. The ground event is the reference point for the figure property, 
which is the most salient part of the DC semantically; the event and the property are indirectly 
related to each other via an entity that is both a participant in the event and the bearer of the 
property. Gestalt psychologists have pointed out that part of the field in a perceptual fig-
ure/ground relationship is represented twice: "a part of the total field, coinciding with the area 
of the small figure, is twice represented in our environmental field, once as the small figure 
itself, and once as part of the larger oblong [the ground; H.S.]" (Koffka 1935: 178). The same 
is true of the conceptualisation underlying the DC: a particular participant serves as the refer-
ence point for the figure property, but it does not stop belonging to the ground only because it 
is related to the figure. Since the figure property is contingent on an entity that participates in 
a force-dynamic event, there is an indirect relation between the depictive property and the 
clausal event, which explains the apparently adverbial relations in depictive sentences (cf. 
246). While the figure property refers to the force-dynamic ground event via its endpoint in an 
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OBJECT-related DC (figure 13a), it refers to the ground event via its initiator in a SUBJET-
related DC (figure 13b).147 
Figure 13: The force-dynamic and figure/ground model behind the DEPICTIVE Construction 
 
  a. OBJECT-related DEPICTIVE Construction 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b. SUBJECT-related DEPICTIVE Construction 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rothstein provides alternative derivations for sentences with S-depictives and O-depictives 
(2000: 251-2). Such derivational accounts are largely superfluous because world knowledge 
and contextual factors typically help to unambiguously identify a sentence as instantiating a 
SUBJECT-related DC or an OBJECT-related DC (Napoli 1989: 146). While pragmatic factors 
disambiguate the large majority of sentences (cf. John ate the meat drunk vs. John ate the 
meat raw), contextual factors usually single out one of the two potential readings in ambigu-
ous cases (e.g. The police arrested John drunk). 
                                                 
147 Along similar lines as the PASSIVE RESULTATIVE Construction (cf. footnote 123), it is also possible to inter-
pret depictive sentences not as instances of a primitive DEPICTIVE Construction, but as combinations of two 
constructions, a DEPICTIVE Construction and some kind of force-dynamic ACTIVITY Construction. Again, the 
question of whether a particular type of sentence should be interpreted as an instance of a primitive construction 
type or as a combination of two constructions largely depends on the degree of its mental entrenchment. My 
characterisation of depictive sentences in this chapter does not hinge on either of the two possibilities, but is 
compatible with both. Note, however, that the DC cannot be freely combined with any force-dynamic construc-
tion; a combination of the DC and the TRANSFER Construction is, for example, not possible: *John gave the 
coffee hot to Mary (ROS: 85); ??John gave the coffee to Mary hot (ROS: 58); *John gave Mary the coffee hot 
(ROS: 77). 
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The DEPICTIVE XP is generally located at the very end of the construction: an S-depictive 
cannot be placed directly after the SUBJECT-entity it refers to (249a vs. a'); similarly, when the 
DC is elaborated by an adverbial, the adverbial typically precedes the DEPICTIVE phrase, as 
the evaluations of 30 informants demonstrate (249b vs. b'). Since the DEPICTIVE phrase serves 
as the figure element in the construction and is therefore the semantically most salient part of 
it, this alignment of the constructional slots is expected, given that the information focus is 
normally at the end of a sentence in English.148 
(249) a.  *John undisturbed wrote the dissertation. 
  a'. John wrote the dissertation undisturbed. 
  b.  John wrote the dissertation undisturbed in his office. (9) 
 b'.  John wrote the dissertation in his office undisturbed. (21) 
A sentence does not usually tolerate more than one figure property. Examples illustrating a 
combination of an O-depictive and an S-depictive (250a), or a combination of two O-
depictives (250b) or two S-depictives (250c) are infelicitous to varying degrees, even though 
they are sometimes quoted in the literature. As soon as there are two figure properties that 
refer to one or even two participants in the ground event, there is no longer an unambiguous 
focus in the sentence and the figure/ground relationship becomes difficult to process; the 
situation diagrammed in figure 14 for a sentence such as (250a) is consequently ruled out.149 
(250) a.  *Johni ate the meatk rawk nakedi. (ROS: 100) 
  b.  *He ate the meat raw, red. (ROS: 73) 
  c.  ?John danced on the table naked, drunk. (ROS: 41) 
Figure 14: Only one DEPICTIVE XP allowed in the DC 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Furthermore, the figure/ground model requires a figure property to refer to only one partici-
pant in the ground event. This is the reason why the sentences in (251) are ungrammatical: 
                                                 
148 In information-structure terms, the force-dynamic event is presupposed, while the figure property contains 
new information. Green showed that the sentence Did the English burn Joan alive? presupposes that the English 
did burn Joan; if such a presupposition is absent, the question becomes odd (cf. Did the English burn Washing-
ton alive?) (1970: 275).  
149 When the two DEPICTIVE phrases are coordinated and form a complex figure, the resulting sentence becomes 
acceptable, though: He ate the meat raw and red; John danced on the table naked and drunk. A complex figure 
is, of course, not possible for (250a): *John ate the meat raw and naked.  
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adjectives such as delicious and boring do not characterise an entity per se, but express a rela-
tion between an entity and a person responding to this entity (see also 11.4.6.2). The configu-
ration depicted in figure 15 is therefore as impossible as that in figure 14. 
(251) a.  *John drank the coffee delicious. (ROS: 100) 
  b. *Mary read the book boring. (ROS: 100) 
Figure 15: DEPICTIVE XP must refer to only one participant 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
The following section will examine the deductive consequences of the conceptual model 
sketched in figure 13 by describing the associations between lexical items and the slots of the 
DC. While the logical representation in (248) describes the basic meaning of the DC quite 
well, it is not equipped to handle these more fine-grained conditions, which are a result of the 
force-dynamic and figure/ground relationships controlling the DC. 
10.2 Conditions on the slots of the Depictive Construction 
It has already been emphasised that the depictive figure refers to a force-dynamic ground 
event. The verbs that can be associated with the VERB-slot of the DC must consequently be 
compatible with the dynamism and asymmetry inherent in the force-dynamic configuration. 
Like the RC, the DC does not normally tolerate stative verbs (252) (cf. Demonte 1987: 5-7; 
Rapaport 1993: 172). 
(252) a.  *John loves Mary happy. (ROS: 100) 
  b.  *John has two children sad. (ROS: 100) 
  c.  *John lives in L.A. bored. (ROS: 85) 
The reason why the ground event is typically dynamic resides in the characteristics of the fig-
ure/ground relationship. On the assumption that a sentence referring to a stative situation is 
invariable in the sense that it holds true at all instances of the situation, the DC could not sin-
gle out a property that holds of a participant only temporarily because every property would 
characterise the participant in a permanent fashion. A permanent attribute is not information-
ally salient enough to serve as a figure property in the DC because it would, in a manner of 
speaking, merge into the ground event along with the participant. A sentence denoting a dy-
force
Endpoint 
(Ground) 
Initiator 
(Ground) 
SUBJECT     VERB  OBJECT DEPICTIVE XP
Figure 
property
Figure 
property
A FIGURE/GROUND ACCOUNT OF THE DEPICTIVE CONSTRUCTION 
 
248
namic event such as John drove the car, on the other hand, can code temporally distinct in-
stances of the event, so that John may be drunk at one instance and sober at another. A static 
relationship such as that described in (252b) is not compatible with the idea of temporally 
distinct instances; thus, when John's children are referred to as sad in (252b), they must be 
referred to as sad in all temporal instances of the situation described by the sentence, which is 
contrary to the requirement that a figure must temporarily stand out from the ground to cap-
ture our attention. A property that holds of an entity in a permanent fashion cannot therefore 
be expressed by a DEPICTIVE phrase, but requires different linguistic means such as, for ex-
ample, an attributive adjective, which becomes part of the participant in the ground situation 
(John has two sad children). 
Although the force-dynamic requirement for the ground event seems to be correct for a 
first pass, the OBJECT-related DEPICTIVE XPs with like-type verbs in (253a, a') and the SUB-
JECT-related phrases in categorical predications (253b, b') offer contradictory evidence be-
cause they relate to participants in stative situations. 
(253) a.  John likes his women plump.      (from Green 1973: 267) 
  a'.  "I think I prefer you drunk," Sandison said (BNC ASN: 2231). 
  b.   Mary is attractive nude. (ROS: 25)              (from Arimoto 1991: 108) 
  b'.  Mary looks even more fantastic naked. (ROS: 15)   
Given that these sentences are static, it stands to reason that the ground event need not neces-
sarily express a force-dynamic relationship as long as it is compatible with the idea of variable 
instantiations. Sentence (253a) does not express an invariable relationship because the set of 
John's women may be different from instance to instance; the sentence therefore means that 
'for every woman who is part of the potential set of John's women, the condition holds that 
this woman must be plump for John to like her'. A sentence such as *John loves his girlfriend 
plump is ungrammatical, on the other hand, because it expresses an invariable situation: in 
contrast to his women in (253a), his girlfriend is a constant with a fixed reference. Similarly, 
the ground situation in (253b) can have various instances, and Mary is only attractive in those 
instances when she is nude. *Mary is attractive tall excludes the possibility of different in-
stances and is therefore ruled out. Compared to force-dynamic grounds, depictive sentences 
with stative grounds are clearly the exception. Such sentences are restricted to a small number 
of verbs (e.g. like, prefer, be and look), and these verbs only show very weak associations 
with the DC. Of 1,080 sentences extracted from the BNC that include the main verb like, for 
example, only a fraction of seven (0.6%) belongs to the DC. (254) gives two more examples 
of what could be called the CONDITIONAL DEPICTIVE Construction with like in the VERB-slot. 
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(254) a.  I don't like it stone cold, I just like it nice, cos if it's too hot you can't taste it (BNC 
        KB8: 6563). 
  b.  He liked her in minuscule bikinis or high-cut swimming costumes (BNC FRS: 719). 
Since the ground event and the figure property must be compatible with the idea of variable 
instantiations, the ground event is usually dynamic or 'conditional', and the figure typically 
denotes a temporary property. As has repeatedly been pointed out in the literature, the DEPIC-
TIVE phrase must host a stage-level adjective, and not an individual-level adjective (255) 
(Rapoport 1993: 171-2). 
(255) a.  John wrote his dissertation drunk/ *intelligent. 
  b.  The maid mopped the floor hungry/ *friendly.    (from Randall 1983: 98) 
  c.  The baker loaded the bread fresh/ *white.             (from Rapoport 1993: 171) 
Only properties expressed by stage-level adjectives such as drunk, hungry or fresh are "escap-
able from" (Randall 1983: 98) and consequently need not be present at all instances of the 
ground event, while properties denoted by individual-level adjectives such as intelligent, 
friendly and white characterise their respective entities at all instances of an event. Individual-
level properties are normally realised as attributive adjectives, which help to identify an entity 
by highlighting one of its permanent attributes (e.g. The friendly maid mopped the floor). 
A rather technical explanation for the different acceptability of stage-level and individ-
ual-level adjectives in the DC has been submitted by Rapoport, who thinks that dynamic 
verbs exclusively license stage-level adjectives, which contain an e(vent)-place, whereas indi-
vidual-level adjectives, which describe permanent properties, do not contain an e-place and 
can therefore not be licensed by a dynamic verb (1993: 173-5). This account can be placed on 
a cognitively more plausible footing when it is argued that the property must be temporary in 
order to apply to only a subset of the instances expressed by the dynamic event; a permanent 
property applies to all potential instances of an event and does not therefore have the salience 
required of a figure. This requirement can be illustrated with a perceptual analogue: when the 
electric lights on a Christmas tree come on and off because of a loose connection, they almost 
necessarily capture the viewer's attention because they temporarily stand out from the ground; 
when the electric lights burn continuously, however, they are more likely to merge with the 
ground and to become one of the permanent characteristics of the Christmas tree. 
In a typical DC, a temporary property thus characterises a participant in a dynamic event. 
Not every participant in the event can serve as a reference point for the figure property, 
though; it is imperative that the participant is either the initiator or the endpoint in the event 
and not, for example, the instrument or location (256a, b). 
(256) a.  *Mary cut the meat with a knife sharp.  
  b.  *Mary cut the meat in the kitchen hot. 
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The participants in an event are not all of the same standing. Mary and the meat are centrally 
involved in the cutting-activity described in (256a, b), which is not conceivable without an 
initiator and an endpoint. The instrument a knife and the location the kitchen, on the other 
hand, are more peripheral participants that merely elaborate the event: even when they are not 
overtly expressed, we know that a cutting-activity includes an instrument and takes place at 
some location; in many cases, these components of the semantic structure can therefore be left 
unspecified and interpreted freely. Instruments and locations elaborate ACTIVITY-
Constructions, but they are not central enough conceptually to serve as reference points for a 
figure property. In other words, a DEPICTIVE phrase can only refer to those participants that 
are obligatorily profiled by the respective construction (figure 16). 
Figure 16: Participants serving as reference points for the figure property in force-dynamic constructions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initiator/endpoint-requirement is very strong. Even obligatory participants that have less 
salient functions in an event as goals in a TRANSFER Construction (257a, b) or topics in a 
communication event (257c) do not constitute felicitous reference points for DEPICTIVE 
phrases (Culicover and Wilkins 1986: 130). 
(257) a.  *Mary received the letter nervous. (ROS: 85) 
  b.  *John gave Mary the letter drunk. (ROS: 80) 
  c.  *The teacher talked about the boy ashamed. (ROS: 100)  
While all kinds of initiators can be characterised by a figure property (258a, b), endpoints 
serving as reference points for DEPICTIVE XPs are typically restricted to a small number of 
event-types, such as those expressed by INCREMENTAL-THEME Constructions (258c, c'), IT-
ERATIVE-ACTIVITY Constructions (258d), and TRANSFER Constructions (258e, e'). 
(258) a.  The officers believe Elizabeth and Julie had been sunbathing naked on the remote 
        beach, confident they would not be seen (BNC CBE: 1445). 
  b.  [I]f the man had been lurking in disreputable quarters and lurching home drunk, it 
        was his own fault (BNC A7A: 1064). 
  c.  Should you eat it raw or cooked? (BNC CB8: 2773) 
  c'. How could he drink his tea so hot, so quickly? (BNC FRC: 833) 
  d.  Charlie chewed the meat raw.           (from Jackendoff 1990a: 226) 
  e.  Sue handed him the towel wet.                           (from Goldberg 1991: 86) 
  e'. I am loath to take it back to SMAC where I bought it new (BNC AN2: 1715). 
What is striking is that the sorts of events that are compatible with O-depictives are exactly 
those that do not tolerate resultative phrases: the force in an INCREMENTAL-THEME Construc-
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tion 'passes through' the endpoint by increments, but does not change it in a specific property; 
the endpoint in an ITERATIVE-ACTIVITY Construction is repeatedly impinged upon by the 
force it receives, but is not changed along one of its property dimensions.150 Similarly, the 
endpoint in a TRANSFER Construction is changed in its location as a whole, and is not affected 
in a particular property; this is also true of (258e') because "change in possession" is "a kind 
of change of location" (Tenny 1994: 92; see also Croft 1991: 206-7) with the qualification 
that "[p]ossession is a discontinuous 'space,' with no intermediate points between one posses-
sor and another: something can be halfway between two spatial locations A and B, but some-
thing cannot be halfway between belonging to A and belonging to B" (Jackendoff 2002: 361). 
An O-depictive can therefore not characterise the endpoint in a resultative sentence (259), 
even though such examples are sometimes quoted in the literature. 
(259) a.  *Bill cooked the meat dry unsalted. (ROS: 77) 
  b.  *We hammered the metal flat hot. (ROS: 87)         (from Aarts 1992: 58) 
The mutual exclusion of resultative phrases and O-depictives could be due to a clash of con-
ceptualisations of the OBJECT-entity in the two constructions: in the RC, the endpoint is high-
lighted in one of its property dimensions, the current instantiation of which is changed by the 
force-transmission event (e.g. 'shape' in 259b); the figure property in the DC characterises the 
OBJECT as a whole, however, and not just the dimension evoked by the VERB and the RESUL-
TATIVE phrase. Even when the endpoint is consumed as in John ate the meat raw, every in-
crement of the meat is still meat and can be characterised by raw, but hot can only refer to the 
metal as a physical object and not to its shape-dimension in (259b).151  
A DEPICTIVE phrase cannot just highlight any property of the initiator or endpoint in a 
force-dynamic event. While (260a, b) are acceptable instances of the DC, (260a') is odd and 
(260b') unacceptable. 
(260) a.   The waiter danced naked. (ROS: 0)       (from Aarts 1995: 90) 
  a'.  ?The waiter smiled naked. (ROS: 45)       (from Aarts 1995: 90) 
                                                 
150 The sentence Mary chewed her knuckles raw must be interpreted as an instance of the RC (Jackendoff 1990a: 
226): the OBJECT-entity her knuckles is affected by the activity 'chew', with the result that they are raw at the end 
of the event. In (258d), the meat does not become raw as a consequence of the chewing-event, but raw is a char-
acteristic of the meat during the event. Since chew can express different sorts of force transmission and highlight 
different aspects of its endpoint, it is compatible with both the RC and the DC (cf. also John burned the steak 
black vs. They burned the witch alive). 
151 This clash of OBJECT-conceptualisations also serves to answer Green's question why a sentence such as Ruby 
shot Oswald dead can only mean that Oswald came to be dead as a result of being shot, but not that Oswald was 
already dead when Ruby started to shoot at him. Green asserts that this is not a self-evident interpretation: 
"Could we not imagine that as they [some group of mystics; H.S.] develop an allegorical tradition, they may 
invent a story about a fallen angel whose crime was that 'he shot Oswald dead' meaning that he shot a bullet into 
the dead body of the man who was called Oswald? If not, can anyone say why not?" (1970: 275). It is, of course, 
possible to conceptualise the situation envisaged by Green, but the force conventionally associated with shoot 
highlights the endpoint as a living being that becomes dead as a result of the event. Shoot is therefore a verb that 
is only compatible with the RC, but not with the DC.  
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  b.   My daughter only eats the vegetables cooked. (ROS: 25) 
  b'.  *My daughter only eats the vegetables expensive. (ROS: 100)  
           (from Demonte 1987: 7) 
Demonte concludes from the infelicity of some DEPICTIVE XPs that they "appear to be in some 
sense selected by the main verb" (1987: 7), and Aarts maintains that there must be some sort 
of pragmatic compatibility between them and the verbal event (1995: 91). While a selection-
account is contrary to the spirit of Construction grammar, Aarts' hypothesis can be fleshed out 
by the figure/ground model underlying the DC: a figure property may only characterise an 
entity in a way that can be construed as being relevant to the participation of the entity in the 
ground event. The activity The waiter smiled profiles the facial expression of the initiator, and 
no sensible relation can be construed between the waiter's facial expression and his nakedness 
(260a'); in (260a), on the other hand, the waiter is profiled as a moving figure in a dancing 
event, and the property naked may be conceived of as characterising the moving figure. Simi-
larly, eating-activities highlight the endpoints as edible objects, so while cooked may be con-
strued as relevant to such an activity, expensive cannot. The latter property may, however, 
serve as the figure in a TRANSFER Construction: John bought the painting expensive. 
One last constraint on the figure property may be mentioned here. The DEPICTIVE phrase 
is typically a non-graded adjective (Aarts 1992: 63-4), so the sentences in (261) are unusual. 
(261) a.  *He ate the nuts extremely salted. (ROS: 86)      (from Aarts 1992: 64) 
  b. *John ate the meat as raw as Mary did. (ROS: 81) 
  c. ??How drunk did John drive the car? (ROS: 61) 
Figure properties that are absolute and not graded stand out more strongly from the ground, 
which can be seen as a linguistic analogue to the perceptual principle that a visual fig-
ure/ground configuration is more pronounced when "[t]he figure is harder, more strongly 
structured, and more impressive" (Koffka 1935: 189; see also Croft 2001: 332). 
10.3 Mapping out the functional space of depictive and related constructions 
10.3.1  Attributive and predicative constructions 
The differences between the DC (262a) and sentences with attributive adjectives (262b) have 
already been hinted at in the preceding section. 
(262) a. Bill drank the coffee cold. 
  b. Bill drank the cold coffee. 
Aarts asserts that such sentence pairs "are close, but not identical, in meaning", paraphrasing 
(262a) with a temporal adverbial clause ('while it was cold') and (262b) with a non-restrictive 
relative clause ('which was cold') (1995: 77). Paraphrases must be handled with care because 
it can be misleading to explain one structure on the matrix of another; what Aarts' paraphrases 
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demonstrate, however, is that DEPICTIVE XPs indirectly refer to an event via one of its partici-
pants, while attributive adjectives "are part of the NP combining with N to form a Common 
Noun expression, and they are not temporally related to the matrix verb at all" (Rothstein 
2000: 244). In other words, a DEPICTIVE phrase denotes a property that holds of a participant 
on a special occasion, while an attributive adjective characterises an entity in a permanent 
fashion — the entity does not even have to evince the quality at the particular instance re-
ferred to by the sentence (263a vs. b). 
(263) a.  *I met the man drunk again, but this time he was sober.       (Rothstein 2000: 244) 
  b.  I met the drunk man again, but this time he was sober.       (Rothstein 2000: 244) 
Bolinger has aptly described the typical function of attributive adjectives as "reference modi-
fication" (1967b: 14). Since reference modification serves to characterise an entity in a per-
manent fashion, only those adjectives and participles that denote a stable and salient property 
of the head noun can be used attributively (1967b: 7-12). Consequently, "if an adjective 
names a quality that is too fleeting to characterize anything" (1967b: 9), it is barred from at-
tributive use (cf. *the ready man, *withdrawn money and *a mistake-erasing secretary; 
Bolinger 1967b: 6, 9). Wierzbicka has argued cogently that reference modification enriches 
the conceptualisation of an entity by adding a permanent feature to "the image evoked by a 
noun" (1986: 374). An attributive adjective modifies the reference system of a noun and is 
therefore tightly bound up with our conceptualisation of the entity the noun refers to; a 
crooked lawyer means 'crooked qua lawyer', so ?a crooked cousin is odd because the concept 
of a cousin does not include the dimension of 'crookedness' (Bolinger 1967b: 22). An attribu-
tive adjective is thus "an intrinsic part of defining the reference of the entire NP" (Napoli 
1989: 20). Croft calls the image evoked by a noun a "cognitive file" (1991: 118) and argues 
that "restrictive modification helps fix the identity of what one is talking about (reference) by 
narrowing the description" (1991: 52) (see also 11.4.6.2). 
A predicative adjective (e.g. The man is asleep) often does not add a permanent feature to 
the cognitive file of an entity, but rather "provides a secondary comment (predication) on the 
head that it modifies" (Croft 1991: 52), a function that Bolinger calls "referent modification" 
(1967b: 20). Referent modification provides new information on an entity, the validity of 
which is frequently restricted to a special occasion. The predication The student is eager does 
not necessarily mean that the student is eager qua student, but may also denote a student that 
is eager to go to the next seminar, for example, and The cousin is crooked does not normally 
modify the reference system of cousin, but more probably refers to the behaviour of the 
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cousin in a special situation (Bolinger 1967b: 21-2).152 To reiterate, an attributive adjective 
typically evokes the noun as a class and adds a feature to the conceptualisation of this class, 
while a predicative adjective frequently refers to an individual representative of the class and 
designates a property of this individual on a particular occasion. The DEPICTIVE phrase is a 
prime example of a predicative adjective because it singles out a temporary quality of an en-
tity at a specific instance. While an attributive adjective becomes part of the nominal refer-
ence system and therefore merges with its head noun into the clausal event, a DEPICTIVE ad-
jective highlights a salient property of a noun on a specific occasion and stands in a fig-
ure/ground relationship with the noun and the event it belongs to.  
10.3.2  Functional map of depictive figure/ground constructions 
In contrast to the semantic difference between DEPICTIVE phrases and attributive adjectives, 
which is rather straightforward, the functional distinctions between the DC (264a) and other 
examples of referent-modification such as the NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSE Construc-
tion (264b), the DETACHED DEPICTIVE Construction (264c) and the As-DEPICTIVE Construc-
tion (264d) has not been described systematically yet (Schneider 1997: 41).  
(264) a.  The teacher taught the English lesson drunk. 
  b.  The teacher, who was drunk, taught the English lesson. 
  c.  Drunk as a skunk, the teacher taught the English lesson. 
  d.  The teacher taught the English lesson as a notorious drunkard. 
I will briefly characterise these constructions separately before I attempt to integrate them into 
a two-dimensional functional map. Each of these constructions constitutes a topic of interest 
in itself and will have to be treated much more intensively than can be done here.  
The conceptualisation behind depictive clauses and non-restrictive relative clauses differs 
along two dimensions: first, the property named by the DEPICTIVE phrase is foregrounded 
relative to the rest of the sentence, while the characteristic designated by the non-restrictive 
relative clause is backgrounded relative to a main-clause participant. Second, the reference 
point for a depictive property is a participant in the event and, indirectly, the event as well; the 
reference point for a non-restrictive relative clause, on the other hand, is only the entity that is 
more closely described by it. The adjective drunk in (264a) characterises the teacher and indi-
rectly his participation in the ground event, whereas the non-restrictive relative clause in 
(264b) only gives additional information on the teacher. Since non-restrictive relative clauses 
                                                 
152 The distinction between attributive and predicative adjectives is not absolute. Since predicative adjectives 
after be can also modify the reference system of the subject noun, Bolinger distinguishes between two kinds of 
be predications that he calls betemp (e.g. The girl is foolish) and ben temp (e.g. The girl was faint) (1967b: 14). Simi-
larly, attributive adjectives may denote a temporary quality of their head noun when the referent of the noun has 
already been established in discourse (Bolinger 1967b: 25). 
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are not related to the main-clause event, they are much less constrained semantically than DE-
PICTIVE phrases. A DC such as *He ate the steak expensive is odd because expensive does not 
characterise the steak with respect to its participation in the eating-event, while He ate the 
steak, which had been expensive is possible because the non-restrictive relative clause refers 
exclusively to its head noun without also implying a semantic relationship with the main-
clause proposition. The conceptualisation behind the DC thus comprises the whole event that 
serves as the ground for the DEPICTIVE phrase (figure 17a), while the conceptualisation behind 
the NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSE Construction only includes the entity that is more 
closely described by the information backgrounded in the relative clause (figure 17b). 
Figure 17: Comparison of the conceptualisations behind the DEPICTIVE Construction and the  
     NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSE Construction 
 
a. DEPICTIVE Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSE Construction 
 
 
            Participant 
          
 
 
 
 
The DC and the NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSE Construction thus contrast along two 
parameters: the property in the former is foregrounded and refers to the event as a whole (via 
one of its participants), while the property in the latter is backgrounded and refers only to an 
entity, but not to the event that entity is part of. There is a construction, which I call the DE-
TACHED DEPICTIVE Construction, that is similar to the DC in that it refers to a participant plus 
the event it takes part in, but is also parallel to the NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSE Con-
struction in that the property it denotes is backgrounded. A DETACHED DEPICTIVE phrase is 
separated from the rest of the clause by comma-intonation and typically occupies the sen-
tence-initial or sentence-final position (Biber et al. 1999: 136; Smith 1977: 332). Like ordi-
nary depictive phrases, detached depictives are more felicitous when they do not simply add a 
characteristic to an entity, but when they characterise that entity with respect to its participa-
tion in the respective event (265).  
Participant 2 
 
Property 
(foregrounded) 
Participant 1 
Property  
(backgrounded)
A FIGURE/GROUND ACCOUNT OF THE DEPICTIVE CONSTRUCTION 
 
256
(265) a.  John started to smile, glad that Mary seemed to like him/ ??completely naked. 
  a'. Naked, Julia stretched under the sheet, stretched so hard she pulled her stomach 
        muscles to their full length (BNC A0R: 5). 
  b.  A hard-core minimalist/ ??Just 20 years old, John despised Construction grammar. 
  b'. Just 20 years old, John published his first monograph. 
  c.  An excellent actor/ ??Married with two children, John performed on Broadway. 
  c'. Married with two children, John regularly visited young actresses.  
Non-restrictive relative clauses are not subject to this restriction: John, who was naked, 
started to smile; John, who was just 20 years old, despised Construction grammar; John, who 
was married with two children, performed on Broadway. Not surprisingly therefore, the rela-
tionship of detached depictives with the rest of the sentence is often characterised as adver-
bial, like that between the DEPICTIVE phrase and the event in the DC (e.g. Biber et al. 1999: 
137; Quirk 1972: 256-7; 760-4). The main difference between the DC and the DETACHED DE-
PICTIVE Construction is that the latter puts the characteristics of an entity into the background 
like a non-restrictive relative clause (figure 18). When the detached predicative is placed at 
the beginning of the sentence, it serves as a kind of frame for the rest of the clause, while its 
function resembles that of an afterthought in sentence-final position (An excellent actor, John 
performed on Broadway vs. John performed on Broadway, an excellent actor). 
Figure 18: Conceptualisation behind the DETACHED DEPICTIVE Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is one construction that our discussion has bypassed so far, namely the As-DEPICTIVE 
Construction. In contrast to bare depictive phrases, as-depictives are invariably realised by 
NPs and never by APs; moreover, they can refer to almost any entity in the clause, not just to 
the initiator or the endpoint, as is evidenced by the examples in (266) (Schneider 1997: 37).  
(266) a. The president gave a speech as the head of state.  
  b. John ate a steak as his favourite kind of meal. 
  c. John gave Mary a kiss as his favourite girlfriend. 
  d. The accident happened to her as a young woman.  
  e. We always visit her in summer as the best time of year. 
The fact that as-depictives can also clearly occur as nominal postmodifiers (e.g. Mary's job as 
a teacher of teenagers is very hard) stands as an argument in favour of analysing as-
depictives as NP-postmodifiers in general: "the as-string depends syntactically not upon the 
main clause predicate but solely upon a single NP" (Schneider 1997: 37). Unlike a bare depic-
tive XP, an as-depictive refers only to an entity in the clause, and not to also to the event the 
entity participates in; as a consequence, as-depictives are not nearly as constrained as bare 
Participant 2 
 
Property 
(backgrounded) 
Participant 1 
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depictives or detached depictives. Semantically, an as-depictive "introduces a distinction into 
sub-categories to what before seemed to be a notionally holistic entity" (Schneider 1997: 37), 
i.e. it highlights one specific facet of a multidimensional entity. As opposed to a non-
restrictive relative clause (cf. figure 17b), the property (or, more precisely, the role/function) 
that has been singled out serves as a figure relative to the entity characterised (figure 19). 
Figure 19: Conceptualisation behind the As-depictive Construction 
 
 
      Participant 
 
 
 
 
 
It remains to be explained why the as-depictive is not, like a non-restrictive relative clause, 
normally placed immediately after the NP it modifies, but usually occupies the sentence-final 
position. For Aarts, the fact that most as-depictives cannot be felicitously placed directly after 
their head nouns (e.g. *John gave Mary as his favourite girlfriend a kiss) constitutes an argu-
ment against their analysis as NP-postmodifiers (1992: 119). This objection is uninformed, 
though. In Construction grammar, the term 'discontinuous constituent' refers to a situation in 
which a syntactic component is separated from the phrase it is semantically related to for rea-
sons of information structure (cf. the examples in 267) (Croft 2001: 187). In the As-DEPICTIVE 
Construction, the as-phrase serves as the informationally salient figure and is therefore aptly 
placed at the very end of the construction. 
(267) a.  A guy came in who I hadn't seen since high school.      (from Croft 2001: 191)  
  b.  A picture is hanging on the wall of a famous movie actor.  
                 (from Jackendoff 2002: 147) 
Table 13 is a first approximation of the functional map formed by the semantically related 
constructions that have been discussed in this chapter. These constructions differ along two 
dimensions: first, whether the depictive property (in the widest sense of the term) is fore-
grounded (indicated by bold type) or backgrounded (indicated by shading); and second, 
whether the property refers only to an entity in the event (indicated by bold underlining) or to 
an entity plus its participation in the event (indicated by normal underlining). 
Just to make the picture complete, there are also depictive phrases that do not character-
ise a participant but refer directly to an event. The ABSOLUTE DEPICTIVE Construction con-
tains a subject/predicate relationship that is backgrounded relative to the rest of the event (cf. 
Biber et al. 1999: 137; Hantson 1989: 214-5; Napoli 1989: 125-7). In the large majority of 
cases, this construction is introduced by with (268). 
Property 
(foregrounded) 
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(268) a.  With John helping me I shall succeed.               (from Hantson 1989: 215) 
  b.  With football on TV, there is hardly anyone at school.       (from Hoekstra 1992: 146) 
  c.  With the bus drivers on strike, we'll have to ride our bicycles. 
          (from Napoli 1989: 125) 
Finally, some As-DEPICTIVE phrases refer to a ground event as a whole, and not to a partici-
pant in this event (269). I will call this rare pattern PROPOSITIONAL As-DEPICTIVE Construc-
tion to distinguish it from the prototypical NP-postmodifying As-DEPICTIVE Construction. 
(269) a. I don't walk my children home from school as a responsibility, but as a treat.  
           (from Napoli 1989: 159) 
  b. John sells cars as a profession. 
Table 13: Functional map of depictive figure/ground constructions 
 property foregrounded property backgrounded 
reference point for property: 
participant 
AS-DEPICTIVE Construction 
 
John returned home as a rich man. 
NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSE 
Construction 
John, who was a rich man, returned home.
reference point for property: 
participant plus event 
BARE DEPICTIVE Construction 
 
John ate the meat drunk. 
DETACHED DEPICTIVE Construction 
 
Glad that Mary seemed to like him, John 
started to smile. 
reference point for property: 
event 
PROPOSITIONAL AS-DEPICTIVE Constr. 
John sells cars as a profession. 
ABSOLUTE DEPICTIVE Construction 
With John helping me, I will succeed. 
The two-dimensional functional space illustrated in table 13 is only a first step towards gain-
ing a deeper understanding of the family of depictive constructions, and the predictions it 
makes will have to be matched against additional data by future research. 
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11. A mental-space account of the Qualifying Construction 
11.1  The Qualifying Construction and functionally related patterns 
The third secondary-predicate construction to be looked at differs markedly from the RESUL-
TATIVE and DEPICTIVE Constructions. While those two constructions typically code force-
dynamic events (270a), the QUALIFYING Construction (QC) denotes a stative mental relation-
ship between a SUBJECT-entity and an OBJECT-entity (270a'). In contrast to the dynamism and 
asymmetry inherent in force-dynamic events, states do not have a clear starting-point or end-
point; moreover, since they do not code change, they present a situation as stable through 
time, i.e. as exhibiting no internal temporal structure (cf. Newman 1982: 155; Schopf 1976: 8-
9).153 Only resultative and depictive sentences, which contain a volitional force-transmitter, 
are found in wh-clefts (270b), can occur in the imperative mood (270c), and may serve as 
complements of a main verb such as promise (270d); a qualifying sentence, on the other hand, 
is incompatible with the dynamic predicate do (270b') and the volitionality implied by the 
imperative mood (270c') or the predicate promise (270d') (cf. Hoekstra 1992: 158; Parsons 
1990: 37; Saeed 1997: 109). Furthermore, only resultative and depictive sentences have an 
extension in time that can be brought into relief by the progressive aspect (270e), whereas 
extension is an irrelevant dimension for qualifying sentences, which therefore do not normally 
tolerate the progressive (270e').154 
(270) a.  The waitress wiped the table clean./ Mary ate the soup hot. 
  a'. John considers Mary intelligent. 
   b.  What the waitress did was wipe the table clean./ What Mary did was eat the soup 
    hot. 
  b'. ??What John did was consider Mary intelligent. (ROS: 65) 
  c.  Wipe the table clean!/ Eat the soup hot! 
  c'. ?Consider Mary intelligent! (ROS: 46) 
  d.  The waitress promised to wipe the table clean./ Mary promised to eat the soup hot. 
  d'. *John promised to consider Mary intelligent. (ROS: 77) 
                                                 
153 Stative constructions must be distinguished from patterns that express two-way causal relations between an 
experiencer and a stimulus (cf. 9.2.1). Sentences such as John knows English or John considers Mary intelligent 
make a statement about "all temporal slices of the individual that they are predicated of" (Hoekstra 1992: 159), 
while John saw Mary or John remembered the answer predicate something of "only a segment, or stage of the 
individual" (Hoekstra 1992: 158). 
154 Again, it is not the verb that is stative, but the construction it appears in. Consider is also compatible with the 
MENTAL ACTIVITY Construction:  
a.  Over the past couple of years, Waverley Borough Council have been considering a number 
   of plans to redevelop the area (BNC BM4: 2616). 
b.  The less the capacity to learn and consider, the greater is the habit instinctive (BNC BMY: 
      485). 
The MENTAL ACTIVITY Construction shows the typical force-dynamic characteristics: What they did was con-
sider the plan seriously./ Please consider this plan!/ They promised to consider the plan./ They were considering 
the plan. 
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  e.  The waitress was wiping the table clean./ Mary was eating the soup hot. 
  e'. ??John is considering Mary a fool. (ROS: 65) 
The SUBJECT of the QUALIFYING Construction is not a volitional initiator, nor is the OBJECT an 
endpoint that is changed in the course of the event. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to 
accommodate qualifying sentences more closely to force-dynamic secondary-predicate con-
structions. Verspoor has argued that a qualifying sentence codes a mental force-dynamic 
event: "In the case of wipe the causation is physical and concrete and in the case of consider 
the causation is mental and abstract" (1997: 434). In a sentence such as John considers Mary 
intelligent, his view goes, the SUBJECT John mentally moves the OBJECT Mary into the cate-
gory intelligent (1997: 448). From a Construction-grammar perspective, there is no need to 
relate formally similar sentences to a common semantic core when this is semantically far-
fetched: qualifying sentences denote permanent mental states, and although a categorising act 
may have preceded John's subjective assessment of Mary as intelligent, this is not part of the 
meaning of the sentence John considers Mary intelligent.155 RESULTATIVE and QUALIFYING 
Constructions constitute distinct pairings of form and meaning and thus need not be treated 
together functionally — the opportunity to describe every construction in its own terms is, in 
fact, one of the great advantages of Construction grammar over discrete accounts, which force 
similar kinds of complex-transitive, small-clause, complex-predicate or Predication-theory 
analysis on semantically different secondary-predicate constructions. 
The meaning of the QC is quite abstract and much more difficult to pin down than that of 
force-dynamic secondary-predicate constructions. To gain a deeper understanding of the se-
mantic relationships underlying a sentence such as (271a), I will attempt to calibrate its mean-
ing in comparison to functionally related patterns: a consider-type mental verb can also be 
followed by a that-clause (271b), a non-finite clause (272c), or the NP as XP-pattern (272d) 
(Schneider 1997: 40). For expository convenience, I subsume these four constructions under 
the term 'qualifying patterns'. 
(271) a.  John considers Mary intelligent. 
   b.  John thinks that Mary is intelligent. 
  c. John believes Mary to be intelligent. 
  d. John regards Mary as intelligent. 
                                                 
155 There is a type of sentence including consider that typically occurs in the imperative mood (a-c). I do not 
analyse these examples as instances of the QUALIFYING Construction, but as resultative sentences in which the 
SUBJECT-entity has some authority over a situation and uses an imperative speech-act to force his or her judge-
ment of a situation onto the interlocutor. These sentences can indeed be regarded as expressing a kind of mental 
force in Verspoor's sense, but my assessment is that they are more similar to social resultative sentences such as I 
declare the meeting finished (cf. 9.2.3) than to qualifying sentences such as John considers Mary intelligent. 
a.  [C]onsider our friendship void! (BNC AD9: 3157) 
b.  Let us consider ourselves engaged; I will marry no one else, I promise (BNC CD2: 1259). 
c.  "[C]onsider me gone," said Scarlet, but she didn't go (BNC G1D: 2334). 
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The relatedness of these four qualifying patterns is also acknowledged in generative and de-
scriptive accounts. As has already been laid out (cf. 5.1), generative grammarians assert that 
consider-type verbs assign an identical propositional θ-role to their postverbal complement, 
no matter how it is realised formally (Hoekstra 1988: 115). The problem with this view is that 
the patterns in (271) do not only differ in form, but are, as we will see, semantically distinct as 
well. Such semantic differences are usually downplayed in generative analyses: dealing with 
the related structures saddle NP and put a saddle on NP, Hale and Keyser maintain that these 
two structures can be assumed to be semantically equivalent from a grammatical point of 
view and that a possible semantic difference between them "is not, strictly speaking, linguistic 
knowledge" (1991: 122), i.e. it is "not the grammarian's problem; rather, it belongs to the cul-
tural encyclopedia" (1991: 119). This syntactocentric view is rejected by construction gram-
marians, who treat syntax and semantics as an interrelated symbolic whole and therefore can-
not close their minds to even very subtle semantic differences. As Langacker stresses, "se-
mantic nuances [...] cannot be safely ignored in grammatical analysis — in fact, they are the 
very essence of grammar" (1999a: 338). 
Although descriptive grammars do not work with underlying structures and derivations, 
their account of the patterns in (271) is equally deficient. Instead of scrutinising the semantic 
import of each of these patterns, they usually put them into distinct categories and subclassify 
them according to a number of formal criteria, such as whether the secondary predicate can be 
realised by an NP or an AP (e.g. Quirk 1985: 1196-1204). This purely descriptive classification 
misses important generalisations, though. Many verbs allow both NPs and APs to realise their 
secondary predicates and must thus be listed in two different groups; furthermore, verbs that 
are found with more than one of the structural patterns in (271) are spread over several classes 
as well. While generative accounts tend to concentrate too narrowly on the common aspects 
of these patterns, descriptive grammars are liable to split them into far too many formal sub-
classes. Both approaches lack explanatory power in the end. 
To break the logjam posed by most current analyses of qualifying constructions we must 
try to bring as much empirical evidence to bear on the patterns in (271) as we possibly can. 
The first task is to find out which mental verbs are commonly associated with each of these 
patterns, and to determine the strength of association between individual verbs and patterns in 
quantitative terms (Schneider 1997: 41). Table 14 presents the results of an extensive BNC-
based study for 15 fairly frequent mental verbs. 
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Table 14: Associations between mental verbs and functionally related qualifying constructions 
 that-clause NP inf XP NP XP NP as XP n156 
know 2,632 
93.6% 
178 
6.3% 
3 
0.1% 
— 2,813 
assume 4,046 
89.3% 
454 
10% 
17 
0.4% 
14 
0.3% 
4,531 
believe 4,431 
85% 
712 
13.7% 
67 
1.3% 
— 5,210 
presume 575 
76% 
163 
21.5% 
19 
2.5% 
— 757 
reckon 2,790 
93.6% 
133 
4.5% 
44 
1.5% 
15 
0.5% 
2,982 
think 4,370 
92.2% 
128 
2.7% 
242 
5.1% 
1 
0.02% 
4,741 
fancy 136 
61.8% 
19 
8.6% 
20 
9.1% 
45 
20.5% 
220 
deem 25 
2.3% 
624 
57.7% 
418 
38.7% 
14 
1.3% 
1,081 
judge 230 
29.3% 
283 
36.1% 
198 
25.2% 
74 
9.4% 
785 
consider 571 
26.1% 
549 
25.1% 
882 
40.3% 
188 
8.6% 
2,190 
find 564 
34.5% 
60 
3.7% 
1,009 
61.8% 
— 1,633 
count — — 132 
41.4% 
187 
58.6% 
319 
regard 1 
0.03% 
12 
0.3% 
19 
0.5% 
3,948 
99.2% 
3,980 
think of — — 1 
1% 
95 
99% 
96 
view — 2 
0.2% 
2 
0.2% 
1,261 
99.7% 
1,265 
 
                                                 
156 The absolute numbers depend on how often an individual verb has turned up in the relevant constructions in a 
sample of up to 6,000 sentences extracted for each individual verb from the BNC. The result is rather meagre for 
verbs such as count or fancy, which are prototypically followed by plain NPs, and more extensive for verbs such 
as believe or regard, which typically occur with that-clauses and the NP as XP-pattern, respectively. The percent-
ages given are thus more representative for verbs that frequently occur in qualifying patterns than for those that 
are rarely found in these patterns.  
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The verbs that are located close to the top of this table occur prototypically with that-clauses; 
verbs in the middle of the table are most frequently found in the NP to be XP and NP XP-
patterns, while verbs towards the bottom of the table are typically associated with NP as XP. 
The picture becomes even clearer when we put aside that-clauses for the time being: it is pos-
sible to set up four groups of verbs depending on which of the three non-finite/verbless quali-
fying structures — NP inf XP, NP XP and NP as XP — they are primarily associated with. The 
first group of verbs occurs prototypically with the non-finite pattern (NP inf XP), rarely with 
the NP XP-structure, and is practically never found with NP as XP (table 15). For a second 
group of verbs, the numerical difference between NP inf XP and NP XP is less pronounced, and 
these verbs are also marginally compatible with the NP as XP-structure (table 16). The cutting 
point between tables 15 and 16 is arbitrary, and the two groups may also profitably be consid-
ered as forming a continuum. Table 17 includes only a single verb, find, which is the only 
relatively frequent English verb that is almost invariably associated with NP XP. Finally, table 
18 comprises verbs that are prototypically or almost exclusively found with NP as XP157, rarely 
with NP XP, and almost never with NP inf XP.158 
Table 15: Group I: prototypical association with NP inf XP 
 NP inf XP NP XP NP as XP n 
know 178 
98.3% 
3 
1.7% 
— 181 
assume 454 
93.6% 
17 
3.5% 
14 
2.9% 
485 
believe 712 
91.4% 
67 
8.6% 
— 779 
presume 163 
89.6% 
19 
10.4% 
— 182 
 
                                                 
157 The alternative to NP as XP, NP for XP, is very rare in present-day English. There is only one verb, take, that is 
still commonly combined with both patterns (cf. a, b). The for-pattern is typically found in contexts that empha-
sise the invalidity of the judgement expressed. 
a.  "Good," Belinda nodded, taking it as a polite enquiry that didn't require a detailed response 
      (BNC H9H: 882). 
b.  A stranger would have taken them for brothers (B1X: 1997). 
158 The less frequent patterns for each of the four groups are not usually mentioned in grammars and dictionaries 
of English; this applies to the NP XP-variant for group I, the NP as XP-pattern for group II, NP inf XP for find and 
NP inf XP and NP XP for verbs of group IV (see, for example, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 265 and the entries 
for believe, judge, find and regard in Close 1975: 210-9).  
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Table 16: Group II: more balanced association with NP inf XP and NP XP 
 NP inf XP NP XP NP as XP n 
reckon 133 
69.3% 
44 
22.9% 
15 
7.8% 
192 
deem 624 
59.1% 
418 
39.6% 
14 
1.3% 
1,056 
judge 283 
51% 
198 
35.7% 
74 
13.3% 
555 
consider 549 
33.9% 
882 
54.5% 
188 
11.6% 
1,619 
think 128 
34.5% 
242 
65.2% 
1 
0.3% 
371 
 
Table 17: Group III: prototypical association with NP XP 
 NP inf XP NP XP NP as XP n 
find 60 
5.6% 
1,009 
94.4% 
— 1,069 
 
Table 18: Group IV: prototypical association with NP as XP 
 NP inf XP NP XP NP as XP n 
fancy 19 
22.6% 
20 
23.8% 
45 
53.6% 
84 
count — 132 
41.4% 
187 
58.6% 
319 
regard 12 
0.3% 
19 
0.5% 
3,948 
99.2% 
3,979 
think of — 1 
1% 
95 
99% 
96 
view 2 
0.2% 
2 
0.2% 
1,261 
99.7% 
1,265 
 
When we compare tables 15-18 to table 14, the following picture emerges: while that-clauses 
are the prototypical pattern for those verbs that prefer NP inf XP to the two verbless qualifying 
structures (verbs of group I and reckon), they are very rare or non-existant with verbs that are 
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prototypically associated with NP as XP (verbs of group IV with the exception of fancy).159 
Verbs in the middle of the continuum, which are typically followed by NP inf XP or NP XP, do 
not behave uniformly: while some occur with that-clauses only marginally (deem), others 
allow that-clauses to a considerable degree (judge, consider, find), while for still others it is 
the prototypical pattern (think). 
The question that needs to be pondered is why individual verbs differ qualitatively and 
quantitatively in their associations with the four functionally related qualifying patterns. Two 
potential answers can be safely excluded from the beginning: first, from a Construction-
grammar perspective, these structures cannot be assumed to be in free variation. The Principle 
of No Synonymy (cf. 8.2.2) states that differences in syntactic form invariably spell differ-
ences in meaning. The semantic basis of different complementation patterns has been repeat-
edly emphasised (Ransom 1986: 5-6; Wierzbicka 1988: 25); functionally related complemen-
tation patterns "instantiate separate and parallel constructions, each representing its own way 
of construing and symbolizing situations" (Langacker 1999a: 339), and each having "a mean-
ing — and range of use — relative to the other choices from the system" (Dixon 1991: 215; 
see also Dixon 1995: 175).160 Second, while it is not impossible that some of the verbs are 
idiosyncratically related to one pattern or another, the fact that groups of verbs show strik-
ingly similar associations with the qualifying constructions indicates that idiosyncrasy cannot 
be a major factor. Rather, it must be assumed that the degree of association between a verb 
and a construction depends on the degree of semantic compatibility between the lexical item 
and the construction (cf. Dixon 1991: 207). We must consequently attempt to pin down the 
semantic/pragmatic factors that govern the distribution of finite that-clauses, NP inf XP, NP XP 
and NP as XP with individual verbs. This is a tricky business because the use of the wrong fac-
tors may preclude the statement of the right generalisations about the verb-construction asso-
ciations. 
                                                 
159 I found only one example with regard followed by a that-clause in my BNC sample:  
It is generally regarded that liquidity is a very important factor in the management of unit trusts 
(BNC K8W: 38). 
160 This functionalist principle has not gone unchallenged. Noël doubts that there is, for example, a semantic 
difference between x believes that... and x believes y to be... because "both constructions are used to express 
opinions" (1997: 274), and he criticises the suggestions that have been made so far because "they are the out-
come of reflection on a limited number of invented examples" (1997: 273). I attempt to show that 'expressing an 
opinion' is only a very coarse semantic characterisation of the situation and that we must probe much more 
deeply into semantic/pragmatic nuances; moreover, while invented examples remain an indispensable tool to 
extract subtle semantic distinctions, a whole range of other empirical data can be used to uncover semantic dif-
ferences between the patterns studied here. 
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11.2 Semantic differences between groups of mental verbs 
Drawing on proposals that have been made on this topic so far, this section looks at semantic 
differences between the four groups of mental verbs (cf. tables 15-18) and informally scruti-
nises how and why they differ in their associations with the four qualifying patterns. The fol-
lowing section (11.3) will put this informal sketch of semantic factors on a more formal foot-
ing.  
11.2.1 Group I: prototypical association with that-clauses and NP inf XP 
The first group of mental verbs, which can be exemplified by know and believe, is prototypi-
cally followed by that-clauses; of the other qualifying patterns, only the NP inf XP-variant is 
reasonably common, while NP XP is rarely, and NP as XP practically never found with these 
verbs. That-clauses after verbs like know and believe refer to "information that is concerned 
with knowledge about the world" (Ransom 1986: 31). Know communicates the sense that the 
main-clause SUBJECT takes the information contained in the that-clause as an indisputable, 
and therefore intersubjectively valid fact. Believe also refers to knowledge, but while know 
makes clear that the SUBJECT is convinced of the truth of the that-clause proposition, believe 
indicates that the SUBJECT is not completely sure about the validity of his or her knowledge 
(Ransom 1986: 32; Wierzbicka 1988: 134). Personally, however, the SUBJECT accepts the 
proposition as true, and has usually arrived at this opinion after careful and serious delibera-
tion (Schneider 1988b: 301). Typically, a that-clause after believe therefore contains a unit of 
information for which the SUBJECT lacks some final piece of evidence that could help turn the 
belief into knowledge. 
When know is followed by the infinitival pattern, the sentence "serves to express a com-
bination of knowledge and subjective judgement, rather than plain knowledge" (Mair 1990: 
200). Subjective judgement and knowledge are compatible when the sentence communicates 
the sense that what is attributed of the referent of NP2, which I will refer to as the TOPIC of the 
SUBJECT's opinion, is derived from the SUBJECT's direct, possibly personal experience with it 
(Duffley 1992: 55-6; Riddle 1975: 471-2). In other words, the SUBJECT must 'know' the 
TOPIC, because what is predicated of the TOPIC "is a function of this experience" (Postal 1974: 
357), otherwise the NP inf XP-structure becomes less felicitous (Borkin 1984: 90; Steever 
1977: 594-5). (272) contains some examples at stake: (272a) is better than (272a') because 
only Colin Powell, and not John's wife, knows George W. Bush personally. The sentence pair 
in (272b, b') also nicely illustrates the required relationship between the SUBJECT and the 
TOPIC in an NP inf XP-pattern: a scientist has usually had extensive experience with his theory, 
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while the students only possess second-hand knowledge of a physics theory; as a conse-
quence, (272b) is fine while (272b') is odd. 
(272) a.  Colin Powell knows George W. Bush to be very honest in private conversations. 
         (ROS: 10) 
   a'. ?From what she reads in the papers, John's wife knows George W. Bush to be very  
         honest in private conversations. (ROS: 35) 
  b.  The scientist knew his theory to be true but was unable to prove it yet. (ROS: 15) 
  b'. ?After our physics teacher had explained the theory to us, we all knew it to be true. 
         (ROS: 32)  
The 30 active sentences in which know is followed by the NP inf XP-pattern in my BNC sam-
ple typically suggest an experiential relationship between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC. 8 sen-
tences communicate information that the SUBJECT has about himself or herself, i.e. NP2 is real-
ised by a reflexive pronoun here (273a, a'); in 7 examples, the SUBJECT makes a judgement 
about a person or animal he or she knows well (273b, b'); the remaining 15 sentences express 
judgements on concrete or abstract entities the SUBJECT is familiar with (273c, c'). 
(273) a.  He was drunk with a new importance, knowing himself to be irreplaceably useful 
         (BNC H7H: 1943). 
  a'. And, through her understanding, she knows herself to be utterly and completely 
        alone (BNC CCN: 1467). 
   b.  Oh, crumbs, Leith thought, and, while knowing Rosemary to be a highly 
         intelligent girl, had a most worrying feeling that ... (BNC JY1: 1709). 
  b'. "They are a breed that will enjoy a long walk and they are excellent car travellers — 
         in the 34 years that I have owned them I have never known one to be car sick," she 
         added (BNC ACM: 1399). 
  c.  [K]nowing this to be his likely mood when I brought in the tea yesterday afternoon,  
   … it would certainly have been wiser not to have mentioned Miss Kenton at all 
    (BNC AR3: 114). 
  c'. No matter how much writers protest, non-writers seem to like the idea that writing is 
        easy, not the arduous manual, emotional and intellectual labour writers know it to 
    be (BNC CG3: 10). 
Similarly, the 276 active sentences with believe in the NP inf XP-pattern are found in contexts 
that indicate some sort of experience between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC. This can again be 
supported with examples: 32 sentences express the SUBJECT's belief about himself or herself 
(274a, a'), 67 instances a belief about another person (274b, b'), and 177 sentences a belief 
about some entity that the SUBJECT has had extensive experience with — frequently in a sci-
entific or religious context (274c, c'). 
(274) a.   Sally-Ann, unlike Rosemary, finds it a struggle ... to dredge up her dreadful past — 
         like Rosemary she has believed herself to be a doormat in society (BNC B03: 1482). 
  a'.  "Dauntless is a paladin," Cleo reminded her, "and therefore believes himself to be 
          pious and true" (BNC GW2: 3190). 
   b.   Clara, already familiar with children of famous parents, and with children who  
          believed their parents to be famous … (BNC EFP: 889). 
  b'.  [S]o many of her contemporaries believed Margery to be mentally ill; only, 
   probably, the superstitious, the credulous and the ignorant believed her to be a 
   genuine mystic (BNC CFX: 801). 
  c.  US linguists Sapir and Whorf who investigated the Hopi Indian language in the 
        1930s believed it to be so distinctive as to represent an entirely different thought 
        process (BNC HH3: 7453). 
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  c'. If one is a fundamentalist Christian who believes the text to be inspired, then one 
        sees why the text is alone to be interpreted in terms of the text (BNC EF0: 640). 
Since the knowledge or belief expressed by the NP inf XP-pattern must be based on the SUB-
JECT's personal experience with the TOPIC, the sentence should not contain factual information 
that is publicly known and is true independent of any subjective experience (275a, b), but 
knowledge or belief that is based on personal experience and judgement (275c, d) (Wierz-
bicka 1988: 50). Empirically verifiable facts, which are "true or false quite independently of 
human values or judgements " (Borkin 1984: 55), are more felicitous in a that-clause (275e, 
f). 
(275) a. ?I know Lisbon to be the capital of Portugal.              (from Wierzbicka 1988: 50) 
  b. ?I believe the square root of one-hundred and twenty-one to be eleven.  
                 (from Mair 1993: 7) 
  c. And how can a farm worker strike against an employer whom he knows to be ... a 
        solicitous and considerate person, even if he pays low wages? (BNC FPR: 324). 
  d. The relationship of television to newspapers is an extremely close one, but it is one 
         which people in television refuse to acknowledge, largely because they believe their 
         product to be morally superior (BNC CEK: 2923). 
  e.  Their rapacious habits have been the subject of bloody hyperbole in films and 
         bestsellers, so everybody knows that the shark has ranks of fearsome, pointed 
         teeth (BNC AMM: 1153). 
  f.  Is it possible that the organizers had misread the calendar, believing that Saturday 
         was the first of April, not the third? (BNC EAK: 61). 
This is a crucial distinction that can also be brought out in evaluation tests. The NP inf XP-
pattern is typically used when "the truth of a proposition is not absolute but depends on one's 
view of things" (Borkin 1984: 55). For this reason, sentences (276a, b, c) are odd because the 
infinitival patterns express objective, empirically verifiable assessments; the primed sen-
tences, on the other hand, are fine because the SUBJECT attributes a quality to the TOPIC that is 
based on personal experience and subjective judgement. Objective propositions are again 
more natural in that-clauses: I know/believe that John is a teacher/that my brother is a Protes-
tant/that seven is a prime number. 
(276) a.  ?I know John to be a teacher. (ROS: 45) 
  a'.  As his colleague, I know John to be a very competent teacher. (ROS: 11) 
  b.   ?I believe my brother to be a Protestant. (ROS: 42) 
  b'.  As a devout Catholic, I believe my brother to be an immoral person. (ROS: 23) 
  c.   ?I believe seven to be a prime number. (ROS: 35) 
  c'.  I believe seven to be a lucky number. (ROS: 20). 
The requirement that the sentences in the NP inf XP-pattern after know and believe need to ex-
press subjective judgements is not tantamount to saying that the judgements merely depend 
on the SUBJECT's idiosyncratic view of things; rather, the SUBJECT assumes that anyone who 
had the same personal experience with the TOPIC would arrive at similar conclusions. 
A corollary of the constraint that the quality attributed to the TOPIC must be based on per-
sonal experience and subjective judgement is the requirement that the sentence must express a 
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permanent quality, and not a temporary state of affairs (277a, b vs. a', b') (Borkin 1984: 58). 
The assessment of temporary attributes does not depend on a long-standing personal experi-
ence with the TOPIC and is therefore typically put into a that-clause (277c, d).161 
(277) a.  I know John to be a very competent teacher. (ROS: 11) 
  a'. ?I know John to be very nervous these days. (ROS: 40) 
  b.  Mrs Thatcher was apparently informed of the French decision ... and it may well 
         have encouraged her to believe that Britain's European partners are now ready 
    to take the difficult decisions which are a prelude to monetary union (BNC A9W: 
    17). 
  b'. ??The Prime Minister believes Britain's European partners to be now ready to  
        take the difficult decisions which prelude the monetary union. (ROS: 54) 
  c.  If the pain becomes acute, the cat knows that it is in great danger (BNC BMG: 
        769).  
  d. I was depressed, and when they arrived at my house and said, "We're very sorry to 
        hear about your husband", I believed they were genuine (BNC AJY: 1209). 
The rare NP XP-structure after believe shares most of its characteristics with the NP inf XP-
pattern: the assessment must be based on personal experience and must express a subjective 
judgement on a permanent characteristic of the TOPIC. In contrast to sentences with NP inf XP, 
however, the SUBJECT is less convinced about the possible intersubjective validity of his 
judgement. In other words, while the SUBJECT in the NP inf XP-pattern is convinced that any-
one who had the same personal experience with the TOPIC would share his judgement, the 
SUBJECT in the NP XP-pattern concedes that his judgement may be more hypothetical and idio-
syncratic. The NP XP-pattern after believe (67 instances) is restricted to some clearly defined 
contexts: 12 sentences contain the comparative phrase more than x could/would have believed 
possible, in which the SUBJECT's original assessment is refuted (278a); another 12 instances 
express an official assumption that cannot (at present) be proved, usually to the effect that 
someone has died in the war (278b) or is responsible for a crime (298c). The other sentences 
express rather subjective beliefs, particularly about oneself (298d). 
(278) a. What he was saying hurt Shiona more than she could ever have believed possible 
        (BNC JXS: 4006). 
  b. 500 believed killed in fighting (BNC K22: 1163). 
  c. The mafia was believed responsible for the killing on March 12 of Salvatore Lima 
        (BNC HLH: 1535). 
  d. The rage of the novel's males can sometimes be made to appear the rage of those 
   who believe themselves permanently beaten and cheated (BNC A05: 1658). 
                                                 
161 There is a set of exceptions in my corpus data for which I do not have an explanation. Transitory states of 
affairs are possible in the NP inf XP-pattern after believe in military contexts. The following sentences present 
two of the eight examples I found: 
a.  Typically, the first action he describes was a mistake: the bombing of Freiburg at the 
      beginning of the war by a sQuadron [sic!] of the Luftwaffe believing itself to be over  
      Dijon (BNC A4U: 10). 
b.  The US Navy, ..., believing herself to be under attack, released the missile that shot down 
      an Iran Air Airbus (BNC HRE: 929). 
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Know almost never tolerates the NP XP-pattern because the greater hypothetical quality of this 
structure would clash with the meaning of the verb that the SUBJECT has certain knowledge 
about a characteristic of the TOPIC. The three instances that I found in my corpus sample are 
interesting because they show ways in which knowledge can exceptionally be made compati-
ble with a high degree of subjectivity: (279a) is a poetic sentence that expresses knowledge 
derived from a very personal and contradictory experience; (279b) is equivalent to the com-
parative examples with believe (cf. 278a) and indicates that the SUBJECT's original knowledge 
has proved invalid; finally, (279c) contains a contradictory sort of knowledge that the SUB-
JECT has about himself. 
(279) a. There was the taste of death in the kiss, but she accepted the price with the prize, and 
        clung to the bitterness and the bliss alike, knowing them for ever inseparable now 
        (BNC K8S: 2209). 
  b. She'd known him barely two days, and already he'd steered her through more 
        emotions than she'd known herself capable of (BNC HGY: 1300). 
  c. Lastly, I should not choose this manner of writing, wherein knowing myself 
    inferior to myself, led by the genial power of nature to another task ... (BNC KRH: 
   4248). 
To briefly mention two other verbs of group I, presume and assume are similar to believe in 
that they indicate that the SUBJECT accepts a proposition as true although it cannot be proved 
in an intersubjectively convincing way. Both verbs include the additional semantic component 
that the SUBJECT may have doubts about the validity of the proposition himself or herself, but 
deliberately accepts it as true (Schneider 1988b: 328) — in the case of presume because the 
proposition is probably true although it cannot be proved yet (Schneider 1988b: 328), and in 
the case of assume because the SUBJECT accepts the proposition as "valid only within the 
bounds of a chain of reasoning" (Borkin 1984: 81; see also Schneider 1988b: 315-6). The 
typical pattern for these two verbs are that-clauses (280a, b), whereas the NP inf XP-pattern is 
a rare alternative that is only chosen when there is an experiential relationship between the 
SUBJECT and the TOPIC (280c, d). 
(280) a. The moral is clear: when gustiness is getting near to the limit for safe flying, assume  
        that at any time it could suddenly increase (BNC A0H: 200). 
  b. it is fair to presume that for them Hitler remained the symbol of continued hope  
       and determination (BNC ADD: 217). 
  c. In short lesbians and gay men are assumed to influence young people over their  
       sexuality, whilst heterosexuals assume themselves to be neutral (BNC CF4: 
   1794).  
  d.  [E]thologists have begun to re-examine the issue of animal intellect and to ask 
       whether the organisms they study are, as we presume ourselves to be, something 
       more than mere mindless circuitry (BNC B7J: 1363). 
The NP XP-pattern is very infrequent with these verbs; I found just 17 instances after assume 
and 19 after presume. The examples with assume typically belong to a scientific context in 
which the SUBJECT deliberately accepts some quality of the TOPIC as given for the purposes of 
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reasoning even though he knows that this quality is not objectively true (281a); the instances 
with presume (281b, c) are comparable to those cases with believe that express official as-
sumptions about the death or legal status of a person (cf. 278b, c). 
(281) a. For simplicity in this analysis the leadscrew has been assumed ideal (BNC H7R: 
       338). 
  b. 12,000 were left homeless, with thousands more still missing and presumed dead 
        (BNC HLD: 1189). 
  c. [T]he Old Thunderer even confessed itself vexed by the 'overmagnanimous spirit of 
       the British law, which always presumes a man innocent until he is proven guilty' 
       (BNC EDE: 1116). 
11.2.2 Group II: prototypical association with NP inf XP and NP XP 
Of the items in group II, only reckon and think are prototypically followed by a that-clause. 
Compared to verbs of group I, they signal a weaker commitment to the factual status of the 
dependent proposition (282) (cf. Ransom 1986: 71). 
(282) a. "I reckon the way to this woman's heart is through her mind." (BNC A0L: 1407). 
  b. The militants were tempted to think that the door to their ambitions was ajar 
    (BNC ABA: 964). 
We will not concern ourselves with the variable and heterogeneous kinds of information that 
can be conveyed by that-clauses after reckon and think, but rather with the semantic condi-
tions constraining the non-finite, and particularly the NP XP-pattern after consider, judge, 
deem, reckon and think. Even more so than the NP inf XP-pattern after verbs of group I, sen-
tences including the NP XP-pattern after consider-type verbs must express "a self-initiated, 
original opinion, rather than a recognition of the truth of a proposition formed by someone 
else" (Borkin 1984: 78), i.e. they must denote a subjective judgement of the SUBJECT that is 
based on his or her personal experience with the TOPIC. Empirically verifiable attributes, 
which have some validity independent of the SUBJECT's perceptions, are therefore less felici-
tous than personal judgements (283a). Moreover, permanent characteristics are again more 
natural than temporary attributes (283b)162; in (283c), the permanent interpretation of the ad-
jective sick, as 'perverted' instead of 'ill', is forced by the construction (Rapoport 1993: 178-9, 
footnote 16). 
(283) a. Mrs. Searle deems her teacups ?broken/worthless, although in my opinion they are 
        only slightly cracked.        (adapted from Borkin 1973: 46) 
  b. John considers her knowledgeable enough/?briefed well enough to handle the 
        situation.                       (from Borkin 1984: 80) 
  c. I consider him sick.               (from Rapoport 1993: 178) 
                                                 
162 Judge is also compatible with temporary states of affairs: 
Samuel Roberts, judging the moment to be ripe, rapped on the table with a silver spoon (BNC 
HTS: 2499). 
A MENTAL-SPACE ACCOUNT OF THE QUALIFYING CONSTRUCTION 
 
272
The major difference between verbs of group I and those of group II is that the latter express a 
more subjective judgement, not only when followed by that-clauses, but also in combination 
with NP (to) XP. While NP XP is only a marginal alternative for the verbs of the first group, 
which describe judgements that are based on knowledge and belief, it becomes the central 
pattern for verbs of the second group, which describe the SUBJECT's unique and original 
judgement of the TOPIC. The unique judgements expressed by verbs such as consider may not 
be intersubjectively verifiable, but they are typically based on serious and rational delibera-
tions and are subjectively "rated as 'true'" (Schneider 1988c: 163). While consider expresses 
all kinds of subjective judgements that have been arrived at after some thoughtful reflection, 
judge (284a, a') and particularly deem (284b, b') are in the main found in formal and official 
contexts (Schneider 1988b: 352-3). Think also typically occurs in formal contexts when com-
bined with the NP (to) XP-pattern (284c, c'), but it is also sometimes found in more colloquial 
sentences (284c''). 
(284) a.  They do not propose to enter into work in school which makes achievement in 
         competitive examinations possible, having judged this to be highly undesirable 
         (BNC CLW: 427). 
  a'. We must continue to make it clear to potential aggressors, however, that we should  
       strike back with all the means that we judge appropriate, conventional or nuclear 
       (BNC ABA: 1214). 
  b.  [P]olice organizations have asserted themselves more publicly to promote not only 
         their own organization, but also particular policies regarding law and order which 
         they deem to be necessary (BNC GV5: 1124). 
  b'. [T]he ANC held its biggest public meeting on Sunday in the Transkei since Pretoria 
       deemed the organisation unlawful in 1960 (BNC A28: 281). 
  c.  If the decision is illegal it can be quashed; otherwise the court cannot ... intervene, 
        even if it thinks the decision to be wrong in some respect (BNC EBM: 94). 
  c'. This gives the authority the power, if it thinks fit, to refer the matter to the D.P.P. 
        (BNC EVK: 1399).163 
  c''.  How on earth could she even think Piers sexy? (BNC H8H: 1068).  
To recapitulate: sentences with verbs of group II, particularly when combined with the NP XP-
pattern, express rational and thoughtful judgements like sentences with verbs of group I in the 
NP inf XP-pattern. However, while the group I-sentences communicate the sense that similar 
sorts of judgement could be reached by anyone having the SUBJECTs' experience with the 
TOPIC, so that these judgements might ultimately be open to empirical verification, the group 
II-sentences emphasise that the judgements depend on the SUBJECTs' idiosyncratic, if ration-
ally based, view of things. (285a) communicates the sense that the Danes do not need to con-
sider themselves European citizens although they have joined the European Union. While a 
sentence such as The Danes don't believe themselves to be European citizens would be odd 
                                                 
163 The NP XP-pattern after think frequently contains expressions such as think fit/proper/possible, in which the 
TOPIC is left unspecified. These phrases, which are felt to be "an indivisable semantic whole" (Visser 1963: 476), 
are relics from earlier stages of English when a semantically vague pronoun did not have to be obligatorily real-
ised as it (Visser 1963: 467). 
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because it could be empirically invalidated, the SUBJECTs in the sentence The Danes don't 
consider themselves European citizens hold an opinion that they know is empirically incor-
rect, but is nevertheless true with respect to their personal view of the situation. Similarly, the 
speaker in (285b) deliberately decides not to consider himself a Christian any longer, and 
while he may still be a Christian from a more objective point of view (because he is baptised, 
still belongs to the church, etc.), this is immaterial to the personal view of his religious iden-
tity. 
(285) a. The Danes said Yes to Maastricht only because other governments solemnly  
        reassured them at Edinburgh last December that they need not consider themselves 
        European citizens (BNC CRB: 236). 
  b. "I am writing to tell you that I no longer believe in God or consider myself a  
        Christian" (BNC C8V: 1430). 
The distinctions between verbs of group I followed by NP inf XP and verbs of group II fol-
lowed by NP XP can be brought out in carefully constructed sentence pairs164: (286a) with be-
lieve NP inf XP is preferable to consider NP XP (286a') because a family relationship can be 
empirically verified. Of course, a sentence such as Bob considers Sam his father is possible, 
but it would mean that Sam is not Bob's true father, but that Bob personally decides to con-
sider Sam as such. (286b') with consider NP XP is favoured over (286b) because the rude clas-
sification of a person as a piece of furniture can only be made from a subjective point of view, 
and it is hardly conceivable that all other persons having the same experience with the TOPIC 
would reach a similar sort of judgement; along the same lines, consider NP XP is more felici-
tous in the third and fourth sentence pair than believe/consider NP inf XP because the SUBJECT 
deliberately decides to view the TOPIC in a way that is contrary to fact.165  
(286) a.  I just found out that Sally isn't related to me at all, and it surprises me because I 
        always believed her to be my sister. (30) 
  a'. ?I just found out that Sally isn't related to me at all, and it surprises me because I 
        always considered her my sister. (15)      (adapted from Borkin 1973: 46) 
  b.  ?Mary always believed her boyfriend to be part of the furniture. (11) 
  b'. Mary always considered her boyfriend part of the furniture. (34) 
                         (adapted from Borkin 1973: 46) 
  c.  ?John believes that girl to be an idiot although he knows that she is actually quite 
        intelligent (12) 
  c'. John considers that girl an idiot although he knows that she is actually quite 
                                                 
164 The numbers given in parentheses indicate how many of my 45 informants chose one sentence or the other. 
165 Since sentences with verbs of group II that are followed by the NP inf XP-pattern are somewhat in between 
sentences with verbs of group I followed by NP inf XP and sentences with verbs of group II followed by NP XP, it 
is more difficult to work out appreciable semantic distinctions between pairs of sentences with, for example, 
believe NP inf XP and consider NP inf XP or consider NP inf XP and consider NP XP in evaluation tests. My corpus 
data reveal that such distinctions do exist, though. To give an example with reckon: while reckon with the NP inf 
XP-pattern is often used to express a (verifiable) assessment about age, height, etc. (cf. a), reckon followed by NP 
XP is typically used to assess more subjective qualities (cf. b). 
a.  I reckoned him to be about forty-ish, a family man (BNC BN3: 1940). 
b.  Mr Dini, for his part, was reckoned too political (BNC CR9: 2662). 
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        intelligent (33). 
  d.  ?Even though Sally is 25, I still consider her to be a stupid child (9). 
  d'. Even though Sally is 25, I still consider her a stupid child (36). 
11.2.3 Groups III and IV: prototypical association with NP XP and NP as XP 
When find is followed by a that-clause or NP inf XP, it shows many similarities to verbs of 
group I, the main difference being that the content of the dependent proposition is not pre-
sented as knowledge or belief that has been gained over a longer period of time, but that has 
only recently been found out. The finite-clause construction is used when there is not neces-
sarily an experiential relationship between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC (287a), while NP inf XP 
again favours direct experience, frequently in scientific or medical contexts (287b, c). 
(287) a. It was a lovely sight to see all the sleeping hens on their perch and exciting to open 
    up the door in the morning to find they had laid eggs for our breakfast in the three 
    nest boxes on the floor (BNC B22: 1531). 
  b. Two scientists, Schumman and Went, sampled other pines there in the mid-1950s 
    and found the oldest to be about 4900 years (BNC B78: 2110). 
  c. When interviewing Margaret, the therapist found her to be moderately depressed 
        (BNC B30: 608). 
The prototypical NP XP-pattern with find is semantically similar to this pattern after verbs of 
group II. While NP inf XP denotes "the discovery of a fact" (Duffley 1992: 48) that is open to 
empirical verification, the NP XP-pattern conveys subjective judgements that express the SUB-
JECT's personal view of a situation. There is, however, a slight difference between sentences 
with verbs of group II when followed by the the NP XP-pattern and sentences with find fol-
lowed by this pattern: the former verbs describe personal, but rational judgements, which have 
been reached after some thoughtful deliberation, whereas find is used in sentences that ex-
press judgements that have a strong egocentric colouring, and are sometimes spontaneous 
reactions to TOPICS that are not very important (288a, b). Very often, the judgements refer to a 
temporary state of affairs (288c) and not a permanent quality of the TOPIC. The subjective and 
not very rational nature of the judgements expressed by find in the NP XP-pattern is empha-
sised by the fact that the quality denoted by XP is frequently (in 328 out of 1,009 instances) 
modified by intensifiers such as almost, awfully, bloody, extremely, a little, particularly or 
really (288d). 
(288) a. I find hot showers disgusting (BNC ABS: 1718). 
  b. She likes all our regulars but finds the crossword a bit hard! (BNC A17: 723). 
  c. [S]he tossed her head frequently, as if finding the heat oppressive (BNC FU8: 
   1443). 
  d. As in the UK, bright young people find it extra galling that some of those who are 
       occupying the jobs they need are not nearly as bright as they (BNC B7C: 492). 
While the NP as XP-pattern is also a reasonably common variant for verbs of group II, it is the 
prototypical structure for verbs of group IV. Like find, fancy denotes speculative sorts of 
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judgement, which frequently have positive connotations (Schneider 1988b: 337). The NP inf 
XP-pattern is rare with this verb and practically restricted to sports contexts (289a); sentences 
with the NP XP-pattern often express a judgement that the SUBJECT only imagines to be true, 
but which the speaker knows is false (289b). The most frequent construction for fancy is NP as 
XP, which is found in contexts similar to those of the NP XP-pattern (289c). 
(289) a. I fancy Jimmy to go all the way and win the tournament (BNC K51: 1938). 
  b. He fancied himself in love with me, the silly boy, but that was absurd (B20: 261). 
  c. "[F]ancy yourself as a hero, do you?" (BNC ACB: 2985). 
Count, which is not attested in the NP inf XP-pattern, is used equally often with NP XP as with 
NP as XP. What is particularly noteworthy about this verb is that it mostly occurs in colloca-
tional patterns (Schneider 1988b: 356), with XP frequently being realised as lucky/fortunate 
(40 instances), a success (9 instances) or among NP (39 instances) (290). 
(290) a. He counts himself lucky to have avoided being shot (BNC HH3: 4611). 
  b. That the evening could still be counted a success was partly down to the attack and 
        verve of the Liverpool Philharmonic Choir (BNC A1R: 59). 
  c. [T]he whole process cannot be counted as a success if every step has to be repeated 
        for the next discrete problem (BNC CGS: 2918). 
  d. President Vaclav Havel, who counts many Liberal Club signatories among his 
    closest friends, has refrained from taking sides (BNC ABD: 1585). 
Regard, think of and view occur almost exclusively in the NP as XP-pattern (291a-a''); the NP 
inf XP and NP XP-patterns are only marginally found with regard (291b, b'; 0.3% and 0.5% of 
all instances, respectively) and view (291c, c'; both 0.2% each of all instances).166 I did not 
find an instance of think of followed by NP inf XP in my corpus sample, and only one example 
with NP XP (291d). 
(291) a.  Poststructuralists aspire to remove what they regard as the arbitrary distinctions 
         between literature, criticism, theory, and philosophy (BNC A1A: 1040). 
  a'.  It was then but an intellectual elision to view abstraction as the purest of all styles,  
         since it depicted nothing at all (BNC A7M: 156). 
  a''. His fellow-undergraduates thought of him as a gangly youth with brown hair  
         (BNC A68: 364). 
  b.  I have already mentioned that I regard the inductivist account of science to be 
   very wrong and dangerously misleading (BNC FBE: 207). 
  b'. Let me ask you whether you would regard yourself a depressive person? (BNC  
         FLF: 11). 
  c.  According to the report the pardon indicated that Assad no longer viewed the 
                                                 
166 Interestingly, both patterns are sometimes employed as structural alternatives to NP as XP when this pattern is 
not possible. In the following sentences, in which XP is preposed, the use of the as-pattern would necessitate the 
highly doubtful pied-piping or stranding of as (cf. 4.3). 
a.   [E]xhibitions can be a powerful sales tool and not the expensive luxury that many 
      companies regard them to be (BNC K94: 1468). 
a'.   ??... the expensive luxury as which many companies regard them/ ??... the expensive luxury 
      which many companies regard them as. 
 b.   So important was this regarded that in the final quarter of the fourteenth century a 
       system of coastal defence on land was developed (BNC EDF: 1411). 
 b'.  ??As so important was this regarded that .../ ??So important was this regarded as that ... 
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        Brotherhood to be a viable threat (BNC HLE: 2391). 
  c'. Those committeemen who once viewed him obsolete ... have been afflicted by a  
        creeping reverence (BNC CU1: 1097). 
  d. ... the play's Prologue, in which an alcoholic tinker called Christopher Sly is 
         persuaded by a group of gentry to think of himself an aristocrat (BNC AHG: 
         1096). 
The semantic differences between verbs of group IV followed by NP as XP and verbs of group 
II followed by NP XP are marginal. Like consider-type verbs (but unlike find), regard-type 
verbs express subjective judgements of permanent, and not temporary characteristics of the 
TOPIC. It has sometimes been argued that regard-type verbs denote more subjective judge-
ments than consider-type verbs (Borkin 1984: 64). This seems to be true of think of (Schnei-
der 1988b: 357), which frequently occurs in sentences that show that the SUBJECT's judgement 
of the TOPIC is very idiosyncratic (note the frequent use of like to think of, tend to think of, 
still think of and the high number of reflexive pronouns as TOPIC; 292a-c). To a lesser degree, 
idiosyncrasy also plays a role in sentences with view (Schneider 1988b: 354-5). Regard, by 
comparison, does not distinguish itself by the greater subjectivity of the sentences it occurs in; 
in fact, regard is typically used for consciously and rationally held opinions in text categories 
such as commerce and finance, world affairs, and social science. As matters stand, the distinc-
tion between the consider NP XP and the regard NP as XP-patterns has to be sought elsewhere 
(see 11.4.6.2). 
(292) a. Some people in publishing like to think of theirs as a glamorous medium (BNC 
        B7C: 34). 
  b. I think he thinks of me still as more of a child (BNC FU1: 1518). 
  c. So he thinks of himself as a warm-hearted, caring human being (BNC A08: 
       2021). 
11.2.4 Extensions from the core: less prototypical qualifying verbs 
Like the RESULTATIVE and DEPICTIVE Constructions, the QUALIFYING Construction has a pro-
totypical centre and various less typical extensions from the core. I will provide two examples 
of qualifying verb groups that are further removed from the typical instances represented by 
the four groups of verbs detailed above, namely verbs of perception and describe-type verbs. 
Sentence (293a) is an instance of the PERCEPTION Construction, in which the SUBJECT 
perceives a TOPIC participating in event. (293b), however, straddles the distinction between 
the PERCEPTION Construction and the non-finite qualifying pattern: the verb see no longer 
denotes an immediate visual perception as in (293a), but rather an "inference" (Duffley 1992: 
31) or the mental apprehension of a fact (Bolinger 1974: 66-7). In contrast to a typical quali-
fying sentence, however, (293b) does not provide a permanent judgement on the TOPIC, but a 
judgement which has been inferred from a particular situation and which is restricted to that 
situation. Not all verbs of perception are semantically compatible with this inferential con-
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struction, though. Watch, for example, is exclusively associated with the concrete PERCEP-
TUAL Construction (cf. *I watched flight to be impossible); ceteris paribus, there are also 
verbs that can only be used in inferential sentences (*Mary discerned John cross the street vs. 
Mary discerned the figure to be a woman) (Bolinger 1974: 67; Duffley 1992: 32-3). (293c), 
finally, is an example of the verb see in a typical qualifying sentence. Verbs such as see or 
look upon fulfil the same function in the AS-QUALIFYING Construction as regard or view, 
which are also perception verbs etymologically and can still sometimes be used as such in 
modern English (293d, e). 
(293) a. Mary saw John cross the street. 
  b. Seeing flight to be impossible, he surrendered.             (from Jespersen 1940: 280) 
  c. I see John as my friend. 
  d. He turned from the fire to regard her, and Grainne saw the leaping flames reflected 
   in his eyes (BNC G10: 2028). 
  e. The only way to view the Chancellor was by scrambling through the neighbouring 
        graveyard (BNC A4R: 42). 
I also submit that sentences with describe-type verbs represent non-prototypical instances of 
the qualifying NP as XP-pattern. Describe-type verbs include verbs such as characterise, de-
fine, depict, describe, interpret, paint, portray, represent, as well as verbs evaluating the 
TOPIC in a positive (appreciate, esteem, honour, praise, value, etc.) or negative way (con-
demn, denounce, dismiss, reject, etc.) (294). The only grammarian I know of who explicitly 
classifies these verbs with the other qualifying verbs is Poutsma, who states that regard-type 
verbs convey a "practically unmodified judging", while describe-type verbs express a "dis-
tinctly modified judging" (1928: 354). 
(294) a. Moon rats have an irritable nature and can hardly be described as attractive (BNC 
        CK2: 1384). 
  b. For example, we can characterise the human body as a system which is comprised 
        of a number of sub-systems (BNC GVN: 267). 
  c. He gave art an openly political meaning and did not appreciate the artist as an 
        individual dissenting voice (BNC CKY: 133). 
  d. It is too pure for this impure world, therefore they condemn it as vile (BNC ABL: 
        519). 
Such sentences have caused problems in both descriptive and generative accounts because, 
unlike with regard-type verbs, the secondary predicate does not need to appear obligatorily 
after describe-type verbs (cf. ??I regarded him vs. I described him). Nevertheless, it is not 
necessary to ascribe different valencies to regard-type and describe-type verbs, for example 
by treating the complement of regard as an SC and that of describe as a direct object plus a 
second subcategorised phrase (cf. 5.4).167 Both types of verbs can be seen as instantiating the 
                                                 
167 It is not possible to characterise the secondary predicate after describe-type verbs as a depictive phrase. 
Unlike as-depictive phrases, which can only be realised by an NP (e.g. John visited me as my lawyer), the XP 
after describe-type verbs allows the same range of categorial realisations as the XP after regard-type verbs. Of 
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QC: not only two different regard-type verbs (295a), but also a regard-type and a describe-
type verb are frequently used in parallel constructions (295b). In a number of cases, a regard-
type and a describe-type verb are even coordinated (295c). 
(295) a. While society continues to idealize the two-parent family and regard it as the norm, 
        there is a danger that remarriage will be seen as the solution to the individual and 
        social problems associated (BNC CN6: 855). 
  b. Gilpin (1987), like many liberal economists, regards it as contrary to consumer 
        interests, whereas others describe it as 'a ray of hope in a dismal world' (BNC EEF: 
        1465). 
  c. The association might encourage the development of shared publicity and marketing 
        to ensure as much effective publicity and ticket sales promotion as it is possible to 
        provide, both for those projects and those which we regard and cherish as our own 
        (BNC KS5: 71). 
In contrast to regard-type verbs, describe-type verbs can also be used in a construction with a 
single postverbal NP and without a secondary predicate (296a). Without wanting to go into a 
detailed semantic analysis, it is obvious that this MANNER-OF-QUALIFICATION Construction 
only tolerates describe-type verbs, whose meaning specifies the way in which the TOPIC is 
qualified, but not regard-type verbs, whose semantics only express the fact that the TOPIC is 
qualified, but not the manner in which this is done. In other words, a (non-perceptual) sen-
tence such as ??I regard Jim does not contain enough information to be felicitous because 
regard does not lexicalise a manner-component like characterise, condemn or value. This is 
comparable to sentences with default resultative verbs such as render or make, which only 
convey the meaning that the force-recipient is changed, but do not specify the manner in 
which this is done and are therefore not acceptable in the MANNER-OF-ACTIVITY Construction 
(cf. *I rendered John vs. I painted the wall; see 9.2.3). When a manner-component is supplied 
by an additional phrase, regard-type verbs can be used in the MANNER-OF-QUALIFICATION 
Construction, though (296b, b'). The manner-component of describe-type verbs can be en-
riched in similar ways (296c, c'). 
(296) a.  We value our privacy (BNC AHN: 1524). 
  b.  Field staff regard their work in intensely practical terms (BNC FA1: 785). 
  b'. "We view Brown's behaviour very seriously," said the presiding official (BNC 
   A6Y: 754). 
  c.  Their narrow perspective alienates them from broad-minded people who value the 
         business in broader terms (BNC EW5: 1350). 
  c'. The former king condemns the Kabul regime with the same tone he used when the 
        Soviet troops were in Afghanistan (BNC A28: 20). 
                                                                                                                                                        
the 350 instances of describe followed by NP as XP that I extracted from the BNC, XP is realised by an NP in 67% 
of all cases, but it can also be realised by an adjective (in 22% of all instances; cf. 294a, d), by a PP (in 3% of all 
instances; cf. a), and even by a VP (in 7% of all instances; cf. b). 
a.  Lightman took into account the Irishman's financial situation, which he described as 'in 
     pretty bad shape' (BNC A9H: 512). 
b.  This realpolitik was most vividly demonstrated by the Ford purchase, an act an automotive 
     Harold Macmillan might have condemned as selling the family silver (BNC EDT: 864). 
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The QUALIFYING Construction and the MANNER-OF-QUALIFICATION construction are semanti-
cally very close and are also sometimes combined (cf. 4.3): 
(297) a. [T]hey view their Southern compatriots at best with indifference and at worst as 
        traitors who sold them out to the loyalists (BNC A07: 66). 
  b. In the West, the majority of people tended to regard modern artists with suspicion, 
        as charlatans without a real job (BNC A7M: 1181). 
  c. Hitler is still today regarded there in 'heroic' terms as a 'great statesman' and 
       significant personality' (BNC ADD: 1196). 
  d. [T]hey are regarded suspiciously as possible Trojan horses (BNC FPR: 149). 
A constructional account can therefore give a rather straightforward explanation for the distri-
bution of regard-type and describe-type verbs without having to take recourse to different 
sememes and valencies of these verbs in qualifying and manner-of-qualification sentences (cf. 
Aarts 1992: 116-9).  
11.3 Formalising the semantic differences: a mental-space account 
The semantics of qualifying constructions are more difficult to formalise than those of the 
force-dynamic secondary-predicate constructions because qualifying sentences conceptualise 
mental processes that do not have a correlate in 'reality'. The most innovative look at such 
more abstract cognitive configurations has been taken by Fauconnier. The basic idea behind 
his mental-space theory is that human beings actively construct and flexibly switch between 
cognitive domains when they think and talk (1997: 35-6), so that "the unfolding of discourse" 
can be regarded as "a succession of cognitive configurations" (1997: 38). The formal model-
ling of such cognitive configurations in the mental-space framework helps to reveal and illus-
trate the rather abstract meaning-constructions that are set up by some sentence types. Unlike 
possible worlds, mental spaces are conceptual in nature and do not have any ontological basis 
outside of the mind; they are predicated on the fundamental insight that human beings are able 
"to entertain multiple world views and functional world views" (Sweetser and Fauconnier 
1996: 3). 
For a mental-space account to be feasible, there must be at least two mental spaces, "one 
primary and the other dependent on it" (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996: 2). The primary space 
is called the 'Base Space', and a second space is set up relative to this original space. The 
number of spaces proliferates in discourse, with the consequence that, "[m]etaphorically 
speaking, the discourse participants move through the space lattice" (Fauconnier 1997: 38). 
Since we are only looking at the small segment of discourse that is represented by a qualify-
ing pattern, a configuration of two spaces will suffice for our purpose. A new mental space is 
set up relative to the Base Space when this is induced by a so-called space builder. Space 
builders such as in 1945, maybe or in the photo can open spaces that refer to new "time peri-
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ods, possible and impossible worlds, intentional states and propositional attitudes, epistemic 
and deontic modalities, pictures ... and so on" (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996: 9). In the con-
text of qualifying constructions, the Base Space represents information provided by back-
ground knowledge and the previous discourse. Mental verbs such as believe, think or consider 
are space builders that set up a new 'Subjective Space' relative to the Base Space. There is an 
epistemic divide between the two spaces because the Subjective Space partitions off informa-
tion on the beliefs of a person from the more factual information provided by the Base. Thus, 
while the Base contains information that the interlocutors look upon as being intersubjectively 
valid, the Subjective Space demarcates information that is of a more personal and hypotheti-
cal nature.  
To introduce some more mental-space terminology: the dependent space, in our case the 
Subjective Space, is the 'focus', i.e. the space that is currently structured and therefore in the 
focus of attention; either the Base Space or the Subjective Space serves as 'viewpoint', i.e. as 
the point of view from which the focus space is accessed (Fauconnier 1997: 38-9). The Sub-
jective Space is not an ontologically independent possible world that must be created from 
scratch; when the Base Space serves as viewpoint, the dependent space is linked to the Base 
by connectors that relate most elements across the two spaces (Fauconnier 1997: 40). In other 
words, most of the default background knowledge structuring the Base will be available in the 
Subjective Space as well. The so-called 'Access Principle' states that "an expression that 
names or describes an element in one mental space can be used to access a counterpart of that 
element in another mental space" (Fauconnier 1997: 41). When a term such as John appears 
in a dependent Subjective Space, for example, all the background knowledge evoked by this 
term is freely transferred from the Base into the Subjective Space. In case the Subjective 
Space serves as viewpoint, however, access from the Base is limited and a term such as John 
is directly introduced into the Subjective Space. 
Figure 23 illustrates the mental-space configuration underlying a sentence such as I be-
lieve that John is a teacher, which is an example of what I will call the FINITE OPINION Con-
struction.  
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Figure 23: Mental-space configuration underlying the FINITE OPINION Construction (I believe that John 
                  is a teacher) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What the space builder believe does is generate a new space and indicate that this space is 
epistemically separated from the Base Space. While the Base represents the factual back-
ground knowledge shared by the discourse participants, the Subjective Space partitions off 
some non-factual unit of information. A Subjective Space must always be anchored by a SUB-
JECT that holds the belief, in this case the speaker denoted by the first-person pronoun. Since 
the Base serves as viewpoint, the downward arrow indicates that the factual information 
shared by the interlocutors about the TOPIC John is freely transferred from the Base Space 
into the Subjective Space; in other words, the speaker does not presuppose any knowledge of 
the TOPIC that is not familiar to the hearer as well. In the Subjective Space, John is qualified 
as 'a teacher'168. Since verbs of group I such as know or believe suggest that the content of the 
that-clause is probably true, the qualification of John as a teacher is seen from the point of 
view of the Base Space and is therefore supposed to float back into the Base, a fact that is 
indicated by the upward arrow. When the second discourse participant confirms the proposi-
tion made in the Subjective Space (Of course, he is a teacher), the proposition becomes a firm 
part of the Base Space; when the proposition is rejected (No, he is a janitor), the Subjective 
Space disappears without having had an effect on the Base Space. When the hearer cannot 
prove or disprove the speaker's hypothetical proposition, the information that John is a teacher 
will by default be transferred into the Base Space, but with the reservation that it is based on 
the speaker's belief, and not yet on clear, factual evidence (this is indicated by the use of a 
dotted arrow). As Ransom observes, 
                                                 
168 Only that-clauses containing categorical judgements will be considered here because thetic predications such 
as I believe that John will visit us tomorrow do not have a counterpart in the other qualifying constructions. 
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the expectation of it [the subordinate proposition; H.S.] being the case is semantically entailed, 
and if the proposition is coupled with an expression asserting that it is not expected, native 
speakers will judge that a contradiction or anomaly arises, but if the expression merely asserts a 
possible alternative, no contradiction is felt to arise. (Ransom 1986: 74) 
To give an example: while ??I believe that John is a teacher, but it's not possible that he is is 
an anomalous statement because the qualification of John as a teacher is prevented from float-
ing back into the Base, the sentence I believe that John is a teacher, but he may not be is fine 
because it only highlights the fact that the speaker's qualification of John is not completely 
certain. The reservations about the truth value of the subordinate proposition are more pro-
nounced with verbs of group II such as think, which express stronger doubts as to the validity 
of the that-clause proposition, than with verbs of group I such as believe or know. Similarly, 
the degree of certainty can also be indicated by a modal in the that-clause: Around the world, 
many cultures believe that any harm done to a dolphin may cause ill-fortune or sickness 
(BNC ABC: 56). 
A subordinate that-clause after mental verbs such as believe or think represents an inde-
pendent piece of information which, while anchored by the person denoted by the main-clause 
subject, is independent enough from the subjective views of this person to allow information 
from the Base Space — the viewpoint — to access the Subjective Space. In other words, the 
FINITE OPINION Construction expresses "a two-place relation between a person [the SUBJECT; 
H.S.] ... and something that person believes" (Dik 1981: 20), and not between the SUBJECT 
and the TOPIC. The TOPIC is enclosed in the subordinate proposition and remains independent 
of the SUBJECT's personal views and experience: "the complement is presented in a 'detached', 
objective way; no further involvement on the part of ... [the main-clause SUBJECT; H.S.] is 
suggested than that he happens to have this opinion" (Dik 1997: 349-50). Structurally, the 
independence of the TOPIC from the SUBJECT is mirrored by the fact that the TOPIC does not 
belong to the main clause, but is an element of the subordinate that-clause. This accords well 
with Borkin's intuition that "the formation of that-clauses ... maintains the integrity and inde-
pendence" of the subordinate proposition both in structural and in semantic terms (1984: 76). 
Things are a little bit different with a sentence such as I believe John to be a competent 
teacher, which illustrates what I will call the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction. As we have 
seen, this construction is typically used when there is a personal, experiential relationship be-
tween the SUBJECT and the TOPIC, i.e. when the judgement given on the TOPIC depends on the 
SUBJECT's experience with it. As a consequence, the TOPIC John referred to in the Subjective 
Space is not identical to the entity John in the Base Space, but is based on the speaker's per-
sonal view. Characteristics of the TOPIC are not transferred from the Base to the Subjective 
Space, but are directly introduced into the Subjective Space; to put it another way, access 
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from the Base Space is limited because the TOPIC is seen from the point of view of the Sub-
jective Space. Similar to the FINITE OPINION Construction, however, the speaker's qualifica-
tion of John is supposed to be transferred back to the Base Space (again with the reservation 
that the information given in the Subjective Space is not yet factual knowledge); the view-
point, which has been in the Subjective Space when the TOPIC John has been introduced, 
therefore shifts to the Base Space with respect to the qualification that John is a competent 
teacher. 
Figure 24: Mental-space configuration underlying the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction (I believe John 
                  to be a competent teacher) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This mental-space configuration is reflected by the syntactic structure of the non-finite con-
struction; as Wierzbicka observes, "the structural link between the main verb and its 'surface 
object' begins to make sense, since it is shown to reflect a semantic link between a predicate 
of thinking ... and the entity thought about" (1988: 53; see also Mair 1990: 200; Steever 1977: 
594-5; Ureland 1973: 298)169; in other words, the syntactic closeness between the SUBJECT 
and the TOPIC in the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction mirrors a higher degree of semantic 
closeness (cf. Borkin 1984: 99-102) because the TOPIC is dependent on the personal experi-
ence and judgement of the SUBJECT. While, as Riddle notes, "that complements describe 
situations which are more objectively true and where there is a greater psychological distance 
between the subject or speaker and the object" (1975: 473), Borkin has opined that the syntac-
tic disintegration of a subordinate clause reflects a "semantic disintegration of whole proposi-
                                                 
169 Since generative grammarians do not usually acknowledge this link, it is remarkable that Hornstein and 
Lightfoot have suggested that "some kind of secondary semantic relationship exists between believe and the 
following NP" (1987: 48); this idea has not been taken up in the generative treatment of non-finite clauses after 
believe, though. 
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tions and potential states of affairs relevant to empirical reality, into elements whose status is 
more dependent on human perception" (1973: 55). Despite all claims to the contrary (cf. 4.2), 
therefore, there is in fact a semantic link between the main-clause SUBJECT and the NP2 in a 
sentence such as I believe John to be a competent teacher, which could be brought out by the 
paraphrase 'I believe about John that he is a competent teacher'.170 Unlike in the FINITE OPIN-
ION Construction, the TOPIC in the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction has a semantic relation 
both with the main-clause subject and with the XP that adds the qualification. To take up some 
basic ideas of Langacker's in his characterisation of the difference between the sentences I 
expect that Don will leave and I expect Don to leave (1999a: 336-7), a sentence such as I be-
lieve that John is a teacher directly profiles a relationship between the SUBJECT and a proposi-
tion, while the sentence I believe John to be a competent teacher profiles the relation between 
the SUBJECT and the proposition only indirectly, mediated by the entity John, which stands 
metonymically for the proposition it is part of: "Metonymy instantiates our basic cognitive 
ability to invoke one conceived entity as a reference point for purposes of establishing mental 
contact with another" (Langacker 1999a: 358-9). In this view, the NON-FINITE OPINION Con-
struction establishes a semantic link between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC, which is the most 
salient entity in the subordinate proposition, rather than between the SUBJECT and the subor-
dinate proposition as a whole. The NON-FINITE OPINION Construction thus accords greater 
prominence to the TOPIC than the FINITE OPINION Construction does (DeGroot 1981: 48; Dik 
1997: 350). 
Sentences such as I find John attractive or I regard John as a genius, which are instances 
of the QUALIFYING Construction proper, also convey the sense that what is attributed to the 
TOPIC is a function of the SUBJECT's experience with it; the TOPIC is therefore presented from 
the point of view of the Subjective Space. In contrast to the NON-FINITE OPINION Construc-
tion, the judgement given in a QUALIFYING Construction is marked as idiosyncratic and per-
sonal and is therefore not supposed to float back to the Base Space. The hearer will not typi-
cally prove or disprove the information given in the Subjective Space, but will accept it as the 
speaker's personal view. A likely reply to the sentence I find John attractive will consequently 
not be No, he is unattractive, but You really do?, which merely expresses surprise at the 
                                                 
170 This semantic link has already been pointed out by Bolinger, who has observed that NON-FINITE OPINION 
sentences in which the string 'main clause subject-verb-NP2' is semantically compatible with the meaning of the 
whole construction are more felicitous than sentences in which there is a semantic clash between this string and 
the sentence as a whole (1967a: 48). The sentence "We believe these ideas to be constructive and helpful" is 
more acceptable than "?We believe these ideas to be destructive and worthless" (Bolinger 1967a: 51) because the 
"apparent constituent" (Bolinger 1967a: 50) I believe these ideas is semantically compatible only with the first 
sentence. 
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speaker's judgement, but does not challenge its validity. Since the Subjective Space created by 
a QUALIFYING Construction also serves as viewpoint for the SUBJECT's qualification of the 
TOPIC, the Subjective Space is almost completely closed off from the Base Space (figure 25).  
Figure 25: Mental-space configuration underlying the QUALIFYING Construction (I find John attractive) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The lack of independence of the qualification expressed in the Subjective Space from the 
main-clause SUBJECT is reflected in the structure of the QUALIFYING Construction; as com-
pared to the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction, the secondary predicate XP 
not only becomes syntactically more like an adjunct to this NP [the TOPIC NP; H.S.] and more of 
a part of the higher clause itself, but semantically its characteristics are also more adjunct-like, 
in that it functions less like a proposition evaluable as true or false or less like a state of affairs 
seen as existing or not existing independently of a particular person. (Borkin 1973: 54) 
While both the TOPIC NP and the qualifying predicate are syntactically independent of the ma-
trix clause in the FINITE OPINION Construction (and therefore semantically independent of the 
main-clause SUBJECT), a NON-FINITE OPINION Construction only includes an independent 
infinitival predicate, while the TOPIC NP has been integrated into the matrix clause — with the 
consequence that the TOPIC is dependent on the personal views of the SUBJECT and only the 
qualification expressed by the non-finite predicate can be transferred into the intersubjective 
Base Space. In a QUALIFYING Construction, finally, both the TOPIC NP and the qualifying 
predicate have been syntactically integrated into the matrix clause, which signals their com-
plete semantic dependence on the main-clause SUBJECT. 
The FINITE OPINION, NON-FINITE OPINION and QUALIFYING Constructions thus contrast 
along two parameters, which are illustrated in figure 26.  
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Figure 26: Functional map of qualifying constructions 
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On the horizontal dimension, the constructions differ as to whether the TOPIC is viewed from 
the intersubjective Base Space or from the point of view of the SUBJECT in the Subjective 
Space. The FINITE OPINION Construction typically gives information on the TOPIC that is in-
dependent of the SUBJECT's personal view of it, while the NON-FINITE OPINION and the 
QUALIFYING Constructions usually provide information that is based on the SUBJECT's experi-
ence with the TOPIC. The vertical dimension distinguishes various degrees to which the quali-
fication can be transferred from the Subjective Space into the Base: both the FINITE OPINION 
and the NON-FINITE OPINION Constructions essentially indicate that the judgement made on 
the TOPIC could be intersubjectively valid. The degree of certainty also crucially depends on 
the choice of the main verb, however: the transfer of the judgement from the Subjective Space 
into the Base Space is much more limited in the sentences I find that John is attractive and I 
consider John to be competent than in the statements I believe that John is a teacher and I 
know John to be a competent teacher. Since the QUALIFYING Construction treats the judge-
ment made on the TOPIC as the SUBJECT's idiosyncratic view, the intersubjective validity of 
this judgement is typically strongly restricted. While the two factors isolated here help to dis-
tinguish prototypical instances of the qualifying patterns, they must be seen as forming a con-
tinuum that admits many untypical instances as well. Unlike the discrete functional maps 
drawn up for resultative/motion constructions and depictive constructions (cf. tables 12 and 
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13), the functional maps for qualifying constructions grade into one another along the two 
parameters. The overlapping nature of these constructions also explains why a particular men-
tal verb is not exclusively found in one qualifying pattern or the other, but only shows a cer-
tain tendency to occur prototypically in one (or two) of these patterns.  
The empirical correctness of the horizontal parameter, which determines the various de-
grees to which the TOPIC is dependent on the personal views of the SUBJECT, can be supported 
by a closer look at the referential properties which TOPIC NPs have in the FINITE OPINION Con-
struction as opposed to the NON-FINITE OPINION and the QUALIFYING Constructions. In the 
latter two constructions, the TOPIC is usually a definitely referring, frequently human or at 
least concrete entity. While a vaguely referring pronoun such as there is found in 116 out of 
1,198 sentences (9.7%) of the FINITE OPINION Construction after believe (298a), there occurs 
in only 6 out of 268 instances (2.2%) of the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction after believe 
(298b); the QUALIFYING Construction does not tolerate existential there at all (298c) (cf. 
5.2.2). 
(298) a.  Many people believe that there are schoolrooms and football grounds where 
   civilized order is forever on the verge of breaking down (BNC ECN: 8). 
  b. Newsom accepted the tripartite system, believing there to be different levels of 
        natural ability in children (BNC H8D: 185). 
  c. *Newsom considers there different levels of natural ability in children. 
In addition, Borkin argues that sentences with indefinite or generic TOPICs are less acceptable 
in the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction and the QUALIFYING Construction than in the FINITE 
OPINION Construction (299) (1984: 33, 44-7). This assessment is largely buttressed up by na-
tive-speaker evaluations, although the differences between the FINITE OPINION and the NON-
FINITE OPINION Constructions in the first two sentences (299a vs. a' and b vs. b') are not very 
pronounced. 
(299) a.  The public believes that a lot is wrong with our system of government. (ROS: 5) 
  a'. The public believes a lot to be wrong with our system of government. (ROS: 20) 
  a''. ?The public considers a lot wrong with our system of government. (ROS: 50) 
   b.  I believe that any beaver is a lot smarter than any domestic pet. (ROS: 13) 
  b'.  I believe any beaver to be a lot smarter than any domestic pet. (ROS: 22) 
  b''.  ?I regard any beaver as a lot smarter than any domestic pet. (ROS: 32) 
  c.   We believe that the littlest thing is irritating to him. (ROS: 14) 
  c'.  ?We believe the littlest thing to be irritating to him. (ROS: 33) 
  c''.  ??We regard the littlest thing as irritating to him. (ROS: 55)  
                                    (adapted from Borkin 1984: 45-6) 
The independence of the TOPIC from the personal views of the SUBJECT in the FINITE OPINION 
Construction is also borne out by the fact that that-clauses allow not only referentially trans-
parent (de re), but also referentially opaque (de dicto) readings. A referentially opaque read-
ing relates the SUBJECT to a dictum, i.e. a proposition that can contain indefinitely referring 
NPs, while a transparent reading relates the SUBJECT to a res, a definitely referring individual 
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that her belief is about (cf. Fauconnier 1997: 51-3). When the SUBJECT Mary knows that her 
colleague and the Soviet spy refer to the same person, the sentence Mary believes that the So-
viet spy is more intelligent than her colleague would be contradictory on a transparent/de re 
reading, in which the Soviet spy is a definitely referring entity for the SUBJECT Mary. How-
ever, when Mary is not aware of the referential identity between the definite descriptions the 
Soviet spy and her colleague, the sentence Mary believes that the Soviet spy is more intelli-
gent than her colleague is not contradictory on an opaque/de dicto reading, in which the So-
viet spy does not, for Mary, refer to a specific person. In an opaque reading, there is thus no 
direct relationship between the SUBJECT Mary and the TOPIC the Soviet spy. On the other 
hand, sentences such as Mary believes the Soviet spy to be more intelligent than her colleague 
and Mary considers the Soviet spy more intelligent than her colleague are by necessity con-
tradictory because they allow only a transparent interpretation in which the referential proper-
ties of the Soviet spy are determined for the SUBJECT. The NON-FINITE OPINION and the 
QUALIFYING Constructions do not admit of an opaque reading in which the TOPIC NP is not 
definitely referring; both constructions presuppose a direct, de re semantic relationship be-
tween the SUBJECT and the TOPIC. To put the matter another way: the potentially indefinite 
referential properties of the TOPIC in the FINITE OPINION Construction indicate "a dyadic rela-
tion of belief between a believer and a proposition", while the necessarily definite referential 
properties of the TOPIC in the NON-FINITE OPINION and the QUALIFYING Constructions suggest 
a "triadic relation of belief among a believer, an object, and an attribute" (Quine 1971: 104). 
An opaque reading is impossible in a triadic belief-relation, in which the SUBJECT is directly 
related to the TOPIC (cf. Borkin 1984: 48-9). 
A related piece of evidence comes from the different scope properties of the existential 
quantifier in the FINITE OPINION Construction and the QUALIFYING Construction, which have 
already been illustrated in 6.2. The examples are repeated here for convenience (300). Since 
the scope properties of a quantifier in the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction are less clear, I 
will not discuss them here (see Borkin 1984: 34; Suzuki 1991: 29). 
(300) a.  Mary believes that someone is angry at John.  
   a'. Mary believes ∃x [x is angry at John].  
   a''. ≠ ∃x [Mary believes x is angry at John].  
   b.  Mary considers someone angry at John. 
   b'. = ∃x [Mary considers x angry at John]. 
   b''. ≠ Mary considers ∃x [x is angry at John]. 
A quantifier in the FINITE OPINION Construction typically takes narrow scope over the subor-
dinate proposition, while it takes wide scope over the whole sentence in the QUALIFYING Con-
struction. The different scope properties need not be attributed to a complicated mechanism of 
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quantifier raising and SC-restructuring (cf. 6.2), but can be given a straightforward explana-
tion in terms of the referential requirements of the TOPIC NP: there is no personal relation be-
tween the SUBJECT and the TOPIC in the FINITE OPINION Construction, so the reference of the 
quantifier can remain indeterminate (opaque interpretation). In (300a), therefore, Mary does 
not have a specific person in mind, but only believes that there is at least one person that is 
angry at John. Since the qualification of the TOPIC in the QUALIFYING Construction is depend-
ent on the SUBJECT's personal view of the TOPIC, the reference of the TOPIC must be deter-
mined in this construction. As a consequence, (300b) indicates that Mary has a particular in-
dividual in mind who she has an opinion about (transparent interpretation; cf. Quine 1971: 
101-3).171 To sum up: while the FINITE OPINION Construction, which expresses a relation be-
tween a SUBJECT and a proposition, tolerates indefinitely or vaguely referring TOPIC NPs such 
as there, a lot, any beaver, the littlest thing as well as narrow-scope quantifiers and referen-
tially opaque definite descriptions, the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction and the QUALIFYING 
Construction, which denote a direct relation between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC-entity, re-
quire the TOPIC to be a definitely referring NP. 
That the mental spaces drawn up for the three qualifying constructions in English are 
somewhere along the right lines is also supported by cross-linguistic evidence from French 
(Fauconnier 1997: 95) and Spanish (Mejías-Bikandi 1996: 158-72). The divergent accessibil-
ity conditions between the Base Space and the Subjective Space that are created by different 
syntactic constructions in English are rendered by mood in French and Spanish. To give an 
example from Spanish: the expression tal vez ('maybe') sets up a Possibility Space relative to 
the Base Space, which represents the discourse participants' shared view of reality. When the 
verb is in the indicative as in (301a), the speaker suggests that he knows that the man he is 
talking about has a son, so this presupposition can be transferred into the Base Space. When 
the verb is in the subjunctive mood (301b), however, the speaker only sets up a hypothetical 
situation; thus, the hearer cannot assume that the speaker knows the man he is talking about 
and that this man really has a son (Mejías-Bikandi 1996: 159-61). The subjunctive in Spanish 
consequently closes off the Possibility Space from the intersubjective Base Space, whereas 
the indicative allows elements from the Possibility Space to transfer into the Base Space (for 
examples in which the indicative allows elements from the Base Space to transfer into the 
Possibility Space, whereas the subjunctive makes this transfer problematic, see Mejías-
                                                 
171 The different scope properties become more easily apparent when we use a different matrix verb and a differ-
ent quantifier. In the sentence The teacher proved that none of the students is dishonest, the quantifier only has 
scope over the subordinate clause (the teacher has no specific students in mind), while it has scope over the ma-
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Bikandi 1996: 166-70). While the Spanish constructions Mejías-Bikandi deals with are func-
tionally different from the English constructions under investigation here, the semantic 
mechanisms that are at work are very similar: like the subjunctive in Spanish, the English 
QUALIFYING Construction presents judgements that are dependent on the idiosyncratic views 
of the speaker and cannot freely be adopted into the intersubjective Base Space. 
(301) a. Tal vez su hijo está en la cárcel. 
      'Maybe his son is-IND-in jail.' 
  b. Tal vez su hijo esté en la cárcel. 
       'Maybe his son is-SUBJ in jail.'              (from Mejías-Bikandi 1996: 159-60) 
11.4  A semantic explanation of syntactic and stylistic differences between  
  qualifying patterns  
To put the mental-space account on a more empirical footing, I will examine the behaviour of 
the qualifying patterns along a number of empirically observable syntactic and semantic pa-
rameters: 
Dependent qualifying constructions constitute a syntactic variable in the best sense of the word, 
with a set of equivalent variants that can be analyzed quantitatively and correlated with inde-
pendent categories, internal or external variable constraints. (Schneider 1997: 48) 
On the assumption that syntactic form is a reflection of underlying meaning, it should be pos-
sible to interpret syntactic differences between the qualifying patterns as systematically deriv-
ing from semantic motivations. Each of the following six subsections focuses on one stylistic 
or syntactic variable and compares the behaviour of the qualifying patterns with respect to this 
variable. I will attempt to account for these differences in a tightly interlocking fashion by 
appealing to the mental-space configurations presented above. If such a unified explanation of 
surface distinctions becomes feasible, this can also be seen as supporting the mental-space 
account given for the FINITE OPINION Construction (SUBJECT + matrix verb + that-clause), the 
NON-FINITE OPINION Construction (SUBJECT + matrix verb + NP inf XP), and the QUALIFYING 
Construction (SUBJECT + matrix verb + NP (as) XP) from an empirical point of view.  
11.4.1 Stylistic differences 
11.4.1.1 The data 
This section considers that-clauses, NP inf XP, NP XP and NP as XP as carriers of potentially 
differing stylistic significance. Stylistic distinctions must be assumed "when higher or lower 
scores of a variable are directly correlated with higher and lower positions on a scale of for-
                                                                                                                                                        
trix proposition in The teacher proved none of the students (to be) dishonest (the teacher has specific students in 
mind). 
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mality of the context" (Lavandera 1978: 172). Studies of this kind have been most successful 
with phonologically variant forms (Lavandera 1978: 175). The problem with alternative syn-
tactic structures is that they — unlike variable phonetic forms — are likely to differ semanti-
cally as well. The analyst consequently faces the problem that "non-phonological variables 
are defined so that even when they do carry social and stylistic significance, they also have 
referential meaning, although this referential meaning is held to be the same for all variants" 
(Lavandera 1978: 176; see also Feagin 2002: 23-4). If one makes it a precondition of a study 
of stylistic differences that the variant forms must share identical meaning, such a study could 
not be reasonably conducted on the level of syntax because a given pair of sentences is practi-
cally never synonymous. To make a stylistic examination of syntactic constructions feasible, 
Lavandera proposes "to relax the condition that the referential meaning must be the same for 
all the alternants and substitute for it a condition of functional comparability" (1978: 181). On 
this basis the frequencies of the four qualifying patterns can be compared on a scale of for-
mality even if they are semantically not equivalent.  
Table 19 compares the relative frequency of that-clauses and the NP inf XP-pattern (both 
after believe) across text categories. No major stylistic distinctions become evident (compare 
the low ϕ-value), with most registers not exhibiting a significant departure from the average 
3:1 ratio between that-clauses and the infinitival pattern. There are only two minor excep-
tions: that-clauses are relatively more frequent than NP inf XP-sentences in spoken registers 
(and in imaginative texts, which include many dialogue sections), while the NP inf XP-pattern 
is slightly overrepresented in very formal written registers (belief and thought and, particu-
larly, natural and pure science). 
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Table 19: Frequency of that-clauses and NP inf XP after believe across text categories 
 that-clause NP inf XP Σ (text categories) 
natural and pure science 232 
(277.5) 
χ2=7.5 
131 
(85.5) 
χ2=24.2 
363 
applied science 324 
(328.7) 
χ2=0.1 
106 
(101.3) 
χ2=0.2 
430 
social science 308 
(303.5) 
χ2=0.1 
89 
(93.5) 
χ2=0.2 
397 
belief and thought 203 
(233.2) 
χ2=3.9 
102 
(71.8) 
χ2=12.7 
305 
commerce and finance 312 
(314.2) 
χ2=0.02 
99 
(96.8) 
χ2=0.1 
411 
world affairs 357 
(353.9) 
χ2=0.03 
106 
(109.1) 
χ2=0.1 
463 
arts 259 
(250.7) 
χ2=0.3 
69 
(77.3) 
χ2=0.9 
328 
leisure 279 
(273.7) 
χ2=0.1 
79 
(84.3) 
χ2=0.3 
358 
imaginative 166 
(144.5) 
χ2=3.2 
23 
(44.5) 
χ2=10.4 
189 
spoken 208 
(168.2) 
χ2=9.4 
12 
(51.8) 
χ2=30.6 
220 
Σ (constructions) 2,648 816 n=3,464 
χ2=104.4; df=9; highly significant at p<0.001; ϕ=0.17 
These results are unspectacular because it is widely known that that-clauses after verbs ex-
pressing personal attitudes such as believe and think are very common in conversation (Biber 
et al. 1999: 666-9), while the NP inf XP-pattern after mental verbs is a less frequent and more 
formal construction (Altenberg 1993: 229-30; Biber et al. 1999: 698-9; Hornby 1954: 22-3; 
Mair 1990: 175). The following sentence pair offered by Bolinger nicely illustrates the fact 
that the NP inf XP-pattern is more at home in formal than in colloquial contexts: 
(302) a. I believe these facts to have proved accurate. 
  b. ?I believe these facts to have checked out 100%.              (from Bolinger 1967a: 51) 
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Nevertheless, the relative frequencies between the finite and the infinitival patterns (expressed 
in per cent figures) do not differ considerably from register to register, with that-clauses nor-
mally making up 70-80 per cent of all instances, and NP inf XP accounting for 20-30 per cent. 
It is only in spoken texts that NP inf XP drops below the 10-per-cent margin, and in very for-
mal text categories that it accounts for about a third of all cases (figure 27). 
Figure 27: Relative frequencies of that -clauses and the NP inf XP-pattern across 
text categories
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To ascertain data about the relative frequencies of NP inf XP, NP XP and NP as XP across regis-
ters, I conducted a corpus study with the verb consider, which can be combined with all three 
patterns. The results are displayed in table 20: the relative frequencies of the three patterns are 
again quite constant across text categories (observe the low ϕ-value); NP XP-sentences are 
found more often than expected in imaginative texts, while the NP inf XP-pattern is overrepre-
sented in the natural-and-pure-science category. The observed frequencies for the NP as XP-
pattern are slightly higher than the expected frequencies in the registers of natural and pure 
science and social science. 
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Table 20: Frequency of NP inf XP, NP XP and NP as XP after consider across text categories 
 NP inf XP NP XP NP as XP Σ (text categories) 
natural and pure science 93 
(68.9) 
χ2=8.4 
83 
(124.6) 
χ2=13.9 
46 
(28.5) 
χ2=10.7 
222 
applied science 106 
(92.1) 
χ2=2.1 
146 
(166.7) 
χ2=2.6 
45 
(38.2) 
χ2=1.2 
297 
social science 77 
(77.3) 
χ2=0 
120 
(139.8) 
χ2=2.8 
52 
(32) 
χ2=12.5 
249 
belief and thought 99 
(92.1) 
χ2=0.5 
164 
(166.7) 
χ2=0.04 
34 
(38.2) 
χ2=0.5 
297 
commerce and finance 64 
(58.6) 
χ2=0.5 
103 
(106.1) 
χ2=0.09 
22 
(24.3) 
χ2=0.2 
189 
world affairs 99 
(95.9) 
χ2=0.1 
178 
(173.4) 
χ2=0.1 
32 
(39.7) 
χ2=1.5 
309 
arts 102 
(113.6) 
χ2=1.2 
224 
(205.4) 
χ2=1.7 
40 
(47) 
χ2=1 
366 
leisure 83 
(98.4) 
χ2=2.4 
204 
(177.9) 
χ2=3.8 
30 
(40.7) 
χ2=2.8 
317 
imaginative 51 
(84.7) 
χ2=13.4 
203 
(153.2) 
χ2=16.2 
19 
(35.1) 
χ2=7.4 
273 
spoken 64 
(56.5) 
χ2=1 
91 
(102.2) 
χ2=1.2 
27 
(23.4) 
χ2=0.6 
182 
Σ (constructions) 838 1,516 347 n=2,701 
χ2=110.4; df=18; highly significant at p<0.001; ϕ=0.2 
Figure 28 demonstrates that the relative frequencies of the three non-finite/verbless qualifying 
patterns behave similarly across text categories, with the exception of imaginative texts, 
which show a disproportionately high number of NP XP-sentences, and the category of natural 
and pure science, which clearly favours the NP inf XP-pattern at the expense of NP XP.172 
                                                 
172 Similar results could be replicated with other verbs as well. Find, for which the NP XP-pattern is the prototypi-
cal construction, occurs in imaginative texts much more often than expected. The NP as XP-pattern after regard is 
equally distributed across text categories, with slight peaks in world affairs, commerce and finance, belief and 
thought and social sciences. 
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Figure 28: Relative frequencies of NP inf XP, NP XP and NP as XP across 
text categories
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11.4.1.2 A mental-space explanation 
The stylistic differences between the qualifying patterns are not very pronounced. The FINITE 
OPINION Construction is more frequent than the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction in all text 
categories and particularly in spoken texts because it can be used to present a SUBJECT's opin-
ion on any state of affairs and with any degree of commitment to the validity of the attitude 
expressed (303a, a'). The NON-FINITE OPINION Construction is restricted to the special case 
that a rational judgement depends on the personal relation between a SUBJECT and a TOPIC; 
moreover, the SUBJECT is usually convinced that anyone with her experience would arrive at 
the same conclusion. Such contexts seem to occur most typically in scientific text categories 
in which a SUBJECT presents a judgement that depends on her long-standing experience with 
the TOPIC (303b). The bare QUALIFYING Construction is significantly overrepresented in 
imaginative texts, which could be due to the fact that this text type frequently includes charac-
terisations from the subjective point of view of the narrator or another fictional character 
(303c); at the same time, it is significantly underrepresented in scientific registers because the 
idiosyncrasy of the opinion expressed by it (especially after a matrix verb such as find) is not 
compatible with the conventions of this text category. It is difficult to present any stylistic 
generalisations for the AS-QUALIFYING Construction because the degree of rationality ex-
pressed by it depends largely on the main verb used (cf. 11.2.3). 
(303) a.  If your looking for love and your absolutely desperate there's always a thing called 
        date line which I believe is very successful and I know at least two people who've 
        got very happy marriages from that. (BNC FLB: 211). 
  a'. But I think Ibrahim's OK (BNC A74: 47). 
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  b.  As it happens, neither this mechanism, nor that found in Dendrocoelum, bears much 
         resemblance, even by analogy, to plant tropisms, or to the mechanism Loeb 
         believed to underlie animal orientation. (BNC AE7: 1070). 
  c.  They were taken deeper into that neighbourhood and Eleanor wrote to her sister 
         Laura in Paris that she considered New York a 'very dirty, shoddy town' 
         (BNC A0U: 2415). 
11.4.2 Syntactic complexity 
11.4.2.1  The data 
One major factor distinguishing that-clauses from the other three qualifying patterns is com-
plexity. While a that-clause can easily be elaborated by adverbials and further subordinate 
structures, both non-finite clauses and NP (as) XP-structures are less tolerant of additional syn-
tactic material (Mair 1990: 187). The first line of table 21 provides the average number of 
words in that-clauses (after believe), NP inf XP-structures (after believe) and NP XP-patterns 
(after consider), each based on a sample of 240 sentences. On average, that-clauses contain 
more words than non-finite clauses by a third, and they are twice as long as the NP XP-
pattern.173 More interesting than the mean pattern length is the variability of the scores within 
the three data sets, i.e. whether the observed lengths are all very close to the typical length or 
whether they are considerably scattered above and below the mean. The second line of the 
table therefore presents the standard deviation for each pattern174; the values demonstrate that 
the length of that-clauses is much more variable than that of the other two patterns, which are 
more uniformly spread around the mean. To put the matter another way, individual that-
clauses vary considerably in length and can be relatively long, whereas the sentences in the 
other two patterns are typically short: while 76 that-clauses contain 15 words or more, this is 
the case with only 21 instances of the NP inf XP-pattern, and 14 of the NP XP-pattern. 
Table 21: Average length of that-clauses, NP inf XP and NP XP  
 that-clause 
 (after believe) 
NP inf XP 
(after believe) 
NP XP 
(after consider) 
average length (in words) 12 8 6 
standard deviation 8.3 4.8 4.9 
 
                                                 
173 Since every sentence in the NP inf XP-pattern also contains an infinitive (John believes Mary to be intelligent), 
the fact that this pattern is, on average, two words longer than the verbless NP XP-structure (John considers Mary 
intelligent) can be directly attributed to the infinitival form. 
174 The standard deviation has been calculated with the following formula (Oakes 1998: 7): 
1
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−
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(304a) illustrates an average that-clause comprising 12 words, and (304b) an average NP inf 
XP-pattern with 8 words. While a that-clause with 28 words (304c) is not too unusual, 28 
words are highly untypical for NP inf XP (304d). 
(304) a.  There are some people who believe that the future of books and magazines for  
      recording information is bleak (BNC APX: 261). 
   b. IGNORED our plea for him to address the 'Southgate Semiotics Society' — a body 
        concerned with discussing the most poignant examples of what we believe to be 
        ironic, individualist/regionalist and deconstructionist English (BNC BNS: 990). 
  c. I am afraid I am cynical enough to believe this is just another round of a giant  
      game of poker, where the only thing that will matter in the end will be the size 
   of the cheque (BNC A04: 143). 
  d.  Thomson believes this code compiled approach to be a major advantage of the  
         fuzzy TECH system, and one of the most important factors in the decision to 
         team with Inform GmbH (BNC CPS: 48). 
It is necessary to consider more fine-grained data in order to determine some common sources 
for the greater complexity of that-clauses vis-à-vis the NP inf XP-pattern (similar remarks hold 
for NP (as) XP). While roughly 18% of all that-clauses contain an additional subordinate or 
coordinate clause (305a, b), only about 3% of all NP inf XP-patterns include another clause 
(305a', b'). What is more, some that-clauses are made up of conjuncts with different TOPIC 
NPs (305c), something that is not normally possible for NP inf XP (305c'). In addition, adver-
bial subordinate clauses, which are frequently found inside that-clauses (305d), do not usually 
occur with NP inf XP because this pattern does not seem to tolerate independent modification 
(305d').  
(305) a.  I happen to believe that the fears that have been voiced on that account are 
       exaggerated (BNC HHW: 11961). 
   a'. Per Andersen of IDC's European Unix Expertise Centre believes this to be a  
       significant trend that will shape the industry over the next two years (BNC 
       CP5: 190). 
  b.  The problem was still his mother and the prefectural doctors, who continued to  
       believe that he was schizophrenic and should be hospitalized (BNC HH3: 6952). 
  b'. So, Blacklock still believes her to be married and living the good life? (BNC FPK: 
        371) 
  c.  We all know intuitively that if someone firmly believes they are inadequate and 
       worthless, that the world is a rotten place and that life is full of suffering, then 
        they will not have a joyous, exuberant and loving life (BNC CA5: 261).  
  c'. ?John believes himself to be inadequate and the world to be a rotten place. 
  d.  Some of the notable protagonists in the debate are John and Nuala Scarisbrook, of  
       the 'Life' organisation, who believe that all abortion is wrong because life begins at 
        conception (BNC ANA: 728). 
   d'. ?Some people believe abortion to be wrong because life begins at conception. 
By the same token, while parentheticals and adverbials occur in about 6% of all FINITE OPIN-
ION Constructions (306a, b), fewer than 1% of the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction include 
a parenthetical phrase (306a'); an adverbial modifying the non-finite clause is not normally 
felicitous at all (306b'). 
(306) a.  Professor Lear believes that individuation and autonomy are the highest goals of 
   Man and he also believes, along with Socrates, that the unexamined life is not 
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    worth living (BNC AHG: 537).  
  a'. [I]f the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe, for example, a person to  
        be of hostile origin, he may imprison him (GU6: 1672). 
 b.  It is just that I believe they are probably more rare than is claimed (BNC C9W: 
        1322). 
  b'. ?I believe them to be probably more rare than is claimed. (ROS: 41) 
Two points are worth noting here: first, that-clauses are, on average, considerably longer and 
more complex than the other qualifying patterns; second, only that-clauses can be independ-
ently modified, whereas an adverbial phrase or clause cannot obviously take scope over a 
non-finite or verbless pattern (cf. 5.2.1). Thus, while an adverbial can modify either the main 
or the subordinate proposition of a that-clause construction (307a), an adverbial may only 
modify the main clause in the other qualifying constructions, but not the NP (inf/as) XP-string 
(307b) (cf. Steever 1977: 596-7). 
(307) a.  John firmly believes that Mary is a genius for sure. 
  a'. John firmly believes Mary to be a genius (??for sure). 
A related observation equally lends support to the claim that NP (inf/as) XP-strings cannot be 
independently modified. It has frequently been acknowledged that only that-clauses, but not 
non-finite clauses — let alone NP (as) XP — can include a modal auxiliary (Dixon 1991: 223; 
Mair 1990: 188; Noël 1997: 271). Of the 4,431 instances of that-clauses after believe ex-
tracted from the BNC, 1,640 sentences (37%) contain some modal auxiliary. (308) provides 
examples with the epistemic modal may, the emphatic modal do, and the future auxiliary will, 
respectively. None of these modal meanings can be rendered by non-finite or verbless qualify-
ing patterns.175 
(308) a. Economists believe that the boost to the labour force may be worth an additional 1  
      per cent a year in the early 1990s (BNC A7V: 47). 
  b. "But the day I wrote this song I honestly believed that I did love everyone!" insists  
      Paul, chirpily (BNC CAE: 1492). 
  c. I believe that one day Manchester United will again win the league title (BNC A2K: 
       123). 
Negation data also serve to underline this point: while that-clauses commonly occur in ne-
gated form (309a, a'), negation in the NP inf XP-pattern is uncommon and frequently sounds 
odd (309b). In the few cases where the negator not is found in the non-finite pattern, it typi-
cally carries contrastive stress and exclusively takes scope over the infinitival constituent 
(309c, c'). Similarly, negation in NP (as) XP-patterns is usually only possible in the form of 
                                                 
175 Non-finite clauses after believe cannot normally express future reference (Higuchi 1999: 130). There are a 
few ways around this restriction, though, such as the immediate future denoted by on the point of: 
Apart from the fact that she believed her teeth to be on the point of falling out, she had not had 
her period for several weeks and was afraid that she was barren (BNC EFW: 1333). 
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constituent negation with contrastive stress (309d, d' and e, e'; cf. 5.3.3). When no contrast is 
implied, the XP must be negated by morphological means (309f).  
(309) a.  I knew I wasn't attractive, and I didn't help myself by dressing like a young fogey in 
        tweed sportsjackets (BNC FR3: 785). 
  a'.  In the light of the facts which emerged subsequently, he believed that Evans' 
       execution was not justified and that a mistake had been made (BNC EEC: 939). 
  b.  ??He believed Evans' execution not to be justified. 
  c.  However, its existence was never firmly established, and today it is believed not to 
       exist (BNC GW6: 1142). 
  c'. "At first I thought it was rubbish ..." The implication, of course, is that Mr Bowen 
       now considers it not to be 'rubbish' (BNC BNS: 191). 
  d.  He considered the Shah an autocrat, not a dictator (BNC G3R: 2151). 
  d'.  John Paul II will be judged not the healer of a divided Church, but the 
         gravedigger of Pope John's aggiornamento (BNC CRK: 198). 
  e.  Either way, astronomers are regarding it as a fascinating astronomical object and  
        not just a recordbreaker (BNC B78: 382). 
  e'. He thus suggested that ideas should be viewed not as mirrors of reality but plans 
   of action (BNC EAJ: 966). 
  f.   Since convention in Britain establishes that acts of parliament are law, a British 
   judge must enforce even acts of parliament he considers unfair or unwise (BNC 
   JXJ: 40). 
11.4.2.2 A mental-space explanation  
The FINITE OPINION Construction expresses a relation between a SUBJECT and a proposition 
that provides a unit of information believed by the SUBJECT. Since the proposition is profiled 
as a whole and syntactically put into relief by an independent subordinate clause, the number 
of words it contains is not constrained by any semantic factors, which accounts for the vari-
able lengths of that-clauses after believe and the fact that that-clauses frequently include addi-
tional subordinate or coordinate clauses (cf. 305a, b, d). Both the NON-FINITE OPINION and the 
QUALIFYING Constructions profile a relationship between a SUBJECT and a TOPIC, though. The 
(inf/as) XP-string does not therefore provide an isolated, detached predication, but a predica-
tion that is dependent on the SUBJECT's view of the TOPIC. This predication is not only seman-
tically backgrounded relative to the SUBJECT-TOPIC relation, but is also syntactically more 
"adjunct-like" (Borkin 1973: 54) in that it is realised only by a non-finite verb or no verb at 
all. As a result, the string following the TOPIC is usually rather short in these constructions and 
does not normally contain another subordinate or coordinate clause (cf. the rare cases illus-
trated by 305a', b' and d'). 
Furthermore, since the FINITE OPINION Construction profiles a relation between a SUB-
JECT and a proposition, a that-clause can also contain several independently qualified TOPICS 
(cf. 305c), while the other qualifying constructions, which profile a relation between a SUB-
A MENTAL-SPACE ACCOUNT OF THE QUALIFYING CONSTRUCTION 
 
300
JECT and a TOPIC, typically only present judgements made on a single TOPIC.176 The TOPIC, 
which serves as the target of the SUBJECT's belief, is in an informationally salient position in 
the NON-FINITE OPINION and the QUALIFYING Constructions, and a single sentence does not 
normally tolerate more than one information focus (cf. the restriction against several figure 
properties in the DEPICTIVE Construction; 10.1).177 
Most importantly, only the dependent proposition in the FINITE OPINION Construction can 
be independently modified by an adverbial or a modal auxiliary (cf. 306b, 308), while the NP 
(inf/as) XP-strings do not usually tolerate any independent modifying element (cf. 306b'). The 
truth value of an informationally detached proposition can be freely modified; a proposition 
that is dependent on the personal judgements of the SUBJECT, on the other hand, is already 
epistemically marked in quite a specific way, and the 'adjunct-like' predication is therefore not 
independent enough to allow any additional modification. By the same token, a SUBJECT may 
not only have a belief about a positive, but also about a negative proposition (cf. 309a, a'). It is 
highly unusual, however, that a SUBJECT makes a negated judgement about a TOPIC (??I be-
lieve John not to be intelligent); instead, the SUBJECT will highlight a positive or a negative 
characteristic of the TOPIC (I believe John to be intelligent/unintelligent). 
Finally, the judgement expressed in a QUALIFYING Construction is marked as subjective 
and idiosyncratic by the construction as such. Any additional modification of the truth value 
of the qualification (??I consider Mary probably intelligent) would be semantically incom-
patible with this construction: the QC presents a judgement from the point of view of the 
speaker and does not imply that the judgement is to float back to the Base Space; a modifier, 
however, would measure the degree of certainty of the qualification against an intersubjec-
tively valid external scale. For the same reason, a discourse participant would be more likely 
to modify or question the validity of a that-clause in a conversation than the validity of an NP 
XP-structure (310). A more appropriate reply to (310b) would therefore be a surprised You do? 
(Augustus Cavanna, p.c.). 
(310) a. A: I believe that Mary is intelligent.  
       B:  She may be intelligent, but her test results don't prove that./ No, she isn't. Look at 
               her test results! 
  b. A:  I consider Mary intelligent.  
        B:  ??She may be intelligent, but her test results don't prove that./ ??No, she isn't. 
               Look at her test results! 
                                                 
176 The fact that the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction profiles a relation between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC 
also explains the paucity of parenthetical expressions between the matrix verb and the TOPIC (cf. 306a'), as this 
would divert attention away from the SUBJECT-TOPIC relation. 
177 Sentences such as I consider this man an idiot and that man a genius are felicitous because the focus here is 
on the contrast between the qualities of the two TOPICS (cf. 5.2.1). 
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11.4.3 Tense and aspect 
11.4.3.1 The data 
Besides their more limited complexity and their lack of independent modification, non-finite 
and verbless qualifying patterns are also known to be less versatile with respect to 
tense/aspect-distinctions. It has become a commonplace for scholars that non-finite clauses 
after mental verbs are characteristically stative (Borkin 1984: 61; Kilby 1984: 154; Mair 
1990: 175; Menzel 1975: 105-6). This assumption can be empirically bolstered up by a com-
parison of the verb forms in finite that-clauses after believe and in the NP inf XP-pattern after 
believe and consider.178 The single most frequent verb in both that-clauses and non-finite 
clauses is be; nevertheless, there are considerable differences: while 1,198 out of 2,791 
(42.9%) that-clauses contain a form of be (311a, a'), no fewer than 241 out of 268 (89.9%) 
and 299 out of 326 (91.7%) non-finite clauses after believe and consider, respectively, have to 
be as their predicate (311b, b').179 
(311) a. The recent series of disasters from The Herald of Free Enterprise onwards, has led us  
        to believe that Britain is particularly unsafe (BNC A3B: 84). 
  a'.  So he supported reunion with Methodists and believed that it was Canute-like to  
       oppose the ordination of women (BNC A4J: 101). 
  b. Supporters of the free movement of capital believe it to be of benefit to all countries  
      (BNC CE8: 217). 
  b'. [T]he early doxographic writers considered him to be second-rate and more or less  
        ignored him (BNC BM8: 1045). 
The proportion of to be in the NP inf XP-pattern is so high that some linguists have claimed 
that this is the only verbal form possible in this construction (Watts 1983: 67). This conclu-
sion is too strong, though. Non-finite clauses also sometimes tolerate perfective infinitives: 11 
out of 268 infinitives after believe (4.1%), and 12 out of 326 infinitives after consider (3.7%) 
include a perfective verb form (312a); again, however, half of the instances are represented by 
perfective be (312a'). This proportion of perfective infinitives is rather low compared to the 
number of verbs in that-clauses which temporally precede the matrix verb (575 out of 2,791 
instances, i.e. 20.6%; only a fifth of these cases contain a past or perfective form of finite be) 
(312b, b'). 
                                                 
178 Since modal auxiliaries are exclusive to that-clauses, only those 2,791 that-clauses after believe (from the 
sample of 4,431) that do not contain a modal have been integrated into this comparison. As we will see later 
(11.4.5.2), non-finite clauses after the passive forms of believe and consider constitute a functional pattern of 
their own, so this section is only based on the 594 non-finite clauses after the active forms of believe and con-
sider. 
179 Included in these numbers are only those forms of finite or non-finite be that have the same (relative) tense as 
the matrix verb. Forms of be that temporally precede the matrix verb (such as I believe that Britain was unsafe in 
the Middle Ages and I believe Britain to have been unsafe in the Middle Ages) are included in the count of 
past/perfective infinitives (see 312a', b'). 
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(312) a.  Who considers those persons to have been involved in abuse or attempted abuse of 
       the immigration laws? (BNC B7M: 176) 
  a'.  She had informed Elizabeth Mowbray of the girls' exchange of identities — 
        information which the duchess had received thankfully, believing the exchange to 
       have been necessary for Anne's safety (BNC CCD: 1647). 
  b.  He believed that Peter's reforms had disrupted society by creating a Western-type  
       bourgeoisie (BNC A18: 163). 
  b'. The PCA may believe the use of horses was 'perfectly proper' (A88: 509). 
It has been persuasively argued that the perfect makes the verb stative because a perfect form 
denotes the state that has resulted from the verb's activity (Bolinger 1974: 73; Noël 1997: 272, 
footnote 4). Indeed, perfective infinitives that do not allow a stative interpretation are gener-
ally ruled out; the following sentence has been unanimously rejected by my informants: 
(313) *I know the president to have accepted this proposal. 
Stativity also seems to play a key role in the few passive infinitives after believe (8 out of 268, 
i.e. 3%) and consider (4 out of 326, i.e. 1.2%). All of these passives can be argued to charac-
terise the direct object (314a, a') (cf. Higuchi 1999: 131-2), and passives that do not possess a 
characterising function are much less felicitous (314b, b'). Finite that-clauses, by contrast, 
contain a higher proportion of passives (204 out of 2,791 instances, i.e. 7.3%), with the pas-
sive verbs being both stative and dynamic (314c, c'). 
(314) a.  If Cadwallon believed himself to be descended from a Votadini chieftain, he ...  
       (BNC G0G: 167). 
  a'. They do not discuss clearly whether in class society they consider all aspects of 
       cognition to be moulded by false consciousness (BNC A6S: 412). 
  b.  ?John believes Mary to be admired by all her students. (ROS: 41) 
  b'. ??John believes Mary to have been kissed by one of her students. (ROS: 57) 
  c.  In other words they believe that sexism in this instance is built on some 'natural'  
      foundation (BNC CGF: 688). 
  c'. I believe some were killed, mostly gypsies and homosexuals (BNC AK9: 762). 
Stativity is also involved in the very few cases in which the NP inf XP-pattern contains a pro-
gressive infinitive (2 out of 268, i.e. 0.7%, for believe and 1 out of 326, i.e. 0.3%, for con-
sider). The progressive form normally has a characterising function (315a); dynamic progres-
sives, on the other hand, are much less acceptable (315b). Progressive verb forms in that-
clauses are again more frequent (180 out of 2,791, i.e. 6.4%) and are, of course, typically 
found in dynamic contexts (315c). My corpus sample also includes 19 that-clauses after be-
lieve that contain passive progressive verb forms (315d), which do not have a structural corre-
late in the NP inf XP-pattern (315d'). 
(315) a.   In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Claude Simon considered marginalized 
    writing to be subverting totalitarian political control at least implicitly (BNC CRU: 
    626). 
  b. *I believe the president to be waiting outside. (ROS: 80) 
  c.  They will starve to the end, because they believe rescue is coming by sea (BNC 
   BP0: 685). 
  d.  A Swindon man is preparing to go to Pakistan to try to find his girlfriend, whom he 
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      believes is being kept there against her will (BNC K24: 647). 
  d'. *... to find his girlfriend, whom he believes to be being kept there against her will. 
Finally, non-finite clauses only marginally tolerate simple, i.e. non-perfective, non-passive 
and non-progressive verbs other than to be (6 out of 268, i.e. 2.2%, for believe, and 10 out of 
326, i.e. 3.1%, for consider); these verbs are all stative verbs with a characterising meaning, 
typically to have (316a, a'), and dynamic simple verbs are basically ungrammatical here 
(316b) (May 1987: 31-2; Newman 1982: 159-60).180 This restriction is absent from that-
clauses, which accept both characterising and non-characterising simple verbs (634 out of 
2,791, i.e. 22.7%) (316c, c'). 
(316) a.   Every person whom the applicant believes to have parental responsibility for the 
        child is entitled to respondent status in all proceedings of the Act (BNC J76: 573). 
  a'.   He was questioned by senior security officials about his teaching of the Darwinist 
        theory of evolution which they considered to contradict their interpretation of the 
        principles of Islam (BNC CJS: 520). 
  b.  *I believe John to bake a cake. 
  c.  They also believe that they have the right to snoop and that the shootings violate the 
       German-Soviet treaty signed last year (BNC ABJ: 1496).  
  c'.  No-one in their right minds would have believed that Labour wanted to abolish 
        heterosexuality or promote AIDS (BNC C9S: 604). 
The following table shows that tense/aspect-distinctions weigh heavily in the contrast be-
tween that-clauses after believe and the NP inf XP-string after believe and consider. 
                                                 
180 It has been suggested that dynamic verbs become possible in the NP inf XP-pattern when they can be inter-
preted habitually (Borkin 1984: 62; Kilby 1984: 154; May 1987: 32). The examples cited (such as I believe her 
to beat her children, from Kilby 1984: 154) have generally been given poor acceptability ratings by my infor-
mants. 
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Table 22: Comparison of the tense/aspect-variation in that-clauses and the NP inf XP-pattern  
  that-clause 
(after believe) 
NP inf XP 
(after believe/consider) 
∑ 
(tenses/aspects) 
be  
(same temporal reference as main verb) 
1,198 
(1,433) 
χ2=38.5 
540 
(305) 
χ2=181.1 
1,738 
other verbs than be  
(simple and progressive forms; same 
temporal reference as main verb; only 
active) 
814 
(686.8) 
χ2=23.6 
19 
(146.2) 
χ2=110.7 
833 
past/perfective verb 
(including be; only active) 
575 
(493.1) 
χ2=13.6 
23 
(104.9) 
χ2=63.9 
598 
passive verb  
(same temporal reference as main verb 
or anterior to main verb) 
204 
(178.1) 
χ2=3.8 
12 
(37.9) 
χ2=17.7 
216 
∑ (patterns) 2,791 594 n=3,385 
χ2=452.9; df=3; highly significant at p<0.001; ϕ=0.37 
While the NP XP-pattern does not contain a verb, the NP as XP-structure can include a non-
finite –ing-form (cf. 4.3). As table 23 demonstrates, such verbal structures are much rarer than 
verbless NP as XP-patterns; the ratio between verbless and verbal as-patterns is almost identi-
cal across various main verbs. 
Table 23: Ratio between verbless and verbal NP as XP-patterns 
 NP as XP NP as V-ing XP n 
judge 64 
86.5% 
10 
13.5% 
74 
consider 162 
86.2% 
26 
13.8% 
188 
think of 78 
82.1% 
17 
17.9% 
95 
view 1,115 
88.4% 
146 
11.6% 
1,261 
regard 3,497 
88.6% 
451 
11.4% 
3,948 
 
When we count the verbless NP as XP-pattern (in addition to the rare stylistic variant NP as 
being XP) as equivalent to structures with finite be in that-clauses and infinitival be in the NP 
inf XP-pattern, we see that the tense/aspect-options are very restricted for the NP as XP-pattern 
as well. Let us take the 3,948 cases after regard as an example: 3,661 instances contain the 
form being (164 sentences) or no overt verb at all (3,497 sentences), which makes up 92.7% 
of all cases (317a, a'); just 19 sentences (0.5%) include a perfective verb form, again fre-
quently with the verb be (317b, b'), and 32 instances (0.8%) have a (perfective) passive verb 
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form (317c, c'). Quite a number of sentences (263, i.e. 6.4%) contain verbs other than be, but 
the large majority of these verbs expresses stative relationships. The single most frequent verb 
is have (44 instances), followed by belong (10), provide (9), involve (7), represent (6), consti-
tute (5), contribute (5), exist (4), lie in (4), form (4), and arise from (4) (316d, d'). Non-stative 
verbs are, by comparison, very rare (317e). 
(317) a.   Although Mr Wise regards Windows as being in its fairly early days, he says that the 
         firm is devising a standard configuration for Windows users on the network (BNC: 
        CBY: 2213). 
  a'.   John regards him as Saviour of the world and records Jesus' declaration to be the  
        light of the world (BNC CCL: 617). 
  b.   And the past to which you are so resolutely attached — I suppose you regard it as  
        having been ideal? (BNC: AEA: 1135). 
  b'.  [T]he Cro-Magnons, generally regarded as having wiped out the Neanderthal  
        precursors, were similarly large-brained (BNC CET: 374).  
  c.   It will look at the part played by pressure groups in the system, and it will examine 
         the case that has been made for regarding democracy as significantly undermined 
   by 'political elites' (BNC FS7: 733). 
  c'.   Some of the cases to which I have referred suggest that the answer to the problem  
        depends on whether or not the debtor can be regarded as having been appointed by 
        the creditor to act as agent of the creditor (BNC FD3: 66). 
  d.   In the matter of contract, drunkenness is regarded as having the same effect as  
        insanity (BNC ABP: 602). 
  d'.  [W]e do not want to regard the blue tits on the Isle of Wight as belonging to a 
         different species to those on the mainland (BNC AE7: 530). 
  e.   A person may belong to several different families during his life, and it makes little 
        sense to regard him as changing identity on leaving or entering a nuclear family 
        (BNC H9J: 937). 
Table 24 illustrates that the tense/aspect-restrictions governing the NP as XP-pattern are highly 
significant vis-à-vis that-clauses; indeed, as-patterns are even more constrained in this respect 
than the NP inf XP-pattern (cf. the ϕ-values of tables 22 and 24). 
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Table 24: Comparison of the tense/aspect-variation in that-clauses and the NP as XP-pattern  
 that-clause 
(after believe) 
NP as XP 
(after regard) 
∑ 
(tenses/aspects) 
be 
(same temporal reference as main verb) 
1,198 
(2,012.4) 
χ2=329.5 
3,661 
(2,846.6) 
χ2=233 
4,859 
other verbs than be  
(same temporal reference as main verb; 
only active) 
814 
(434.9) 
χ2=330.5 
236 
(615.1) 
χ2=233.6 
1,050 
past/perfective verb 
(including be; only active) 
575 
(246) 
χ2=440 
19 
(348) 
χ2=311 
594 
passive verb  
(same temporal reference as main verb 
and anterior to main verb) 
204 
(97.7) 
χ2=115.7 
32 
(138.3) 
χ2=81.7 
236 
∑ (patterns) 2,791 3,948 n=6,739 
χ2=2,075; df=3; highly significant at p<0.001; ϕ=0.55 
To conclude, while that-clauses are compatible with a large variety of tenses and aspects, the 
other qualifying patterns are strongly restricted to stative verbs (especially be) that have the 
same temporal reference as the matrix predicate. 
11.4.3.2 A mental-space explanation 
That-clauses denote units of information that are rather independent of the matrix clause; 
therefore, "there are no restrictions on the type of subject, predicate or time reference that the 
proposition can contain" (Ransom 1986: 32). The FINITE OPINION Construction profiles a rela-
tionship between a SUBJECT and a whole proposition, the content of which is practically un-
constrained by the semantics of the construction. The subordinate proposition includes a finite 
verb slot that can be filled by a whole range of stative and dynamic verbs that may express all 
kinds of tense/aspect-distinctions; the reference-time of the that-clause may, for example, be 
contemporaneous with, anterior to, or posterior to that of the matrix clause. In other words, 
the temporal and aspectual constitution of a that-clause is not restricted by the tense or aspect 
of the matrix verb. 
The NP to be XP-string of the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction and the NP as V-ing XP-
string of the AS-QUALIFYING Construction, on the other hand, are dependent on the matrix 
clause and its SUBJECT, a fact that also restricts the variability of tenses and aspects which can 
be expressed by them. Since these constructions profile a relation between a SUBJECT and a 
TOPIC, the TOPIC is not an independent part of the subordinate proposition, but is shared by 
the matrix clause and the non-finite subordinate clause (cf. Dik 1981: 28). As a consequence, 
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the two clauses are more strongly interconnected than the matrix clause and the that-clause of 
the FINITE OPINION Construction. The higher degree of interconnectedness of the two clauses 
also has an effect on the tense/aspect-distinctions that can be made in the subordinate non-
finite clause. Compared to the formation of a that-clause, the formation of a non-finite quali-
fying sentence "weakens the integrity" of a subordinate proposition "by removing its subject, 
neutralizing tense distinctions and putting the remaining predication into an adjunct-like sur-
face structure role" (Borkin 1984: 75). The fusion of the matrix and the subordinate clause in 
the verbless QUALIFYING Construction "further destroys the separate clause status" of the NP 
(as) XP-string (Borkin 1984: 75). There is no subordinate verb in the QUALIFYING Construc-
tion that could determine its own tense/aspect-value, so there is always a default stative 'be'-
predication between the TOPIC and the XP. A non-finite clause is a more deranked clause type 
(Croft 2001: 354-7) than a subordinate that-clause, and a verbless NP (as) XP-string is more 
deranked than a non-finite clause because it only contains a non-verbal secondary predicate. 
While finite verb forms in English have "absolute tense", i.e. can independently deter-
mine their tense/aspect values with respect to the speaker's point of reference, non-finite verb 
forms have "relative tense" (Comrie 1976: 2). The relative tense of a non-finite verb is deter-
mined by the meaning of the construction it is part of; May defines relative tense as "the rela-
tionship between the temporal incidence of a matrix verb and the temporal incidence of any 
complement which is predicated of that verb" (1987: 35). In English, there are essentially 
three kinds of relative tense available to non-finite verb forms. In a PERCEPTION Construction, 
the event denoted by the bare infinitive or the present participle takes place simultaneously 
with the act of perception expressed by the matrix verb (318a, b) (May 1987: 36; Duffley 
1992: 29-30); seen alongside the bare infinitive, the present participle emphasises the unfold-
ing of the perceived activity in time (Dixon 1995: 185).  
(318) a.  John saw Mary cross the street. 
  b.  John saw Mary crossing the street. 
In a "MODAL"-INFINITIVE Construction (Dixon 1991: 220), the main-clause SUBJECT wants, 
intends or expects the non-finite event to happen (cf. Duffley 1992: 19-20; May 1987: 34; 
Wierzbicka 1988: 35). As Duffley puts it, the infinitive evokes "a subsequent potentiality, i.e. 
an event whose actualization is futurized with respect to that of the main verb" (1992: 89). In 
other words, since "the expectation of the Subject is always prior to his certain knowledge of 
the acts or events" expressed in the non-finite clause, the relative tense of the non-finite verb 
is necessarily subsequent to the tense of the matrix verb in this construction (319). 
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(319) a. Mary wants John to come to her party. 
  b. Mary ordered John to come to her party. 
  c. I'd like you to leave now. 
Like the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction, the PERCEPTION and MODAL-INFINITIVE Con-
structions do not denote the relationship between the SUBJECT and a state of affairs directly, 
but use a salient entity in the perceived or expected state of affairs — which I will also call 
TOPIC for convenience — as a metonymic reference point that mediates between the SUBJECT 
and the subordinate event (Langacker 1999: 348-9). In a PERCEPTION Construction, the main-
clause SUBJECT perceives both an event and an entity participating in that event (cf. Bolke-
stein 1976: 287; Ureland 1973: 298-9). Since the SUBJECT's perception of the TOPIC is by ne-
cessity contemporaneous with the TOPIC's participation in the perceived event, the relative 
tense of the non-finite verb form in the PERCEPTION Construction is simultaneous with the 
temporal reference of the finite matrix verb. Similarly, there is also a relation between the 
SUBJECT and the TOPIC in the MODAL-INFINITIVE Construction: the SUBJECT does not only 
expect the event to happen as such, but also expects the TOPIC to be involved in this event 
(Dixon 1991: 226-7). In many cases, there is a control relationship between the SUBJECT and 
the TOPIC in the sense that the SUBJECT influences the TOPIC to take part in a future event; to 
put the matter another way, there is a relationship of inducive causation between the SUBJECT 
and the TOPIC (cf. 9.1) because the TOPIC functions as the addressee of the SUBJECT's com-
mand, request etc. and has, as a result, "an attitude of intention or volitionality toward the en-
visaged process" (Langacker 1999: 343). 
The relative tense expressed by the non-finite verb in qualifying constructions is contem-
poraneous with the temporal reference of the main verb. Since qualifying constructions are 
stative, the subordinate clause does not denote a simultaneous event like the bare infinitive or 
present participle in the PERCEPTION Construction, but a state that holds of the TOPIC at the 
point of time that the SUBJECT has a belief about it. In other words, since the relationship be-
tween the SUBJECT and the TOPIC is stative, the judgement expressed by the non-finite predi-
cate must be stative as well. As we have seen above, the non-finite verb forms in the NON-
FINITE OPINION Construction and the AS-QUALIFYING Construction are strongly restricted to 
stative verbs with a characterising function. The verb be accounts for the lion's share of all 
instances, and other verbs as well as perfective, passive, and progressive verb forms must be 
interpretable as stative and characterising. Dynamic infinitives would clash aspectually with 
the stative SUBJECT-TOPIC relation because they could not be temporally anchored within the 
construction: *I consider John to come to the party. 
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There is no evident reason for contending that some TOPICs in PERCEPTION, MODAL-
INFINITIVE or NON-FINITE OPINION Constructions have a (metonymic) semantic relationship 
with the main clause, while others are denied such a relationship. The boundary between sen-
tences in which NP2 is semantically independent of the matrix verb (the classical Raising or 
ECM-cases) and sentences in which it has a semantic relationship with the matrix verb (the 
classical Equi or object-control cases) cannot be drawn in an unopportunistic fashion (Borkin 
1984: 93-4; Langacker 1999: 322-3). It is more realistic to regard the semantic relationship 
between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC as forming a continuum (cf. Langacker 1991: 324; Mair 
1993: 17-8), with the relation being quite direct and concrete in a speech-act configuration (I 
order you to leave the room!), less direct but still rather concrete in a perceptual relationship 
(I saw him climbing the fence), and more abstract and mental in volitional (I want John to kiss 
me) and qualifying sentences (I believe John to be in love with me). As Langacker notes, "full 
non-participation [of the TOPIC; H.S.] in the profiled relation [between SUBJECT and TOPIC; 
H.S.] represents the limiting case, the endpoint in a continuous spectrum of possibilities" 
(1999: 358). When no relationship between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC is implied, a that-
clause is typically used, denoting a relation between the SUBJECT and the subsequent (320a) or 
simultaneous event (320b) or state (320c) as a whole (Dixon 1991: 218; Riddle 1975: 472-3). 
Borkin has shown that when a direct relationship between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC cannot 
be construed in a PERCEPTION Construction, a that-clause is obligatory (320d) (1973: 46-8). 
(320) a.  Mary wished that the war would end. 
  b.  John saw that Mary was attacked by two young men. 
  c.  John believed that Mary would visit him soon. 
  d.  In the paper, we noticed that the store was closed/ ??the store to be closed.  
                       (from Borkin 1973: 46) 
Our discussion therefore tends to the conclusions that the relative tense of a non-finite verb 
form is determined by the meaning of the construction it is part of, and that, for qualifying 
sentences, the non-finite verb must be stative because the construction expresses a stative re-
lationship between a SUBJECT and a TOPIC, with the non-finite clause providing a characteri-
sation of the TOPIC that is based on the SUBJECT's personal view of it. The lower tense/aspect-
potential of the NON-FINITE OPINION and QUALIFYING Constructions as compared to the FI-
NITE OPINION Construction is thus quite in line with the expectations engendered by the dif-
ferent mental-space configurations established by these constructions. 
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11.4.4 Extraction of NP2 
11.4.4.1 The data 
Mair has pointed out another difference between that-clauses and the NP inf XP-pattern: NP2, 
i.e. the 'subject' of the non-finite variant, is frequently extracted from its clausal domain 
(1990: 191). My corpus data yield four syntactic environments that require the extraction of 
NP2: relative clauses (321a), what-constructions (321b), as-constructions (321c), and di-
rect/indirect questions (321d). 
(321) a.  Anselm overrode the objectors, told the monks of Bec to elect as abbot the man 
       whom he believed to be most fitted (BNC CKR: 208). 
  b.  It is reasonable for the Hong Kong government to do what it believes to be in the 
       best interests of the people of Hong Kong (BNC CEM: 173). 
  c.  If, as we believe to be the case, the unconscious activity of the mind consists in 
       imposing forms upon content... (BNC CGY: 1174). 
  d.  What does the right hon. Gentleman consider to be the size of the fleet? (BNC 
       HHX: 15930). 
I could not replicate the high proportion of extractions that Mair found in the corpus of the 
Survey of English Usage, where 40.5% out of 42 non-finite clauses occurred in relative-clause 
constructions alone (1993: 10). Table 25 displays my BNC results: in more than two-thirds of 
all instances, active sentences with consider and believe show no extraction of the non-finite 
'subject'; relative constructions and what-constructions constitute the bulk of extraction cases, 
whereas as-constructions and questions are very rare. 
Table 25: Extracted and non-extracted 'subjects' in the NP inf XP-pattern 
 no extraction extraction in 
relative-clause 
constructions 
extraction in 
what-
constructions 
extraction in 
as-constructions 
and questions 
n 
NP inf XP 
(after believe) 
207 
77.2% 
26 
9.7% 
34 
12.7% 
1 
0.4% 
268 
NP inf XP 
(after consider) 
224 
68.7% 
42 
12.9% 
58 
17.8% 
2 
0.6% 
326 
 
FINITE OPINION clauses exhibit almost the same range of extraction environments as the NP inf 
XP-pattern181: the subject can be extracted in relative-clause constructions (322a) and what-
constructions (322b); although I did not find an extraction example triggered by an as-
construction or a question with finite believe, such patterns are clearly possible (322c, d).  
                                                 
181 It is crucial that the complementiser that is not present, otherwise the sentence becomes ungrammatical: He is 
the man who I believe (*that) is responsible for all this. I suspect that the obligatory absence of the complemen-
tiser is due to the fact that the matrix and the subordinate clause are more closely connected when an element is 
extracted from the subordinate domain, and that this interconnectedness is incompatible with an element that 
explicitly marks the boundary between the two clauses. 
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(322) a. And newspaper is a product that most people believe is readily degradable (BNC 
      FTA: 220). 
  b. Hewlett-Packard Labs and AT&T Microelectronics have co-developed what they 
        believe is the first technology to transmit data at 100 Mbits/s (BNC CSS: 416). 
  c. If that is the case that each of the political parties, as I assume is the case for er the  
      Conservative party, I know it to be the case of the Labour party (BNC JSG: 265). 
  d. What do you believe is the reason for this? 
However, extractions from finite clauses are considerably less frequent than from non-finite 
clauses; while roughly a third of all non-finite patterns has its 'subject' extracted, this is the 
case in just 4% of finite clauses (table 26). 
Table 26: Extracted and non-extracted subjects in FINITE OPINION clauses182 
 no extraction extraction in 
relative-clause 
constructions 
extraction in 
what-constructions
extraction in 
as-constructions 
and questions 
n 
finite clause 
(after believe) 
1,261 
96.1% 
40 
3% 
11 
0.8% 
0 
0% 
1,312 
 
Mair attributes the paucity of extractions from finite clauses to the fact that "the serial se-
quence of two finite verb phrases one of which is syntactically subordinated to the other ... is 
unusual and makes such structures difficult to process" (cf. He is the man who I believe is 
responsible for all this), and the higher extraction tendency of non-finite clauses to the fact 
that "the sequence of a finite verb and an infinitive ... is a good iconic representation of the 
hierarchical relationship obtaining between the two verb phrases" (cf. He is the man who I 
believe to be responsible for all this) (1990: 191). Although this assumption carries some 
weight, the conclusion Mair draws from it is vulnerable. Let me quote Mair at some length 
(note that he calls the NP inf XP-pattern a 'Raising'-structure): 
When in variation with finite complement clauses, believe-type raising constitutes the structur-
ally, stylistically and semantically 'marked' option. A reversal of markedness occurs in syntactic 
environments requiring the extraction of subjects from embedded clauses, because such extrac-
tion tends to be ungrammatical or highly constrained in finite complement clauses. Raising is 
predicted to be more frequent or acceptable in those environments in which it serves as a con-
venient substitute for the finite complement clause, while the reverse distribution — raising be-
ing more frequent or acceptable in declarative clauses — is dysfunctional and therefore unlikely 
to be attested. (Mair 1993: 6) 
If the NP inf XP-pattern were really functionally superior to finite clauses only in sentences 
with extraction, it is not clear why more than two thirds of all infinitival patterns after con-
                                                 
182 To make the numbers comparable with those of non-finite clauses, I used only those 1,312 finite clauses after 
believe (from the sample of 2,791) which contain a form of be. As the following examples show, extraction is 
not restricted to that-clauses with be, however: 
a.  The NUS has put forward counter proposals which it believes meet the Government's 
      central criteria of enhanced financial control of union activities (BNC K5M: 8338). 
b.  What Pepper v Hart does is bring to an end an anomaly most lay people would not have 
      believed existed (BNC CBT: 661). 
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sider, and more than three fourths of infinitival structures after believe occur in putatively 
'dysfunctional' non-extracted environments (323). 
(323) a. Thus the Catholic conservatives believe the church to be a God-given institution 
      (BNC EF0: 275). 
  b. I had considered my body to be lumpy, untidy, anomalous and entirely unsuited 
      to the person within (BNC CEE: 907). 
Moreover, my informants did not rate extraction from finite clauses as marginal, but only as 
less formal. This assessment is also supported by a comparison of the proportions of extrac-
tion cases across various registers. While extraction is equally rare in all written domains, it is 
somewhat more frequent in the spoken subcorpus of the BNC (table 27). 
Table 27: Ratio between extracted and non-extracted subjects in FINITE OPINION clauses across registers 
text categories extraction no extraction text categories extraction no extraction 
natural and pure  
science (n=541) 
17 
3.1% 
524 
96.9% 
world affairs 
(n=718) 
23 
3.2% 
695 
96.8% 
applied science 
(n=754) 
23 
3.1% 
731 
96.9% 
arts 
(n=603) 
28 
4.6% 
575 
95.4% 
social science 
(n=717) 
15 
2.1% 
702 
97.9% 
leisure 
(n=651) 
22 
3.4% 
629 
96.6% 
belief and thought 
(n=472) 
12 
2.5% 
460 
97.5% 
imaginative  
(n=386) 
9 
2.3% 
377 
97.7% 
commerce and finance
(n=728) 
25 
3.4% 
703 
96.6% 
spoken  
(n=508) 
32 
6.3% 
476 
93.7% 
χ2=27.2; df=9; very significant at p<0.01; ϕ=0.1 
Extraction is also quite frequent from the NP XP and NP as XP-patterns; the pertinent syntactic 
environments again include relative-clause constructions (324a, a'), what-constructions (324b, 
b'), as-constructions and questions (324c, c'). In addition, NP2 is also sometimes extracted in 
topicalisation constructions (324d, d'). 
(324) a. Or that my mind, which I consider intelligent and creative, is occupied only with 
        sex, violence and car engines? (BNC A8M: 72). 
  a'.  Students should expect the Government to meet living costs, but not to cough up for 
       the extra beer and nightclubbing which Richard regards as an important part of 
       student life (BNC A8K: 485). 
  b.  Then I am happy, in that I have attained what you would call success; and happy, in 
         that I have attained what I consider good (BNC ASD: 2774). 
  b'.  This perception leads Le Roy Ladurie to contrast the revolts of the fifteenth and 
         sixteenth centuries with what he regards as the national revolutionary movements 
       of the Enlightenment (BNC CMN: 1326). 
  c.  In giving such consent, the committee may also impose such conditions as it 
        considers necessary or expedient to ensure the adequacy of such arrangements 
        (BNC A49: 460). 
  c'.  What do you regard as your particular strengths? (BNC BNA: 1638). 
   d.  This I still consider the most brilliant course of lectures I have ever heard 
         anywhere (BNC H9X: 319). 
  d'. His blackness he now regards as a personal stabilizer rather than a means for 
        rejecting society (BNC CL1: 1476). 
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The overall frequency of extraction differs between matrix verbs: while the relative number of 
extraction cases from the NP XP-pattern after consider is comparable to that from NP inf XP 
after believe or consider, it is much lower for NP XP after find and NP as XP after regard (table 
28). 
Table 28: Ratio between extracted and non-extracted 'subjects' in the NP XP and NP as XP-patterns 
 no extraction extraction in
relative  
constructions 
extraction in
what-
constructions 
extraction in 
as-constructions 
and questions 
extraction in 
topicalisation 
constructions 
n 
NP XP 
(after consider) 
302 
66.5% 
98 
21.6% 
32 
7% 
17 
3.7% 
5 
1.1% 
454 
NP XP 
(after find) 
889 
88.9% 
83 
8.3% 
15 
1.5% 
0 
0% 
13 
1.3% 
1,000
NP as XP 
(after regard) 
1,985 
82.7% 
231 
9.6% 
141 
5.9% 
5 
0.2% 
39 
1.6% 
2,401
 
To recapitulate: both the infinitival and the NP (as) XP-patterns show a considerable number of 
extraction cases (particularly in relative-clause and what-constructions), whereas extraction 
from that-clauses is uniformly low in all written registers. 
11.4.4.2 A mental-space explanation 
The TOPIC NP is extracted from the NON-FINITE OPINION and the QUALIFYING Constructions in 
a tenth to a third of all instances, particularly in relative-clause constructions and what-
constructions, while it is rarely extracted from that-clauses (with the exception of spoken reg-
isters). The low frequency of extraction from finite clauses can be attributed to the fact that 
the FINITE OPINION Construction denotes a relation between a SUBJECT and an independent 
unit of information; since the TOPIC does not have any special status in the construction, it is 
highly unlikely to leave its clausal domain. The NON-FINITE OPINION and QUALIFYING Con-
structions, on the other hand, profile a relation between a SUBJECT and a TOPIC. The matrix 
and subordinate clauses are much more closely interconnected, and the TOPIC is therefore as 
much part of the higher than of the lower predication and can consequently more easily be 
'moved' to a position in the matrix clause. 
In a relative-clause construction, the TOPIC is independently introduced into a superordi-
nate clause and is subsequently characterised by a qualifying pattern forming a relative clause; 
the qualifying pattern is put into the background relative to the superordinate proposition the 
TOPIC is part of (325a). In a what-construction, the TOPIC is directly introduced into the sen-
tence by way of its characteristics: the variable what acts as a place-holder for the TOPIC, 
which is more closely specified by a qualifying construction. In some cases, the characterised 
variable is supplemented by a definitely referring NP that is provided in an informationally 
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salient position at the end of the sentence (325b); in most instances, however, the variable is 
only enriched by the characteristics provided by the qualifying predication and is not more 
closely specified by an additional NP (325c, c'). 
(325) a. Crawford played Kent, one of the boys who go on strike and threaten to burn down  
        the gym when the headmaster decides to dismiss the teacher, who has fallen in love 
        with his son — and whom he believes to be his illegitimate daughter (BNC HRF: 
        255). 
  b. Women are the historical 'have-nots' and as a consequence they take over what they 
        consider to be their only 'possession' — their children (BNC EVS: 1829). 
  c.  All first-class advocates concentrate on what they consider to be their good points 
         (BNC FRA: 1090). 
  c'. All you have to do is put the qualities for the Man of the Nineties listed on the 
    coupon in order of what you consider to be important, from one to six (BNC A7N: 
   1400). 
11.4.5 Voice 
11.4.5.1 The data 
The active/passive ratio between sentences in the three non-finite and verbless qualifying pat-
terns differs substantially.183 Verbs followed by the NP inf XP-pattern show a strong tendency 
to occur in the passive voice: 80.3% of all infinitival sentences with know, 75.6% of all sen-
tences with assume and 62.4% of all sentences with believe, for example, are found in the 
passive (326a). Verbs followed by the NP XP-pattern do not behave uniformly: while verbs of 
group II such as consider and judge show a balanced active/passive ratio (326b, b'), find oc-
curs almost exclusively in the active voice (326c). Finally, most verbs followed by the NP as 
XP-pattern exhibit a slight tendency to occur in the active; this is the case with 64.6% of all 
instances with regard and 77.9% of all instances with think of, for example (326d).  
(326) a.   Many new members of an audience have been known to object to the applause 
        greeting the last bow (BNC A12: 968). 
  b.   She would go on the day she judged best (BNC A6N: 834). 
  b'.  There is also concrete, steel tubing and glass to think about, materials judged more  
          suited to framing the aspirations of modern man (BNC AB6: 191). 
  c.   At first they irritate a bit but when you are used to them you find them serviceable  
          (BNC A68: 1943). 
  d.   Gardeners occasionally regard shade as an evil to be avoided at all costs (BNC  
          A0G: 2678). 
Table 29 demonstrates that the tendency for NP inf XP to be found after passive matrix verbs 
and for NP XP after find to occur after active matrix verbs is highly significant, while the slight 
tendency for NP as XP to be combined with active verbs does not indicate statistical signifi-
cance. 
                                                 
183 That-constructions can be disregarded here because they only allow an impersonal passive (It is believed that 
...). We will turn to this variant in the following section. 
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Table 29: Active/passive ratio for the NP inf XP, NP XP and NP as XP-patterns  
 Active Passive ∑ (patterns) 
NP inf XP (after believe) 268 
(466) 
χ2=84.1 
444 
(246) 
χ2=159.4 
712 
NP XP (after consider) 468 
(577.3) 
χ2=20.7 
414 
(304.7) 
χ2=39.2 
882 
NP XP (after find) 1,000 
(660.4) 
χ2=174.6 
9 
(348.6) 
χ2=330.8 
1,009 
NP as XP (after regard) 2,572 
(2,604.3) 
χ2=0.4 
1,407 
(1,374.7) 
χ2=0.8 
3,979 
∑ (voices) 4,308 2,274 6,582 
χ2=810; df=3; highly significant at p<0.001; ϕ=0.35 
 
The high proportion of passive sentences with the NP inf XP-pattern has long attracted the in-
terest of syntacticians. Mair gives an explanation for this phenomenon in terms of information 
structure, arguing that the passive version of the NP inf XP-pattern makes it possible to move 
NP2 to the main-clause subject position, which typically codes contextually given information 
(Mair 1990: 181). This is reasonable enough, but does not furnish a complete answer. It is 
true that that-clauses after an active matrix verb frequently contain new information: "it 
makes sense that a proposition that is largely independent of previous given information 
should be put into maximal relief as a fully tensed, whole constituent clause" (Borkin 1984: 
59). However, it has been observed that NP2 is typically a contextually given element not only 
in passive, but also in active variants of the infinitival pattern (this is also true of the NP (as) 
XP-patterns):  
information structure-wise the opposition is not between that-clauses and infinitival comple-
ments with passive matrix verbs, but between that-clauses and infinitival complements full stop, 
irrespective of whether the matrix verb is passive or active, and ... the passive option is nor-
mally only taken to avoid mentioning the active subject because there is no need to mention it. 
(Noël 1997: 276; see also Borkin 1984: 59-61)  
In a corpus-based study of 100 sentences with the NP inf XP-pattern, Noël has been able to 
show that NP2 is most frequently a pronoun or noun phrase that "takes up a referent from a 
preceding clause in the same sentence or from a previous sentence" (1997: 277). While these 
observations yield another difference between that-clauses and the non-finite or verbless 
qualifying patterns (new vs. given TOPIC NP), they do not provide an answer to the question 
why the infinitival pattern occurs so frequently after passive verbs and the NP XP-pattern most 
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typically after active verbs, because both structures predominantly contain given TOPIC NPs. 
This question will be pursued in the following section. 
11.4.5.2 A mental-space explanation 
Verbs of group I occur in the passive version of the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction in 
more than two thirds of all instances. Given the fact that the passive is normally a marked 
structure and much rarer than the active (passives make up 2% of all finite verbs in conversa-
tion, 15% in journalistic texts and 25% in academic prose; see Biber et al. 1999: 476), it is a 
highly unusual finding that "the passive, and not the active, is the statistical norm" for this 
construction (Mair 1990: 176).  
Even more remarkable is the fact that most of the constraints which govern the active 
NON-FINITE OPINION Construction do not apply in the passive variant (Mair 1990: 190; 
Wierzbicka 1988: 52). While the NP inf XP-string is typically short when following an active 
form of believe (8 words on average; cf. 11.4.2.1), it is considerably longer after passive be-
lieve (11 words on average). This length is very similar to that of finite that-clauses (12 words 
on average). As a consequence, long non-finite clauses are less unusual in the passive coun-
terpart of the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction (cf. 327a with 34 words), as are non-finite 
cases containing another subordinate clause (327b). 
(327) a.  It is believed to have been composed early in the second century, very likely by 
   an individual who was indeed named Jude and who, together with his brother 
         James, presided over the Nazarean party at the time (BNC EDY: 1532). 
  b.   This house and Palazzo Durini ... are believed to be the first two town houses to have 
          been built in the city after the population had been decimated by plague in 1630 
          (BNC ANB: 1243). 
Moreover, most of the tense/aspect restrictions governing the active NON-FINITE OPINION 
Construction are absent from the passive variant. As can be seen from table 30, to be makes 
up a full 89.9% of all verbs in active versions of the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction, but 
accounts for a mere 37.4% of all verbs in the passive variant. Interestingly, this is very similar 
to the proportion of finite be in the FINITE OPINION Construction after believe (42.9%). On the 
other hand, perfective forms account for just 4.1% of all verbs in the active NON-FINITE OPIN-
ION Construction, but make up 23% of the verb forms in the passive variant. Again, this is 
comparable to the proportion of past and perfective verbs in the FINITE OPINION Construction 
(20.6%). Passive verb forms are also very rare in the non-finite pattern after active believe 
(3%), while they are more frequent after passive believe (12.7%); the proportion of passive 
verb forms in that-clauses after believe lies between these two values (7.3%). Similarly, pro-
gressive verbs, which are very rare in the active NON-FINITE OPINION Construction (0.7%), 
are more frequent in both the passive non-finite variant (8.1%) and the FINITE OPINION Con-
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struction (6.4%). A further indication of the parallels holding between passive non-finite 
clauses and that-clauses lies in the frequency of other non-perfective, non-passive and non-
progressive simple verbs: while their proportion is quite substantial in these two patterns 
(19.4% and 22.7%, respectively), it is very low (just 2.2%) in active non-finite sentences. 
Table 30: Comparison of tense/aspect variation between the active and passive NON-FINITE OPINION  
                 Constructions and the FINITE OPINION Construction 
 active NON-FINITE OPI-
NION CONSTRUCTION 
passive NON-FINITE OPI-
NION CONSTRUCTION 
FINITE OPINION  
CONSTRUCTION 
be 
(same temporal reference 
as main verb) 
241 
89.9% 
166 
37.4% 
1,198 
42.9% 
past/perfective verb 
(including be; only active) 
11 
4.1% 
102 
23% 
575 
20.6% 
passive verb  
(same temporal reference 
as main verb and anterior 
to main verb) 
 
8 
3% 
 
54 
12.7% 
 
204 
7.3% 
progressive verb 
(same temporal reference 
as main verb and anterior 
to main verb) 
 
2 
0.7% 
 
36 
8.1% 
 
180 
6.4% 
other verbs than be  
(same temporal reference 
as main verb; only active) 
6 
2.2% 
86 
19.4% 
634 
22.7% 
n 268 444 2,791 
χ2=248; df=8; highly significant at p<0.001; ϕ=0.3 
The passive NON-FINITE OPINION Construction is thus as unrestricted with respect to 
tense/aspect distinctions as the FINITE OPINION Construction. Unlike in the active NON-FINITE 
OPINION Construction, the infinitive in the passive counterpart can refer to a dynamic event 
that precedes the temporal reference of the matrix verb (328a vs. a') and can also be realised 
as a non-characterising passive (328b vs. b'). Moreover, the passive construction occurs with 
non-characterising progressive verbs (328c vs. c'), and all kinds of non-characterising simple 
verb forms (328d vs. d'). In addition, the passive NON-FINITE OPINION Construction can even 
refer to future events, something that is strictly disallowed in the active variant (328e vs. e'). 
(328) a.   Spiro is believed to have driven off in a four-wheel-drive vehicle (BNC K97: 624). 
  a'.  ??I believe Spiro to have driven off in a four-wheel-drive vehicle. 
  b.   The meeting, believed to have been suggested by the Soviet Union, is the first such 
          encounter since 1971 (BNC A9N: 93). 
  b'.  ??The meeting, which I believe to have been suggested by the Soviet Union, ... 
  c.   Mr Shaw was believed to have been waiting to collect fishbait near the shores of 
         Belfast ... when a car pulled alongside and a gunman opened fire (BNC K5M: 2151). 
  c'.  ??The police believe Mr Shaw to have been waiting to collect fishbait ... 
  d.   [H]e was generally believed to carry his wife around secretly on his travels in a box 
          or coffin (BNC CFF: 199). 
  d'.  ??I believe him to carry his wife around secretly in a box or coffin. 
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  e.  The campaign is believed to start next week. (ROS: 18) 
  e'.  ??The public believes the campaign to start next week. (ROS: 64) 
All this evidence is grist to the mill in establishing the passive NON-FINITE OPINION Construc-
tion as a functional counterpart to the active FINITE OPINION Construction rather than to the 
active NON-FINITE OPINION Construction. The following two characteristics also key in with 
our analysis: the TOPIC of the passive NON-FINITE OPINION Construction can more easily be 
realised by vaguely or indefinitely referring pronouns such as there or the littlest thing (329a, 
a') than the TOPIC in the active variant (cf. 11.3), and the string 'TOPIC-passive matrix verb' 
does not form an apparent constituent as does the string 'SUBJECT-active matrix verb-TOPIC' 
(329b vs. b') (Bolinger 1967a: 52; cf. footnote 170).  
(329) a.   The red stripe on the file was attached only if there was believed to be a risk of 
          escape (BNC CJT: 476). 
  a'.  The littlest thing is believed to be irritating to him. 
  b.   The man was believed to be insane./ John was believed to be lying.  
  b'.  ?I believe the man to be insane./ ?I believe John to be lying. 
                     (from Bolinger 1967a: 52) 
The syntactic differences between the active and passive versions of the NON-FINITE OPINION 
Construction have frequently been commented on, but they have not been convincingly ex-
plained so far. Functionally speaking, the passive construction distinguishes itself from its 
active counterpart by the relative prominence accorded to the SUBJECT and the TOPIC. As has 
been pointed out in the preceding section, the TOPIC NP is typically a textually 'given' element 
in both the active and the passive NON-FINITE OPINION Construction. Only the passive variant, 
however, foregrounds the TOPIC by putting it into the prominent initial slot of the construc-
tion. From a textual perspective, the passive construction is a "useful means of redistributing 
sentence information" (Mair 1990: 180) because the given TOPIC NP can be put into the 
clause-initial slot, which is the most appropriate position for purposes of textual coherence. 
The constructions extracting the TOPIC from the active NON-FINITE OPINION Construction (cf. 
11.4.4.1) also help to promote this entity to the first constructional slot. In a relative-clause 
construction, for instance, the TOPIC is first introduced into the superordinate clause before it 
is qualified in the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction. Frequently, the relative-clause construc-
tion and the passive NON-FINITE OPINION Construction, which are functionally related means 
of foregrounding the TOPIC, occur in combination (330). 
(330) a.  The rapist, believed to be aged 20 to 22 years, was described as lean but muscular 
         and about 5ft 8in tall (BNC A49: 568). 
  b.  One of those was Hafez Dalkammoni, believed to be the cell's leader, who is now 
         awaiting trial on arms offences (BNC AAL: 19). 
  c.  Ghouls are more accurately evil spirits, believed to haunt graveyards and similar 
         places, and to 'feed' on human remains (BNC B2G: 1408). 
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This brings us to another functional advantage of the passive version. Unlike its active coun-
terpart, it allows the speaker or writer to present a judgement about the TOPIC in a more im-
personal way: "The passive construction refers to other people's opinion, which the speaker 
wishes to disassociate himself from; the active construction, on the contrary, refers to the 
speaker's private thoughts" (Wierzbicka 1988: 49). The passive NON-FINITE OPINION Con-
struction thus effects a figure/ground reversal that is typical of passive constructions in gen-
eral: it allows the TOPIC to be foregrounded by being put into the first constructional slot and 
the SUBJECT to be backgrounded or even eliminated, thereby presenting the belief in a more 
general way and not from the point of view of an individual SUBJECT.  
These functional characteristics of the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction do not, in 
themselves, explain why the constraints governing the active NON-FINITE OPINION Construc-
tion are absent from the passive counterpart — unless we go one step further. In functional 
terms, a sentence such as John is believed to be a genius may be interpreted not as the passive 
version of the sentence I believe John to be a genius, but as the passive of the FINITE OPINION 
sentence I believe that John is a genius, which does not put any restrictions on the complexity 
or tense/aspect potential of the subordinate clause either. A true personal passive of the finite 
construction, in which the TOPIC of the subordinate that-clause is fronted to the initial position 
of the matrix clause and the SUBJECT is eliminated from the construction, is not possible 
(*John is believed (that) is a genius), but a sentence of the type John is believed to be a gen-
ius fills this structural gap. Looked at in this way, both the TOPIC and the judgement made on 
it have been promoted to matrix-clause status in the passive construction, while the original 
matrix clause is demoted to a less prominent position — the personal SUBJECT is not usually 
included in the construction at all, and the original matrix verb is relegated to a more adver-
bial-like function, modifying the original subordinate proposition. Bolinger has been the first 
scholar to hit upon this idea by explicitly likening the function of is believed to to adverbials 
such as allegedly, supposedly, so they say etc., and by comparing its form to auxiliaries such 
as is able to, is bound to etc. (1974: 79-80). In this view, a sentence such as John is believed 
to be a genius is an example of the process of clause-collapsing, which Croft describes in the 
following way: "a complex sentence structure with a main verb and a complement verb is 
being reanalyzed as a single clause with a tense, aspect, and/or mood indicating form (the 
former main verb) and a main verb (the former complement verb)" (2001: 218). When the 
subordinate clause has indeed become the main clause in the passive NON-FINITE OPINION 
Construction, with the former matrix verb having been demoted to an adverbial-like modifier 
restricting the validity of the new main clause, the lack of restrictions governing passive in-
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finitival sentences can readily be accounted for.184 Unlike the active NON-FINITE OPINION 
Construction, the passive variant does not profile a relationship between a SUBJECT and a 
TOPIC, but a whole proposition like a that-clause, with the difference that the TOPIC has been 
promoted to the clause-initial position. The SUBJECT holding the belief is, as a rule, not men-
tioned explicitly, but remains 'off-stage' and is construed generically. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, the passive construction is typical of academic texts that prefer the expression of imper-
sonal stance to subjectively anchored opinions (cf. Biber et al. 1999: 980). The examples 
given in (331a, a') fall in neatly with our line of reasoning because they illustrate cases in 
which the non-finite clause, which has been promoted to main-clause status, is coordinated 
with a finite main clause; (331b) clearly shows the adverbial-like function of is believed to, 
which could easily be replaced by a modal verb (The British Museum has, or may have, some 
...). 
(331) a.   Both were believed to have originated from the Soviet Union and had been  
          smuggled through Czechoslovakia (BNC HLL: 2463). 
  a'.  It is believed to bestow merit and prosperity and acts as a protective circle 
   preventing harm (BNC CB9: 459). 
  b.  The British Museum has (or is believed to have) some 5 or 6 million objects (BNC 
         AC9: 1343). 
Of course, there is also a passive variant of the FINITE OPINION Construction (332). From a 
functional perspective, this pattern comes off poorly in comparison with sentences such as 
John is believed to be a genius because it only allows the demoting of the SUBJECT, but not 
the fronting of the TOPIC. The clause-initial slot is occupied by extrapositive it, which is in 
construction with the extraposed that-clause. The functional motivation of the passive FINITE 
OPINION Construction is therefore much weaker than that of the passive NON-FINITE OPINION 
Construction. Of the 2,791 instances of the FINITE OPINION construction in my corpus sample, 
only 94 (3.4%) are in the passive. The passive NON-FINITE OPINION Construction therefore 
seems to come in handy as a more effective passive version of the FINITE OPINION Construc-
tion. 
(332) a.  It is believed that over six million men, women and children died in concentration 
        camps under Nazi domination (BNC ALY: 942). 
  b.  When ice melts it is believed that this structure is largely maintained but that the 
         spaces become partly filled (BNC C9V: 713). 
Far from being just a passive variant of the active NON-FINITE OPINION Construction, the pas-
sive non-finite clauses after believe constitute a construction in its own right; picking up a 
term coined by Wierzbicka (1988: 47), I will call it the PASSIVE-OF-OPINION Construction. 
                                                 
184 A further indication that this analysis is somewhere around the right track comes from a structure such as 
John is said to be a genius, which does not have a non-finite, but only a finite active counterpart (*They say John 
to be a genius; They say that John is a genius).  
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There is one more functionally related construction that deserves mentioning in this con-
text. The sentences provided in (333) illustrate what I will call the PARENTHETICAL OPINION 
Construction (cf. Dixon 1991: 209-15; Noonan 1985: 86; Schneider 1988b: 29-30). Like the 
ACTIVE FINITE OPINION CONSTRUCTION, this construction profiles a proposition and not a 
relation between a SUBJECT and a TOPIC; unlike the former construction, however, the be-
lieved proposition does not occupy a subordinate that-clause, but the main clause, and the 
SUBJECT plus the mental verb are provided in a parenthetical clause that can go in any of the 
major breakpoints of the matrix clause.185 As a result, both the SUBJECT and the TOPIC are 
foregrounded because they occupy prominent positions in their respective clauses, and none is 
syntactically subordinated to the other. 
(333) a.  Her loyalty, she believes, is worth a great deal to Charles (BNC FB0: 189). 
  b.  Vietnam's weakness was, he believed, endemic to the people and its society (BNC 
         EFA: 60). 
Table 31 illustrates where each of the constructions that profiles a whole proposition sits 
within the spectrum of functionally related opinion constructions. While the PARENTHETICAL 
OPINION Construction and the ACTIVE FINITE OPINION Construction foreground a personal 
SUBJECT, the person holding the belief remains implicit in the PASSIVE-OF-OPINION Construc-
tion and the PASSIVE FINITE OPINION Construction and is usually interpreted as 'people in gen-
eral'. On the vertical dimension, the PARENTHETICAL OPINION Construction and the PASSIVE-
OF-OPINION Construction put a premium on the TOPIC by putting it into the constructionally 
initial slot, whereas the other two constructions demote it to a position in the subordinate 
clause. None of these constructions is thought to be derived from another because, as we have 
seen, we would miss many differences if we derived the PASSIVE-OF-OPINION Construction, 
which profiles a believed proposition, from the ACTIVE NON-FINITE OPINION Construction, 
which profiles a relation between a SUBJECT and a TOPIC. I therefore fully agree with Bolin-
ger's statement that "we come out with a better explanation if we appeal to the coexistence of 
constructions rather than to formal derivations" (1974: 84). 
                                                 
185 A corpus study conducted on the basis of 240 instances of the PARENTHETICAL OPINION CONSTRUCTION with 
believe has shown that the parenthetical clause occupies the position after the TOPIC (plus the main verb be in 
some examples) in 68% of all cases (cf. a, a') and the clause-final position in 25% of all cases (cf. b); in only 7% 
of all instances is it found in a different position in the sentence (cf. c). 
a.  But this, I believe, is a mistake (BNC EV4: 19).  
a'. She was, Betty believes, genuinely shy and nervous (BNC GU9: 926). 
b.  PC-based X-solutions are more popular in business than X-terminals, she believes. (BNC 
      CSX: 93). 
c.  Ardnave ... is the birthplace, we believe, at least the paternal residence, of Miss Campbell 
     (BNC FTT: 222).  
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Table 31: Functional map of opinion constructions profiling a proposition 
 TOPIC foregrounded TOPIC backgrounded 
SUBJECT foregrounded PARENTHETICAL OPINION Construction 
He is a genius, I believe. 
ACTIVE FINITE OPINION Construction 
I believe that he is a genius. 
SUBJECT backgrounded 
(or eliminated) 
PASSIVE-OF-OPINION Construction 
He is believed to be a genius. 
PASSIVE FINITE OPINION Construction 
It is believed that he is a genius. 
 
Let me pick up a few loose threads at the end of this section. Most verbs that are typically 
associated with the QUALIFYING and AS-QUALIFYING Constructions occur slightly more often 
in active than in passive sentences. The passive versions of these constructions constitute a 
reversal of the unmarked relationship between the SUBJECT and the TOPIC, with the latter oc-
cupying the more prominent clause-initial position and the former being demoted to a by-
phrase or being only implicitly present in the passive sentence (334a, b).186 Since verbs such 
as consider, judge, deem or regard are primarily used for rational, if subjective, judgements, 
sentences with an implicit SUBJECT convey the sense that the judgement expressed by the con-
struction is shared by many people. The greater subjectivity and idiosyncrasy of the judge-
ments provided by qualifying sentences with find, on the other hand, explain why this verb is 
practically restricted to active sentences. Since judgements introduced by find mostly express 
a SUBJECT's emotional or intellectual reaction to a TOPIC, these judgements require the explicit 
mentioning of a personal SUBJECT. Of the 1,009 qualifying sentences with find, only a frac-
tion of 9 occur in the passive; interestingly, all of them include a by-agent (334c).  
(334) a.  Grant Metropolitan's Entrepreneur lease already provides for independent arbitration  
         but rents are still considered excessive by many tenant leaders (BNC A14: 775). 
  b.  The reply came from an under-secretary who said that the present funding was  
         considered adequate (BNC A98: 80). 
  c.  Two of the best-remembered things in it are Emma's adulterous drive in the 
   curtained cab (a passage found especially scandalous by right-thinkers) ... (BNC 
    G1A: 374). 
11.4.6 Categorial realisation of XP 
11.4.6.1 The data 
The three non-finite or verbless qualifying patterns also differ in how the XP is typically real-
ised categorically. PPs are the rarest option187: they are found in fewer than 10% of all in-
                                                 
186 There is an unusual English construction that also allows to reverse the figure/ground relation of the SUBJECT 
and the TOPIC, but requires the SUBJECT to be explicitly mentioned. While the sentence I consider John a genius 
foregrounds the SUBJECT and backgrounds the TOPIC, the structure John strikes me as a genius puts the TOPIC 
into the clause-initial position and the SUBJECT into a less prominent but obligatory constructional slot.  
187 Cases in which the XP is not realised as a PP, NP or AP are few and far between. In (a), it is realised as an ad-
verb, and in (b) as a subordinate clause. 
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stances in the NP inf XP-pattern188 (335a) (e.g. in 9.5% of all instances after believe, 9.4% after 
reckon; 8.5% after assume and 6.7% after know) and hardly occur in the NP XP-pattern (335b) 
(e.g. in 3.8% of all instances after deem, 2.7% after consider, 1% after judge and 1% after 
find) and the NP as XP-pattern189 (335c) (e.g. in 1.9% of all instances after regard, 1.6% after 
view, 0.6% after consider and 0.5% after count). The NP inf XP-pattern does not show a clear 
tendency in favour of either NPs or APs: believe and presume exhibit a slight preference for 
NPs (335d), and know and assume for APs (335e), without these differences being in any way 
significant. The NP XP-pattern, on the other hand, clearly prefers APs (335f): they account for 
62.1% of all instances after consider, 67.2% after judge, 77.5% after deem and a full 92.7% 
after find. The NP as XP-pattern is exactly the reverse of NP XP and exhibits a marked tendency 
for NPs, which occur in 70.4% of all instances after regard, 79.2% after view, 81.4% after 
consider and 87.1% after count (335g).  
(335) a.  Tam Dalyell believes drug substitution to be against the national interest (BNC  
         B73: 2044). 
  b.  [I]f this is not produced, he considers his responsibilities at an end and shuffles back 
         into the hut where he lives rather snugly (BNC G3M: 372).  
  c.  Many people regard themselves as under the authority of the state (BNC ANH:  
        1038). 
  d.  These six poems are a brief moment of religious experience in an age that believes  
         religion to be a kind of defeatism (BNC A1B: 1515). 
  e.  Because Mrs like erm sort of assumes herself to be really fashionable by the things  
         that like up with the fashions or anything (BNC JSV: 121). 
  f.  I find it galling that they seem to keep looking for jam today (BNC A6L: 1458). 
  g.  Record companies consider this support quite economic because they view a band's 
         tours as a good way of promoting records (BNC A6A: 2145). 
Table 32 compares the categorial realisations of XP for six selected verbs. When we disregard 
PPs, we see that the relationship between NPs and APs is as expected for the NP inf XP-pattern; 
the observed frequencies for NPs in the NP XP-pattern are significantly lower than the expected 
frequencies, whereas there are significantly more APs than expected; in the NP as XP-pattern, 
on the other hand, the observed frequencies are significantly higher than the expected fre-
quencies for NPs, but significantly lower for APs. 
                                                                                                                                                        
a.  Montgomery clearly regarded the conversation as over (BNC CKC: 2983). 
b.  [A]nd the daughter, if she felt like coming home, preferred to regard home as where her 
     mother was (BNC H8Y: 1247). 
188 Not counted were those infinitival sentences in which the infinitive is realised by another verb than to be 
because otherwise the NP inf XP-pattern could not be compared to NP XP; moreover, only active sentences were 
considered because the passive NP inf XP-pattern constitutes a construction of its own, the PASSIVE-OF-OPINION 
Construction (cf. 11.4.5.2). 
189 Only those NP as XP-patterns that do not include another verb were counted here (cf. preceding footnote). 
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Table 32: Categorial realisation of XP for the NP inf XP, NP XP and NP as XP-patterns  
 NP AP PP ∑ (patterns) 
NP inf XP (after assume; 
active voice) 
32  
(47) 
χ2=4.8 
43  
(33.3) 
χ2=2.8 
7 
(1.8)190 
χ2=15 
82 
NP inf XP (after believe; 
active voice) 
125  
(138) 
χ2=1.2 
93 
(97.8) 
χ2=0.2 
23 
(5.2) 
χ2=60.9 
241 
NP XP (after consider) 310 
(505) 
χ2=75.3 
548 
(357.8) 
χ2=101.1 
24 
(19.2) 
χ2=1.2 
882 
NP XP (after find) 64 
(577.7) 
χ2=456.8 
935 
(409.3) 
χ2=675.2 
10 
(22) 
χ2=6.5 
1,009 
NP as XP (after regard) 2,579 
(2,096.2) 
χ2=111.2 
1,011 
(1,485.1) 
χ2=151.4 
71 
(79.6) 
χ2=0.9 
3,661 
NP as XP (after view) 917 
(663.1) 
χ2=92.2 
223 
(469.8) 
χ2=129.7 
18 
(25.2) 
χ2=2.1 
1,158 
∑ (categories) 4,027 2,853 153 7,033 
χ2=1,888.5; df=10; highly significant at p<0.001; ϕ=0.52 
 
11.4.6.2 A mental-space explanation 
Before we can attempt to account for the differences in the categorial realisation of XP be-
tween the NON-FINITE OPINION, the bare QUALIFYING and the AS-QUALIFYING Constructions, 
it will be expedient to sketch the outlines of a functional theory of syntactic categories. While 
formal grammarians usually distinguish syntactic categories on the basis of grammatical crite-
ria such as distribution and inflection (Jackendoff 2002: 124-5; Schachter 1985: 3), function-
alists posit that categories "have a cross-linguistically valid external basis" because they "are 
founded on basic principles of a commonsense ontological classification of the world and of 
presumably very deep principles of organizing information" (Croft 1991: 147; see also Dixon 
1995: 175-6; Lyons 1966: 209-11).  
                                                 
190 Although expected frequencies that are smaller than 5 can sometimes pose a problem, this is not the case 
here:  
We can go ahead and carry out the chi-squared test even if some expected frequencies are 
rather too small … If all the cells with small expected values have an observed frequency very 
similar to the expected and thus contribute relatively little to the value of the total deviance, it 
is unlikely that the value of the deviance has been seriously distorted, and the result can be ac-
cepted. (Woods, Fletcher and Hughes 1986: 145) 
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Croft discriminates between the central syntactic categories noun, verb and adjective on 
the basis of three semantic classes and three pragmatic functions. The semantic classes 'ob-
ject', 'event' and 'property' can be described as bundles of the semantic characteristics 
'valency', 'stativity', 'persistence', and 'gradability' (Croft 1991: 132). A concept has valency or 
inherent relationality "if its existence or presence requires the existence or presence of another 
entity" (Croft 1991: 62-3). Both events and properties are inherently relational: an event pre-
supposes the existence of at least one participant that takes part in the event, and a property 
requires an entity it holds true of. An object, on the other hand, is not a relational semantic 
concept because it is perfectly possible to conceptualise an entity autonomously, i.e. without 
setting it in relation to another entity (Croft 1991: 63). Stativity represents "the presence of 
[sic!] absence of change over time in the state of affairs described by the concept" (Croft 
1991: 63). Events, in the widest sense of the word, can be processual or stative; both objects 
and properties, on the other hand, are usually stative (Croft 1991: 63). Persistence refers to the 
distinction between individual-level and stage-level concepts. Processual events are transitory 
or stage-level because they do not last over time, while states are persistent or individual-
level. Similarly, objects and properties typically denote persistent concepts (Croft 1991: 64). 
Finally, gradability pertains to the fact that "the entity denoted by the concept can be mani-
fested in degrees"; only properties are gradable, whereas both objects and stative/processual 
events are non-gradable (Croft 1991: 65).  
The pragmatic functions or "propositional acts" Croft identifies are 'reference', 'predica-
tion' and 'modification' (1991: 51-2). The act of reference identifies an entity by opening what 
Croft calls "a cognitive file" for that entity (1991: 118). The act of predication describes the 
role of an entity in a permanent or transitory state of affairs (Croft 1991: 52). Lastly, the act of 
modification enriches the cognitive file of an entity by specifying an additional feature of it 
(Croft 1991: 52). 
Each semantic class is prototypically associated with a specific pragmatic function; the 
three syntactic categories 'noun', 'verb' and 'adjective' can be regarded as linguistic correlates 
of these unmarked pairings of semantic class and pragmatic function: "The relation between 
semantic class and pragmatic function is part of the (possibly innate) cognitive structure of 
every individual human language speaker" (Croft 1991: 95). The basic distinction in gram-
matical categories is between nouns and verbs because, as Sapir already noted, "there must be 
something to talk about and something must be said about this subject of discourse once it is 
selected" (1921: 119). The act of reference is typically used with respect to objects, because 
objects denote autonomous entities that are stable through time: "Lexical semantic categoriza-
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tions based on unchanging and permanent features of the entity are more likely to be used for 
reference because a cognitive file must be opened and its identity maintained over time" 
(Croft 1991: 118). The syntactic category that is prototypically associated with objects that 
can be referred to is that of nouns. While pronouns (and proper names) only refer to an indi-
vidual, most nouns typically evoke an entity as a representative of the kind it belongs to: 
"Pure referring is the main function of a pronoun; nouns refer and categorize at the same 
time" (Wierzbicka 1986: 365; see also Parsons 1990: 4). The act of predication is normally 
combined with events, which denote stative or processual relations between entities (Croft 
1991: 55). Verbs can be identified as the syntactic category which normally denotes events 
that can be used to predicate of other entities. The act of modification is usually linked to 
properties, and the syntactic category that typically codes properties that modify an entity is 
adjective. As compared to nouns and verbs, adjectives are a less central syntactic category. 
There are quite a number of languages that only have a very small, closed class of adjectives, 
and adjectives also occupy a position intermediate between nouns and verbs in functional 
terms (Croft 1991: 130). Modification can be a subsidiary function to reference when an ad-
jective is used to enrich the cognitive file of the referent evoked by a noun (Croft 1991: 52); 
in this use, an adjective derives its gender, number and case features from the noun. Modifica-
tion can also be an ancillary function to predication when an adjective is employed to make a 
secondary comment on a participant in an event (Croft 1991: 52); in this use, an adjective is 
dependent on a verb effecting a primary predication.  
The following table illustrates the position that the syntactic categories noun, verb and 
adjective occupy in the functional space mapped out by the semantic classes object, property 
and event, and the pragmatic functions reference, modification and predication. Each of the 
combinations is illustrated by an example; the prototypical associations are underlined. While 
prototypical nouns and verbs are characterised by only one combination of semantic class and 
pragmatic function, the category 'adjective' is a linguistic correlate of two typical combina-
tions: property and modification for attributive adjectives, and property and predication for 
predicative adjectives. 
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Table 33: Functional space of syntactic categories 
 Reference Modification Predication 
Object object reference 
NOUN (the cat) 
object modifier 
(John's cake; a cake for 
John) 
object predication 
(John is a fool) 
Property property reference 
(beauty; a beautiful one) 
property modifier 
ATTRIBUTIVE ADJECTIVE   
(the pretty cat) 
property predication 
PREDICATIVE ADJECTIVE  
(the cat is pretty) 
Event event reference 
(the killing of the president; a 
killer) 
event modifier 
(a running cat; the cat which 
ran to the door) 
event predication 
VERB  
(The cat scratched the dog) 
(adapted from Croft 1991: 67 and 2001: 92) 
A prototypical noun referring to an entity opens a cognitive file for that entity by evoking the 
class the entity belongs to, along with all the properties which are typically associated with 
that class. A prototypical adjective that is used to modify a noun (attributive adjective) or to 
make a secondary comment on it (predicative adjective) enriches the cognitive file opened by 
that noun by ascribing an additional feature/property to it. While typical adjectives thus name 
a single feature, "nouns embody concepts which cannot be reduced to any combination of 
features. They stand for categories which can be identified by means of a certain positive im-
age, or a certain positive stereotype, but an image which transcends all enumerable features" 
(Wierzbicka 1986: 361). In other words, "nouns tend to designate 'kinds of things' endowed 
with certain properties; whereas adjectives designate properties as such" (Wierzbicka 1986: 
362). The pragmatic differences between typical nouns and adjectives are also mirrored in 
their inflectional behaviour: adjectives are gradable because they denote properties that can 
hold of a referent to varying degrees. Nouns are countable because "[a] noun can place the 
intended referent within a certain imaginable kind ..., and so it can make delimitation, identi-
fication and counting possible" (Wierzbicka 1986: 366). 
In a qualifying pattern, the TOPIC is realised by an NP used for object reference, which 
opens a cognitive file for that NP. When the XP is realised by a predicative adjective, this ad-
jective makes a secondary comment on the TOPIC NP by adding an additional property to it. 
The proportion of APs is particularly high for the NP XP-pattern, while it is balanced vis-à-vis 
NPs for the NP inf XP-structure, and comparatively low for NP as XP. In order to understand 
why adjectives are so central to the bare QUALIFYING Construction, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at the semantic groups of adjectives used in qualifying patterns. For heuristic rea-
sons, I put the adjectives into three broad classes: adjectives such as intelligent, small or mod-
est are categorised as 'characterising' because they enrich the cognitive file opened by the 
TOPIC NP with another characteristic; adjectives such as important, appropriate or necessary 
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do not denote a characteristic inherent in an entity, but evaluate the TOPIC against some exter-
nal scale of importance, appropriateness, necessity etc.; I will call these adjectives 'evaluative'. 
Adjectives such as stimulating, disgusting or incomprehensible also evaluate the TOPIC, but in 
contrast to evaluative adjectives such as important, this is done on the basis of an emotional 
or intellectual reaction the TOPIC triggers in the SUBJECT; these adjectives will therefore be 
termed 'subjective-response'. These provisional semantic classes overlap in many respects, 
and some of my classifications are certainly arbitrary; nevertheless, the heuristic value of this 
classification is quite substantial, as the following table shows. 
Table 34: Semantic classes of predicative adjectives in qualifying patterns 
 characterising evaluative subjective response 
believe NP inf AP 
(active) n=93 
53 
57% 
37 
39.8% 
3 
3.2% 
consider NP AP 
n=548 
247 
45.1% 
285 
52% 
16 
2.9% 
find NP AP 
n=935 
143 
15.3% 
91 
9.7% 
701 
75% 
regard NP as AP 
n=330 
223 
67.6% 
98 
29.7% 
9 
2.7% 
 
The proportion of characterising adjectives is slightly higher than that of evaluative adjectives 
in the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction, while subjective-response adjectives are hardly 
found in it. Since, as we will shortly see, characterisations can also be made by predicative 
NPs, this construction shows a balanced ratio of APs and NPs in the XP-slot. The following box 
illustrates some of the adjectives used with believe NP inf AP in the three semantic classes.191 
believe NP inf AP 
 
characterising:  British; childish; clever; dangerous; dishonest; famous; fat; inspired; precious; superior; 
                            unorthodox. 
evaluative:   true (12); wrong (4); right (2); inefficient (2); desirable; essential; important; necessary; 
  viable; worthwhile. 
subjective-response: interesting, irresistible; offensive. 
 
While there are all kinds of adjectives in the characterising class (336a), the evaluative cate-
gory is dominated by adjectives that evaluate the TOPIC as true or false (336b). These are 
evaluations that can float back to the Base Space because they could theoretically be checked 
by other persons; evaluations such as important or necessary, and particularly subjective re-
sponses such as irresistible (336c) are more idiosyncratic and consequently rare in the NON-
FINITE OPINION Construction. 
                                                 
191 This and the following boxes give ten examples for adjectives in each of the three semantic classes; in addi-
tion, all adjectives that occur three times or more are provided. 
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(336) a.  Are we to conclude, therefore, that the Anglican Church's neglect of purification  
   ritual for women is not because it believes women to be 'clean', but because it would 
   rather such matters weren't mentioned at all? (BNC ACL: 28). 
  b.  But I believe it to be true that in many corners of Christendom spiritual warfare is 
    no longer a central concern (BNC CCE: 18). 
  c.  [A]geing and unmarried though he was, he believed himself to be irresistible (BNC 
         G06: 824). 
The QUALIFYING Construction with consider exhibits quite a large number of adjectives that 
are typically associated with it, especially in the evaluative class: 
consider NP AP 
 
characterising:  (un)safe (8); lucky (5); (in)capable (4); dangerous (4); excessive (4); (un)natural (4); small 
 (4); (un)able (3); (un)fortunate (3); inferior (3); intelligent (3); old (3); positive (3);  
 responsible (3); superior (3); unethical (3). 
evaluative:  (un)necessary (39); (in)appropriate (36); important (20); (un)desirable (12); essential 
 (11); (un)likely (10); significant (10); (un)suitable (8); acceptable (7); good (7); relevant 
 (7); (un)just (5); (un)fit (4); (in)adequate (4); prudent (4); sufficient (4); (un)wise (4); 
 (un)worthy (4); impracticable (3); possible (3); satisfactory (3); useful (3); vital (3). 
subjective-response: strange (2); attractive; boring; helpful; impressive; odd; reassuring; revolting; surprising;
                                   vexing. 
 
The characterisations (337a) and evaluations (337b, b') given in qualifying sentences with 
consider are not supposed to float back to the Base Space; as a consequence, evaluative adjec-
tives such as necessary, appropriate, important or desirable, which measure the TOPIC against 
a subjective scale provided by the SUBJECT, predominate this pattern. Since evaluations are 
typically expressed by adjectives and not by nouns, the NP XP-pattern after consider signifi-
cantly prefers APs to NPs. The qualifications in sentences with consider are typically made on 
a rational basis; subjective-response adjectives (337c) are therefore quite rare in this pattern. 
(337) a.  The nicest thing is that you consider me intelligent (BNC AN7: 3594). 
  b.   We consider it necessary to proceed to the resolution of the nationality question 
          (BNC ANT: 1247). 
  b'.  The Magistrates Association's immediate response was that its members already had  
          this information and would continue to pass the sentence they considered 
          appropriate to the offence (BNC G1J: 1087). 
  c.   There were some notable gaps in care but on the whole the research can be 
   considered reasonably reassuring (BNC CS7: 850). 
The situation is different with qualifying sentences introduced by find. While some evaluative 
adjectives are also quite frequent, the pattern is strongly predominated by subjective-response 
adjectives: 
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find NP AP 
 
characterising:  funny (8); (un)able (5); wanting (4); cheap (3); beautiful (2); complex (2); loveable (2); 
 expensive; modest; primitive. 
evaluative:  (un)necessary (19); (un)acceptable (10); good (7); (un)convincing (5); (in)adequate (3); 
                    (un)satisfactory (3); (in)efficient (2); (un)favourable (2); ideal (2); important (2).  
subjective-response: difficult (148); hard (106); easy (48); (im)possible (26); useful (22); interesting (21); 
 helpful (17); (un)attractive (10); intolerable (7); boring (6); embarrassing (6); frustrating 
 (6); tough (6); (in)convenient (5); distasteful (5); stimulating (5); strange (5); amusing (4); 
 appealing (4); disturbing (4); exciting (4); fascinating (4); incomprehensible (4); irritating 
 (4); painful (4); (un) pleasant (4); rewarding (4); (un)surprising (4); (dis)agreeable (3); 
 (un)comfortable (3); confusing (3); diverting (3); enjoyable (3); pleasing (3); valuable (3). 
 
Qualifying sentences with find are used for idiosyncratic, not very rational and often merely 
temporary qualifications. In contrast to the pattern with consider, both the characterisations 
(338a) and the evaluations (338b, b') imply a less rational perspective.  
(338) a.   She was one of the few people in the world who genuinely found Henry funny 
    (BNC ASS: 2035). 
  b.   I'm afraid you'll find it necessary to entertain yourself (BNC HHB: 2467). 
  b'.  Another disciple of Nostradamus, S. O. Letterman, has been throwing the pebbles in  
         LA and finds the omens good (BNC FAJ: 1328). 
The subjective-response adjectives used with find fall in a number of semantic subclasses. 
Most adjectives denote qualifications of a TOPIC as easy or difficult for the SUBJECT to handle 
(339a, a'); other adjectives denote negative or positive emotional reactions of the SUBJECT 
towards the TOPIC (339b, b'), or negative or positive intellectual reactions to it (339c, c'). Still 
other adjectives represent more physical responses towards the TOPIC (339d, d'). Subjective-
response meanings can hardly be expressed by NPs, which seems to be the reason why the NP 
XP-pattern after find strongly prefers predicative adjectives to predicative nouns. 
(339) a.   I find it difficult to persuade my family to eat healthily (BNC G2V: 2495). 
  a'.  Certain children find it easier to resist temptation than others (BNC B10: 130). 
  b.   Jack shook his head, evidently finding such cynicism distasteful (BNC GVP: 1702). 
  b'.  He finds Miriam appealing and she holds for him the added attraction of being 
         married (BNC BLW: 2162). 
  c.   [E]ven if you find taxonomy boring you may find this helpful in understanding the  
          names currently applied to these fish (BNC C97: 584). 
  c'.  "Did you find the story interesting?" asked Dr Mortimer (BNC H7V: 123). 
  d.   There was no bed and we did it on the floor, which I found excruciatingly 
          uncomfortable (BNC FBM: 4392). 
  d'.  Helen found the aromatherapy massage very relaxing (BNC G2F: 1499). 
The AS-QUALIFYING Construction is not typically used with adjectives. The semantic types of 
adjectives that are found in this pattern are very similar to those that occur in the bare QUALI-
FYING Construction after consider: 
regard NP as AP 
 
characterising:  suspect (3); ambitious (2); authentic (2); complex (2); hazardous (2); inferior (2); neutral 
 (2); primitive (2); sacrosanct (2); stubborn (2). 
evaluative:  (un)important (13); (un)necessary (6); essential (5); inevitable (4); normal (4); desirable 
 (3); (un)fair (3); relevant (3); significant (3); adequate (2); appropriate (2); vital (2). 
subjective response: agreeable; boring; disturbing; encouraging; impressive; intrusive; oppressive; outrageous; 
 relaxing. 
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Since this pattern is used for subjective but rational judgements, characterising (340a) and 
evaluative adjectives (340b) prevail, while subjective-response adjectives are not very com-
mon (340c). 
(340) a.  The other member states regard Germany as quite isolated (BNC AAA: 228). 
  b.  Thus, the professions might continue to regard limiting 'forms of organisation among 
         their members as necessary' (BNC A4K: 485). 
 c.  Many English fans even regard West Indian cricket as boring (BNC ABR: 1363). 
The semantic kinds of adjectives that are typically associated with NP inf AP after believe, NP 
AP after consider, NP as AP after regard and NP AP after find can also be brought out in evalua-
tion tests. The following groups of sentences were submitted to 62 native speakers of English, 
who had to decide on the construction that sounded most natural to them (the number and 
percentage of informants who chose a particular sentence is given in parantheses). Evalua-
tions as true or false strongly favour believe and the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction (341): 
(341) a.  The scientist believes this theory to be true (35/ 56.5%). 
  b.  The scientist considers this theory true (6/ 9.7%). 
 c.  The scientist finds this theory true (15/ 24.2%). 
  d.  The scientist regards this theory as true (6/ 9.7%). 
Evaluative adjectives such as important or likely are most typically associated with consider 
and the bare QUALIFYING Construction (342 and 343). They are also rather common in the 
NON-FINITE OPINION Construction, which, however, conveys the meaning that the evaluation 
could be intersubjectively validated. 
(342) a.  The president believes this measure to be important (17/ 27.4%). 
  b.  The president considers this measure important (23/ 37.1%). 
 c.  The president finds this measure important (7/ 11.3%). 
  d.  The president regards this measure as important (15/ 24.2%). 
(343) a.  He believes it to be likely that the mayor will win the upcoming election  
   (16/ 25.8%). 
  b.  He considers it likely that the mayor will win the upcoming election (35/ 56.5%). 
 c.  He finds it likely that the mayor will win the upcoming election (8/ 12.9%). 
  d.  He regards it as likely that the mayor will win the upcoming election (3/ 4.8%). 
Characterising adjectives such as intelligent are equally found both in the bare and AS-
QUALIFYING Constructions and the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction in the corpus (cf. table 
34), and the evaluation test does not show any clear tendencies either (344). While (344a) 
conveys the sense that the teacher's characterisation is supposed to float back to the Base 
Space, this is not implied in (344b) and (344d). What is surprising is that quite a number of 
informants chose (344c) with find, although this verb is not typically used for rational charac-
terisations in the corpus. 
(344) a.  The teacher believes Mary to be intelligent (17/ 27.4%). 
  b.  The teacher considers Mary intelligent (16/ 25.8%). 
 c.  The teacher finds Mary intelligent (15/ 24.2%). 
  d.  The teacher regards Mary as intelligent (14/ 22.6%). 
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Subjective-response adjectives are strongly associated with find, and are rare in other con-
structions or after other matrix verbs. 
(345) a.  I believe this movie to be repulsive (1/ 1.6%). 
  b.  I consider this movie repulsive (9/ 14.5%). 
 c.  I find this movie repulsive (48/ 77.4%). 
  d.  I regard this movie as repulsive (4/ 6.5%). 
Predicative adjectives, i.e. the linguistic correlates of the combination of the semantic class 
'property' and the pragmatic function 'predication', are the typical realisation of secondary 
predicates. Since syntactic categories are "radial categories" (Lakoff 1987: 291), they are also 
characterised by various extensions from the unmarked prototype. In our context, we are 
mainly interested in one marked correlation between semantic class and pragmatic function, 
namely nouns that are used for object predication. When a syntactic category is employed for 
a marked pairing of semantic class and pragmatic function, it usually displays only a defective 
set of inflections (Croft 1991: 79). While nouns denoting objects for purposes of reference 
normally exhibit nominal inflections such as number, nouns used for predication do not nor-
mally set their number parameter independently of the NP that they are predicated of (*I con-
sider John fools; cf. 4.1.2). The main reason for this defective inflectional behaviour is that 
when a syntactic category is used for an untypical pragmatic function, it shifts semantically 
towards the category prototypically associated with this pragmatic function (Croft 2001: 73). 
Since the function of making a secondary comment on another entity in the event is typically 
fulfilled by predicative adjectives, nouns coerced into this function become semantically more 
adjective-like as well.  
While objects and properties share the qualities of stativity and persistence, they differ 
with respect to gradability and valency. Objects used for secondary predication not only lose 
some of their typical nominal inflections such as independent number and case, but also take 
on the typical adjectival characteristic of gradation (I consider John very much an expert/more 
an expert than a liar; cf. 4.1.3). Moreover, while nouns used for object reference denote 
autonomous concepts that do not relate to any other entity, a relation to another entity must be 
coerced on predicative nouns (Croft 1991: 69). In the case of object predication, there is a 
continuum of relations that a predicative noun can have towards the NP it is predicated of (cf. 
4.1.1): on one end of the scale, the predicative noun retains its referring qualities and denotes 
another entity that the NP is equated with (equative relation: John is my English teacher); in 
the middle of the continuum, the predicative noun evokes a class that the NP belongs to (clas-
sifying relation: John is a teacher); at the other end of the continuum, the noun is used com-
pletely predicatively and denotes a property like an adjective (characterising relation: John is 
a genius).  
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While the relation between the SUBJECT NP and the predicative noun can be equative, 
classifying or characterising in copula sentences, most qualifying patterns require a character-
ising relation; in other words, a predicative noun in a qualifying pattern is much more adjec-
tive-like than a predicative noun in a copula sentence. Equative predications, in which the XP 
is realised by an NP that serves as a label (value) that identifies the TOPIC (variable), are not 
possible in the bare and As-QUALIFYING Constructions (346a, a'), but sometimes occur in the 
NON-FINITE OPINION Construction (346b). As is typical of equative predications, in which 
both NPs are referring (but see footnote 23), the unmarked order of 'TOPIC (variable) before 
identifying label (value)' can also be reversed (cf. 4.1.1). An indication that we are dealing 
with a marked order is intonation: the identifying label, which sets the value of the TOPIC-
variable, is the information focus and therefore typically stressed. While it is placed at the end 
of the sentence in the canonical alignment (346c), it is followed by the unstressed TOPIC in the 
marked alignment (346c') (for in-depth characterisations of equative predications and the dif-
ference between canonical and marked order, see Halliday 1994: 122-9 and Huddleston and 
Pullum 2002: 268-9). 
(346) a.   *I consider/find the murderer John. 
  a'.  *I regard the murderer as John. 
  b.   I believe the murderer to be John. 
  c.   I believe the murderer to be John. 
  c'.  I believe John to be the murderer. 
The following two sentences (347) illustrate equative predications in the NON-FINITE OPINION 
Construction (both with the unmarked order of the TOPIC-variable preceding the identifying 
value). Such equative predications are not particularly frequent in this construction; of 125 
NPs used as secondary predicates with the matrix verb believe, only 20 (16%) can be specified 
as equative. 
(347) a. Supervising the diggers was a large man he recognised as the Irish-Scandinavian 
         bishop from Saxony whose name he believed to be Hrolf (BNC HRC: 2183). 
  b.  Believing his benefactor to be Miss Havisham, he nourishes a fantasy that she 
         intends him to marry Estella (BNC B0Y: 1126). 
Not only equative predications, but also classifying predications are not usually felicitous in 
qualifying constructions (348a, a') because a pure classification cannot normally express a 
judgement based on personal experience (cf. 11.2). A combination of classification and char-
acterisation is therefore called for (348b, b'). A classifying NP opens a multidimensional cog-
nitive file like NPs used for object reference; combined with a premodifying adjective, how-
ever, one of the features typically associated with the class is highlighted and ascribed to the 
TOPIC NP. 
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(348) a.   ?I believe John to be a teacher. (ROS: 41) 
  a'.  ?I consider John a teacher. (ROS: 45) 
  b.   I believe John to be a competent teacher. 
  b'.  I consider John a competent teacher. 
The premodified NP is usually indefinite (349a), but can sometimes also be definite or posses-
sive (349b, c). In quite a number of cases, the adjective is in the superlative degree (349d). 
(349) a.  Reso's widow Patricia, who went to the court, said of Seale: "I believe him to be an 
         evil person, a sick person" (BNC CBE: 167). 
  b.  I found the ankle cuff the right height and shape to provide support without  
         restricting my movement (BNC A65: 1837). 
  c.  McDiarmid considers Volpone 'our great classical comedy' (BNC G2E: 397). 
  d.   Within such an approach, objects may not be reducible to the workings of a central  
          hierarchical principle, or be directly related to what are otherwise considered the  
          most important social divisions (BNC FAK: 1194). 
There is a limited number of NPs that express quality concepts like adjectives and that can 
therefore be used as characterising predicative nouns without an adjectival premodifier. 'Qual-
ity nouns' such as alcoholic, cripple, fool or genius do not open multidimensional cognitive 
files, but denote single properties like adjectives. In contrast to semantically related adjectives 
such as intelligent or stupid, however, the quality nouns genius and fool do not just ascribe a 
property to a person, but put the person into a category that is solely defined by a characteris-
tic property. When an entity is categorised on the basis of a single, noticeable property, this 
always has a semantic reason; the speaker "wants to stress, hyperbolically, the property in 
question, and his own emotional reaction to it; he wants to exaggerate that property, and to 
show that in his eyes it looms so large that it determines his way of seeing the referent, to the 
exclusion of other properties" (Wierzbicka 1986: 365). Quality nouns are such unprototypical 
NPs that they can hardly be used for object reference (350a); on the other hand, they can be 
graded and intensified like adjectives (350b, b') (Bolinger 1980: 3).192 
(350) a.  ?The liar/fool sat down.           (from Wierzbicka 1986: 364) 
  b.  X is a greater hero/saint than Y.           (from Wierzbicka 1986: 375) 
  b'.  Mary is such an angel!/ What an idiot John is! 
The following sentences illustrate some of the quality nouns that are typically found in quali-
fying patterns (351). 
(351) a.  Not for another two decades was his great work finished, and then only because a 
        local artist, Bramantino, used his own cash to do it, believing the work to be a 
        masterpiece (BNC ANB: 966).  
  b.  Finally, rebleeding from a previously missed and non-treated ulcer was considered a  
         failure (BNC HWT: 237). 
  c.  Moreover, he finds it a nuisance to have her in his flat all day (BNC CA6: 1684). 
  d.  [S]laves who have learned to regard their existence as an injustice will look for a  
         terrible vengeance (BNC H0N: 1319). 
                                                 
192 Similarly, when adjectives are used in a function typically performed by nouns (property reference), they 
assume the categorising behaviour of nouns; as a consequence, they no longer denote a single property but sug-
gest more denotational and connotational features (Wierzbicka 1986: 362): the young, blacks, innocence etc. 
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Noun phrases that are neither premodified by an adjective nor constitute quality nouns are 
rare in the NON-FINITE Opinion Construction and the bare QUALIFYING Construction after 
consider (352a, b), and are practically nonexistent after find. On the other hand, they are typi-
cal of the AS-QUALIFYING Construction (352c). 
(352) a.  Along with other footballers ... he felt a kind of mild predestination, believing 
   himself to be a footballer even while at school (BNC CL1: 1644). 
  b.  The fact that Murphy considers himself first and foremost a businessman who  
         happens to be in PR ... (BNC K59: 1107). 
  c.  John regards him as Saviour of the world (BNC CCL: 617). 
Table 35 gives an overview of the formal types of NP found in the various qualifying con-
structions. While the NON-FINITE Opinion and the bare QUALIFYING Constructions are domi-
nated by premodified NPs or quality nouns, the AS-QUALIFYING Construction distinguishes 
itself by a great proportion of unmodified NPs.  
Table 35: Kinds of predicative NPs in qualifying patterns 
 adjective +  
indefinite NP 
adjective +  
definite NP 
superlative + 
NP 
'quality' NP unmodified NP 
  
'adjectival' NPs 
 
believe NP inf NP 
(active) n=103 
45 5 10 18 25 
  
75.7% 
 
24.3% 
consider NP NP 
n=310 
117 31 15 93 52 
  
82.6% 
 
16.8% 
find NP NP 
n=64 
36 3 2 23 0 
  
100% 
 
0% 
regard NP as NP 
n=775 
141 43 37 94 460 
  
40.6% 
 
59.4% 
 
An unmodified predicative noun, particularly one introduced by as, does not denote a single 
property like more 'adjectival' nouns, but opens a multidimensional cognitive file like the 
TOPIC NP. In the AS-QUALIFYING Construction, therefore, a relation is established between the 
image evoked by the TOPIC NP and the image evoked by the predicative NP. It is a general 
property of human thought to establish connections between different cognitive domains, 
even between domains that are not a priori closely connected (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996: 
4). In a cross-domain or analogical mapping, the structure of one domain, the source domain, 
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is projected onto another domain, the target domain: "Analogies can inventively induce us to 
construct new connections, and recast or tune others" (Turner 1991: 125). Such analogical 
mapping thus makes it possible to "evoke[.] an understanding of one domain in terms of the 
other" (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996: 4). With regard to the AS-QUALIFYING Construction, 
the cognitive file opened by the TOPIC NP is the target domain, while the file opened by the 
predicative NP introduced by as is the source or analogical domain. The analogical domain is 
superimposed on the TOPIC domain, with the consequence that schemata and frames associ-
ated with the analogical domain are freely transferred into the TOPIC domain. This is a maxi-
mally economical way to gain a fresh understanding of the TOPIC NP; thus, "significant and 
rich meaning is obtained at very little cost" (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996: 21). The result of 
the cross-domain mapping is a blend, which "consists in integrating partial structures from 
two separate domains into a single structure with emergent properties within a third domain" 
(Fauconnier 1997: 22). The following sentence nicely illustrates these emergent properties 
because the analogy established in the blend serves as the basis for further analogical reason-
ing processes: 
(353) If one thinks of the DNA codes for proteins as records in a jukebox, the problem is to 
    understand why one disc, say the haemoglobin theme, is played only in red blood  
    cells while another, the albumin theme, is played only in liver cells (ASL: 1119). 
AS-QUALIFYING sentences are dominated by predicative NPs rather than APs because they do 
not typically characterise the TOPIC NP with respect to a single property, but with respect to an 
analogical domain. Since a noun opens a cognitive file that includes a whole bundle of fea-
tures and characteristics and not just a single property, "there is more in a noun than meets the 
eye; there is more in a noun than there is in an adjective" (Wierzbicka 1986: 380). Figure 30 
provides a formal representation of the cross-domain mapping effected by the qualifying sen-
tence John regards school as a prison: the TOPIC NP school opens a cognitive file that con-
tains all of the denotational and connotational background knowledge associated with the ref-
erent of that NP (indicated by the subindexed a's). The analogical NP a prison opens a second 
file and evokes a multidimensional image associated with that NP (indicated by the subin-
dexed b's). Some of the features of the TOPIC and analogical domains get mapped onto the 
blend, which in our example represents the image 'school as a prison'. As a consequence of 
this mapping, the TOPIC NP has inherited some of the denotational and connotational features 
of the analogical domain and can therefore be partially understood in terms of that domain. It 
is not possible to predict, in a way that generalises over specific speakers and specific situa-
tions, which aspects of the two domains will be mapped onto one another in the blend: "a 
striking feature of the blended construction is its underspecification ... there is no recipe for 
A MENTAL-SPACE ACCOUNT OF THE QUALIFYING CONSTRUCTION 
 
337
knowing what will be projected from the inputs" (Fauconnier 1997: 162). The 'school as a 
prison'-blend will probably not inherit elements such as schoolbooks, exams or blackboards 
from the TOPIC domain, or aspects such as probation, prison wall or barred windows from the 
analogical domain, but it could well be that for some speakers the blend also contains an asso-
ciation between the school's headmaster and the prison governor, or between the school yard 
and the prison yard. 
Figure 29: Cross-domain mapping in the AS-QUALIFYING Construction (John regards school as a 
                   prison) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As is consequently much more than simply a semantically empty structural device (cf. 5.3); 
while it has a "unity-fractioning" function (Schneider 1997: 38) in the DEPICTIVE Construc-
tion (cf. 10.3.2), it has an analogical-mapping function in the AS-QUALIFYING Construction. 
Although analogical cross-domain mapping "might seem like improbable mental acrobatics", 
it is in fact "the stuff of our everyday thinking and talking" (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996: 
21), and it is such a deeply ingrained mental organising principle that "we are typically not 
conscious of the mapping during use" (Fauconnier 1997: 9). Frequently, a more abstract or 
unfamiliar domain is seen in terms of a more concrete or familiar domain (354a, a') because 
"patterns that are inherently meaningful can be present in other concepts, such as abstract 
concepts, whose meaningfulness is given to them by the inherently meaningful concepts" 
(Turner 1991: 46), but it is also possible that both domains have a similar degree of abstrac-
tion (354b, b'). Very often, it is the positive or negative connotations associated with the ana-
logical domain that are exploited for the cross-domain mapping (354c, c'). What is important 
is that discourse participants can recognise certain analogies between the two domains; oth-
erwise, the mapping becomes infelicitous (354d). 
(354) a.  Consider each impasse that you meet as a stepping stone along the path to eventual 
         happiness and fulfilment (BNC CBC: 4507). 
TOPIC domain: 
'school' 
a1                 a2 
a3        
     an 
 a1 b1           
                      a2 b2 
          an bn 
b1                 b2
    b3       
         bn 
analogical domain: 
'prison' 
blend: 'school as prison'
a1: teachers 
a2: students 
a3: exams 
... 
b1: prison guards 
b2: prisoners 
b3: barred windows 
... 
a1/b1: teachers as prison guards 
a2/b2: students as prisoners 
... 
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  a'. Socioecology regards the plants as the work, the herbivores as the workers, and 
        the carnivores as the management (BNC HCK: 10). 
  b.  One could regard the front of the sweater as a canvas (BNC CGW: 996). 
  b'. And erm she always thought of her husband as daddy (BNC KB8: 4796). 
  c.  Mrs Thatcher, however, has remained a mobilizer; she clearly regards herself as 
         Heath plus, providing greater political will and persistence (BNC A6F: 944). 
  c'.  Most farm animals, however, still endure conditions devised in days when they 
   were merely thought of as meat machines (BNC H06: 1651). 
  d.  ??John regards school as an apple. 
The following table exemplifies a number of typical cross-domain mappings effected by the 
As-QUALIFYING Construction with regard: 
Table 36: Cross-domain mappings in the AS-QUALIFYING Construction 
TOPIC domain (target) Analogical domain (source) BNC code 
work service to Christ CGE: 1796 
society a gigantic market place A6F: 1021 
marriage a quest for his or her self-fulfilment CGE: 2445 
the health service some enormous trade union ABU: 1134 
the Church a rescue post from the world CCL: 573 
her life with the handsome doctor a game with rules CCM: 1876 
their property in a high-priced housing area a 'nest-egg' for their retirement CHS: 960 
a town a machine to live in ADX: 1851 
her existential pain a cup of instant coffee to be sweetened with 
saccharin 
AEA: 1576 
the call of the Killer whale a dinner gong BMY: 1123 
the earth a living, breathing entity CB9: 632 
women writers pilgrims on the way to modern feminism AN4: 730 
her job an oasis in a desert of coping with Harry's 
lack of direction 
B3G: 387 
the New Testament a stormy sea in which he was tossed about in 
a little boat as he explored 
A68: 701 
the asylum Hades CFX: 964 
the priest at the Eucharist 'a specific and bodily reminder' of Jesus AT9: 262 
their house home B03: 1455 
the illness sin made manifest in bone ADA: 79 
Moran's work voluntary slavery A6N: 1749 
his flock his children ALK: 373 
the lobby their own personal fiefdom AJY: 1688 
 
The relationship between the two domains is also frequently more closely specified by a 
prepositional expression. The sentences in (355) illustrate some of the prepositional phrases 
that occur repeatedly in regard-type qualifying sentences, such as an example of, a part of, 
one of, a sign of and a source of. 
(355) a.  It is perhaps a technical point whether we regard this work — with its fragmented  
        associations and obscure, perverse and personalised allusions, as an example of  
        schizophrenic language or, as Brain argues, evidence of manic flight of ideas 
        (BNC CFX: 1175). 
  b.  Even a letter to the Police Review can be regarded as a form of indiscipline (BNC 
         A0K: 394). 
  c.  I regard humour as one of life's vital ingredients (BNC CKW: 1128). 
  d.  Now the receipt of unsolicited junk mail may seem a relatively trivial matter (though  
        for some, who seem to regard their letter-box as part of their person, it is an  
        affront) (BNC BNE: 720). 
  e.  Firstly, Hitler was regarded as the personification of the nation (BNC ADD: 
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    1063). 
  f.  The wealth and power he clearly possesses by the time he is reunited with his  
        brother would have been regarded by the writer and the first hearers of the story as 
         clear signs of God's blessing (BNC ACG: 997). 
  g.  It was an easy step from this type of attitude to regard women as the source of all  
         evil in the world (BNC ACL: 466). 
  h.  Charlemagne's throne ... gave all the kings of western Europe sooner or later the idea  
         of regarding a throne as an essential symbol of royal greatness (BNC BMV: 
    1281). 
While analogical meanings cannot be rendered by adjectives, the meaning of the premodified 
NPs and quality nouns in the various qualifying patterns is similar to that of the respective 
adjectives. Most predicative NPs in the NON-FINITE OPINION Construction are characterising 
(356a), and a minority has evaluative semantics (356b); since characterisation can also be 
effected by NPs, the rather high proportion of predicative NPs in this construction can be ac-
counted for. 
(356) a.  I believe the 'Express' to be a poem of great beauty (BNC HD8: 108). 
  b.  The problems began when Mr Major and Northern Ireland Secretary of State Tom  
         King, negotiated what they believed to be the best deal for the taxpayers (BNC  
         K2F: 1085). 
For the bare QUALIFYING Construction with consider, characterising (357a) and evaluative 
(357b) predicative NPs are equally common, while subjective-response NPs are very rare 
(357c). 
(357) a. This is especially likely since evolution is considered a very conservative process  
         (BNC CMH: 430). 
  b.  Root crops were of great significance only in Speyside where 83% of the farmers 
         considered turnips an important ingredient in winter stock diets (BNC ALC: 188). 
  c.  It was not considered an easy or even feasible task to prove this relationship (BNC  
         B0N: 336). 
Although analogical mapping is a prime function of the AS-QUALIFYING Construction, not all 
sentences with regard-type verbs express analogical mappings (cf. the sentences with predica-
tive adjectives). There is a broad semantic overlap with the bare QUALIFYING Construction 
with consider-type verbs; as in this construction, the predicative NPs in the AS-QUALIFYING 
Construction frequently have characterising (358a) and evaluative (356b), but only rarely sub-
jective-response semantics (358c). 
(358) a.  Was he in general, would you say, well-liked, regarded as a competent priest? 
   (BNC HA2: 1913). 
  b.  Independent soft-commission brokers regard it as an acceptable method of 
    payment so long as they deal at the best price (BNC AHB: 241). 
  c.  Much may hinge upon points that the typical executive might understandably regard  
         as irritating technicalities (BNC B08: 1973). 
Predicative NPs in QUALIFYING sentences with find also sometimes have a characterising 
(359a) or evaluative (359b) meaning, but most typically express emotional or intellectual re-
actions of the SUBJECT towards the TOPIC (359c). Since NPs are not well suited to the task of 
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denoting subjective responses, predicative nouns are significantly underrepresented in quali-
fying sentences with find. 
(359) a.  [T]he young men were away fighting most of the time and the older ones found it 
         slow work reaping by moonlight (BNC CM7: 2369). 
  b.  Purists will argue that the additional contributions purchase additional benefits but  
        many will not find this a good point (BNC HXB: 1466).  
  c.  She explodes in a verbal attack on Trevor which momentarily he finds quite a relief 
        (BNC CGE: 668). 
A final word on predicative prepositional phrases: PPs rarely occur as predicative phrases in 
qualifying patterns because they are not typically used to express properties, but to establish a 
relation with another entity. When they occupy the XP-slot of a qualifying pattern, they must 
shift towards an 'adjectival' meaning like premodified NPs and quality nouns. Predicative PPs 
typically take on evaluative (360a), characterising (360b) or subjective-response (360c) se-
mantics like predicative adjectives. 
(360) a.  After killing the 'man', they apparently considered the woman of little importance  
        (BNC B20: 2665). 
  b.  So, though there are no stars in your eyes, you consider yourself beyond 
    temptation? (BNC JXT: 749). 
  c.  [T]hose who admire warm analogue sound will find this disc wholly to their taste 
        (BNC ED6: 3347). 
11.4.7 Overview of syntactic and stylistic differences 
The following table gives a synopsis of the syntactic and stylistic differences between the four 
functionally related qualifying patterns. That-clauses are most sharply set apart from the other 
patterns because they are the only structure that is able to represent independent propositions. 
The infinitival pattern differs from NP (as) XP-structures in that it is typically found after pas-
sive matrix verbs and is rather formal; the PASSIVE-OF-OPINION Construction is functionally a 
passive version of the FINITE OPINION Construction, and the formality of the active NON-
FINITE OPINION Construction is due to the fact that it expresses rational judgements that are 
based on the SUBJECT's long-standing experience with the TOPIC — a relationship that is typi-
cal of scientific contexts. The bare QUALIFYING Construction distinguishes itself by its fre-
quent occurrence in imaginative texts and by the typical categorial realisation of XP as AP; it is 
typically used when the TOPIC is characterised or evaluated in a personal and idiosyncratic 
way. The AS-QUALIFYING Construction, on the other hand, exhibits a great proportion of NPs 
in the XP-slot because it is predominantly used when the TOPIC NP is to be seen in terms of 
another, analogical domain. 
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Table 37: Overview of the syntactic and stylistic differences between qualifying patterns 
 that-clause NP inf XP NP XP NP as XP 
Complexity variable low low low 
Independent modification possible hardly possible not possible not possible 
Tense/aspect variability high low none low 
Extraction of 'subject' NP rare frequent frequent frequent 
Voice of matrix verb typically active typically passive neutral or typically 
active 
neutral 
Categorial realisation of XP neutral between 
AP/NP 
neutral between 
AP/NP 
typically AP typically NP 
Style neutral or rather 
colloquial 
rather formal frequent in imagi-
native texts 
neutral 
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12. Conclusions 
Secondary-predicate constructions that follow the syntactic formula 'NP1 V NP2 XP' present a 
complex range of scholarly conundrums and have therefore proved a rich hunting ground for 
various syntactic theories. There are four major lines of analysis which have attempted to clar-
ify the problems posed by these constructions, each of them comprising a plethora of slightly 
differing subanalyses.  
Descriptive grammars analyse the [NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern, which they usually call a 'com-
plex-transitive' complementation structure, on the matrix of transitive and copula clauses. In 
this view, NP2 is equivalent to the direct object of ordinary transitive sentences, and XP can be 
likened to the postverbal complement of copula clauses. This ternary analysis, in which the 
main verb selects a subject, a direct object and what is widely known as a 'predicative com-
plement', runs into serious difficulties, though, because it cannot account for the predicative 
relationship holding between the two postverbal complements. Attempts to remedy the situa-
tion by positing a hidden copula between NP2 and XP or by claiming that the matrix verb pos-
sesses some kind of intensive subcategorisation frame force the abandonment of the syntactic 
distinctions descriptive grammars rely on: NP2 would be both the direct object of the matrix 
verb and the subject of the predicative complement; XP would be an argument with respect to 
the main verb, but a predicate with respect to NP2; finally, the main verb would be bivalent 
and trivalent at the same time, with the consequence that the complex-transitive pattern would 
be both monoclausal and biclausal. 
The predicative relationship between NP2 and XP is the linchpin of the SC-analysis, which 
regards NP2 as the subject and XP as the (primary) predicate of a verbless clause. The scholar-
ship on SCs is dominated by theoretical considerations deriving from various subtheories of 
generative grammar, such as the Theta Criterion, the Projection Principle and the binary-
branching requirement. The empirical arguments put forward in favour of the claim that the 
main verb selects a subordinate clause are largely unconvincing, and there is also abundant 
evidence showing that NP2 and XP behave like two separate, non-clausal constituents, with NP2 
acting more like a direct object than a subject.  
The complex-predicate analysis, which has been formalised in generative and Categorial-
Grammar frameworks, avoids the difficulties of SC-theory by treating NP2 and XP as two sepa-
rate constituents again. The predicative relationship obtaining between these two phrases is 
attributed to the fact that the main verb and XP form a complex predicate, which selects NP2 as 
its direct-object argument. The empirical basis of this line of inquiry is rather tenuous, though, 
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because neither the word-order facts nor the semantics of secondary-predicate constructions 
support the view that the main verb and XP form a syntactic and semantic complex. Both gen-
erative and Categorial-Grammar approaches need to invoke special transformations or rules of 
combination to rectify this problem. 
The fourth contender for the correct analysis of secondary-predicate constructions, Predi-
cation theory, treats NP2 in a sentence such as John drank the tea hot as a direct object of the 
main verb, and the XP as a secondary predicate that is licensed by the argument complex of 
the primary predicate. Although a licensing account can circumvent many of the difficulties 
besetting the other theories — the main verb does not need to select another predicate, and the 
predicative relationship between the two postverbal phrases need not be instantiated by a 
clause — it has proved almost impossible to triangulate adequate structural licensing condi-
tions. 
Apart from the predicative relationship holding between NP2 and XP, there is the addi-
tional problem of how to account for the different semantic relationships that can be conveyed 
by secondary-predicate constructions. Even though the four syntactic approaches differ from 
one another on this question as well, answers have frequently gravitated towards a comple-
ment/adjunct account: qualifying sentences are most often argued to constitute a complement 
structure, with the direct object and the predicative complement (or the SC) being selected by 
the main verb, while depictive sentences seem to be adjunct structures in the sense that NP2 is 
selected by the verb, whereas XP (or a SC with a PRO-subject) constitutes an adjunct. Resulta-
tive sentences have received heterogeneous analyses because resultative XPs straddle the 
complement/adjunct distinction. In addition, there have also been attempts to capture the dif-
ferent semantic relationships by combining existing analyses, such as suggesting a complex-
predicate analysis for qualifying and resultative sentences, and a licensing account for depic-
tive patterns. 
The reason why none of the four competing lines of analysis has produced any definitive 
results so far lies in the principles that have guided research within the paradigm of syntactic 
discreteness. Complex syntactic structures such as the [NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern are thought to be 
assembled out of smaller, discrete parts according to certain rules of combination. This bot-
tom-up approach crucially relies on the distributional method in order to identify syntactic 
primitives; as the discussion of secondary-predicate constructions has shown, however, the 
distribution of grammatical properties is skewed, and every postulated syntactic building 
block is confronted with a large number of distributional mismatches. In order to defend their 
analyses, discrete research agendas become susceptible to what Croft has criticised as 'meth-
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odological opportunism': those grammatical properties that support a given theory are allowed 
to hold sway to the exclusion of other properties, which tend to be omitted from the scope of 
linguistic description. Multistratal grammars have yet another way of coming to terms with 
distributional mismatches: conflicting evidence can be explained away if it is assumed that a 
discrete analysis holds true at a deeper syntactic level, and that mismatches are surface-
structure reflexes of independent grammatical principles. As the fruitless quest for the right 
D-structure representation of SCs in generative grammar has illustrated, however, such an 
approach is no longer amenable to empirical testing. 
If we do not want to dilute the results of the distributional method in order to uphold 
theoretical preconceptions, we must renounce the idea of cross-constructional syntactic build-
ing blocks such as 'predicative complement', 'small clause', 'complex predicate' or 'symmetri-
cal c-command'. It consequently becomes a moot question to ask which of the discrete analy-
ses of the [NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern is superior to the others because it is impossible to find incon-
trovertible empirical evidence for any of them. For this reason, the chimera of the 'right' syn-
tactic analysis should be given up in favour of a more holistic and functional approach to sec-
ondary-predicate constructions. The perspective of non-discrete grammar calls for a fresh 
understanding of syntactic and semantic phenomena by arguing that constructions, and not the 
elements and relations they contain, are the proper units of syntactic representation. Since 
Construction grammar begins with the larger units and defines their constituents merely with 
respect to the role they play within the larger construct, it eschews the principle of full com-
positionality not only for idioms, but for all syntactic constructions. Construction grammari-
ans postulate a continuum between the lexicon and syntax because both words and construc-
tions are partly arbitrary pairings of form and meaning; symbolic relations are thus internal to 
constructions and do not exist cross-constructionally. There is a bi-directional, associative 
relationship between semantically related words and constructions, rather than a bottom-up 
integration of words into the syntactic structures provided by a categorial component. This 
connectionist perspective is also broadly consonant with the multidirectional and amodal 
views taken by recent neuroscientific models. 
When syntax and semantics are so intimately entwined, it is impossible to provide inter-
systemically discrete syntactic or semantic analyses of constructions. Syntactic form must be 
seen as a reflection of the specific semantic functions a given construction fulfils. Since the 
[NP1 V NP2 XP]-pattern can convey at least three different semantic relationships, we must as-
sume that it codes at least three distinct constructions. This approach cuts through many of the 
knots of discrete syntax because it is no longer necessary to force a similar kind of complex-
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transitive or small-clause analysis on all secondary-predicate constructions, and it also allows 
us to avoid the reductive binarism of complement/adjunct accounts. Each of the three seman-
tically distinct secondary-predicate constructions must rather be described in its own terms. 
The prototypical RESULTATIVE Construction codes an event in which one entity, a mental 
initiator, acts on another entity, a physical endpoint, thereby changing it in one of its proper-
ties. This force-dynamic model helps to account for most of the constraints governing the 
roles of the RC: the VERB-slot must be filled by a dynamic verb that can direct its force onto a 
specific property dimension of the endpoint; the SUBJECT hosts an initiator who translates his 
or her will into physical force, and the OBJECT an endpoint that can manifest a new property 
as a result of the force transmitted onto it; the attribute denoted by the RESULTATIVE phrase 
must be compatible with the property dimension activated by the VERB and with the direction 
of force transmission. 
The DEPICTIVE Construction conceptualises a figure/ground relationship in which a sali-
ent property stands out from an event; the figure property and the ground event are indirectly 
related to each other via an entity that is both a participant in the event and the bearer of the 
property. The figure/ground asymmetry explains many of the peculiarities of depictive sen-
tences: the ground event must be dynamic or at least compatible with the idea of variable in-
stantiations, so that a figure property can be conceived of as exceptionally standing out from 
it; to effect an ideal figure/ground relationship, there may be at most one figure in the event, 
the participant that serves as reference point for the figure must play a central role in the event 
as initiator or endpoint, and the figure must denote an absolute property. 
In contrast to the RC and the DC, the QUALIFYING Construction conceptualises a stative 
relationship between a SUBJECT-entity and a TOPIC-entity, which can be modelled along the 
lines of Fauconnier's mental-space theory. On the basis of his or her experience, the SUBJECT 
has a permanent opinion on the TOPIC, which differs in certain respects from intersubjectively 
shared knowledge and which is not supposed to float back to the more factual Base Space. 
Depending on which main verb is used in the construction, the SUBJECT's judgement is pre-
sented as personal but rational (e.g. consider), or as rather idiosyncratic and unimportant (e.g. 
find). 
Constructions are similar to lexical items in many interesting respects. For one thing, 
they have a prototypical meaning and various extensions from the core. Prospective resulta-
tives (John ordered the floor cleaned), conditional depictives (I prefer tea with milk) and de-
scribe-type qualifying sentences (John values Mary as a competent colleague) can be inter-
preted with respect to the constructional prototype, but also show idiosyncratic syntactic and 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
346
semantic behaviour. Even more importantly, a construction — like other lexical items — is 
part of a multidimensional network, so that its meaning cannot be exhaustively characterised 
without comparing it to the alternative conceptualisations provided by functionally related 
constructions. Resultative sentences, for example, are tightly connected to MOTION Construc-
tions, in which the force transmitted by the initiator targets the endpoint as a physical entity 
that can be transposed in space. The DC, which foregrounds a figure property relative to a 
ground event, can be compared with, for example, the DETACHED DEPICTIVE Construction, in 
which a property is backgrounded with respect to an event. Finally, the QC forms a functional 
map with the FINITE OPINION and the NON-FINITE OPINION Constructions: while the Subjec-
tive Space is completely closed off from the Base Space in a typical instance of the QC, the 
other two constructions allow the judgement made on the TOPIC to be partially transferred 
back into the Base. 
Although the problem of how the predicative relationship between NP2 and XP can be 
modelled cross-constructionally has been put to rest by the non-discrete approach, the ques-
tion remains why the RC, the DC and the QC all rely on a secondary predication. The reason 
seems to be that the entity denoted by the postverbal NP fulfils a double role in all three con-
structions: the OBJECT-entity in the RC is the endpoint of the force transmitted by the initiator, 
and it also manifests a new property as a result of this transmission of force; in the DC, the 
referent of the postverbal NP is both a participant in the ground event and the bearer of the 
figure property; finally, the QC symbolises a mental relationship between the SUBJECT and the 
cognitive file opened by the TOPIC NP, which is more closely specified by a property that the 
TOPIC displays as a result of the SUBJECT's particular views of it. 
The present dissertation has tried to analyse secondary-predicate constructions by looking 
for converging evidence from multiple sources; it has therefore combined such heterogeneous 
methods and data as syntactic tests, introspection, native-speaker evaluations and corpus in-
vestigations. The dictates of practicality have restricted the integration of extensive corpus 
data to the analysis of the QC; it is perfectly feasible, though, to bring corpus evidence to bear 
on the RC and the DC as well. 
Non-discrete grammar is only just beginning to emerge as a serious alternative to discrete 
syntax, and there are still a large number of open theoretical issues. A constructional approach 
does not obviate the need to tackle phenomena which have hitherto been rather successfully 
described in componential terms, such as general syntactic rules like the passive or adverbial 
modification (cf. John is considered a fool; Mary wiped the table clean with a sponge). 
Whether it is possible to assume combinations of constructions (e.g. a combination of the 
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QUALIFYING Construction with a schematic PASSIVE Construction), or whether constructional 
and componential approaches could profitably be combined, is a question that will have to be 
addressed by future research (Hoffmann and Saurenbach, in progress).  
Although it is customary and, I think, innocuous to describe linguistic phenomena with 
respect to an idealised language such as 'English', Construction grammar can also be used as a 
powerful tool to compare functional maps of constructions across different varieties of one 
language, and of tracing the development of such maps in the history of a language. It is the 
long-range goal of non-discrete grammar to augment our knowledge of the way linguistic 
patterns are functionally organised, and of how and why such functional organisations can 
vary and change. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
348
References 
AARTS, Bas. 1992. Small Clauses in English: The Nonverbal Types. (Topics in English Lin-
guistics 8.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
——. 1995. "Secondary predicates in English". In Bas Aarts and Charles F. Meyer, eds. The 
Verb in Contemporary English: Theory and Description. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 75-101. 
——. 1997. "Predicative XPs in English". Journal of English Linguistics 25: 332-9. 
AARTS, Flor and Jan AARTS. 1988. English Syntactic Structures: Functions and Categories in 
Sentence Analysis. New York and London: Prentice Hall. 
ALLERTON, David John. 1982. Valency and the English Verb. London and New York: Aca-
demic Press. 
ALTENBERG, Bengt. 1993. "Recurrent verb-complement patterns in the London Lund Corpus". 
In Jan Aarts, Pieter de Haan and Nelleke Oostdijk, eds. English Language Corpora: 
Design, Analysis and Exploitation. (Language and Computers: Studies in Practical 
Linguistics 18.) Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 227-45. 
ANGELELLI, Ignacio. 1990. Gottlob Frege: Kleine Schriften. 2nd ed. Hildesheim, Zürich and 
New York: Georg Olms. 
ARD, William Josh. 1977. Raising and Word Order in Diachronic Syntax. Bloomington, Indi-
ana: Indiana University Linguistics Club. 
ARIMOTO, Masatake. 1991. "There-insertion and the structure of sentences/small clauses". In 
Nakajima and Tonoike, eds. 1991: 107-46. 
ASTON, Guy and Lou BURNARD. 1998. The BNC Handbook: Exploring the British National 
Corpus with SARA. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
BACH, Emmon. 1979. "Control in Montague grammar". Linguistic Inquiry 10: 515-31. 
——. 1989. Informal Lectures on Formal Semantics. Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press. 
BALTIN, Mark R. 1998. "A nonargument for small clauses as constituents". Linguistic Inquiry 
29: 513-5. 
BASILICO, David. 2003. "The topic of small clauses". Linguistic Inquiry 34: 1-35. 
BAYER, Josef. 1986. "The role of event expression in grammar". Studies in Language 10: 1-
52. 
BEHRENS, Werner. 1937. Lateinische Satzformen im Englischen: Latinismen in der Syntax der 
englischen Übersetzungen des Humanismus. Emsdetten: Lechte. 
BIBER, Douglas, Stig JOHANSSON, Geoffrey LEECH, Susan CONRAD and Edward FINEGAN, eds. 
1999. Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. Harlow: Longman. 
BIERWISCH, Manfred. 1993. "Ludwig Jägers Kampf mit den Windmühlen: Anmerkungen zu 
einer merkwürdigen Sprach(wissenschafts)verwirrung". Zeitschrift für Sprachwissen-
schaft 12: 107-12.  
—— and Ewald LANG. 1987. "Etwas länger – viel tiefer – immer weiter: Epilog zum Dimen-
sionsadjektivprojekt". In Manfred Bierwisch and Ewald Lang, eds. Grammatische und 
konzeptuelle Aspekte von Dimensionsadjektiven. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 649-99. 
REFERENCES 
 
349
BOAS, Hans C. 2002. "On the role of semantic constraints in resultative constructions". In 
Reinhard Rapp, ed. Sprachwissenschaft auf dem Weg in das dritte Jahrtausend: Akten 
des 34. linguistischen Colloquium, Germersheim 1999. Vol. 1: Text, Bedeutung, 
Kommunikation. (Linguistik International 7.) Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 35-43. 
BOBALJIK, Jonathan D. to appear. "Floating quantifiers: Handle with care". 
BOLINGER, Dwight. 1967a. "Apparent constituents in surface structure". Word 23: 47-56. 
——. 1967b. "Adjectives in English: Attribution and predication". Lingua 18: 1-34. 
——. 1974. "Concept and percept: Two infinitive constructions and their vicissitudes". In 
Suniti Kuman Chatterji, ed. World Papers in Phonetics: Festschrift for Dr. Onishi's 
Kiju. S.I.: The Phonetic Society of Japan, 65-91. 
——. 1977. Meaning and Form. London and New York: Longman. 
——. 1980. Syntactic Diffusion and the Indefinite Article. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Linguistics Club. 
BOLKESTEIN, A. Machtelt. 1976. "A.c.i.- and ut-clauses with verba dicenda in Latin". Glotta 
54: 263-91. 
——, ed. 1981. Predication and Expression in Functional Grammar. London and New York: 
Academic Press. 
BORKIN, Ann. 1973. "To be and not to be". Papers from the Ninth Regional Meeting of the 
Chicago Linguistic Society. CLS 9: 44-56.  
——. 1984. Problems in Form and Function. Norwood: Ablex. 
BOWERS, John. 1993. "The syntax of predication". Linguistic Inquiry 24: 591-656. 
BRESNAN, Joan. 1982. "The passive in lexical theory". In Joan Bresnan, ed. The Mental Rep-
resentation of Grammatical Relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3-86. 
——. 2001. Lexical Functional Syntax. (Blackwell Textbooks in Linguistics 16.) Oxford and 
Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
—— and Annie ZAENEN. 1990. "Deep unaccusativity in LFG". In Katarzyna Dziwirek, Pat-
rick Farrell and Errapel Mejías-Bikandi, eds. Grammatical Relations: A Cross-
theoretical Perspective. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Informa-
tion, 45-57. 
BRODY, Michael and M. Rita MANZINI. 1988. "On implicit arguments". In Ruth M. Kempson, 
ed. Mental Representations: The Interface between Language and Reality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 105-30. 
BROWN, Edward K. and James E. MILLER. 1991. Syntax: A Linguistic Introduction to Sentence 
Structure. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. 
BURTON-ROBERTS, Noel. 1986. Analysing Sentences: An Introduction to English Syntax. 
London and New York: Longman. 
——. 1991. "Prepositions, adverbs and adverbials". In Ingrid Tieken-Boon van Ostade and 
John Frankis, eds. Language: Usage and Description. Studies Presented to N. E. 
Osselton on the Occasion of His Retirement. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 
159-72. 
CANN, Ronnie. 1993. Formal Semantics: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
REFERENCES 
 
350
CARDINALETTI, Anna and Maria Teresa GUASTI. 1993. "Negation in epistemic small clauses". 
Probus 5: 39-61. 
—— and —— .1995. "Small clauses: Some controversies and issues of acquisition". In Car-
dinaletti and Guasti, eds. 1995: 1-23. 
—— and ——, eds. 1995. Small Clauses. (Syntax and Semantics 28.) San Diego, CA: Aca-
demic Press. 
CARRIER, Jill and Janet H. RANDALL. 1992. "The argument structure and syntactic structure of 
resultatives". Linguistic Inquiry 23: 173-234. 
—— and ——. 1993. "Lexical mapping". In Reuland and Abraham, eds. 1993: 119-42. 
CHAMBERS, John K., Peter TRUDGILL and Natalie SCHILLING-ESTES, eds. 2002. The Hand-
book of Language Variation and Change. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
CHIERCHIA, Gennaro and Raymond TURNER. 1988. "Semantics and property theory". Linguis-
tics and Philosophy 11: 261-302. 
CHOMSKY, Noam. 1957. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton. 
——. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
——. 1972. Conditions on Transformations. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
——. 1975. The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory. New York and London: Plenum 
Press. 
——. 1980. Rules and Representations. New York: Columbia University Press. 
——. 1981. Lectures on Government and Binding: The Pisa Lectures. Dordrecht: Foris Pu-
blications. 
——. 1986a. Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use. New York: Praeger. 
——. 1986b. Barriers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
——. 1995. The Minimalist Program. (Current Studies in Linguistics 28.) Cambridge, MA 
and London: MIT Press. 
——. 2000. New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
CHUNG, Sandra and James MCCLOSKEY. 1987. "Government, barriers and small clauses in 
modern Irish". Linguistic Inquiry 18: 173-235. 
CLOSE, Reginald A. 1975. A Reference Grammar for Students of English. London: Longman. 
COMRIE, Bernard. 1976. Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related 
Problems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
CONTRERAS, Heles. 1987. "Small clauses in Spanish and English". Natural Language and 
Linguistic Theory 5: 225-43. 
——. 1995. "Small clauses and complex predicates". In Cardinaletti and Guasti, eds. 1995: 
135-52. 
COOK, Vivian J. and Mark NEWSON. 1996. Chomsky's Universal Grammar: An Introduction. 
2nd ed. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
COOPMANS, Peter and Suzanne STEVENSON. 1991. "How extraction from finite and infinitival 
complements: A surprising asymmetry". Linguistic Inquiry 22: 359-67. 
REFERENCES 
 
351
CROFT, William. 1991. Syntactic Categories and Grammatical Relations: The Cognitive Or-
ganization of Information. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
——. 2001. Radical Construction Grammar: Syntactic Theory in Typological Perspective. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
CULICOVER, Peter W. and Wendy WILKINS. 1986. "Control, PRO, and the projection princi-
ple". Language 62: 120-53. 
CURME, George O. 1931. A Grammar of the English Language. Vol. 3: Syntax. Boston: 
Heath. 
DAMASIO, Antonio R. 1989. "Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: A systems-level 
proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition". Cognition 33: 25-62. 
——. 1994. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Quill. 
—— and Hanna DAMASIO. 1992. "Sprache und Gehirn". Spektrum der Wissenschaft 11/1992: 
80-92. 
DEMONTE, Violeta. 1987. "Remarks on secondary predicates: C-command, extraction and 
reanalysis". The Linguistic Review 6: 1-39. 
DENISON, .David 1993. English Historical Syntax: Verbal Constructions. London: Longman. 
DIK, Simon C. 1981. "Discrepancies between predication and expression in natural lan-
guages". In Bolkestein, ed. 1981: 19-39.  
——. 1997. The Theory of Functional Grammar. Vol. 2: Complex and Derived Construc-
tions. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
DIRVEN, René and Günter RADDEN. 1977. Semantische Syntax des Englischen. Wiesbaden: 
Athenaion. 
DIXON, Robert M. W. 1991. A New Approach to English Grammar, on Semantic Principles. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
——. 1995. "Complement clauses and complementation strategies". In Frank R. Palmer, ed. 
Grammar and Meaning: Essays in Honour of Sir John Lyons. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 175-220. 
DOWNING, Angela and Philip LOCKE. 2002. A University Course in English Grammar. Lon-
don and New York: Routledge. 
DOWTY, David. 2000. "The dual analysis of adjuncts/complements in categorial grammar". In 
Fabricius-Hansen, Lang and Maienborn, eds. 2000: 53-78. 
DUFFLEY, Patrick J. 1992. The English Infinitive. London and New York: Longman. 
EINENKEL, Eugen. 1916. Geschichte der englischen Sprache. Vol. 2: Historische Syntax. 3rd 
ed. Straßburg: Trübner. 
EISENMEIER, Josef, Alfred KASTIL and Oskar KRAUS. 1918. Anton Marty: Gesammelte Schrif-
ten. Vol. 2.1: Schriften zur deskriptiven Psychologie und Sprachphilosophie. Halle a. 
S.: Niemeyer. 
EK, Jan A. van and Nico J. ROBAT. 1984. The Student's Grammar of English. Oxford: Black-
well. 
EMONDS, Joseph E. 1984. "The prepositional copula as". Linguistic Analysis 13: 127-44. 
——. 1985. A Unified Theory of Syntactic Categories. Dordrecht: Foris Publications. 
EMONS, Rudolf. 1974. Valenzen englischer Prädikatsverben. Tübingen: Niemeyer. 
REFERENCES 
 
352
——. 1978. Valenzgrammatik für das Englische: Eine Einführung. Tübingen: Niemeyer. 
ENDO, Yoshio. 1991. "The syntax and semantics of small clauses". In Nakajima and Tonoike, 
eds. 1991: 59-74. 
FANSELOW, Gisbert and Sascha W. FELIX. 1993. Sprachtheorie: Eine Einführung in die Gene-
rative Grammatik. Vol. 1: Grundlagen und Zielsetzungen. 3rd ed. Tübingen und Ba-
sel: Francke. 
FABRICIUS-HANSEN, Cathrine, Ewald LANG and Claudia MAIENBORN, eds. Approaching the 
Grammar of Adjuncts. (ZAS Papers in Linguistics 17.) Berlin: Zentrum für Allgemei-
ne Sprachwissenschaft. 
FAUCONNIER, Gilles. 1997. Mappings in Thought and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
—— and Eve SWEETSER, eds. 1996. Spaces, Worlds and Grammar. Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
FEAGIN, Crawford. 2002. "Entering the community: Fieldwork". In Chambers, Trudgill and 
Schilling-Estes, eds. 2002: 20-39. 
FILLMORE, Charles J. 1968. "The case for case". In Emmon Bach and Robert T. Harms, eds. 
Universals in Linguistic Theory. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1-88. 
——, Paul KAY and Mary C. O'CONNOR. 1988. "Regularity and idiomaticity in grammatical 
constructions: The case of let alone". Language 64: 501-38. 
FODOR, Jerry. 1983. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, 
MA and London: MIT Press. 
FRANCIS, Gill, Susan HUNSTON and Elizabeth MANNING. 1996. Collins COBUILD Grammar 
Patterns. Vol. 1: Verb. London: Harper Collins. 
GIVÓN, Talmy. 1993. English Grammar: A Function-based Introduction. Vol. 1. Amsterdam 
and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 
GOLDBERG, Adele E. 1991. "A semantic account of resultatives". Linguistic Analysis 21: 66-
96. 
——. 1995. Constructions: A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure. Chi-
cago and London: University of Chicago Press.  
—— and Farrell ACKERMAN. 2001. "The pragmatics of obligatory adjuncts". Language 77: 
798-814. 
—— and Ray JACKENDOFF. to appear in Language. "The English Resultative as a family of 
constructions". 
——, Devin M. CASENHISER and Nitya SETHURAMAN. to appear in Cognitive Linguistics. 
"Learning argument structure generalizations". 
GOODALL, Grant. 1987. Parallel Structures in Syntax: Coordination, Causatives, and Restruc-
turing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
GRAFFI, Giorgio. 1988. "Structural subject and thematic subject". Linguisticae Investigationes 
12: 397-414. 
GREEN, Georgia M. 1970. "How abstract is surface structure?" Papers from the Sixth Regional 
Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. CLS 6: 270-81. 
——. 1972. "Some observations on the syntax and semantics of instrumental verbs". Papers 
from the Eighth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. CLS 8: 83-97. 
REFERENCES 
 
353
——. 1973. "A syntactic syncretism in English and French". In Braj B. Kachru, Robert B. 
Lees, Yakov Malkiel, Angelina Pietrangeli and Sol Saporta, eds. Issues in Linguistics: 
Papers in Honor of Henry and Renée Kahane. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
257-78. 
GREWENDORF, Günther. 2002. Minimalistische Syntax. Tübingen and Basel: A. Francke. 
DEGROOT, Casper. 1981. "Sentence-intertwining in Hungarian". In Bolkestein, ed. 1981: 41-
62. 
GUÉRON, Jaqueline and Teun HOEKSTRA. 1995. "The temporal interpretation of predication". 
In Cardinaletti and Guasti, eds. 1995: 77-107. 
HAEGEMAN, Liliane M. and Jacqueline GUERON. 1999. English Grammar: A Generative Per-
spective. Oxford: Blackwell. 
HALE, Ken and Samuel J. KEYSER. 1992. "The syntactic character of thematic structure". In 
Roca, ed. 1992: 107-43.  
HALLIDAY, Michael A. K. 1967. "Notes on transitivity and theme in English, Part 1". Journal 
of Linguistics 3: 37-81. 
——. 1994. An Introduction to Functional Grammar. 2nd ed. London, New York, Melbourne 
and Auckland: Edward Arnold. 
HAMMERICH, L. L. 1930. "Nexus: Subjekt und Objekt, Aktiv und Passiv". In Niels Bøgholm, 
Aage Brusendorff and C. A. Bodelsen, eds. A Grammatical Miscellany Offered to Otto 
Jespersen on His Seventieth Birthday. London: George Allen and Unwin, 299-317. 
HANTSON, André. 1989. "The complementizer as". In Dany Jaspers, Wim Klooster, Yvan 
Putseys and Pieter Seuren, eds. Sentential Complementation and the Lexicon: Studies 
in Honour of Wim de Geest. Dordrecht and Providence: Foris Publications, 207-19. 
HASPELMATH, Martin, Ekkehard KÖNIG, Wulf OESTERREICHER and Wolfgang RAIBLE, eds. 
Language Typology and Language Universals: An International Handbook. Vol. 2. 
Berlin and New York. 
HATAKEYAMA, Yuji. 1997. "An analysis of inverse copula sentences and the theoretical con-
sequences for clause structure: A feature compositional approach to the split-CP hy-
pothesis." Linguistic Analysis 27: 26-65. 
HAYASHI, Ryujiro. 1991. "On the constituency of small clauses". In Nakajima and Tonoike, 
eds. 1991: 11-25. 
HENGEVELD, Kees. 1992. Non-verbal Predication: Theory, Typology, Diachrony. (Functional 
Grammar Series 15.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
HENRY, Alison. 2002. "Variation and Syntactic Theory". In Chambers, Trudgill and Schilling-
Estes, eds. 2002: 263-82. 
HIGUCHI, Hisashi. 1999. "On the nature of ?I believe Jack to arrive tomorrow". In Peter 
Collins and David Lee, eds. The Clause in English: In Honour of Rodney Huddleston. 
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, 127-32. 
HOEKSEMA, Jack. 1991. "Complex predicates and liberation in Dutch and English". Linguis-
tics and Philosophy 14: 661-710. 
HOEKSTRA, Teun. 1988. "Small clause results". Lingua 74: 101-39. 
——. 1992. "Aspect and theta theory". In Roca, ed. 1992: 145-76. 
REFERENCES 
 
354
HOFFMANN, Thomas and Holger SAURENBACH. in progress. "How much structure is good for 
syntax? A cross-theoretical perspective from Construction Grammar and the Minimal-
ist Program". 
HOFMANN, Johann Baptist. 1972. Lateinische Grammatik. Vol. 2: Lateinische Syntax und Sti-
listik. (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaften 2,2,2.) Neubearbeitet von Anton Szan-
tyr. München: Beck. 
HORNBY, Albert Sydney. 1954. A Guide to Patterns and Usage in English. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
HORNSTEIN, Norbert and David LIGHTFOOT. 1987. "Predication and PRO". Language 63: 23-
52. 
HOUSE, Homer C. and Susan Emolyn HARMAN. 1950. Descriptive English Grammar. 2nd ed. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
HUDDLESTON, Rodney D. 1984. Introduction to the Grammar of English. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
—— and Geoffrey K. PULLUM. 2002. The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
INOUE, Isao. 1984. "Derivative processes in as-constructions". English Linguistics 1: 87-104. 
IONESCU, Daniela. 1997. "The categorial status of the prototypical small clause". Revue Rou-
maine de Linguistique 42: 167-83. 
JACKENDOFF, Ray S. 1990a. Semantic Structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
——. 1990b. "On Larson's treatment of the double object construction". Linguistic Inquiry 
21: 427-56. 
——. 1997. "Twistin' the night away". Language 73: 534-59. 
——. 2002. Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
JACOBSON, Pauline. 1987. "Phrase structure, grammatical relations, and discontinuous consti-
tuents". In Geoffrey J. Huck and Amerindo E. Ojeda, eds. Discontinuous Constitu-
ency. Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 27-69. 
JÄGER, Ludwig. 1993. "Language, what ever that may be: Die Geschichte der Sprachwissen-
schaft als Erosionsgeschichte ihres Gegenstandes". Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft 
12: 77-106. 
JESPERSEN, Otto. 1924. The Philosophy of Grammar. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
——. 1932. A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles. Vol. 4: Syntax: Third Vol-
ume. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
——. 1933. Essentials of English Grammar. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
——. 1940. A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles. Vol. 5: Syntax: Fourth 
Volume. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
JOHNSON, Kyle. 1987. "Against the notion 'SUBJECT'". Linguistic Inquiry 18: 354-61. 
KANG, Beom-Mo. 1995. "On the treatment of complex predicates in categorial grammar". 
Linguistics and Philosophy 18: 61-81. 
KAPLAN, Jeffrey P. 1988. "Small clauses and the projection principle". Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the Berkely Linguistics Society 14: 78-87. 
REFERENCES 
 
355
KAUFMANN, Ingrid. 1995. "O- and D-predicates: A semantic approach to the unaccusative-
unergative distinction". Journal of Semantics 12: 377-427. 
KAYNE, Richard S. 1984. Connectedness and Binary Branching. Dordrecht: Foris Publica-
tions. 
——. 1985. "Principles of particle constructions". In Jacqueline Guéron, Hans-Georg Obe-
nauer and Jean-Yves Pollock, eds. Grammatical Representation. Dordrecht: Foris Pu-
blications, 101-40. 
KENNEDY, Graeme. 1998. An Introduction to Corpus Linguistics. London and New York: 
Longman. 
KIKUCHI, Akira and Daiko TAKAHASHI. 1991. "Agreement and small clauses". In Nakajima 
and Tonoike, eds. 1991: 75-105. 
KILBY, David A. 1984. Descriptive Syntax and the English Verb. London, Sydney and Dover, 
NH: Croom Helm. 
KITAGAWA, Yoshihisa. 1985. "Small but clausal". Papers from the General Session at the 
Twenty-first Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. CLS 21: 210-20. 
KLUENDER, Robert. 1985. "Sätzchen: German small clauses as S's". Proceedings of the Six-
teenth Annual Meeting of the North East Linguistics Society. NELS 16: 274-92. 
KOFFKA, Kurt. 1935. Principles of Gestalt Psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World. 
KOSTER, Jan. 1984. "On binding and control". Linguistic Inquiry 15: 417-59. 
KOZIOL, Herbert and Felix HÜTTENBRENNER. 1956. Grammatik der englischen Sprache. Hei-
delberg: Carl Winter. 
KRIFKA, Manfred. 1998. "The origins of telicity". In Rothstein, ed. 1998: 197-235.  
KRUISINGA, ETSKO. 1932. A Handbook of Present-day English. Part 2: English Accidence and 
Syntax. Vol. 3. 5th ed. Groningen: Noordhoff. 
KULIKOV, Leonid I. 2001. "Resultative constructions". In Haspelmath, König, Oesterreicher 
and Raible, eds. 2001: 886-98. 
LAKOFF, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about 
the Mind. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
——. 1989. "Some empirical results about the nature of concepts". Mind and Language 4: 
103-29. 
LANGACKER, Ronald W. 1987. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Vol. 1: Theoretical Pre-
requisites. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.  
——. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Vol. 2: Descriptive Application. Stanford, 
CA: Standford University Press. 
——. 1999a. Grammar and Conceptualization. (Cognitive Linguistics Research 14.) Berlin 
and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
——. 1999b. "Assessing the cognitive linguistic enterprise". In Theo Janssen and Gisela Re-
deker, eds. Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology. (Cognitive 
Linguistics Research 15.) Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
LARSON, Richard K. 1988. "On the double object construction". Linguistic Inquiry 19: 335-91. 
REFERENCES 
 
356
LASNIK, Howard. 1992. "Case and expletives: Notes toward a parametric account". Linguistic 
Inquiry 23: 381-405. 
LAVANDERA, Beatriz. 1978. "Where does the sociolinguistic variable stop?". Language in 
Society 7: 171-82. 
LAW, Paul. 1996. "Remarks on the verb be and the expletive there in English". Linguistische 
Berichte 166: 492-529. 
LEE, David. 2001. Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
LEVIN, Beth. 1993. English Verb Classes and Alternations: A Preliminary Investigation. Chi-
cago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
—— and Tova R. RAPOPORT. 1988. "Lexical Subordination". Papers from the Twenty-fourth 
Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. CLS 24: 275-89. 
—— and Malka RAPPAPORT-HOVAV. 1991. "Wiping the slate clean: A lexical semantic ex-
ploration". Cognition 41: 123-51. 
—— and ——. 1992. "The lexical semantics of verbs of motion: The perspective from unac-
cusativity". In Roca, ed. 1992: 247-69. 
—— and ——. 1995. Unaccusativity: At the Syntax-Lexical Semantics Interface. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
LINZ, Erika. 2002. Indiskrete Semantik: Kognitive Linguistik und Neurowissenschaftliche 
Theoriebildung. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. 
LONG, Ralph B. 1961. The Sentence and its Parts: A Grammar of Contemporary English. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
—— and Dorothy B. LONG. 1971. The System of English Grammar. Glenview and London: 
Scott, Foresman and Company. 
LYONS, John. 1966. "Towards a 'notional' theory of the 'parts of speech'". Journal of Linguis-
tics 2: 209-36. 
——. 1968. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
MAIR, Christian. 1990. Infinitival Complement Clauses in English: A Study of Syntax in Dis-
course. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
——. 1993. "A crosslinguistic functional constraint on believe-type raising in English and 
other selected European languages". Papers and Studies in Contrastive Linguistics 28: 
5-19. 
MALLÉN, Enrique. 1992. "Secondary predicates and lexical identification". Studia Linguistica 
46: 1-29. 
MANZINI, M. Rita. 1989. "Constituent structure and locality". In Anna Cardinaletti, Giuliana 
Giusti and Giugliemo Cinque, eds. Constituent Structure. Dordrecht: Foris, 157-201. 
MARTIN, Roger. 2001. "Null case and the distribution of PRO". Linguistic Inquiry 32: 141-66. 
MATTHEWS, Peter H. 1981. Syntax. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
MAY, Thor. 1987. "Verbs of result in the complements of raising constructions". Australian 
Journal of Linguistics 7: 25-42. 
MEJÍAS-BIKANDI, Errapel. 1996. "Space accessibility and mood in Spanish". In Fauconnier 
and Sweetser, eds. 1996: 157-78. 
REFERENCES 
 
357
MENGE, Hermann. 2000. Lehrbuch der lateinischen Syntax und Semantik. Völlig neu bearbei-
tet von Thorsten Burkard und Markus Schauer. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft.  
MENZEL, Peter. 1973. Semantics and Syntax in Complementation. The Hague and Paris: Mou-
ton. 
MITTWOCH, Anita. 1982. "On the difference between eating and eating something: Activities 
versus accomplishments". Linguistic Inquiry 13: 113-22. 
MORLEY, David G. 1991. "Determining objects, adjuncts and complements in English". Word 
42: 295-302. 
MORO, Andrea. 1995. "Small clauses with predicative nominals". In Cardinaletti and Guasti, 
eds. 1995: 109-32. 
NAKAJIMA, Heizo. 1991a. "Introduction". In Nakajima and Tonoike, eds. 1991: 3-10. 
——. 1991b. "Reduced clauses and argumenthood of AgrP". In Nakajima and Tonoike, eds. 
1991: 39-57. 
—— and Shigeo TONOIKE, eds. 1991. Topics in Small Clauses: Proceedings of Tokyo Small 
Clause Festival. (Linguistics Workshop Series 1.) Tokyo: Kurosio Publishers. 
NAPOLI, Donna Jo. 1989. Predication Theory: A Case Study for Indexing Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
NEDJALKOV, Vladimir P. 2001. "Resultative constructions". In Haspelmath, König, Oesterrei-
cher and Raible, eds. 2001: 928-40. 
NEWMAN, John. 1982. "Predicative adjuncts". Australian Journal of Linguistics 2: 153-66. 
NOËL, Dirk. 1997. "The choice between infinitives and that-clauses after believe". English 
Language and Linguistics 1: 271-84. 
NOONAN, Michael. 1985. "Complementation". In Shopen, ed. 1985: 42-140. 
OAKES, Michael P. 1998. Statistics for Corpus Linguistics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
OGAWA, Akira. 1994. "As-phrases as small clauses". In Shuyi Chiba, ed. Synchronic and Dia-
chronic Approaches to Language. Tokyo: Liber Schuppan, 439-58. 
ONIONS, Charles T. 1904. An Advanced English Syntax: Based on the Principles and Re-
quirements of the Grammatical Society. London: Kegan Paul. 
PARSONS, Terence. 1990. Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic Seman-
tics. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. 
PENCE, Raymond W. and Donald W. EMERY. 1963. A Grammar of Present-day English. New 
York: Macmillan. 
PERLMUTTER, David M. and Scott SOAMES. 1979. Syntactic Argumentation and the Structure 
of English. Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press. 
PINKER, Steven. 1989. Learnability and Cognition: The Acquisition of Argument Structure. 
Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. 
PINKSTER, Harm. 1988. Lateinische Syntax und Semantik. Tübingen: Francke. 
POSTAL, Paul M. 1974. On Raising: One Rule of English Grammar and its Theoretical Impli-
cations. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. 
REFERENCES 
 
358
—— and Geoffrey K. PULLUM. 1988. "Expletive noun phrases in subcategorized positions". 
Linguistic Inquiry 19: 635-70. 
POUTSMA, Hendrik. 1928. A Grammar of Late Modern English. Part 1: The Sentence. Vol. 1: 
The Elements of the Sentence. 2nd ed. Groningen: Nordhoff. 
PULLUM, Geoffrey K. 1986. "Footloose and context-free". Natural Language and Linguistic 
Theory 4: 409-14. 
PUSTEJOVSKY, James. 1991. "The syntax of event structure". Cognition 41: 47-81. 
——. 1995. The Generative Lexicon. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. 
QUINE, Willard van Orman. 1971. "Quantifiers and propositional attitudes". In Leonard 
Linsky, ed. Reference and Modality. London: Oxford University Press, 101-11. 
QUIRK, Randolph, Sidney GREENBAUM, Geoffrey LEECH and Jan SVARTVIK. 1972. A Gram-
mar of Contemporary English. London: Longman. 
——, ——, —— and ——. 1985. A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language. 
London: Longman. 
RADDEN, Günter. 1989. "Semantic roles". In Günter Radden and Richard A. Geiger, eds. A 
User's Grammar of English: Word, Sentence, Text, Interaction. Vol. 2: The Structure 
of Sentences. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang.  
RADFORD, Andrew. 1988. Transformational Grammar: A First Course. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
——. 1990. Syntactic Theory and the Acquisition of English Syntax: The Nature of Early 
Child Grammars of English. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
RAFEL, Joan. 2001. "As for as/for, they are semi-lexical heads". In Norbert Corver and Henk 
van Riemsdijk, eds. Semi-lexical Categories: The Function of Content Words and the 
Content of Function Words. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 475-504. 
RANDALL, Janet H. 1982. "A lexical approach to causatives". Journal of Linguistic Research 
2:3: 77-105. 
RANSOM, Evelyn N. 1986. Complementation: Its Meanings and Forms. Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: Benjamins. 
RAPOPORT, Tova R. 1993. "Stage and adjunct predicates: Licensing and structure in secondary 
predication constructions". In Reuland and Abraham, eds. 1993: 157-82. 
——. 1995. "Specificity, objects, and nominal small clauses". In Cardinaletti and Guasti, eds. 
1995: 153-77. 
RAPOSO, Eduardo and Juan URIAGEREKA. 1995. "Two types of small clauses: Towards a syn-
tax of theme/rheme relations". In Cardinaletti and Guasti, eds. 1995: 179-206. 
RAPPAPORT-HOVAV, Malka and Beth LEVIN. 2001. "An event structure account of English 
resultatives". Language 77: 766-97. 
RAUH, Gisa. 1995. Englische Präpositionen zwischen lexikalischen und funktionalen Katego-
rien. (Theorie des Lexikons – Arbeiten des Sonderforschungsbereichs 282, Arbeitsbe-
richt Nr. 71.) Wuppertal: Heinrich-Heine Universität. 
REULAND, Eric and Werner ABRAHAM, eds. Knowledge and Language. Vol. 2: Lexical and 
Conceptual Structure. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
REFERENCES 
 
359
RIDDLE, Elizabeth. 1975. "Some pragmatic conditions on complementizer choice". Papers 
from the Eleventh Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. CLS 11: 467-
74.  
RIVIERE, Claude. 1982. "Objectionable objects". Linguistic Inquiry 13: 685-9. 
RIZZI, Luigi. 1986. "Null objects in Italian and the theory of PRO". Linguistic Inquiry 17: 
501-57. 
ROBERTS, Ian. 1988. "Predicative APs". Linguistic Inquiry 19: 703-10. 
ROCA, Iggy M., ed. 1992. Thematic Structure: Its Role in Grammar. (Linguistic Models 16.) 
Berlin and New York: Foris Publications. 
ROSENBAUM, Peter S. 1967. The Grammar of English Predicate Complement Constructions. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
ROSS, John Robert. 1981. "When the Be's go, the frost comes". In George Bedell, Eichi Koba-
yashi and Masatake Muraki, eds. Explorations in Linguistics: Papers in Honor of Ka-
zuko Inoue. Tokyo: Kenkyusha, 464-70.  
ROTH, Gerhard. 1991. "Die Konstitution von Bedeutung und Gehirn". In Siegfried J. Schmidt, 
ed. Gedächtnis: Probleme und Perspektiven der interdisziplinären Gedächtnisfor-
schung. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 360-70. 
ROTHSTEIN, Susan D. 1990. "Review of Napoli 1989". Language 66: 598-606. 
——. 1992. "Case and NP Licensing". Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 10: 119-39. 
——. 1995. "Small clauses and copular constructions". In Cardinaletti and Guasti, eds. 1995: 
27-47. 
——. 1998. "Introduction". In Rothstein, ed. 1998: 1-11. 
——. 2000. "Secondary predication and aspectual structure". In Fabricius-Hansen, Lang and 
Maienborn, eds. 2000: 241-64. 
——, ed. 1998. Events and Grammar. Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
RUBENBAUER, Hans, Johann B. HOFMANN and Rolf HEINE. 1977. Lateinische Grammatik. 
10th ed. Bamberg: C.C. Buchners. 
RUDANKO, Juhani. 1997. "On the semantics of object complement control in English". 
LACUS Forum 23: 259-65. 
SAEED, John I. 1997. Semantics. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.  
SAFIR, Ken. 1983. "On small clauses as constituents". Linguistic Inquiry 14: 730-5. 
SAG, Ivan A. and Carl POLLARD. 1991. "An integrated theory of complement control". Lan-
guage 67: 63-113. 
——, Gerald GAZDAR, Thomas WASOW and Steven WEISLER. 1985. "Coordination and how 
to distinguish categories". Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 3: 117-71. 
SAPIR, Edward. 1921. Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. 
SCHACHTER, Paul. 1985. "Parts-of-speech systems". In Shopen, ed. 1985: 3-61. 
SCHEIN, Berry. 1995. "Small clauses and predication". In Cardinaletti and Guasti, eds. 1995: 
49-76. 
REFERENCES 
 
360
SCHEURWEGHS, Gustave. 1959. Present-day English Syntax: A Survey of Sentence Patterns. 
London: Longman. 
SCHNEIDER, Edgar W. 1988a. Variabilität, Polysemie und Unschärfe der Wortbedeutung. Vol. 
1: Theoretische und methodische Grundlagen. Tübingen: Niemeyer. 
——. 1988b. Variabilität, Polysemie und Unschärfe der Wortbedeutung. Vol. 2: Studien zur 
lexikalischen Semantik der mentalen Verben des Englischen. Tübingen: Niemeyer. 
——. 1988c. "On polysemy in English, considering consider". In Werner Hüllen and Rainer 
Schulze, eds. Understanding the Lexicon: Meaning, Sense and World Knowledge in 
Lexical Semantics. (Linguistische Arbeiten 210.) Tübingen: Niemeyer, 157-69. 
——. 1988d. "Advantages and limitations of text corpora in the study of lexis". In Hans-
Werner Ludwig, ed. Anglistentag 1987 Tübingen: Vorträge. Gießen: Hoffmann, 300-
18. 
——. 1997. "As as 'is'. Is as 'is'?". In Udo Fries, Viviane Müller and Peter Schneider, eds. 
From Ælfric to the New York Times: Studies in English Corpus Linguistics. (Language 
and Computers: Studies in Practical Linguistics 19.) Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Ro-
dopi, 33-50. 
SCHOPF, Alfred. 1976. "Lexikalische Klassen als Grundlage für die Beschreibung des engli-
schen Verbalsystems". Anglia 94: 1-43. 
SEARLE, John R. 1979. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. Lon-
don, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 
SEPPÄNEN, Aimo. 1998. "The preposition as in English predicative complementation". Neo-
philologus 82: 463-75. 
—— and Jennifer HERRIMAN. 1997. "The object/predicative contrast and the analysis of 'She 
made him a good wife'". Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 98: 135-46. 
SHOPEN, Timothy, ed. Language Typology and Syntactic Description. Vol. 2: Complex Cons-
tructions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
SIMPSON, Jane. 1983. "Resultatives". In Lori Levin, Malka Rappaport and Annie Zaenen, eds. 
Papers in Lexical-Functional Grammar. Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics 
Club, 143-57. 
SINCLAIR, John. 1990. Collins Cobuild English Grammar. London and Glasgow: Collins. 
SMITH, John B. 1977. "Die Nominalphrase als Prädikativ und als freie Umstandsangabe im 
Englischen und im Deutschen". Muttersprache 87: 326-36. 
SPORTICHE, Dominique. 1995. "French predicate clitics and clause structure". In Cardinaletti 
and Guasti, eds. 1995: 287-324. 
STARKE, Michal. 1995. "On the format for small clauses". In Cardinaletti and Guasti, eds. 
1995: 237-69. 
STAUDINGER, Bernhard. 1997. Sätzchen: Small Clauses im Deutschen. (Linguistische Arbei-
ten 363.) Tübingen: Niemeyer. 
STEEVER, Sanford B. 1977. "Raising, meaning, and conversational implicature". Papers from 
the Thirteenth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. CLS 13: 590-602. 
STERNEFELD, Wolfgang. 1991. Syntaktische Grenzen: Chomskys Barrierentheorie und ihre 
Weiterentwicklungen. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
REFERENCES 
 
361
STOCKWELL, Robert P., Paul SCHACHTER and Barbara H. PARTEE. 1973. The Major Syntactic 
Structures of English. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
STOWELL, Tim. 1978. "What was there before there was there". Papers from the Fourteenth 
Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. CLS 14: 458-71. 
——. 1981. "Origins of Phrase Structure", Ph.D. Thesis, MIT. 
——. 1983."Subjects across categories". The Linguistic Review 2: 285-312.  
——. 1989. "Subjects, specifiers, and X-bar theory". In Mark R. Baltin and Anthony S. 
Kroch, eds. Alternative Conceptions of Phrase Structure. Chicago and London: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 232-62. 
——. 1991a. "Small clause restructuring". In Robert Freidin, ed. Principles and Parameters 
in Comparative Grammar. (Current Studies in Linguistics Series 20.) Cambridge, MA 
and London: MIT Press, 182-218. 
——. 1991b. "Determiners in NP and DP". In Katherine Leffel and Denis Bouchard, eds. 
Views on Phrase Structure. (Studies in Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 25.) 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 37-56. 
——. 1995. "Remarks on clause structure". In Cardinaletti and Guasti, eds. 1995: 271-86. 
SUZUKI, Yubun. 1991. "Small clauses as AgrP". In Nakajima and Tonoike, eds. 1991: 27-37. 
SWAN, Michael. 1980. Practical English Usage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
SWEETSER, Eve and Gilles FAUCONNIER. 1996. "Cognitive links and domains: Basic aspects 
of mental space theory". In Fauconnier and Sweetser, eds. 1996: 1-28. 
TALMY, Leonard. 1976. "Semantic causative types". In Masayoshi Shibatani, ed. The Gram-
mar of Causative Constructions. (Syntax and Semantics 6.) New York, San Francisco 
and London: Academic Press, 43-116. 
——. 1988. "Force dynamics in language and cognition". Cognitive Science 12: 49-100. 
TENNY, Carol L. 1994. Aspectual Roles and the Syntax-Semantics Interface. (Studies in Lin-
guistics and Philosophy 52.) Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers. 
TESCH, Felicitas. 1988. "Die Anwendung des chi-quadrat-Tests in der Linguistik". In Dieter 
Mindt, ed. EDV in der Angewandten Linguistik: Ziele, Methoden, Ergebnisse. Frank-
furt a. M.: Diesterweg, 54-8. 
TESNIERE, Lucien. 1965. Eléments de Syntaxe Structurale. Paris: Klinchsiech. 
TRAUGOTT, Elizabeth Closs. 1992. "Syntax". In Richard M. Hogg, ed. The Cambridge History 
of the English Language. Vol. 1: The Beginnings to 1066. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 168-289. 
TURNER, Mark. 1991. Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
URELAND, Per S. 1973. Verb Complementation in Swedish and Other Germanic Languages: 
Studies in Comparative Syntax. Stockholm: Skriptor. 
VANVALIN, Robert D. Jr. 1990. "Semantic parameters of split intransitivity". Language 66: 
221-60. 
——. 2001. An Introduction to Syntax. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
REFERENCES 
 
362
VERSPOOR, Marjolijn H. 1997. "Predicate adjuncts and subjectification". In Marjolijn Ver-
spoor, Kee-Dong Lee and Eve Sweetser, eds. Lexical and Syntactical Constructions 
and the Construction of Meaning. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, 433-49. 
—— and Kim SAUTER. 2000. English Sentence Analysis: An Introductory Course. Amster-
dam and Philadelphia: Benjamins.  
VISSER, Frederikus T. 1963. An Historical Syntax of the English Language. Part 1: Syntactical 
Units with One Verb. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
——. 1973. An Historical Syntax of the English Language. Part 3, Second Half: Syntactical 
Units with Two and with More Verbs. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
WALLACE, Ian W. 1998. "The psychological reality of the small clause". LACUS Forum 24: 
125-35. 
WATTS, Richard J. 1983. "On infinitival complement clauses". Studia Anglica Posnaniensia 
16: 45-69. 
WECHSLER, Stephen. 1997. "Resultative predicates and control". Proceedings of the 1997 
Texas Linguistics Society Conference. Texas Linguistics Forum 38: 307-21. 
WEKKER, Herman and Liliane M. HAEGEMAN. 1985. A Modern Course in English Syntax. 
London and New York: Croom Helm. 
WIERZBICKA, Anna. 1980. Lingua Mentalis: The Semantics of Natural Language. Sydney and 
New York: Academic Press. 
——. 1986. "What's in a noun? (Or: How do nouns differ in meaning from adjectives?)". 
Studies in Language 10: 353-89. 
——. 1988. The Semantics of Grammar. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 
WILDER, Chris. 1994. "Small clauses im Englischen und in der GB-Theorie". In Anita Steube, 
ed. Zur Satzwertigkeit von Infinitiven und Small Clauses. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 219-
241. 
WILLIAMS, Edwin S. 1980. "Predication". Linguistic Inquiry 11: 203-38. 
——. 1983. "Against Small Clauses". Linguistic Inquiry 14: 287-308. 
WOODS, Anthony, Paul FLETCHER and Arthur HUGHES. 1986. Statistics in Language Studies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
YOUNG, David J. 1980. The Structure of English Clauses. London: Hutchinson.  
ZANDVOORT, Reinard W. 1966. A Handbook of English Grammar. 4th ed. London: Longman. 
ZÖFEL, Peter. 1985. Statistik in der Praxis. Stuttgart: Fischer.  
  
 
